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This dissertation studies the diplomatic and political communication between 
Florence, the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires in the fifteenth century (1439-1481). The 
first chapter is introductory to the thesis and reconstructs the contacts between Florence and 
Byzantium. The second chapter and the third chapter examine the privileges granted by John 
VIII to Florence; the chapters present the contents and contextualise the privileges within the 
humanist environment. The fourth chapter studies the Florentine-Byzantine contacts after the 
Council (1439-1453), focusing on why Florence abandoned Byzantium. The fifth chapter 
analyses the beginning of Florentine-Ottoman relations and reconstructs the commercial 
privileges given by the sultan to Florence. The sixth and seventh chapters investigate 
Florence’s diplomacy during the Ottoman-Venetian war (1463-1479) and Otranto (1480-
1481) until Mehmet II’s death.  
The thesis is accompanied by three appendices including a number of unpublished 
documents, a prosopography of the Florentines involved in the Levant, and selected 
Byzantine charters used for the analysis in chapter two. I aim to demonstrate that the relations 
between the eastern and the western part of the Mediterranean in the fifteenth century were 
determined by political and economic considerations rather than faith. These considerations 
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This PhD dissertation is a study of the political and economic relations between 
Florence and the Levant in the fifteenth century. Politics and economics are, in my 
opinion, among the best observation angles for a study of Florence and its 
connections to the Levant. Undoubtedly, these two elements interact with each other 
as political choices can be influenced by the economic background and vice versa. 
This is because Florence was an economic power rather than a military power in the 
fifteenth century.1 Throughout the fifteenth century, Florence never displayed an 
impressive military power but always relied on the efficiency of its diplomacy and 
economy due to its impressive networks formed by the bankers, emissaries and 
merchants around Europe.2 These networks had connected the Florentine city with 
both the Western and the Eastern parts of the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, 
depending on its trade and political networks, Florence had worked out its policies 
on the basis of events in the Levant and Italy.  
My main goal is to explore and unravel the way in which Florence became the 
most privileged city during the reign of Mehmet II in Constantinople, the reasons 
why Florence wanted to improve its power in Constantinople, the ways adopted by 
the Florentine Signoria to expand its commercial and political influences in 
                                                          
1 For the general history of Florence see Davidsohn 1977. 
2 On the networks see Goldthwaite 2009:37-38. 








Constantinople, and the agreements Florence made with other political powers. 
Furthermore, this PhD dissertation underlines the connections between events in the 
Levant and in Italy. Did the Italian wars in the fifteenth century have some 
connection with the fall of Constantinople or the rule of Mehmet II? Were the 
policies of the Florentine Signoria influenced by Levantine as well as Italian events? 
Was it realistic to define the Mediterranean area in the fifteenth century as a place 
where the borders became more narrow?  The answers to these questions are another 
important goal of this work. Especially, since this dissertation is the first true attempt 
to give a unitary history of Florence and the Levant.   
Moreover, this PhD dissertation fills an important research gap in the 
historiography. This gap lies in the lack of extensive works on Florence and its 
relations with the Levant.3 Although the city of Cosimo the Elder and Lorenzo the 
Magnificent has been extensively studied as the centre and birthplace of the 
Renaissance, little has been said about Florentine relations with the Levant. Indeed, 
the studies on East-West European relations have focused on the most famous Italian 
state-cities such as Venice and Genoa. Florence has scarcely been considered 
because the Florentine city never established such a long commercial tradition as the 
other aforementioned cities. The late acquisition of a seaport in 1419 had also 
affected the commercial power of the Florentine city and its chances of expansion.   
                                                          
3 For a general background of Florence see: Brucker 1994; for the Medici government see Rubinstein 
1997; on the economy see both Goldthwaite 2009 and Molho 1971; for Florence’s general history see 
Davidsohn, R. 1956-1973. As for Florence and the Levant see Babinger 1951; Babinger 1963; Berza 
1944; Origone 1988; Luttrell 1999; Luttrell 1970; Mallett 1967; Tanzini 2010.  
 








The methodology used in this study will be mainly historical and focused on the 
political and economic interactions among Florence and other political powers, such 
as Milan, Rome, Naples, Venice, the Byzantine and the Ottoman empire. This 
appears the best way to reconstruct the complex mechanisms which had regulated the 
Florentine policies with regard to Italy and the Levant. The amount of sources 
concerning this period, both published and unpublished, is considerable. I will 
particularly take into account the governmental sources in the form of 
ambassador/spy reports, private letters from prominent citizens, as well as the 
instructions given to the ambassadors before their missions.4 These sources are of the 
utmost importance because they can further explain the motivations of the policies 
enacted by the Florence Commune. This thesis is clearly historical in nature because 
without historical contextualisation all these aforementioned sources would be 
useless. This work will also use diplomatic methodology in the chapter on the 
privileges granted by John VIII to Florence in 1439. In this specific case, this thesis 
discusses Bruni’s numerous treatises and past privileges granted by both Byzantine 
and Western emperors to other institutions, in order to have a better historical 
contextualisation of the Florentine privileges. A brief introduction of the fifteenth-
century political and economic backgrounds of Europe is therefore needed. Each 
chapter will further integrate the following introduction with more narrative details 
about the general historical backgrounds. 
                                                          
4 Mainly the sections of Missive II Cancelleria, Legazioni e Commissarie, Dieci di Balia, Responsive 
Copiari etc. 








The Byzantine empire in the last century of its history was only a shadow of its 
glorious past.5 The once powerful Eastern Roman empire was now reduced to the 
city of Constantinople, the despotate of Morea and some pieces of land on the Black 
Sea such as Mesembria. In Constantinople, the real rulers were Genoa and Venice. 
The Byzantine emperors were so heavily in debt to these two Italian city-states that 
they were unable to enact any kind of policy adverse to Genoa and Venice’s 
interests. Meanwhile, the Ottomans had progressively acquired the former lands of 
the Byzantine empire and became the foremost threat to Constantinople. Pressured 
on two fronts, the Byzantine emperors could do nothing but attempt to delay the end. 
However, the Ottomans instead started their period of glory. The Ottoman empire 
conquered all of Anatolia and surrounded Constantinople after the conquest of 
Adrianople (1361), Bulgaria (1369) and Thessalonica (1430).6  Finally, Mehmet II (r. 
1444-1446 & 1451-1481) accelerated the end for Byzantium (1453) due to his 
determination to make Constantinople capital of the Ottoman empire.  
In Italy, political instability caused numerous conflicts which influenced the 
whole peninsula through the fifteenth century. The perennial wars between Florence 
and Milan came to end with the death of Filippo Maria Visconti (1447). In the 
kingdom of Naples, the Angevin power disappeared due to the arrival and the 
conquest of Alphonse V (1442) which consequently brought together the kingdom of 
                                                          
5 For the late Byzantine period see Djuric 1995, Nicol 2002.  
6 For the Ottoman empire I prevalently based my work on İnalcik 1973, 1997. 








Sicily, Naples and Aragon. 7  This unification led to the forming of a new superpower 
which had a deep impact on the Italian and Levantine political background. In Milan, 
the dynasty of the Visconti ended with the death of the aforementioned Filippo 
(1447). After the war of succession in Milan, Francesco I Sforza, the renowned 
condottiere, achieved the conquest of the duchy in 1450 and established a new ducal 
dynasty. From the beginning of the century the popes aimed to impose Roman 
authority over the Byzantine emperors. After the fall of Constantinople, all the popes 
tried to organise a crusade against the Ottomans but were unsuccessful due to the 
political divisions among the Italian states.8 Venice was still one of the most 
powerful states in Italy, although its predominance was starting to show its limits for 
the first time. The Serenissima failed in several important goals during the fifteenth 
century such as preventing Francesco Sforza from conquering Milan, avoiding the 
fall of Constantinople and keeping its commercial predominance in Constantinople.9 
By the end of the century, the Venetian city-state had lost most of its past greatness 
and was no longer the uncontested power in the Mediterranean Sea. Also, Genoa lost 
most of its dominions in the Levant. The fall of Constantinople led to the end of the 
independence of Galata. In 1475, the Ottoman conquest of Caffa left Chios the only 
possession of Genoa. Other Aegean islands, including Lesbos, were already lost to 
the Ottomans in 1462. Moreover, in Italy Genoa also lost most of its power due to 
                                                          
7 For the kingdom of Naples and, in general the Aragonese, see Ryder 1990, Caselli 2010. 
8 On the Pope attempts of crusade see in general Setton 1978. 
9 As introduction on Venice see Romanin 1853-1861. On the relation between Venice and the 
Ottoman empire see Preto 2013, Venice’s commercial power in Constantinople see İnalcik 1998. On 
Venice and Byzantium see Nicol 1988. 








the aggressiveness of the Milanese dukes (Visconti and Sforza) and Alphonse V’s 
attempts to cripple the city.  
Meanwhile, Florence witnessed many changes in this century. The Albizzi, an 
ennobled and powerful family and dominant in the Signoria, lost the political war 
against Cosimo the Elder and was exiled in 1434. The Medici’s rise in 1434 brought 
a shift to the Florentine diplomatic position; from this point onward their primary 
aim was to preserve the political balance among the Italian powers.10 Medici 
Florence would never start an offensive war, but rather confront the incoming or 
present threats with its diplomacy and alliances. The major change in the diplomatic 
alliance for Florence was the shift from Venice to Milan after Sforza’s acquisition of 
the duchy of Milan. In fact, Francesco I Sforza’s conquest of Milan was a personal 
success for Cosimo the Elder as he personally financed the condottiere. Sforza’s 
victory brought to a close the long-time enmity between Florence and Milan and 
marked the beginning of one of the most solid alliances for the Florentine Signoria. 
In the Levant, Florence did not achieve such a considerable amount of success. Was 
this failure due to the late acquisition of a seaport or was it the result of political 
circumstances in Constantinople? The Florentines attempted to gain commercial 
privileges from the emperors but only in 1439 did Florence finally obtain the long-
desired commercial privileges from John VIII.11  The political and commercial 
consequences of these privileges are part of this PhD dissertation.  Moreover, it is 
                                                          
10 For the Medici arise to power See Rubinstein 1999, Kent 1978.  
11 On the Council see Gill 1967, id. 1967, id. 1979. 








clearly important to compare the Florentine privileges of the Byzantine period with 
the Florentine status after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453.  
 Scholars’ discussions of East-West relations in the fifteenth century are quite 
diverse. However, scholars have focused mainly on Venice, Genoa, Naples and the 
Byzantine and Ottoman empires.12 Florence has rarely been studied, and when it has, 
it has only been mentioned in passing. In fact, researchers so far have only 
investigated the cities of Venice, Genoa and Pisa, while no monograph has yet been 
written about the history of the relationships between the Florentines and the 
Byzantine and the Ottoman empires. 
In fact, it appears that modern historians took for granted Florence’s political 
and economic conditions in the Levant from a few old articles. For example, Berza 
dated the creation of the Florentine loggia in Constantinople to 1439.13  The author 
simply thought that Florence enacted the Florentine privileges in 1439 without 
undertaking any further investigation. In fact, nearly all historians have accepted 
Berza’s assumption.14 This is also the case with Florence’s privileges granted by the 
Byzantine empire. After the publication of these privileges by Müller (1970) and 
Lampros (1972), the Florentine privileges were strangely forgotten. These privileges 
                                                          
12 Thiriet 1959, 1977 for Venice, for Genoa see Balard 1978.   In general on East-West relations see 
Ashtor 1983 1986, Balard 2006. On Naples the essential work of Caselli 2010.  For the Ottoman and 
Western relations see Babinger 1963, 1979 and İnalcik 1977, 1992.  
13 Berza 1945.  
14 Necipoğlu 2009, İnalcik 1997, Antoniadis-Bibicou 1963 but the list is long and impossible to fit the 
footnote. Enough is to say that none ever argued against the presence of the Florentine loggia.  








were only briefly cited in some works but still lack a proper diplomatic and historical 
analysis.15  
In general, Florence is regarded as a walk-on actor and mostly mentioned in 
passing without specific details. For example, Thiriet states ‘ Jalousée par tous les 
Etats italiens, par Florence notamment, la République de Saint Marc voyait 
s’évanouir son commerce du Levant’, or ‘…le trafic vénitien retrouvé rapidement sa 
vigueur…malgré la concurrence des Florentins…’ ; Balard mentions no contacts 
between Florence and the Byzantine empire ‘… mais au XV siècle celle de Florence, 
qui, ayant conquis sa rivale en 1406 et pris possession de Porto Pisano, entend 
renouer avec les relations anciennes et privilégiées des Pisans avec l’Égypte…Plus 
attirés par les territoires de Romanie et de Turquie, les Florentins ne réussissent pas 
à organiser une ligne régulière…’.16 
New studies on Florence and the Levant have emerged only recently. Unfortunately, 
these works do not present new interpretations but are simply brief synopses from 
older published articles.17 As a result, they do not add any particularly new 
interpretation to the relations between Florence and the Levant. For the Florentine 
relations with the Ottoman empire, İnalcik and his several works are the perfect 
starting point. İnalcik’s works are indeed a valuable modern source for the economic 
factors affecting the commercial relationship between the Florentines and the 
                                                          
15 Dölger and Karayannopoulos 1968, Ferjančić 1967. 
16 Thiriet 1959, Balard 2006. 
17 Fleet 2011, Tanzini 2009. 








Ottomans.18 The author gives evidence for the Florentine commercial activities 
during the reign of Bayezid II (and a bit for that of Mehmet II) in Pera and Bursa. 
However, İnalcik’s interpretation is mainly from the Ottoman point of view and 
lacks discussion of the connection between Florentine economic expansion in the 
Levant and Italian political status.  
Some other scholarly works present the relationship between Florence and the 
Ottoman empire, such as Franz Babinger’s articles.19 This German historian provides 
a good starting point with regard to Ottoman-Italian relations. Babinger’s works 
outline the political ties between the Italian cities and Mehmet II. From Babinger’s 
publications, the diplomatic line of Florence appears to be of the most importance. 
Finally, Babinger raises issues which are also considered as a part of this 
dissertation.  
For example, the German scholar presents Lorenzo de’ Medici as decisively 
leaning in favour of the Sublime Porte.20  This assumption is based on the policies 
enacted by the Ottoman empire, which seemed to favour Florence to the detriment of 
Venice and Genoa. The debate among the scholars on whether Florence was the 
Renaissance “bad guy” did not end with Babinger.   
                                                          
18 İnalcik 1967, Id. 1992, Id. 1997. 
19 Babinger 1951, 1963 and 1978. 
20 Specifically in the article “Lorenzo de’ Medici e la Corte Ottomana” (1963). 








Babinger and Pastor argue that Florence probably did make an agreement with 
Mehmet II against Venice.21 Only Black states that Florence was a power ready to 
back the crusade initiative. 22  Despite the fact that Black’s work is more on the 
figure of Benedetto Accolti (1415-1464), humanist and chancellor of Florence 
(1458-1464), large parts of his book deal with the Signoria’s attitude towards the 
crusade.  
Florence’s active role in the Ottoman’s attack to Otranto seems to be evident for 
the majority of historians. Hankins, Tanzini, Panareo and other scholars stated that 
Florence was actively involved in Mehmet II’s attack against Otranto (1480).23  The 
predominant evidence for this theory is the medal made by Bertoldo di Giovanni and 
gifted to the sultan by Lorenzo de’ Medici. Only Babinger shows some doubts and 
rejects the medal as evidence of Florentine complicity.24 Chapter seven in this 
dissertation will re-examine this question to solve the historical enigma.   
THE SOURCES  
The sources for this PhD dissertation belong essentially to three different 
categories: governmental sources, private correspondence and chronicles. A 
preliminary observation on the sources is necessary.  The governmental sources are 
part of the complicated legislative mechanism which regulated the political life of the 
Italian city-states. Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume the governmental 
                                                          
21 Babinger 1951, 1963. Pastor 1891-1894. 
22 Black 1985. 
23 Hankins 1995, Tanzini 2010, Panareo 1931. 
24 Babinger 1963. 








sources as a monolithic block of information.  The Italian city-states of the period ran 
a bureaucratic machine which tended to preserve most of the documentary evidence. 
Before introducing the sources it might be worthwhile to say few words to introduce 
this monumental institution.  The chancery was the hearth and main core of 
Florence’s political life.25 The entire political life relied on the chancery which had 
the specific duty to redact and copy all the decisions made by the Signoria and the 
other minor offices. At the head of this gigantic institution was the chancellor of 
Florence. Normally, this office was given to a personality of paramount gravity, who 
was a leading figure of Italian humanism, such as Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni, 
Carlo Marsuppini, Poggio Bracciolini and Benedetto Accolti.  This office did not 
have any specific political power, but was of a certain magnitude in terms of its 
political influence. For example, Salutati’s influence was crucial for the arrival of 
Chrysoloras in Florence and Leonardo Bruni had a central role during the ecumenical 
Council. Therefore, the governmental sources are obviously of paramount relevance 
for this dissertation. At the same time, this relevance requires a very careful 
approach. This is the main reason why I divide the sources used in this dissertation 
into five different groups: letters sent and received by the government, instructions 
given to ambassadors, reports from ambassadors and discussions among the most 
prominent citizens on important issues and provisions enacted by the Commune. The 
letters “sent and received” are the main pillar of this research, since these letters gave 
                                                          
25 On the Florentine chancery see the monumental work of Marzi 1910 1-2. 








general information about the political life concerning the Florentine Commune.26 
The Signoria normally sent and received several letters per day.27 This documentary 
evidence is important because it represents the official position of the Florentine 
Signoria. Consequently, the letters do not contain descriptions of individual opinions, 
or general details which were supposed to stay secret.  
Accordingly, the letters are the perfect starting point for a broader investigation. 
For example, a letter could refer to an attack or an agreement on specific dates and 
subjects. The letters “sent and received” can confirm the authenticity of an event, 
with an accurate date. Thanks to these sources, the investigation can proceed on 
more specific government source, such as the ambassadors’ reports. These sources 
give general information for events or rumours about personalities and political 
powers. The ambassadors’ reports are optimal sources for revealing the level of 
awareness of the Florentine Commune about general events, the Florentine 
reputation in other courts and in general the information at the disposal of the 
Signoria. These documents are scattered in all the sections of the Florentine Archive. 
They can be found in Dieci di Balia, Responsive or even Signori, Dieci di Balia, Otto 
di Pratica, Missive, or even in Miscellanea Medicea. 
One of the most relevant sources used in this dissertation are the instructions to 
the ambassadors. They are normally very detailed and contain the guidelines given to 
                                                          
26 In the Florentine state archive the archival name is Signori, Missive II Cancelleria.  
27 The Signoria was formed by the Standard-bearer of Justice and the Prior of Arts the highest of the 
Commune. For the general introduction on the political structure under the Medici see Rubinstein 
1996.  








the ambassadors before the departure. Since the “permanent ambassador” was not yet 
established, Florence had to elect and send ambassadors for every necessity. 
Therefore, the eventual sending of an ambassador was evidence itself of the gravity 
of the event. The typical instruction would contain the target of the mission and the 
event connected, and also the suggestion of tactics to be used as well as the reasons 
behind it. All these pieces of information are of paramount importance because they 
state the unofficial reasons behind the choice of the Florentine Signoria. For 
example, the suggested tactics are normally an important hint of the real necessities 
of the Florentine Commune. Florentine ambassadors are often asked to postpone the 
subsidies of the crusade or never to make official promises. In other instructions the 
Signoria forbids the ambassador to promise anything publicly and orders him to 
negotiate only in secret. 
Another type of government source used in the thesis is the discussions among 
the most prominent citizens generally defined in the work of scholars as pratiche.28 
The pratiche were the restricted meetings in which the most prominent citizens, even 
if at the moment not holding an office, discussed events of high importance, 
proposed possible solutions and finally voted among the suggestions.  Normally the 
Signoria summoned these meetings with the purpose of requesting the viewpoints of 
the most prominent citizens in Florence. The pratiche were not official but the 
proposals were first voted here before being passed to the normal legislative process. 
                                                          
28 From now on whenever the dissertation will refer to the “discussion among the most prominent 
citizens” I will use the term pratiche as well which is the short term taken by the Archival collocation 
namely Consulte e Pratiche.  








The only notary allowed to be present in these meetings was the chancellor of 
Florence and he was in charge of the notarial transcription of the sessions. The fact 
that only the chancellor was allowed to stay only improves the significance of this 
source. 
The matters discussed in the pratiche could range from the subsidies to the pope 
for the crusade, to the diplomatic line towards Venice, Naples and the Ottomans, and 
to problems of administration and finance within the Florentine Commune. This 
source is particularly important because it alone gives a very specific insight on the 
political thinking and discussions of the individuals among the Florentine Signoria.  
Last of the list are the provisions. The provisions were the final act of the 
legislative process of the Florentine Signoria. While the pratiche or the official 
legislative channels discusses eventual proposals, the provisions state without any 
doubt the policies enacted by the Florentine Signoria and provide the text of the 
policy. Moreover, the provisions also contain the official reason behind the policy 
enactment.29 
Of the non-governmental sources, the Medici private correspondence has a 
special importance for this dissertation.30 Although the Medici were not the 
monarchs in Florence, there was no doubt about the Medici’s influence upon the 
decisions of the Florentine Signoria. Therefore, the private letters of the Medici give 
                                                          
29 In the archive these documentary evidences correspond to the Provvisioni.  
30 The Medici private archive called Mediceo Avanti il Principato is exclusively online at the 
following link http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/rMap/index.html. 








us the only opportunities to know about the real thinking of the unofficial rulers of 
Florence. The Medici chose not to appear in the public acts in order to present the 
Florentine republican institution as unaltered and to avoid the risk of angering the 
most prominent Florentine families such as Pitti, Acciaiuoli, Soderini, Giugni and 
Guicciardini.31  
The last types of source used in this dissertation are chronicles. The chronicles 
are historical accounts of events presented in narrative form. They complement in a 
useful way this dissertation since they provide information not contained in the 
governmental sources. Of a particular importance is Dei’s opera “La cronica 
dall’anno 1400 all’anno 1500”.32 Benedetto Dei (1418-1492) is without any doubt 
one of the most original personalities in the fifteenth century.33 He describes himself 
as an adventurer, spy and able man; Dei’s travels included Italy, France, North 
Africa, Greece and Turkey. In the cronica often he appears as the intermediary and 
agent (not so secret apparently) between the Medici and Mehmet II. Besides, he also 
accuses himself of spying on the Venetians on behalf of the Ottomans. 
The cronica practically has been used by every scholar who studied the political 
events in the Levant in the fifteenth century. Moreover, the chronicle gives precious 
insight, which sometimes derails into gossip, into the events in the background of the 
Ottoman-Venetian war. It is essential because it is the only Florentine source which 
                                                          
31 The number of families in Florence can reach quite a high amount for example I did not cite the 
Machiavelli or the Morelli.  
32 Dei 1985. 
33 On Benedetto Dei see DBI s.v. Dei, Benedetto. Pisani 1923 and Orvieto 1969. 








comments on Florence’s espionage on the Ottomans. Furthermore, it provides 
interesting information about the Florentine community in Constantinople and 
Florence’s relationship with Mehmet II. 
 Another fundamental chronicle is the Venetian Malipiero’s “Annali Veneti 
dall’anno 1457 al 1500”.34 Similar to Dei’s, Malipiero’s chronicle refers to the 
background of the Ottoman-Venetian war (1463-1479). Malipiero was a naval 
captain of the Serenissima and part of one of the most important families in Venice.35 
He gives precious details on the modality of the Florentine espionage activity and 
provides the Venetian point of view.  
Usually, the risk in using information from the chronicles is due to the obvious 
bias of the author. Therefore, it becomes essential to integrate altogether the 
chronicles, the government sources and the private correspondence. In this way, the 
correct interpretation of the historical background can follow.  
The main collection of sources on Florentine-Levantine relations, Documenti 
sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll’Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all’anno 
MDXXXI, published by Müller in 1870, was followed by a few similar publications. 
After Müller, some sources were published in Babinger’s articles but the same 
scholar stated that ‘probably the State archive of Florence does not have more 
documents on the relationship between Florence and the Levant. All the documents 
have been published by Müller and only a lucky case could bring to light new 
                                                          
34 Malipiero 1845. 
35 The only important source about Malipiero is his work of the Annali see Malipiero 1845.  








materials.36 Apparently, I was lucky since much of the documentary evidence was 
there. The results were so astonishing that I was forced to circumscribe my 
investigation to the Florentine State Archive. Unfortunately, there was simply not 
enough time to investigate more archives or even to have the chance to consult the 
precious manuscripts preserved in the Medicea or the Laurenziana. Most of the 
sources found are listed and partly transcribed as an appendix of this dissertation.  
These unpublished sources are particularly crucial for this dissertation. The lack 
of a strong military forced the Florentine Commune to seek different ways to expand 
its commercial and political weight in the Levant. Therefore, Florence had to rely 
prevalently on its diplomacy and political/commercial networks. These diplomatic, 
political and commercial links are very complicated in their nature just as Italian 
politics in the fifteenth century. Therefore, to investigate the nature, ways and 
manners used by Florence in its expansion without more documentary materials is 
practically impossible. The importance of this work is in its new interpretations 
thanks to the emergence of new primary sources.  
A humanist channel, in addition to travelling merchants and ambassadors, 
connected Florence to Byzantium.37 This channel developed almost in parallel with 
the expansion of Florence’s commercial companies. It was the combination of 
humanists and commercial workers that created the prerequisites for the arrival of 
                                                          
36All Babinger’s works excluding Mehmet the conqueror and his time generally present unpublished 
sources even if in a limited quantity. Babinger 1963:359 fn. 161. 
37 See as a general introduction Burckhardt 1955, Baron 1957. More specific for this thesis see 
Hankins 2003. 








Byzantine embassies in Florence at the end of the fourteenth century. Coluccio 
Salutati (1331-1406) was doubtless the pioneer of the cultural connection between 
Florence and Byzantium. Being one of the brightest minds and forerunners of the 
Renaissance, Salutati was the Chancellor of Florence from 1374 to 1406.38 The 
epistolary exchanges between the Florentine humanist and Byzantine personalities 
such as Manuel Chrysoloras and Demetrios Kydones revealed the humanist link 
between Florence and Constantinople.39  If Manuel Chrysoloras arrived in Florence 
in 1397 it was due to these connections between Salutati and Chrysoloras.40 Clearly, 
the appointment to the Greek professorship of Manuel Chrysoloras from 1397 to 
1400 was not merely a cultural occasion. For the first time in Florentine history, a 
direct connection between Constantinople and Florence was established. Besides, 
this contact seemed to be even more important as Chrysoloras was not only a 
brilliant scholar but also an important envoy of the Byzantine emperor as well as 
close advisor of Manuel II. Obviously, apart from teaching, Chrysoloras’ mission 
was to make the Western powers aware of Byzantium’s tragic condition. Without 
surprise, during the period of Manuel’s teaching in Florence, the first Byzantine 
                                                          
38 On Salutati see Ullman 1963.  
39 For Chrysoloras and Kydones see in general ODB s.v. Chrysoloras Manuel and Cammelli 1941. 
For Kydones see ODB s.v. Kydones Demetrios and Loenertz 1971. See also in general Barker 2009. 
For Salutati’s epistolary see the unmatched work of Novati 1891-1911. 
40 As the same Salutati explicitly admitted when he wrote to Chrysoloras that he managed to appoint 
the Byzantine erudite as professor of Greek in the Florentine university. Novati 1896: nn. 17; 18; 
XVIII. 








embassy arrived in the city in 1397 led by Hilario Doria, another important oikeios of 
the emperor.41 
The humanist channel was essential to the Ecumenical council as well. Leonardo 
Bruni (1370-1444), chancellor of Florence (1427-1444) at the time of the Council, 
delivered a very important oration to the Byzantine delegation.42 This oration, the 
Περί τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίνων, was one of the first instances in which a Latin 
scholar wrote and probably recited in Greek. The oration is a political work aimed to 
reveal to the Byzantine audience the political structure of the Florentine Commune.  
This dissertation does not aim to provide a literary and philological context of 
the humanist cultural exchanges of the period. Obviously, these contacts contributed 
to the Renaissance, pushed Cosimo the Elder to found the so-called Platonic 
Academy which boosted the recovery of Greek classicism.43 However, the humanist 
channel was also a way used by Florence to establish a direct contact with 
Byzantium. 
In conclusion, before the outset of this thesis, it is important to remark that 
Florence was different than Venice and Genoa in its relations with the Byzantine 
East. It did not directly benefit from 1204 (Venice) or from the Byzantine recovery 
                                                          
41 For the epithet oikeios see Verpeaux 1965. 
42 On Bruni see Baron 1955. On Bruni’s works see “History of the Florentine People” in Hankins 
2004, “Laudatio Florentinae Urbis” in Baldassarri 2000 and in general Viti 1996, Hankins 2000, Id. 
2010 and Griffith Thompson Hankins 1987. 
43 Hankins proved convincingly that rather than being an academy in the modern world sense it was 
most probably a group of scholars of different composition. For the entire argument see Hankins 1991. 
 








of Constantinople (Genoa). It was a landlocked city and its economy was based on 
banking and cloth production. Consequently, the path followed by the Florentine 
Signoria was less straightforward than other political powers at that time, since it was 
the result of a sophisticated labyrinth of stratagems, political choices and alliances, 
together with an extensive diplomatic/commercial network which made Florence 




















The Ecumenical Council in 1439 is only the final step of several approaches made by 
Florence to establish diplomatic contacts with Byzantium. This chapter provides the 
necessary historical background to reveal the relations between Florence and 
Byzantium before the Ecumenical Council. The chapter is divided into three 
interrelated sections in order to provide the best understanding of this multifaceted 
relationship.  
The first section of the chapter introduces the problem of a seaport for 
Florence and sheds light on the political choices made by the Florentine Commune. 
From the twelfth to the beginning of the fifteenth centuries, these choices were 
focused on the acquisition of a seaport to serve the city of Florence. The second 
segment of the chapter proceeds to examine Florence’s efforts which in the end 
produce the first direct contact with Byzantium in 1397, the year of Hilario Doria’s 
embassy to Florence on behalf of the Byzantines. This discussion especially focuses 
on the Florentine commercial companies and their expansion in the Levant, the 








Acciaiuoli’s venture in Greece and the humanist channel. All of these subjects had a 
role in creating a link between Florence and Constantinople. 
The third part of the chapter starts with Doria’s embassy (1397) and ends 
with the Ecumenical Council (1439).  Here I will analyse the diplomatic approaches 
made to obtain commercial privileges from the Byzantine empire by the Florentine 
Signoria after the first contact in 1397. The chapter covers two emperors, Manuel II 
and John VIII, and ends just before the beginning of the Ecumenical Council in 
1439. 
The landlocked position of Florence was surely the most difficult obstacle for 
Florence’s expansion in the Levant.  The Florentine commercial companies, as well 
as private individuals, substituted the Florentine Signoria in Levantine expansion. It 
was thanks to private initiatives that Florence began to claim footholds in the Levant. 
Only the general bankruptcy of the commercial companies in 1345 and the later 
acquisition of Porto Pisano in 1421 allowed the Signoria to take over the Florentine 
private citizens and to establish a Communal diplomatic line towards the Levant. 
The temporal span – from the twelfth century to 1439 – is quite long, but it is 
essential for the comprehension of the historical background. The thirteenth century 
witnessed a number of political changes.44 The most important is the Fourth Crusade 
and the consequent collapse of the Byzantine empire into three separate political 
                                                          
44 On the Italian background between tenth to fourteenth centuries see Abulafia 1997, and Abulafia 
1993.  








powers (Nicaea, Trebizond and Epirus).45 The conquest of Constantinople by the 
crusader army on 12 April 1204 is indeed a turning point in the history of medieval 
Europe as this event opened the Byzantine Levant to the Western powers. Venice 
and the papacy obtained the greatest benefit from this conquest. While the 
Serenissima increased its commercial power by creating new permanent colonies in 
the Latin empire, the Holy See extended its ecclesiastical influence with the 
formation of new dioceses. This new political and economic situation created 
opportunities for minor powers, such as Florence.  
Italy witnessed many political changes which eventually favoured Florence. 
At the battle of Benevento in 1266, the Angevins, led by Charles I of Anjou, defeated 
the troops under the Sicilian king, Manfred Hohenstaufen, the illegitimate son of 
Frederick II. The victory at Benevento allowed Charles I to become King of Sicily 
and to establish the Angevin dynasty. The Kingdom of Sicily would later split 
between the Angevin and the Aragonese after the Sicilian Vespers (1282), when the 
Aragonese, with the complicity of Michael VIII, conquered Sicily. The Angevin 
dynasty would rule Naples until the conquest of Alphonse V of Aragon in 1442. In 
the rest of Italy, the struggle between Guelf and Ghibellines remained fierce.46  In 
Florence, the Guelf faction achieved a permanent victory over the Ghibellines at the 
battle of Montaperti in 1267. From that moment Florence would remain Guelf. The 
                                                          
45 On the fourth crusade see Angold 2003. On the three new Byzantine political powers created after 
the fourth crusade see for Nicaea see Angold 1975. For Trebizond see Karpov 1986 and for Epirus 
Nicol 1957.   
46 The Guelf and Ghibellines fight was, to put it in very simple words, the war between the imperial 
and the papal supporters for the Italian predominance. See Raveggi 2006. 








Guelf predominance opened the city of Florence to alliance with the pope and 
Naples. 
This alliance with the pope and with Naples allowed Florence to improve its 
connections in the Levant. The pope used Florence’s commercial companies for the 
collection of tithes from the newly formed dioceses of the East. Commercial 
companies such as Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli, therefore took on an important role 
in the Levant as they were able to settle in areas previously closed to them, including 
the former territories of the Byzantine empire. 
In addition, the Angevin dynasty would establish a special connection with 
individual Florentines, mostly in the role of bankers and economic operators.47 It was 
thanks to this relationship that Niccolò Acciaiuoli, prominent member of the 
Acciaiuoli company, had the opportunity to become a feudal lord in Achaia. Later, 
Neri Acciaiuoli, a relative of Niccolò, would conquer the duchy of Athens from the 
Catalans (1385-1388).48 The resulting Florentine dynasty in Athens would last for 
almost a century, until Mehmet II decided to have the last ruler, Francesco II 
Acciaiuoli, assassinated in 1460. 
The success achieved to this point by Florentine individuals and commercial 
companies was not shared by the Florentine Signoria. Venice, by this time, had 
already consolidated a tradition of state-galleys and territorial colonies in the Levant. 
                                                          
47 On Florence’s establishment in Naples see Abulafia 1981: 378-384. For the presence of Florentine 
merchants see Abulafia 1993:7.53-7.57. 
48 On Niccolò Acciaiuoli see Tanfani 1863, Léonard 1956 and Tocco 2001. 








Florence was not even able to deploy a fleet. The chief reason for this was the 
geographical position of Florence. Unlike Genoa, Venice and Pisa, Florence was an 
inland city and therefore lacked of a natural seaport. This geographical problem 
greatly influenced Florentine policies in the period which were mainly focused on 
the acquisition of a seaport. The nearest solution was Pisa and its seaport, that is, 
Porto Pisano.49 The wars between Florence and Pisa were numerous in these 
centuries and only ended when Florence annexed Pisa in 1409. Nevertheless, 
Florence had to wait until 1421 when it was finally able to hold a seaport of its own, 
due to French interference at Porto Pisano. 
A logistical problem: Florence and the seaport. 
Map number 1: cities of Northern Tuscany 
 
Map of Tuscany: red arrow points to Porto Pisano (Pisa), green arrow to Talamone (Siena). 
 
                                                          
49 Location of Porto Pisano in map number one red arrow. Florence underwent also internal problems 
such as the revolt of the Ciompi (wool carders ) in 1378. See Franceschi 1993. 









Florence’s main obstacle concerning the maritime commerce was doubtless the lack 
of a seaport.  While Genoa and Venice were geographically inclined to the sea, the 
city of Florence was landlocked. This geographical disadvantage influenced 
Florence’s policies in both the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Therefore, 
Florence had to depend on other Italian seaports such as Pisa, Genoa and Siena for 
the transport of its wares. The first solution found by the Florentine Commune was 
diplomatic. On 4 July 1171, Florence signed an agreement with Pisa which allowed 
the Florentines to trade its wares through Porto Pisano.50  
While Pisa benefited from the mercantile traffic in the seaport, Florence 
benefited by finally being able to transport their wares. Consequently, Florence was 
also able to improve its economy through the transport of wares to international 
markets. This treaty included an offensive and defensive alliance for the duration of 
forty years.51 The treaty also provided that Florentine citizens in Pisa would pay the 
same taxes as Pisa's citizens, and established two fondaci for Florentine merchants 
on the river Arno.52  
However, in the thirteenth century the Florentine commercial volume was not 
as significant as the other three Italian maritime cities of Genoa, Venice and Pisa. In 
this century, Florence’s commercial presence was mainly formed by individual 
                                                          
50 Goldthwaite 2009:26. The accurate position of Porto Pisano is in the map at the beginning of the 
chapter with the red arrow. 
51 Davidsohn 1977: 1.497.  
52 The fondaci were buildings in which the merchants stayed or stored their wares. For the treaties see 
Davidsohn 1977: 1.768-1.769 and Arias 1901:18-20.  








merchants, most of them associated by accomandita with other merchants (not 
surprisingly, most of them were Genoese or Venetians citizens).53  Florence did not 
have proper commercial companies or a structured governmental organisation for the 
Levant such as those of Pisa, Genoa or Venice.  
Florence’s economic growth frightened Pisa to the point that the latter 
nullified the treaty with Florence in 1220. Moreover, Pisa’s government confiscated 
the Florentine wares. These actions were a consequence of the on-going hostilities 
between the Western empire and the papacy which had a severe impact on the Italian 
struggle between Guelf and Ghibelline. The reciprocal affiliation of either Pisa or 
Florence to one of the two factions was not relevant for the purposes of these wars. 
What really mattered was Pisa’s concern over Florence’s growing power.  Not 
surprisingly, Pisa decided to nullify the treaty in 1220 when both Florence and Pisa 
were Ghibellines. The economic interest was almost certainly the first reason for the 
new tensions between Pisa and Florence rather than their faction affiliation. Pisa’s 
defeat in this new war forced the signing of a new treaty with Florence in 1256.54 
This treaty was later renewed in 1270.55 The real need for Florence to have a seaport 
was the primary reason for all the wars fought against Pisa as Florence needed the 
access to a seaport for the transport of its wares such as wool.56  
                                                          
53 The accomandita was a kind of commercial activity in which the merchant received money from 
investors for a limited travel or expedition.  
54 Arias 1901:49.  
55 Arias 1901:98. 
56 Goldthwaite 2009:267-298. 








The duration of the treaty signed in 1270 must have ended at the beginning of 
the 1280’s. Otherwise there would not have been a valid reason for Florence to sign a 
treaty on 7 February 1281 with the municipality of Genoa.57 
This episode comes from the Annali di Caffaro, an annalistic source, which is 
one of the most important historical documents for medieval Genoa. The name of 
these annals comes from the author – Caffaro di Rustico da Caschifellone.58 
Afterwards, the Genoese Commune institutionalised these annals and more scribes 
took over Caffaro’s work. 
The commercial exclusion of the Florentine merchants from the Levantine 
routes is clearly a result of the will of the Genoese to preserve their monopoly in the 
Levant. Although in the later treaty between Florence and Genoa of 30 December 
1298 the limitation on travel to Romania did not appear explicitly, this does not 
prove that Genoa deleted the aforementioned clause, since the Annali di Caffaro 
explicitly affirmed that there were Florentine merchants who operated in the Levant. 
For example, the Byzantine ambassador who in 1262 brought to Genoa the news of 
Michael VIII’s conquest of Constantinople belonged to the natione Florentinorum.59 
                                                          
57 Ferretto 1903:345-346. Michele dei Salvatici da Valenza, podestà, Oberto Spinola e Oberto Doria, 
capitani, ... stipulano con Geri Cardinale e con Giovanni de Vulpe, ambasciatori e procuratori del 
Comune di Firenze un trattato di navigazione e commercio, durevole 5 anni. Si promettono 
vicendevole aiuto, e i Fiorentini dichiarano di non andare nelle parti di Romania, stante la 
convenzione coll’imperatore dei Greci.  
58 For more reference about Caffaro see s.v. Caffaro da Rustico da Caschifellone in DBI 16 (1973). 
59 Imperiale 1926:45 unfortunately the name of the scribe is unknown. Die quinta madii de Romania 
applicuit quedam navis Ansaldi Aurie, in qua detullit quendam nuncium dicti imperatori natione 
Florentinum; et in qua nave nova venerunt quod dictus imperator civitatem Constantinopolitanam a 
Venetis et latinis abstulerat et ipsam suo imperio adiacerat, et quod idem imperator palacium latum et 









Further documentary evidence from notarial acts confirms the Florentine 
presence in the Levant at the time of the Genoese-Florentine treaty.  Donato 
de’ Donati appears in ten notarial deeds drawn up in Pera from July 1281 to 
October of the same year. Yet, Pera, in territorial terms, was a Genoese colony. 
Therefore, the exclusion from Romania did not ban the Florentine merchants in 
the Levant.60 It was mandatory for Florentine merchants to trade through the 
Genoese loggia. It makes sense as the Florentine merchants would pay the 
taxes on their wares when approaching the Genoese loggia. Otherwise, it is 
impossible to explain the presence of Donato de’ Donati in Pera at the time of 
the treaty if there was a ban on the Florentine wares.61 
This Florentine-Genoese treaty of 1298 did not last long. The appearance 
of the emperor Henry VII (1310-1312) in Italy brought Genoa into the imperial 
alliance. At the time of the emperor’s arrival, Florence was a member of the 
Guelf faction due to the battle of Montaperti (1260) and the defeat of Farinata 
degli Uberti, the Florentine leader of the Ghibelline faction. Before the arrival 
of the emperor there was no necessity for Genoa, a member of the Ghibelline 
faction, to block the Florentine transport of wares. One ought to consider that 
the transport of Florentine wares was probably good business for Genoa. 
However, the imperial alliance likely forced Genoa to nullify their treaty and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
amplum ad formam castri quod Veneti in dicta civitate obtinebant, Ianuensibus qui sibi aderant pro 
comuni Ianue donavit. 
60 See the previous treaty for the travel limitation to Romania. See fn. 55. 
61 Ferretto 1903: nn. 797, 805, 812, 822, 827, 835, 843, 844, 870. 








consequently put Florence again into the situation of needing a seaport.  
Florence sent an embassy to Siena in 1311, led by Francesco di Balducci 
Pegolotti, to negotiate access to the Talamone seaport. Talamone is located 
near Grosseto in Tuscany, and at that time was part of Sienese territory. This 
negotiation likely led to a treaty between the two cities. The use of Talamone 
presented both positive and negative factors for Florence. The Sienese seaport 
was unhealthy and suffered silt. Nevertheless, Talamone also represented an 
advantage for Florence, since not transporting Florentine wares was an 
economic loss for Pisa, Florence’s direct rival. The economic condition was so 
critical for Pisa that after Florence renewed its treaty with Siena again in 1362, 
Pisa had little choice but to declare war against Florence. However, after two 
years Florence harshly defeated Pisa at the battle of Cascina in 1364. After the 
war, the Florentines again obtained access to Porto Pisano under the same 
conditions of the past treaties. Furthermore, the other terms inflicted on Pisa by 
Florence in the peace treaty were so harsh that Pisa ceased to represent a threat 
to the Florentine mercantile and territorial expansion in future years.62  
Florence was unable to annex Pisa because a new, strong enemy emerged 
in Italy: the Visconti of Milan. After the Pisan-Florentine war, the Visconti 
seized the cities of Pisa, Siena and Perugia from 1399 to 1400. Indeed, the fall 
of Pisa and Siena were a hard blow for the Florentine municipality as the 
Florentine Commune was again without a seaport. Only the duke of Milan’s 
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death saved Florence from complete defeat. A Florentine counter-offensive 
was aided by an alliance with the papacy concluded on 28 March 1404. 
Reinforced by this new agreement, after two years the Florentines and the 
papacy were able to drive out the Milanese from Bologna, Perugia and Siena. 
Finally, Florence and Pisa signed a truce at the end of July 1404.  The truce 
again allowed Florence access to Porto Pisano. Finally, Florence purchased the 
city of Pisa from Gabriel Maria Visconti on 9 October 1406 for the sum of 
200.000 florins. However, just before the final agreement with Florence, 
Gabriel Maria Visconti granted Porto Pisano to France. Indeed, the French aim 
was to limit Florentine expansion as in that period Genoa was a vassal of 
France. In order to secure the port, the king of France sent Boucicaut, marshal 
of the kingdom of France, to Porto Pisano. Boucicaut’s presence again limited 
Florentine ambitions with regard to the seaport. For that reason Florence had to 
sign another treaty in 1413 with Genoa in order to access Porto Pisano. This 
treaty forced Florence to pay 10.000 florins and grant the towns of 
Portovenere, Lerici and Sarzanello to Genoa. These three towns were 
strategically important as they were on the border between Liguria and 
Tuscany. Only in 1421, thanks to the desperate condition of Genoa which was 
at the time under siege by the Visconti, was Florence able to successfully 
purchase Porto Pisano and Livorno for an overall sum of 100.000 florins. 63 
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In conclusion, the long history of the Florentine attempts to acquire 
access to a seaport is clear evidence of the Florence’s interest in expanding its 
commercial organisation. Thanks to the conquest of Porto Pisano, Florence 
was finally able set up a maritime commercial policy and to begin its 
commercial adventure. 
 
 The first approaches: the cases of the Alberti, the Bardi and the Peruzzi and 
the rise of the Acciaiuoli to the dukedom of Athens. 
 
As stated in the introduction, Florence’s presence into the Levant had improved 
sensibly because of three events: the conquest of Constantinople by the crusader 
army on 12 April 1204, the Florentine alliance with the papacy after the Guelf 
triumph in Florence in 1260 (battle of Montaperti) and Charles of Anjou’s 
acquisition of the Sicilian crown after the victory at Benevento in 1267.  
These three elements together marked the beginning of the new alliance 
between the pope, Florence and the kingdom of Naples. The good relations with the 
popes allowed some Florentine banks such as the Bardi, the Peruzzi and the 
Acciaiuoli, to obtain the office of tithe collectors for the newly formed Eastern 
dioceses.64  The acquisition made by Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli was due to the 
logistical problems of the pope who had difficulties in the effective collecting of the 
tithes in the Eastern dioceses. Therefore, from the first half of the fourteenth century, 
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the pope began using the Florentine branches to collect the tithes, thus helping the 
Florentine banks to expand into the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.  
The success of the Florentine banks was due to the proper organisation which 
protected tithes from any danger, such as the Mediterranean piracy or highway 
robbers. The reliability of this system was absolute. The branch collected the tithes 
and then would send a communication to the Roman branch. The latter would deliver 
the money to the Apostolic Chamber. This was for, both pope and Florence, 
extremely convenient. While the pope avoided losing money to corruption or piracy, 
at the same time the Florentine merchants obtained currency to invest in several 
activities such as trading and lending. The commercial companies based their entire 
organisation on the capital association and on a strong familiar presence: at the edge 
of the companies there were always members of the family who controlled the bank 
while the other workers were normally external employers in a subordinate 
position.65  
The large amount of money used by the banks in investments came mainly 
from public and private deposits. In fact, the banks encouraged people to deposit 
money with the guarantee of an annual interest return of around six and seven per 
cent. Therefore, the people involved ranged from the high classes to the common 
citizens. In addition, another point of strength of the commercial companies lay in 
the organisation of the branches as the investments spread from Florence to all 
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Europe (London, Barcelona, and Constantinople). The branches were partially 
autonomous and operated in the same way as the mother-branch in Florence.  The 
reason of the term “partially” is due to the structure of the companies. The mother-
branch retained a sort of superior control, especially in the case of heavy losses or 
problems. In this situation, the mother-branch could have reacted by sending a 
trusted man in order to reorder the branch. Indeed, the banks not only collected tithes 
in the Levant, but also had several other businesses such as changing, lending, and 
trading. This way of operating resembles that of a regional power, as the banks even 
possessed autonomous diplomatic channels. The commercial companies of Florence 
conducted independent negotiations with other political powers on different matters 
such as taxes and safe conduct.66 
The Fourth Crusade played an important role for Florentine interests as the 
pope supported Florence’s expansion in the Levant. Without surprise, the first 
mentions of Florentines in Pera and Caffa begin to appear from the beginning of the 
thirteenth century.67 Florentine merchants were present not only in Pera and Caffa, 
but also in the kingdom of Cyprus. Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, a Florentine 
merchant, successfully negotiated some commercial privileges from the king of 
Cyprus in 1335. Soon after, the king of Cyprus extended these privileges to every 
Florentine citizen. Pegolotti was an important employee of the Bardi’s bank. This 
                                                          
66 See fn. 63. 
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Florentine merchant also wrote an important source related to Florentine commerce – 
“La pratica della mercatura”.68 The same Bardi commercial company was present in 
Little Armenia as Pegolotti reports: ‘The commercial company of the Bardi is free, 
as they do not have to pay anything in the kingdom of Armenia neither entering nor 
getting out’.69  
The privilege granted by the king of Cilician Armenia in 1335 showed the 
typical modality of Florentine expansionism supported by the papacy as in that 
period the Armenian king was supported by the Church of Rome. In this political 
context the pope requested that the Bardi bank buy 10.000 florins worth of grain for 
the king of Armenia, after a famine had stricken the kingdom. This event should be 
taken as the perfect example of the Florentine commercial policies mainly tied to the 
papacy. Finally, on 18 June 1317 the pope granted to the Bardi and the Peruzzi the 
right of collecting the tithes in all Romania.70 
Therefore, Bardi and Peruzzi were present in all of the most important 
ecclesiastical dioceses in the Levant. The same Acciaiuoli had several branches in 
Clarenza, Rhodes and in general in the Levant. Specifically, the Acciaiuoli’s interests 
lie in Greece and Rhodes, rather than Cyprus or Constantinople.  
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The Florentine commercial companies had a lot of interests connected to the 
Knights Hospitaller. These interests lay in the recent conquest of Rhodes by the 
Knights Hospitaller in 1310 under the Grandmaster Fulkes de Villaret.71 Florentine 
activity there ranged from logistical supply to lending and changing. For example, 
since 1312 the Bardi had been trading swords and Florentine panni. The panno was a 
general piece of cloth of variable length and kind. There were several kinds of panni 
made of cotton or wool and later silk such as Florentine panni, Milanese panni etc.72 
The Florentines were also conducting other activities, such as buying buildings and 
terrains and exporting various items such as spices, soap, sugar and other products of 
Rhodes. Moreover, Florentine banks transferred currencies from the West to Rhodes 
and operated lending activities. By 1320 the Knights Hospitaller owed to the 
Florentines the huge sum of 500.000 florins, more than the double the pope’s annual 
income. 
The English bankruptcy of 1343, which led to the bankruptcy of the Florentine 
banks, created a great deal of turmoil for the investors in the Florentine banks. In 
fact, as news of the bankruptcy spread, the investors immediately tried to recover the 
money from the banks, thus accelerating the bankruptcy of the Florentine banks. The 
same Pope Clement IV, even if he was formally still an ally of the Florentine 
municipality, abandoned the Florentine banks. Moreover, the pope tried to recover 
ecclesiastical money through papal tribunals, while the Florentine government 
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protected the merchants and the families involved in the great bankruptcy.73 This 
event led to a shift in the Florentine policy towards commerce and the trade. 
Florence had to revise its economic policies and made trade expansion even more 
protected in order to maintain the support of the economic growth in the city. As a 
matter of fact, the banks’ failure did not coincide with a decrease in local 
manufacturing activities which, instead, continued to grow. Therefore, another 
intermediary had to be sought as the banks ceased to support the local growth by 
trading and selling the wares produced by the manufactories. The banks acted on 
behalf of the Florentine Signoria like foreign governments.74 However, after the 
bankruptcy, a new mediator emerged for the Florentine interests, that is, the 
Florentine Commune itself. From at this specific time the Signoria began to act in 
favour of the Florentine companies, while in the past the companies carried out 
negotiations on their own behalf. For example, the municipality of Florence offered 
its condolences to Peter I of Lusignan, King of Cyprus, after his father’s death in 
1360, and underlined the good relationship existing between the Florentine 
merchants and the kingdom of Cyprus. Moreover, the Florentine municipality 
recommended to Peter I Luca Alberti, an employee of the new bank of the Alberti 
Nuovi, as well as Arriguccio Pegolotti.75  Clearly, the Signoria assumed prerogatives 
that in the past belonged to the Florentine commercial companies. 
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74 See the previous paragraph. 
75 See Müller 1879:120-128. 








I can therefore conclude that the bankruptcy of 1343 did not greatly modify the 
Florentine presence in the Levant, but caused a change in the Florentine commercial 
system.  This symbolised the failure of a commercial system, not the failure of 
Florentine trade. The same families who had run the bankrupted banks were part of 
the Signoria and they did not stop to obtain prestigious offices within the Florentine 
Signoria. Clearly, these families had a lot of interests in protecting the family 
businesses through the power of the government rather than weaker commercial 
companies.76 The commercial rights given to all the Florentines without exception 
benefited the city as a whole.77 Moreover, as far as the commercial negotiations are 
concerned, surely the Signoria had more strength, authority and credibility than the 
single companies. 
Although the Bardi, Acciaiuoli and Peruzzi banks had disappeared, the same 
cannot be said for the merchants’ activities. The Hospitaller Order continued 
recruiting and privileging many Florentines within the Order because they still 
provided useful services. For example, Niccolò di Catellino Aldobrandi, previously 
an employee of the Peruzzi, became a citizen of Rhodes and an agent of the Order. 
Aldobrandi traded in retail items such as grain, timber, oil and textiles. Niccolò da 
Prato transferred money from Cyprus to Rhodes for the Knights. In March 1348, 
Bartolomeo degli Albizzi bought grain and collected money for the Order. Niccolò di 
Lapo Bellincioni, previously an employee of the Bardi, afterwards became citizen of 
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Rhodes, from whence he led a merchant ship to Constantinople in order to buy spices 
and other goods.78 The Florentines were also present in the Byzantine capital itself. 
The account book of the Alberti bank stated that Miniato Filippi e Ridolfo Cambi 
were both employees of the Alberti branch in Constantinople.79 The Florentine 
expansion was mostly commercial without any kind of territorial expansion.  
A different expansion: the case of Niccolò and Neri Acciaiuoli in Greece. 
 
The relationship between the Florentine municipality, the pope and the 
Kingdom of Naples was providential for the Acciaiuoli family. This relationship 
offered to Niccolò Acciaiuoli the possibility of becoming a powerful feudal lord in 
Latin Achaia. The Florentines, as I have mentioned, were usually employed as 
commercial agents and lenders. The Angevin conquest of the kingdom of Naples 
witnessed a growing presence of Florentine banks and merchants, in particular the 
Acciaiuoli. The lenders’ activities were much in demand for the primary necessity of 
fresh cash which in general every ruler needed in order to sustain their expensive 
wars. At the same time, the commercial banks were usually lending to the sovereigns 
at zero per cent interest as the lenders would have gained in material grants (lands, 
titles). The expedition of Charles I against the Hohenstaufen was actually financed 
by a notable number of Florentine banks which in exchange received commercial 
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rights. For example, the company of Ghino Frescobaldi received a safe conduct to 
trade in the Angevin territories in exchange for several loans.80 Sometimes, the 
crown could appoint to prestigious offices the same lenders either for their 
commercial abilities or in order to repay previous debts. Niccolò Acciaiuoli was one 
of the most successful cases in which a banker rose to a top political position of 
Angevin power, first as Great Seneschal (1348) and afterwards as one of the most 
important fief-holders in Latin Achaia. Niccolò was an important citizen of Florence, 
son of Acciaiuolo Acciaiuoli who was in Naples as administrator of the local 
Acciaiuoli branch.81 He was to become one of the most important lenders of the 
Angevin crown.82  
The politics of the Mediterranean Sea changed in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries with the emergence of new protagonists such as the Aragonese and the 
Catalans. The Aragonese, thanks to their alliance with Michael VIII Palaiologos, 
successfully drove out the Angevins from Sicily in 1282 in the so-called Sicilian 
Vespers. Furthermore, the pope consecrated the Aragonese as the rightful ruler of 
Trinacria in Sicily. The other groups, the Catalans, were former mercenaries of the 
Byzantine empire connected to the Aragonese Crown. They established a new 
dynasty in Athens after they defeated and killed the duke of Athens, Gualtier of 
Brienne. Angevin power in Morea was consolidated in 1267 with the death of 
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William II Villehardouin. William II, prince of Achaia, had previously made an 
agreement with Charles I of Anjou. By this agreement the Principality of Achaia was 
to go to Charles I Anjou after William II’s death.83  The new Catalan threat forced 
the Angevins to strike back in order to preserve their economic interests in Latin 
Achaia. Indeed, such military expeditions would normally have required huge sums 
of money. The Acciaiuoli bank offered the necessary money in loan for the first 
expedition against Achaia and the Catalans which was conducted by Giovanni di 
Gravina.84 As a form of compensation, the Acciaiuoli bank received some fiefdoms 
in Elis, Lichina, and Mandria. These feudal fiefs represented the beginning of the 
Acciaiuoli’s expansion in the Latin Achaia. Their main difference with other 
Florentine commercial companies lay in the fact that the Bardi and the Peruzzi, for 
example, exclusively maintained a commercial profile. Instead, Niccolò Acciaiuoli 
pursued familiar and territorial aims. This point is illustrated further by an example 
in 1334, when Niccolò, acting as a private citizen, purchased the territories of Elis, 
Lichina and Mandria from the Acciaiuoli bank, which they had received previously 
from the Angevins. Furthermore, in 1335 Catherina of Valois-Courtenay appointed 
Niccolò Acciaiuoli to the prestigious office of Royal Seneschal in return for his past 
lending the amount of 5.000 gold ounces.85 To this appointment followed three other 
important concessions all in Morea: the first in 3 June 1336, which granted to 
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Niccolò a fief formed by nine villages that in the past belonged to Perin de 
Courcelles and Pietro Joussard; the second was on 18 November 1337, which 
comprised other fiefdoms formed by thirteen villages in Elis previously belonging to 
Lisa du Quartier and several concessions in Cephalonia; finally the third on 13 July 
1338 was another fiefdom formed by five villages.86 The reason for these 
concessions was additional loans made by Acciaiuoli to the Angevins between the 
years 1333-1342 for an overall sum of 40.000 gold ounces. The grants of several 
loans was surely part of Niccolò’s plan to obtain feudal rents on behalf of the bank, 
as after having relieved these lands from the bank he put them directly under his 
control.87  
There is an invaluable source detailing the entirety of the Acciaiuoli’s 
possessions in Achaia, that is, the inventory compiled by Aldobrando Baroncelli in 
1354.88 This inventory listed several lands in Latin Achaia: in Christiana (Krestena), 
Cremisi (Ano Kremmydi and Kato Kremmydi), Machona (Macona in Messenia, not 
far from Kremmydi), Caraveniza, Clegi (Gliczi), Grisi (eastern extremity of 
Messenia), Cosuma (Cosmina or Chosmina), Arcangeli, Lacus, Arminico, Kalamata, 
Drusii, Bulcano, Petoni. Finally, in 1358, Queen Joanna I of Naples and Princess of 
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Achaia granted to Niccolò Acciaiuoli the barony of Corinth for the merits shown 
during the military expedition in Sicily from 1356-1357.89  
After Niccolò’s death, his son Angelo Acciaiuoli inherited the lands and 
appointed his cousin Donato di Jacopo Acciaiuoli as administrator of the barony of 
Corinth. However, Donato di Jacopo Acciaiuoli had several debts with another 
cousin Neri Acciaiuoli. Therefore, Angelo paid his debts to Neri with the barony of 
Corinth.  
Around Neri’s acquisition of Corinth there emerged two different branches of 
the Acciaiuoli family in Greece.  The first branch would be the Acciaiuoli patrimony 
administered by Aldobrando Baroncelli and controlled the fiefs in Elis and Messenia. 
The second branch would be Neri Acciaiuoli’s autonomous rule of the barony of 
Corinth.90 The crucial year of Neri’s expansion towards the Catalan duchy of Athens 
was 1373. In this year Philip II of Taranto died. He had held several titles, among 
them the title of emperor of Constantinople and prince of Achaia. After Philip II’s 
death without an heir, a dispute took place over his inheritance between Jacques des 
Baux (?- 1383), the grandson of Philip II, and Joanna I (1326-1382), the queen of 
Naples. The latter was the daughter of Charles, duke of Calabria (1298 –1328), who 
was the son of Robert I of Naples (1276-1343). She became queen in 1343 and with 
the Neapolitan crown she also received the claims in Morea. On the other hand, 
Jacques des Baux had dynastic legitimacy due to being the son of Margherita of 
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Taranto and Francois des Baux, duke of Andria and Montescaglioso, and was the 
sole descendant of Philip II of Taranto. Besides the title of prince of Achaia, des 
Baux also possessed a claim on the title of emperor of Constantinople.  
The barons of Morea supported and recognised Joanna, the queen of Naples, 
on 25 November 1373. The reason for the dispute over the inheritance concerned the 
claims on the Latin Principality of Achaia, as both contenders had valid claims. The 
struggle between Joanna I and des Baux was brief as Charles III of Durazzo (1345-
1386) invaded the kingdom of Naples and took Joanna I prisoner. Afterwards, 
Charles III became the new king of Naples in 1382 and claimed the Angevin titles in 
Greece and replaced Joanna I in her fight against Des Baux.91 
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This struggle helped Neri to expand the territories of the duchy of Athens. In 
fact, in 1374 Neri Acciaiuoli had already occupied the city of Megara when Florence 
entered the war against the Catalans. The accurate date for the fall of Thebes and 
Levadia into the hands of Neri is still debatable. It is certain that both cities were part 
of Neri’s possession at the time of Neri’s death as his will in 1395 confirmed both 
Thebes and Levadia to Antonio I Acciaiuoli.92  
Since 1378, the Hospitaller had been hiring several companies of mercenaries 
after the disaster of Vonitza, in which the Order was defeated by the Albanians of 
Gjin Spata.93  One of these companies was that of Juan de Urtubia. From the 
documentary evidence it seems that Neri Acciaiuoli hired de Urtubia for the conquest 
of Thebes, Levadia and Athens.94  Neri Acciaiuoli, together with Urtubia’s army, in 
1385 occupied Athens, except for the acropolis, which submitted three years later. 
Neri I emerges with the ducal title in one privilege granted to the Greek branch of the 
Medici in 1387.95 However, this source is not very reliable. Finally, at the end of the 
fourteenth century, Ladislaus, king of Naples, confirmed definitively Neri’s title of 
duke.96 
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brought it from Naples with the aim of claiming their being relatives to the grand duke Cosimo de’ 
Medici.  
96 Buchon 1843:2.223-2.228. 








The investiture of Neri as duke of Athens represented a turning point for the 
Acciaiuoli’s history in Greece. While Navarreses mercenary companies at the order 
of Jacques des Baux conquered the fiefs of the Angevin concessions to Niccolò 
Acciaiuoli, the cadet branch led by Neri in Athens continued autonomously. In fact, 
from the end of the fourteenth century, even if contacts between Florence and the 
duke of Athens persisted, the political and social choices of the Acciaiuoli followed 
the real-politik just as other regional powers in Greece. This new dimension for the 
Acciaiuoli of Athens started with the matrimonial policy which aimed to build a web 
of alliances like any territorial lord. Neri Acciaiuoli married Agnese Saraceni, 
daughter of Saraceno Saraceni, who was an important and influential merchant in 
Negroponte, whose ties connected Neri to Venice. Of Neri’s daughters, one, 
Francesca Acciaiuoli, married Charles I Tocco, son of Leonardo I and Maddalena 
Buondelmonti (daughter of Niccolò Acciaiuoli’s sister and Manente dei 
Buondelmonti) and the other, Bartolomea, married Theodore I Palaiologos, despot of 
Morea.97 The Tocco were Sicilian family, Palatine counts of the Western empire, and 
at that time rulers of the isles of Cephalonia, Leuca, Santa Maura, and the cities of 
Arta and Ioannina.  Neri also had a male son, Antonio, not from Agnese Saraceni, 
but Maria Rendi, who was the daughter of Demetrio Rendi, the notary of Athens. 
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Antonio Acciaiuoli later married Maria Melissene, the daughter of an important 
Greek archon.98  
Several observations are needed to explain the eventual diplomatic aims 
pursued by Nerio Acciaiuoli. The Acciaiuoli’s natural allies were the despotate of 
Morea (thanks to the marriage between Bartolomea and Theodore I) and the Toccos 
(as Charles I was son of a Buondelmonti and he himself had married an Acciaiuoli). 
The second consideration is that the enemies of the Acciaiuoli were the Navarreses, 
presently vicars of Morea on behalf of Jacques des Baux, and the Turks. The 
relationship with Venice depended on single episodes. In fact, Venice had always 
considered Athens politically important due to its strategic position. This Venetian 
attitude is clearly visible in the Venetian attempt to seize the city upon Neri’s death. 
Antonio Acciaiuoli was able to regain Athens only after he defeated the Venetians in 
1402. Neri Acciaiuoli even became a relative of the Byzantine imperial family, thus 
indirectly connecting Florence with Byzantium. In fact, even if Neri ruled 
autonomously, he was still a Florentine citizen and had connections in Florence. This 
point can be illustrated by a detailed analysis of Neri’s capture by the Navarreses 
company obedient to Venice. 
Neri’s captivity immediately became a matter of international politics as it 
involved many of the major governments of the period, including the papacy. There 
are several sources which detail the events following Neri’s capture. First of all, the 
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instructions to Donato Acciaiuoli, Neri’s brother, given to the Florentine ambassador 
in Venice, which specified that Neri was a Florentine citizen and above all 
Venetian.99  
Even about this matter they did not pay attention. They have offended the prestige of 
their municipality [Venice] and ours by offending Nerio and his status as he is 
[Venetian] and our citizen and [offended also] our city,… and he is its son and 
servant… 
The mentioned Nerio and his daughters and heir, for their singular grace have the 
citizenship and singular privilege in Venice and outside Venice and the same his brother 
Donato Acciaiuoli 100 
In addition, this event involved Genoa.101 This document is one of the most 
interesting because it clearly shows the internationalisation of Neri’s capture. 
The municipality of Florence, allied with the papacy, pressed the doge of 
Venice in order to facilitate Neri’s release. Meanwhile, Maddalena 
Buondelmonti, the Duchess of Leuca and Cephalonia, appealed for Neri’s 
release. Maddalena Buondelmonti had ties in Genoa after the Genoese 
municipality granted citizenship to Charles I Tocco the Genoese.102 What 
emerged is the pervasive influence that the Acciaiuoli-Buondelmonti family 
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100 Ibidem Eziandio di questo chaso non anno riguardato, ma offeso la riverenza del loro chomune e 
del nostro, offendendo messer Nerio e ‘l suo istato, il quale è loro e nostro cittadino, e insieme cholla 
nostra città a lui eguale patria e d’esso filgiuolo e servidore... Il detto messer Nerio e le sue filglie 
erede, per loro singhulare grazia, anno della loro cittadinanza singhulare brevilegio in Vinezia e 
fuori di Vinezia, e ‘l simile Donato Acciaiuoli suo fratello. 
101 Ibidem In prima, sarete a gienova, e parlate con messer Ludovicho e Choni Stroza, anbasciadori 
del comune; e chon essi ordinate che messer lo Dugie vi faccia porre in su la ghalera che va in 
Romania…che di nuovo mandai due più savi huomini di Firenze ambasciatori di chomune a Vinegia 
chon ogni modo a preghare l’aiuto… e questa potenzia, dalle parti di qua, non chonosco più utile che 
Gienovesi. E che sopra di ciò o voluto sentire lanimo del Dugie e de’ Gienovesi; li quali truovo molto 
bene disposti al servigio in fare aiuto a messer Nerio e alla donna e al suo istato perché sento che la 
duchessa della Luchata fu fatta accomandata dalla singnoria di Gienova chon cierti mezzi e 
chondizioni e, anno preso la sua difesa... 
102 Charles I Tocco was Maddalena Buondelmonti’s son. See Zĕcević 2005:61-75. 








had in Italian cities other than Florence. The same instruction of Donato to the 
aforementioned ambassadors stated: 
When you will be in Corinth with Agnese, Nerio’s wife, you will greet her on behalf of 
me and of the cardinal as our sister ... you will say that I sent to Venice Lionardo 
Frescobaldi as an ambassador of the municipality and that the cardinal sent another one 
on behalf of the pope. Those will be together with the bishop of Argo.103 
The cardinal cited in this document is Angelo Acciaiuoli, son of Jacopo di 
Donato and Bartolomea Ricasoli, brother of Donato. Angelo Acciaiuoli was bishop 
of Florence in 1383, and became cardinal on 26 June 1385. Therefore, there was a 
communication channel between Angelo Acciaiuoli and Theodore I of Morea, 
Despot of Morea, evident in the letter sent by the despot to Angelo Acciaiuoli.104  
Another episode which helps to understand the pervasive influence of the 
Acciaiuoli network is that of Esaù of the Buondelmonti family. He was the son of 
Manente Buondelmonti and Lapa Acciaiuoli.105 Therefore, Esaù was the brother of 
Maddalena Buondelmonti, at the time duchess of Leuca and Cephalonia. After the 
death of Thomas II Preljubović, the despot of Ioannina, in 1384, Esau married the 
widow Maria Angela Doukaina Palaiologina (1350-1394) in 1385, and obtained 
sovereignty over Ioannina.106 After Maria Doukaina’s death in 1394, Esau married 
Irene, daughter of John Buo Spata (?-1399) in 1396 and added to the dominion the 
                                                          
103 Buchon 1843:  2.238-2.254 Quando sarete a Choranto chon Madonna Angnesa, donna di messer 
Nerio, salutarete ella per parte del cardinale e mia, chome nostra sorella ... Direte le chome a vinegia 
mandai Lionardo Frescobaldi ambasciadore per lo chomune, e ‘l cardinale vi mandò uno per la 
pappa, i quali vi si trvarono insieme col vescovo d’Argho. 
104 Angelo Acciaiuoli was therefore a brother of Neri Acciaiuoli. The letter is in Miklosich- Müller, 
1865:5.250-5.251. 
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city of Arta. Spata was Albanian and the despot of Arta and Angelokastron from 
1374.107 
Esaù’s death in 1403 allowed Charles I Tocco to take over all Buondelmonti’s 
territories as he was Esaù‘s nephew.108 This territorial acquisition strengthened the 
Acciaiuoli’s network in the Epirote-Greek area as the duke of Cephalonia married 
Francesca Acciaiuoli, the daughter of Neri and Agnese Saraceni.   
Therefore, I assert that the Acciaiuoli’s sphere of influence, stretching from 
Genoa to the Morea and able to touch even the Palaiologoi, was extensive. This 
territorial area in the Epirote-Greek territories was the first bridge, in a certain sense, 
between Florence and the Byzantine empire.109 
 
Florence’s expansion in the Levant in the fifteenth century before the 
Council of Ferrara-Florence 
 
The Florentine commercial expansion in the Levant, which became consistent 
after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, was a long process which 
began before Florence’s annexation of Pisa. In fact, the economic development 
had already started with the commercial companies in the fourteenth century. 
However, there were no institutional contacts between the Florentine 
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Commune and the Byzantine empire. This relationship only began at the end of 
the fourteenth century, during the reign of Manuel II. The first document which 
reported institutional contacts was the official embassy conducted by the 
Byzantines to Florence in 1397. Previously, if contacts between Florence and 
Byzantium had occurred, they must have been only indirect, as there is a lack 
of any sources with regard to Florence and Byzantium. The letter from 
Coluccio Salutati, at the time chancellor of Florence, to Pope Boniface IX on 5 
October 1397 states the arrival in Florence of Hilario Doria.110 
Hilario Doria, a high-born Genoese, was an important personality in the 
Byzantine court who had married Zampia Palaiologina, illegitimate daughter of 
Manuel II. He was also gambros of Manuel II and was often used as 
ambassador on behalf of the Byzantine empire.111 In the Byzantine imperial 
court he held the title of mesazon, one of the highest in the imperial 
administration.112 At the time of Doria’s embassy to Florence on 25 September 
1396, Byzantium was in a dire state due to the blockade of Constantinople 
enacted by Bayezid I, the Ottoman sultan, from 1389-1402. As a matter of fact 
in 1387, just ten years before Doria’s embassy, the Byzantine empire had lost 
Thessalonica to the Turks. Moreover, just one year before Doria’s embassy, a 
crusade that was supposed to free Constantinople was completely crushed in 
Nicopolis.  
                                                          
110 Langkabel 1981:339-340. 
111 On the genos see Ganchou 2008:71-94. See PLP s.v. Hilario Doria. 
112 On the mesazon see Verpaux 1966:270-296. 








After the dramatic end of the Nicopolis Crusade, the Byzantine empire 
was in a dreadful state. It stands to a reason that the Byzantine ambassadors 
went to Rome to ask for subsidies and help in lifting the blockade from 
Constantinople. Salutati’s letter confirmed Doria’s passage to Florence. The 
document is a recommendation made by the Florentine municipality in Doria’s 
favour.113 The possible reasons why Doria decided to stop in Florence are 
various. Florence at the time was a rich city in Italy, and it is probable that 
Manuel II knew this, due to the indirect contacts in the past, such as Neri’s 
matrimonial policy with the despotate of Morea and the presence of Florentine 
banks in the Levant from the second half of the thirteenth century. Another 
example is the same marriage between Antonio I Acciaiuoli, Neri’s heir, and 
Maria Melissene.114 Nevertheless, the humanistic channel was the main source 
of Manuel II’s information on Florence. As I stated in the introduction, 
Coluccio Salutati had a direct relationship with Salutati, Manuel Chrysoloras 
and Demetrios Kydones in the last years of the fourteenth century (1397-
1400).115 In a letter dated 8 March 1396, Salutati announced to Chrysoloras that 
he managed to appoint Chrysoloras as professor of Greek in the Florentine 
University.116 Manuel Chrysoloras arrived in Florence on 2 February 1397.117 
Moreover, the time gap between the arrival of Chrysoloras and Doria was not 
                                                          
113 Langkabel 1981:339-340.  
114 Daughter of Leo Melissene and Helena Chalcocondylis. 
115 Novati 1896: nn. 17; 18; XVIII. 
116 Novati 1896:119-125. 
117 Thomson 1966:76. On Chrysoloras in Florence see Weiss 1977:227-254. 








that wide, since the Commune wrote to the pope the recommendation letter in 
Doria’s favour on 5 October 1397.118 The proximity of the two arrivals cannot 
be a coincidence, considering the importance of both Chrysoloras and Doria in 
Manuel II’s court.119 What is most likely is that by the end of the fourteenth 
century Florence came to be known in the Byzantine court due to a number of 
the indirect contacts (the commercial companies and the Acciaiuoli dynasty in 
Athens) and direct contacts (the humanist channel).  
The main purpose of Doria’s embassy was to request subsidies and help 
against the Turks who at the moment were blockading Constantinople. 
Florence determined to deny Doria’s request.120 Their refusal was probably due 
to several reasons. Florence, already by 19 May 1397, had asked for 
commercial privileges from Byzantium as stated in the pratiche.121 There is no 
doubt that the Byzantine emperor rejected Florence’s request since there is no 
trace of eventual privileges received by Florence at the time of Doria’s 
embassy. Another important reason was probably the on-going war between 
Florence and Milan which was at that moment going badly for the Florentine 
Commune. Doria’s embassy still remains significant since it was the first direct 
contact between Florence and Byzantium. It was only the first of more 
embassies in the time to come.   
                                                          
118 The sources do not state whether the two came together, so this hypothesis is impossible to prove. 
119 Both were oikeois, and as mentioned above, Doria was gambros, having married Manuel II’s 
daughter. On the oikeois see Verpaux 1965:89-99. 
120 Langkabel 1981:339-340.  
121 Novati 1896:125 Referantur gratie imperatori Constantinopolintano et sciatur ab illis de 
Mercantia an bonum sit quod Florentini habeant consules et si bonum est petatur, aliter non. 








The three year presence (1397-1400) of Chrysoloras probably eased the arrival 
in Florence in 1401 of Demetrius Palaiologos (Goudelis), the emperor’s cousin. He 
was surely mesazon by 1416.122 Since Hilario Doria was also a mesazon, this 
embassy was the second to have a mesazon as its main ambassador. Demetrius’ 
embassy was once again requesting financial and military aid.123 As later became the 
custom, Florence refused to help Constantinople. In regards to the military aid, 
Florence stated that it was the pope’s duty to grant the necessary indulgence. As far 
as the subsidies are concerned, Florence postponed the answer.124 
The embassy of Demetrios Palaiologos Goudelis probably returned to Florence 
the same year from Rome. The pope granted the indulgence required by Florence and 
granted the right to preach for the Crusade. Of course, the Signoria did not intend to 
give money to Byzantium.  
18 October 1401 10 indiction  
Angelo de Baroncelli said 
We should apologise to the ambassador of the Byzantine emperor for the state of our 
current expenses, but the preaching for the crusade shall be allowed. 
Donato Albizzi Acciaiuoli, said 




                                                          
122 Andriopoulou 2010:148 on Goudelis mesazon see also Verpaux 1955:288. 
123 There were also present John Chrysoloras (who met Manuel Chrysoloras in Florence in 1400), 
Demetrius Gadelli (who I identify as Demetrio Goudelis Palaiologos) and Nicolas Notaras as the 
Florentine municipality asked Bettino Bartoli to present to them greetings on behalf of Florence. 
124 Müller 1879:1.148. 
125 Conti-Ninci 1991:261-264. Die xviiij octobris x indictione, mcccc primo Angelus de Baroncellis 
<pro Gonfaloneriis> dixit:…Oratori imperatoris Constantinopolitani fiat excusatio propter expensas 
occurentes, sed predicatio Crucis permittatur...Donatus Albizi <de Acciaiuolis>, pro Duodecim 
dixit:… Super facto oratoris Greci, idem. It is impossible that this source is related to the first 
embassy of Demetrius Goudelis Palaiologos. For, it makes no sense that at first the chancery 
answered negatively by letter to the emperor and afterwards the government discussed again which 
answer they were to give to the emperor’s ambassador. 








Florence again refused financial aid to Byzantium, but allowed the 
preaching of the crusade against the Ottomans. Again, the reasons for the 
Florentine refusal vary. First of all, Florence was at that time waging a war 
against the Visconti. Secondly, the Florentine commercial investments in the 
Levant were probably not so consistent as to justify any economic aid to the 
Byzantine court. Therefore, Florence thought it was unnecessary to help 
Byzantium. Florence was not alone in this decision. Most European powers, 
with the exception of Genoa and Venice, refused to help the Byzantine 
emperor. 
From 1403 to 1420 there was a lack of diplomatic contact between the 
two governments. The purchase of Porto Pisano in 1421 must have changed the 
attitude in Florence. For after this acquisition, the Florentine government sent 
instruction to Bettino Bartoli to ask for privileges from Manuel II. Bettino 
Bartoli was a Florentine citizen who lived and traded in Constantinople. By 
1421 Florence had already taken Pisa (1409) and of course Porto Pisano 
(1421). There is no doubt that the Florentine Commune did not waste time and 
started immediately to discuss the eventuality of expansion in the Levant. 
Clearly, the main aim was Constantinople since the market was the perfect 
place to sell the manufactured woollen clothes and later silk clothes.126 The 
cloth manufactured in Florence had a potentially good market in 
                                                          
126 For the passage from woollen to silk see Tognetti 2002:36-39. 








Constantinople as the Venetian Doge Mocenigo stated before dying in 1423.127 
Clearly the Venetians were not doing this commercial transport on behalf of 
Florence for free. Therefore, it makes sense that Florence, after the acquisition 
of Porto Pisano, wanted to establish a commercial transport of its own.   
...And from the moment that our Lordship had rightly succeeded to the privileges 
and immunities of the Pisans which they had… he (the emperor) should deign to 
confirm and concede to us, to our citizens and merchants who do commerce in 
the place where he rules, or to those who are going to do commerce, the church, 
the loggia, the privileges, the immunities, the benefits and dignities that once 
belonged to the Pisans 128 
From the document emerges that the Florentine government wanted to 
present the city of Florence as the rightful heir of Pisa’s commercial rights in 
Romania. However, before making any interpretation, I think it is mandatory to 
date the letter so to contextualise this document in a proper historical 
background. Surely, the conquest of Porto Pisano happened before Florence 
sent this instruction. Since, the conquest of Porto Pisano finally allowed 
Florence to begin its Levantine expansion. Moreover, the letter mentioned 
Hilario Doria who was dead by 1423. Therefore the chronology of this letter 
could be limited from 1421 to 1423.  
                                                          
127 Romanin 1855:4.94. Voi sapete che I fiorentini danno ogni anno panni sedicimila li quali 
consumiamo nella Barberia, nell’Egitto, nella Morea et nel’Istria et ogni mese. Other evidences 
aboout Florentine clothes are in Iorga 1899:1.100. See also Heyd 1967:2.351. 
128 Müller 1879:149-150. Et perchè la Signoria nostra è iustamente succeduta ne’ privilegii et 
immunità de’ Pisani et che cost’ avevano… che si degni di confermare et concedere a noi et a’ nostri 
cittadini et mercatanti che trafficassono ne’ luoghi sottoposti alla sua dignità, o che in quelli 
arrivassono, la chiesa, loggia, privilegii, immunità, beneficii et dignità che per adietro avevano i 
Pisani. 








We send you this letter, about this subject and as recommendation to you to the 
emperor, Nicolas Notaras, Demetrius Gadelli, Hilario Doria and John Chrysoloras.
129 
 
However, in another document emerges the possible date of this letter. 
The Florentine Commune sent a recommendation letter to Pope Martin V on 
13 June 1421 in favour of Iohannes Platinterius, Manuel II’s ambassador.130 
This evidence shows that the Florentines mediated between the 
Byzantine emperor and the pope. As the aforementioned letter states, Florence 
requested the emperor’s friendship in order to receive benefits from the 
Byzantine empire. These beneficiis might refer to eventual concessions of 
commercial privileges to Florence. Therefore, Florence might have sent the 
instruction to Bettino Bartoli in a period between the purchase of Porto Pisano 
in 1421 and 1422. The only problem concerned the identity of Bettino Bartoli. 
Fortunately, the Florentine Signoria’s instruction gave a partial answer:  
‘From information received by our Lordship from many of our citizens and for the 
report of Luca di Domenico, we have heard about your good fame and that virtuously 
you have been conducting your activities’.131 
 
                                                          
129 Müller 1879:149-150 ti mandiamo con questa lettera sopra questa materia et di credenzia in te 
alla Supereminentia dello imperatore et a messer Nicola notara et a messer demetrio Gadelli, a 
messer Ilario Dora et a messer Giovanni Crissolora.   
130 Müller 1879:151. 
131 Müller 1879:154. Per relationi fatte alla Signoria nostra da molti nostri cictadini et per rapporti di 
Luca di Domenico abbiamo sentito della tua buona fama, et quanto virtuosamente t’eserciti et 
governi, et nel conspecto di ciascuno per le tue virtù et laudabili portamenti se’ accepto. The identity 
of Luca di Domenico is quite impossible to determine without a surname. Yet, There is in the online 
catasto (1427) (http://www.stg.brown.edu/projects/catasto/) a certain Luca di Domenico without 
family name and taxable for 660 ducats, quite a considerable sum. Whether he is the same Luca di 
Domenico it is difficult to say. 








The merchant Bettino Bartoli lived in Constantinople in the period of the letter 
and most probably enjoyed good fame and some ties to the Constantinopolitan court. 
The account book of Giacomo Badoer confirms that Bartoli was a merchant as the 
Florentine emerged with the role of sanser, that is, a commercial broker.132 In 
Badoer’s account book emerges also the presence of Zaneto di Bettino Bartoli, most 
likely the son of Bettino. Zaneto’s presence reinforced the idea of long-term local 
activity of the Bartoli’s family as it seems to imply that Bettino Bartoli had been 
living in Constantinople for more than thirty years.133 However, at that time there 
were neither formal privileges granted by the Byzantine empire for Florence, nor 
were there any formal answers from Constantinople to Bettino’s embassy.  
The main reason for this lies, once more, in Manuel II’s fear of conceding 
further tax-exemption to another Latin power. The Venetian influence over the 
Byzantine court should not be underestimated. Constantinople, especially in the last 
two centuries, was a “victim of the commercial rivalries” of the Italian powers, 
especially between Venice and Genoa.134  Moreover, already by the time of Manuel 
II, the Byzantines owed to Venice a sum of 17.163 hyperpyra.135 It stands to reason 
that Venice was probably not willing to allow another Latin power to expand its 
commercial power into the Constantinopolitan market, especially if that power was 
Florence since the Venetians earned a great deal from carrying Florentine wares, 
                                                          
132 Badoer 1960: pp. 6, n. 19; 7, 94; 17; 19, 102; pp. 19, 135, 251; 34, 95; 76, 78; 505, 520. 
133 Badoer 1960:582, 562. 
134 Nicol 1992:264-283 the definition of Constantinople as a “victim” comes from Nicol in a chapter 
dealing with the rivalries between Genoa and Venice over the Byzantine capital which more than once 
led to naval fights within the very borders of the city. 
135 Nicol 1988:48. 








especially panni, to Constantinople.136 Therefore, the Florentine Commune had to 
change plans and search for other ports of call in the Levant. Luckily for the 
Signoria, the ties which Florence had with the Acciaiuoli family in Athens and with 
Tocco’s despotate in Epirus were beneficial.  
The Duke Charles I Tocco was the son of Maddalena de’Buondelmonti and 
Leonardo I Tocco. Maddalena was part of a noble Florentine family, the 
Buondelmonti, which was strictly bonded to the Acciaiuoli. Furthermore, Charles I 
Tocco married Francesca, the daughter of Neri Acciaiuoli. This marriage 
consequently strengthened the ties between the Toccos and the duke of Athens and 
indirectly also the Florentine Signoria due to the Acciaiuoli connection. The reason 
for Florence’s interest in Tocco’s dominion probably rests in Tocco’s Morea 
possessions. Charles I Tocco had taken advantage of the war between the despot of 
Morea and the Prince of Achaia and purchased from the adventurer Oliverio Franco 
the city of Clarenza in 1421. Afterwards, all Elis soon fell under Tocco’s rule.137 The 
Florentine Signoria sent an ambassador to both Charles Tocco and Antonio 
Acciaiuoli just after the duke of Cephalonia had conquered the whole of Elis. The 
instructions given by the Florentine government to Tommaso di Francesco Alderotti, 
the Florentine ambassador, confirmed Florence’s interest in the Levant as Alderotti 
was to negotiate privileges in favour of Florentine merchants. The informativa of the 
                                                          
136 On Mocenigo’s speech see fn. 121. 
137 Zakythinos 1975: 197-201; On the Tocco See Schirò 1975. 








ambassador also confirmed that this embassy was not the first contact between the 
duchy of Athens and Florence. The text below stated:  
You will say that we had their letters and we listened to what Rinaldo Mezola reported 
on his behalf. And give thanks to him on behalf of our Lordship ...and that we accept 




Rinaldo Mezola had visited Florence in the past, as the letter states. Rinaldo 
Mezola appears in a further source which at least allows us to have some more 
information about Mezola. He was likely an adviser to Antonio Acciaiuoli since he 
also appeared as a legal counsellor on the occasion of an arranged marriage between 
Nerozzo Pitti and Laudamina in 1422 with the name of Rinaldo di Bernardo da 
Mezola, as the chronicler Buonaccorso Pitti stated.139 Since Rinaldo Mezola 
appeared in Florence on the same year as the instructions given to Alderotti, it makes 
sense to hypothesize that the Florentine Signoria negotiated with Neri’s advisor in 
Florence. Unlike in the past, Florence could now state the readiness of its state-
galleys.  
                                                          
138 Müller 1879:152-153. Gli dirai come avemmo le sue lettere, et udimmo quanto ci rapportò Rinaldo 
Mezola per sua parte, al quale si rispose. Et ringrazialo per parte della nostra Signoria…et che noi 
l’acceptiamo come d’amico et buono cittadino di questa città, come sono sempre stati i suoi antenati. 
139 Pitti 1720:130. Adi XXV di Giugno l’anno MCCCCXXII Nerozo mio nipote ando’ Atene in Grecia, 
pewr trovarsi col Signore Antonio degl’Acciaiuoli per conchiudere il matrimonio giurato e 
compromesso in Firenze tra’l detto Nerozo e Laudomina figiuola che fu di Franco di Messer Donato 
Acciaiuoli. Funne roghato Ser Domenico di Arigho di Ser Piero Mucini. Rinaldo di Bernardo da 
Mezola fu procuratore della parte della donna. La dota proimessa è f. dumilia d’oro. There is also 
mention of Mezola’s visit to Florence; however this one year later in 1423. Pitti 1720: 135. There is 
another document in which appears the name of Rinaldo Mezola. Nevertheless, that document is dated 
1481. Unless Mezola lived for over 80 years, this date leads me to doubt that the individual named 
was the same Rinaldo. The document describes him as a resident of Nauplion. He might have been the 
son of the other Rinaldo. The document is in Minio 2008:147 and states: ‘by this I inform you that 
today at the eleventh hour, Sier Rinaldo Mezola arrived here, a citizen of Nauplion, having come from 
Panagia under the jurisdiction of the territory of Thebes, from where he left on the twentieth in the 
greatest haste. 








And you will say to him that our municipality has decided to sail with heavy galleys to 
Alexandria and Syria and also to Romania, and if we had not done so in the past this 




The term marina spedita refers to the galleys built after the conquest of Porto 
Pisano. This guaranteed the duke of Athens a future amount of the Florentine trade. 
Moreover, the mission of Tommaso di Francesco Alderotti included a stop in 
Cephalonia.141 
Florence had commercial interest in the Morea for some time. Alderotti’s 
mission, contrary to that of Bartoli, seems to have had a positive ending, for Antonio 
Acciaiuoli conceded commercial privilege to Florence on 7 August 1422. This 
privilege set the kommerkion at two per cent and abolished all the other minor taxes, 
such as the tax for docking.142 There are no official documents surviving from the 
duchy of Cephalonia. Fortunately, a letter addressed to Charles I Tocco from the 
Florentine Signoria in 21 December 1424 provides evidence for the possible 
outcome of the embassy.143 
The Florentines expressed gratitude to the duke for both the quibus quidem 
beneficiis and the good reception which Tocco provided to the merchants and the 
captains of the Florentine galleys. These benefits along with the “good reception” 
might refer to either a lower kommerkion or a reduction of the minor taxes. However, 
                                                          
140 Müller 1879: 152-153. Et dirai, come la nostra Comunità à diliberato di navicare con galee grosse 
nelle parti d’Alexandria et di Soria, et ancora nelle parti di Romania; et se per lo passato non s’è 
fatto, è stato per non avere avuto la marina spedita come al presente. 
141 Müller 1879:152-153. Ancora anderai al duca di Cianfolonia (eziandio in prima se ti attaglia) 
colla medesima ambasciata… ma ingegnati d’avere da loro eziandio per scriptura, se bisogna, più 
obbligo che puoi. Et di quanto farai ci avisa per tua lettera, se v’è passaggi. 
142 Müller 1879:153. 
143 Müller 1879:154.  








whether the Florentines obtained the privileges from either Alderotti’s embassy or 
due to Neri Acciaiuoli’s connection to the city is not clear.144   
Despite these limited successes, Florence appeared to have an interest in 
expansion in the Levant. Unfortunately for Florence, Charles I Tocco’s presence in 
the Peloponnese did not endure. The Tocco family lost the war against the despot of 
Morea in 1426. After the war the Toccos gave up their territories in the Peloponnese 
to the despotate of Morea. In addition, Charles I Tocco was forced to give 
Maddalena, his niece by his brother Leonardo II, in marriage to Constantine 
Palaiologos, Despot of Morea.145 However, the good relationship between the 
Toccos and Florence seemed to remain unaltered. Proof for this comes from another 
letter, dated on 31 July 1429, in which the Florentines confirmed the ancient 
friendship with Charles I Tocco.146 
The interest in maintaining good relationship with the Tocco family 
derived from the fact that, in those years, the first Florentine galleys had begun 
to sail to the Levant. One of the first sources to discuss Florentine expansion in 
the Levant was an official complaint sent by the Signoria on 8 April 1430 to 
the maona of Chios.147 The reason of the complaint was that, in Chios, the 
Genoese had forced the Florentines to pay taxes on unsold wares. Since there 
                                                          
144 Neri’s voyage cited in the letter had the purpose of ratifying the treaty already concluded by the 
Alderotti. 
145 Maddalena later changed her name in Theodora.  
146 Müller 1879:154.  
147 The maona possessed political and economic power over Chios. On Genoese Chios the 
bibliography is huge. See in general Balard 1978 and Epstein 1996. Specifically on Chios see Balletto 
2005, Balletto 2005 (2) and Basso 2007. Some primary sources on Chios can be found in Rovere 
1979. 








are no sources which mention Florentine state-galleys sent to the Levant, it is 
most likely that the ships were not Florentine. This complaint refers to a 
previous treaty signed between the two cities which may lead one to think that 
the ships were Genoese carrying Florentine wares.148 Moreover, the Florentine 
municipality sent an unofficial request for information to Giovanni de’ Pazzi, 
Florentine merchant in the island:  
We have heard that Florentine wares unloaded in Chios have to pay taxes even for those 
which are not sold. Write to the governor or to their municipality in order that they will 
take the proper actions.149 
 
Another problem for Florentine expansion which becomes apparent from the 
above passage was Florence’s dependence on ports of call. Florence did not 
have the same logistic power possessed by Venice or Genoa which already had 
several ports of call in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Florentine Signoria, 
therefore, had to negotiate passage for Florentine galleys through the colonies 
of the other Italian cities.  
However, the main goal for the Florentine Signoria in the Levant 
remained Constantinople, which traditionally had one of the largest 
international markets in the eastern Mediterranean. Florence once again began 
to negotiate with Byzantium, after the previous interruption during the reign of 
Manuel II. The opportunity for new negotiations emerged after Manuel’s 
                                                          
148  Müller 1879:155-156. 
149 Id. sentiamo che le mercatantie de’Fiorentini che si scarcano a Scio sono constrecte a pagare le 
gabelle, così quelle che non si vendono come quelle che si vendono. Scrivianne al Podestà et alla 
Communità di costì che vi vogliono provedere.  








abdication in favour of his son, John VIII Palaiologos in 1425. The Florentines 
most probably believed that a new emperor represented new prospects. The 
decree of the Sea Consuls, the legislative office of the Commune appointed to 
the maritime policies, on 23 May 1429 states that Florence sent a galley to 
Romania with a special mission: 
To bring to Constantinople, free of charges, six individuals chosen from among the 





Florence may have sent this embassy to officially congratulate the new 
emperor on his ascension to the throne, but it also had the purpose of opening new 
negotiations with regard to commercial privileges. This interpretation is confirmed 
by the letter which the Florentine municipality sent to Constantinople on 8 June 
1430.151 The letter attests to the presence of Byzantine ambassadors in Florence and 
the Byzantine willingness to negotiate for eventual privileges. John VIII Palaiologos 
probably thought it was a good idea to involve as many Latin powers in 
Constantinople as possible. This policy is made evident from the emperor’s 
favourable disposition to negotiating an agreement about the dues and the taxes of 
the Constantinopolitan market. John VIII’s attitude towards the West was quite 
different from Manuel II’s policy. John VIII’s policy strongly favoured the Latin 
West. In fact, the eventual organisation of the Council was in the emperor’s opinion 
the necessary step to persuade the pope in organising the crusade. Furthermore, John 
                                                          
150 Müller 1879:283-284. Portare in Constantinopoli, sanza alcuno nolo, sei tra ambasciatori et 
giovani che si dispueranno pei detti Consoli, con ogni loro arnesi et cose et ridurgli in Porto Pisano. 
151 Müller 1879: 156. 








VIII surely knew of the prosperity and the richness of Florence thanks to the 
previous connection already present since Manuel II. Unsurprisingly, John VIII 
asked for the Florentine help.152  Unfortunately the names of the ambassadors are not 
specified in the aforementioned letter. Nevertheless, I would suggest that they were 
the same ambassadors who, in this period, were in Italy at the papal court. For this 
period saw the first negotiations between Florence, the papacy, the Council of Basle 
and the Byzantine empire in order to organise a council to discuss church union. 
John Dissipatos and Manuel Tarchaneiotes Boullotes were in Bologna on June 20 
1437 to meet with Florentine ambassadors to organise the proposed council.153 There 
is some information on Manuel Boullotes in Manuel II’s letters. He was probably a 
friend of John Chortasmenos, a Byzantine erudite and monk, as he appears in a 
panegyric written in the period from 1390 to 1425 by the same Chortasmenos and 
addressed to Manuel II.154 John Dissipatos was a son-in-law of Demetrios Goudelis 
Palaiologos and was often employed by John VIII as an ambassador in the lead up to 
the council.155 
Unfortunately, the results of these new negotiations were once again 
disappointing. No privileges or concessions were granted to Florence in this period. 
It is possible that either Venice or Genoa intervened with John VIII on the matter. A 
                                                          
152 For a general introduction on John VIII See Djuric 1995, especially the chapter “Secondo primo 
imperatore” Djuric 1995:93-146. 
153 Andriopoulou 2010:294. See also Cecconi 1869 document number XCVI, Müller 1879: 165-166.  
154 Dennis 1960:22-223, Leonte 2012 Although Dennis thought this Boullotes to be much too young 
to be the same Manuel of the Council.  
155 Necipoğlu 2009:211, Andriopoulou 2010: 142. 








Florentine letter dated 22 November 1436 attests to the lack of privileges for 
Florence.  
We plead your sublime Excellency to grant a full safe conduct for all men and wares 
and bestow the same immunity in favour of the Florentines merchants who will sail (to 
Constantinople) and for their wares…such as your sublime Excellency usually granted 
in other cases’156 
 
Two years before this letter, Cosimo de’ Medici had assumed power in 
Florence from the Albizzi who were then exiled from the city. With this letter, the 
Medici confirmed Florence’s interest in the Levant despite the change of regime. 
Furthermore, Cosimo de’ Medici was even more explicit in his goals, as he asked the 
same rights that the other Italian cities had received from the Byzantine emperors. 
Therefore, despite the change of regime in Florence, the main aim of the Signoria 
with regard to the Levant did not change. The letter from the Signoria to the 
Byzantine emperor in 1436 clearly shows that access to Constantinople continued to 




                                                          
156 Müller 1879:162-163 Sublimitatem vestram humiliter precamur, ut et salvum conductum 
pro hominibus et rebus in plena forma concedere placet, et immunitatem talem Florentinis 
istuc navigaturis et eorum rebus et mercibus elargiri, qualem aliis in simili causa Sublimitas 
vestra concedere consuevit.  
 








The three paragraphs, although very different in content, are deeply connected. 
The reason for the late appearance of Florence as a maritime power in the 
Eastern Mediterranean was mainly geographic. As a landlocked city, Florence 
did not have the same advantages as other cities, such as Venice and Genoa, to 
develop its own commercial system. Therefore, Florence fought against Pisa in 
numerous wars from the end of the twelfth century to the fifteenth century. 
After the conquest of Pisa in 1409, Florence had to wait until 1421 to finally 
buy from Genoa the long desired Porto Pisano. Before this, Florence mainly 
relied on private initiatives such as the commercial companies and the 
Acciaiuoli family. After the fall of Constantinople to the crusaders in 1204, the 
alliances with Naples and the papacy further aided Florentine expansion in the 
Levant. Thanks to the alliance with the papacy, the commercial companies 
were able to expand their powers into areas, such as Greece, which were 
previously closed to them. Moreover, the Angevin advent in the Neapolitan 
kingdom represented an opportunity for many Florentine individuals, such as, 
Niccolò Acciaiuoli, who quickly rose through the ranks of Angevin power and 
became a powerful lord in Achaia. Thanks to Niccolò’s personal achievement, 
his successor Neri Acciaiuoli, from the barony of Corinth, conquered the 
Catalan duchy of Athens and finally received the ducal investiture from the 
king of Naples in 1392. The last way in which Florence expanded its influence 
in the Levant was the humanist channel. Thanks to the humanist network of 
Coluccio Salutati, Florence was able to enjoy the presence of Manuel 








Chrysoloras in 1397. That same year, the embassy of Doria appeared in the city 
as well. Whether or not this was a coincidence, Florence was no longer the 
unknown Italian power as it was in the twelfth century. Since the first 
appearance of Doria’s embassy, Florence tried to obtain commercial privileges 
from the Byzantine empire. Clearly, the lack of a seaport affected every 
possible answer from the Byzantine emperors. Without a seaport, Florence 
could not guarantee annual shipping of wares which would justify the eventual 
grant of commercial privileges from the emperor.  
The lack of any mention of Demetrios’ embassy in 1402 to 1421, the 
year of the conquest of Porto Pisano, might not be a coincidence. From the 
moment of the acquisition of the seaport, Florence immediately appointed 
Bettino Bartoli, a Florentine citizen in Constantinople, to ask for commercial 
privileges from Manuel II. However, the emperor refused the Florentine’s 
request. This was probably because of the consolidated presence of Genoa and 
Venice in the Constantinopolitan market. The two Italian city states would 
have never allowed another competitor in the city of Constantinople. Besides, 
Genoa and Venice used to be the commercial brokers of Florentine cloths. 
Clearly, the two Italian cities had their reasons for preventing Florence from 
directly selling its wares in Constantinople.  
The ascension to the Byzantine throne of John VIII changed this 
political situation. The new emperor was determined to increase Latin 








involvement, and thus sent an embassy to Florence to discuss the eventual 
granting of commercial privileges around 1430. Again, the discussions failed. 
The reason for this is unclear, but it was probably again due to the interferences 
of Genoa and Venice. The appearance of the new Medici power in Florence in 
1434 did not change the political and commercial goals of the Florentine 
Signoria. The letter sent from Florence to Constantinople in 1436 was even 
more explicit than previous negotiations in its request for the same privileges 
enjoyed by the other Italian cities.  
What Florence did not accomplish through its diplomacy in embassies, 
letters and humanist exchanges, it finally achieved thanks to the Ecumenical 
Council. The presence of John VIII, and the consequent possibility to negotiate 
directly with him, helped Florence to receive commercial privileges in 1439. In 
Florence, Venice and Genoa were not able to pressure John VIII into refusing 
to grant the privileges to Florence. 
 In conclusion, I maintain that Florence’s commercial and political 
expansion in the Levant was not an initiative of a specific government or 
individual. It was the natural development of a city which boasted one of the 
most important cloth trades in Italy.157 It stands to a reason that Florence 
wanted to become the sole exporter of its own wares rather than pay Genoa and 
Venice for their commercial brokering. Finally, this ambition was made a 
                                                          
157 On the general development of Florence’s oversea markets, Levant excluded, see Ruddock 1951 
for England, and more in general see the introduction in Goldthwaite 2009:23-34.  








reality by the acquisition of Porto Pisano. However, the lack of sea experience 
and the late emergence in a market which was completely overwhelmed by 
Genoa and Venice again stalled the ambitions of the Florentine Signoria, at 






















On this day, 16th of August Wednesday at the 21st hour, the illustrious John Palaiologos, 
emperor of the Romans and of the Greeks, the August, had departed from Florence to 
return to Constantinople. He was going along … the Magistrates … and the Lords…and 
(the emperor) he (John VIII) greeted each Priors and the Standard-bearer of Justice. He 
(John VIII) appointed them Palatine counts …with the right to use the emperor’s coat of 
arms, to legitimate (children) ... He also abolished half of the tax and duties for all the 
Florentines in Constantinople…similarly he (John VIII) granted to this people (the 
Florentines) one house (loggia) which once belonged to the Pisan in Constantinople … 
and also the Florentines had the privilege to have their own consul. 158 
 
In January 1439, John VIII Palaiologos (1425-1448), together with the Patriarch of 
Constantinople, Joseph II (1416-1439), moved to Florence to attend the Ecumenical 
Council.159 Florence’s role was essential for a positive ending of the Council. The 
                                                          
158 Gutwirth 2001:290 Addi’ 16 dagosto il mercholedi’ insulle 21. Hora si parti’ di Firenze lo 
Illustrissimo Ioanni Peleologo Inperadore de’ Romani, e de’ Greci Aghusto, si parti’ di Firenze per 
ritornare a Ghostantinopoli….achonpagniato..e’ Magistrati..e’ Signori..e quivi el detto Inperadore gli 
visito’, e ciaschuno degli altri di detti Signori, el Ghonfaloniere della giust. Lascio’, e fecie chonte di 
Palazzo... 
159 On the Council see Gill 1964, 1967, 1979. 








union achieved by the Ecumenical Council was the necessary price for the emperor 
to pay in exchange for a future crusade against the Ottomans.160  
The pope was the main opponent to any past crusade expeditions in support 
of Constantinople as long as the emperors remained schismatic. In fact, the pope 
requested as mandatory condition that Byzantium acknowledge papal authority and 
accept the religious union with the Roman Church. At the same time, John VIII’s 
policy was clearly different from that of his father, Manuel II. John VIII and his 
father were in disagreement on account of Mustafa and his struggle against Murad II. 
As is well known, Manuel II accepted his son’s decision to support Mustafa though 
expressing his disagreement. As far as the Ecclesiastical Union is concerned, John 
VIII, unlike his father, considered the Union the sole way to save Constantinople 
from the Ottoman threat. Therefore, John VIII tended strongly towards the Latins 
instead of the Ottomans, despite the theological hostility between the Western and 
Eastern world.161 The emperor was surely aware of the risk in pursuing the 
Churches’ Union as a factor of political instability. Already the past Union (Lyon 
1274) brought conflicts within the Byzantine empire. Therefore, John VIII willingly 
risked internal turmoil for the religious Union just to obtain papal support for the 
crusade. The same impressive number of Byzantine delegates at the Council 
                                                          
160 There are letters between Florence and the pope with regard to the imperial schedule. For the 
letters see Müller 1879:159-172.  Florence held the Council not only to raise their prestige but also to 
gain the occasion to negotiate directly with the Byzantine emperor by having the latter in the city. As 
a matter of fact, holding the Council would give to the Florentine government the opportunity to 
negotiate with the John VIII free from any negative enforcing enacted by Genoa or Venice. The same 
Pope Eugene IV had been guest of Florence from 1434 (therefore from the return of the Medici in the 
city) to 1438 (beginning of the Ecumenical Council in Ferrara).  
161 For John VIII’s policies see particularly Djuric 1995. On Manuel II see Barker 1969.  








remarked on the importance the event held for the emperor.162 In fact, never in 
Byzantine history had such an impressive delegation ever gone to Italy. This is the 
main reason why it was to be a very different event from the Council of Lyon in 
1274 or the personal conversion of John V in 1369. Also, John VIII brought with 
him personalities who were publicly against the Union such as Mark Eugenikos or 
Georgios Scholarios. The emperor left the city of Florence on 16 August 1439. 
Moreover, John VIII granted two different chrysoboulloi logoi and nine prostagmata 
to the highest offices in the Florentine Commune. 
This chapter analyses all the privileges granted by the emperor to Florence in 
1439. The analysis will cover the contents, the diplomatic composition, and the 
political and economic background behind the privileges. The investigated 
documents are two chrysoboulloi logoi and two prostagmata, all written in 
Palaiologan minuscule.163 Specifically, each one is addressed to the Standard-bearer 
of Justice and the Priors of Arts on behalf of Florence.164 Each chrysobull has the 
golden bull attached at the middle end of the page.  
One chrysobull granted to Florence commercial privileges, such as the right 
to have a loggia, a consul and a church in Constantinople. For the purposes of the 
chapter analysis, this chrysobull will be identified as the commercial chrysobull from 
now on. The other chrysobull granted to the Florentine Signoria the right to appoint 
                                                          
162 Such as Mark Eugenikos, the Patriarch, the emperor of Constantinople and several others. 
163 About the document classification see Dölger-Karayannopulos 1968 and Oikonomidès 1985:167-
195. 
164 From this moment instead of Standard-Bearer etc., I will use the term Signoria. 








imperial notaries and to legitimate extra-marital children. This chrysobull will be 
identified as the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. 
The chrysobull is the most important imperial grant of privilege. The name 
comes from the Greek χρσός (gold) and βούλλα (seal). This is because of the 
traditional golden bull normally attached at the end of the document. The chrysobull 
had specific and strictly adhered to diplomatic features, such as a rhetorical preamble 
(prooimion), three logos written in red ink and the κράτος formula. The rhetorical 
preamble normally contains ideological elements connected to the imperial figure.165 
These elements are part of the imperial ideology of the Byzantine empire and 
stressed the emperor’s quality as being the supreme good for the mankind. The logoi 
are authentication elements present only in the chrysoboulloi logoi. The emperor 
himself signed the logos after the chancery finished drawing up the document. 
Finally, the κράτος was a specific formula of the chrysobull which contains the 
‘emperor’s autograph subscription written below’.166 
Scholars have divided the chrysobulls granted through the course of 
Byzantine history into two kinds: the chrysoboullos logos and the chrysoboullon 
sigillion. Only these charters have the important golden seal attached from the lower 
margin of the document. The chrysobull logos is the more important of the two. To 
use the words of Müller, the logos was ‘a dignified expression of imperial majesty, in 
                                                          
165 See Angelov 2007:29-51. 
166 OHBS 2008:133. 








accordance with the ideology of the Byzantine ruler and the representational needs of 
that ideology’.167  
The prostagma is an imperial ordinance whose purpose changed several times 
in history. At the beginning it was originally called prostaxis (eleventh to thirteenth 
century) only to become later prostagma (thirteenth to fifteenth century). The name 
is a clear indication of the original purpose of the prostagma, which is the joining of 
the term pros (to) and tagma (the army). In the later period, the prostagma was used 
to grant honorific titles, minor privileges, appointing individuals to administrative 
position, etc.168 This charter does not have the golden seal, the three logos written in 
red ink or the κράτος  formula. It was after all a minor kind of grant, thus it does not 
have the same authentication elements as the chrysobull logos.169 The prostagmata 
were given to each member of the Florentine Signoria and appointed the recipient of 
the title of Palatine Count with the right to elect imperial notaries and legitimise 
illegal children.  
Scholars have often neglected the study of these privileges as they have 
simply acknowledged the contents of the privileges and never raised any doubt about 
the effect achieved by Florence’s implementation of John VIII’s privileges such as 
the loggia, the consul.170  
                                                          
167 OHBS 2008:130. 
168 See ODB, s.v. prostagma.  
169 OHBS 2008:132-133. 
170 Necipoğlu 2009, İnalcik 1997, Antoniadis-Bibicou 1963. As stated in the introduction, the list is 
very long.  








As far as the diplomatic analysis of the Florentine privileges is concerned, 
scholars have never specifically studied the privileges but always mentioned them in 
passing to compare other documents of the same typology. Probably the most 
extensive investigation belongs to Božidar Ferjančić who engaged in a deeper 
discussion of the diplomatic composition.171  However, this analysis is quite 
incomplete as the author failed to notice important elements within the grants. 
Besides, Ferjančić did not take into consideration the actual contents of the privileges 
which, in my opinion, are essential for a correct analysis of these privileges. This 
chapter includes an in-depth analysis of all the privileges which connects the content 
with their diplomatic composition.  
It is important at the outset to discuss the historical background of the 
privileges. Moreover, a brief history of the privileges granted by Byzantium to the 
Italian cities may be useful since Florence was the last Italian city to receive 
commercial privileges from Byzantine emperors. I did not take into account the 
Byzantine privileges given to Venice because of its particular history with the 
Byzantine empire. The complexity of the relation between Venice and 
Constantinople consequently made the privileges clearly different from the privileges 
given to other foreign powers.172 Another question is if the Florentine privileges are a 
transfer of the previous Pisan privileges granted by the Byzantine emperors. The 
Florentines in the past had often tried to disguise themselves as Pisan citizens in 
                                                          
171 Ferjančić 1967, Dölger-Karayannopulos 1968 just mentioned in passing.  
172 On Venice and Byzantium see Nicol 1988. 








order to pay fewer taxes on their wares.173 Besides, one of the first attempts made in 
1422 by Florence after the acquisition of Pisa and Porto Pisano was to present itself 
to the Byzantine emperor as the natural heir of the Pisan privileges due to right of 
conquest.174 Moreover, the emperor effectively granted the buildings Pisa had been 
using in Constantinople. Probably for this reason past scholarship interpreted the 
commercial chrysobull as a transfer from the previous Pisan privileges to 
Florence.175 This chapter will present a comparison of Pisa’s privileges with the 
commercial grants given to Florence in order to establish the nature of the 
commercial chrysobull.  
 
The commercial chrysobull 
 
The document is formed by three folia glued together while the ductus is in Greek 
Palaiologan minuscule. The imperial signature is in red ink. The text states: ‘John in 
Christ God faithful emperor and autocrat of the Romans the Palaiologos and always 
August’.176 The word logos is written three times in red ink in accordance with the 
Byzantine diplomatic tradition. There is no intitulatio or inscriptio as the document 
                                                          
173 Pegolotti 1936:84. Another reference on this matter is in Villani 1990, book 7 chapter 53: e 
eziandio i Fiorentini si spacciavano in Tunisi per Pisani. 
174 After the conquest of Porto Pisano there is Bartoli’s mission in Constantinople. The Signoria 
ordered Bettino Bartoli to present Florence as Pisa’s successor to the privileges for conquest right. See 
chapter I of this PhD dissertation.  
175 Müller 1879, Miklosich-Müller 1860-1890, Lampros 1924. Texts are also in Appendix I. 
176 Müller 1879:174-175. 








starts immediately with the prooimion. The latter presents typical aspect of the 
Byzantine conception of power such as to be generous, to show a sense of humanity 
and to behave showing generosity.177  
After the prooimion, the document leads to the proper narratio, in which the 
Florentines present the requests. The requests are for a consul, a general safe 
conduct, several immunities, tax exemptions and concrete grants such as the loggia, 
the church and the possibility to buy or build houses for their citizens. Furthermore, 
the document states that the Florentines specifically requested these grants. The 
emperor honours Florence through these imperial concessions.178 
The narratio shows the reasons behind the grants, that is, the honours and the 
loyalty which John VIII received from the Florentines due to the Florentine 
involvement as host of the Ecumenical Council.179 As far as the dispositio is 
concerned, the document grants to the Florentines the use of the church of St. Peter 
Apostle and the loggia, located in Galata, which once belonged to Pisa. The 
Florentines are required to expose in the loggia the Communal coat of arms next to 
that of the emperor’s eagle.180 They may elect one consul in Constantinople. The 
consul has legal and legislative powers over the other Florentines, just as the other 
Italian consuls living in Constantinople. The consul may have also a stronghold in 
                                                          
177 Id.:174-175.  
178 Id.:175.  
179 Id.:175.  
180 Id.:175.  








which to reside and to imprison convicted Florentines.181 Another concession given 
to the Florentines is the right to buy or build in Constantinople at most three houses 
for Florentine use.182 Finally, the emperor granted a safe conduct to all the merchants 
and citizens to do business in Constantinople. The document specifies that it is not 
usual to lower the kommerkion due to consequent damages caused to the imperial 
economy.183  
The sanctio specifies that all the privileges become invalid if Florence and 
Byzantium go to war with one another.184 I also want to stress that the privileges 
granted to Florence concern only Constantinople, not the remaining Byzantine 
territories, such as Morea or Mesembria. In fact, the document clarifies that the safe 
conduct allows the Florentines to travel only to and from the Byzantine capital.185 
Furthermore, some years after these concessions, the Florentine Commune 
presumably received from the despot of Morea an argyrobull in 1451 which 
theoretically gave some privileges within the despotate of Morea to Florence.186 I 
wrote “theoretically” because the original copy is lacking and we have only Lascaris’ 
offer. This document, written in Greek, is an offer of an argyrobull presented by 
Athanasius Lascaris to Florence in 1451. Therefore, I think it plausible that the 
Florentines did not enjoy any commercial privilege within the despotate of Morea (at 
                                                          
181 Id.:175-176.   
182 Id.:176.  
183 Id.:176.
184 Id.:176.  
185 Id.:176.  
186  The document has been published by Müller 1879:177-178. I should add that Müller dated the 
document to 1439. However, the correct date is 1451. For the date see Zakythinos 1975:2.276-2.278. 
In addition, Athanasius Lascaris was travelling in Italy in 1451. See PLP n.14522, 145. Unfortunately, 
it seems that there is no original argyroubulla in the Florentine State Archive, but only Lascaris’ offer. 








least not before 1451). Moreover, Florence could not have sailed to the Black Sea 
since the chrysobull mentions only Constantinople. This exclusion is important since 
Florence would have remained officially excluded from the rich markets of Tana, 
Caffa and Trebizond. Accordingly, the Florentine state-galleys officially approached 
the Black Sea only after the fall of Constantinople.187  
The κράτος formula is indeed interesting. Dölger affirmed that one of the 
points for understanding whether a document is original or a forgery is the presence 
of the word κράτος as the first word in the last sentence. However, in this the κράτος 
emerged as the last word of the last sentence.188  
The reason for the absence of any commitments for Florence in the 
chrysobull is probably due to the weakness of the Byzantine empire at the time. The 
emperor had no coercive power to force Florence into stricter duties in exchange for 
the privileges.189 Therefore, contrary to other Italian privileges, Florence remained 
free from any binding agreements.  
Another brief observation on the golden bull remains. In the front, there is the 
imperial figure standing and holding the crossed sceptre. On the left, part of the 
inscription states: 
IW(ANNHS) 
                                                          
187 Mallett first edited the galley list. Mallett 1967:153-176; and then Sapori recovered it. Sapori 1972: 
104-109. The list presents an empty space from 1447 to 1454. 
188 See Dölger-Karayannopulos 1968:137. See also Guillou 1991:94-95. 
189 As it appears common in every chrysobull, the sanctio relates to the support of the empire 
whenever an enemy arises against it. As an example … si inimici vestri insurrexerint in quibus nostri 
sunt e necesse fuerit, ut adiuvent homines vestros, terras vestra. 








While on the right: 
 
 
On the reverse side, there is the blessing Christ standing on a suppedion. On the left 
side the inscription states: 
On the right side: 








Finally, one must consider whether the Florentine commercial chrysobull was 
a transfer of Pisa’s previous privileges. The contents disprove this hypothesis.  
What was the extent of the privileges granted to Pisa from Constantinople? 
Pisa received commercial privileges from the empire on four occasions. The first 
grant received was from Alexios I Komnenos (1111), from John II Komnenos 
(1136), Manuel I Komnenos (1170), and last Isaac II Angelos (1192).190 The 
emperor Isaac II granted the latter after a period of turmoil, the so-called Latin 
massacre (1182). Isaac II gave to Pisa significant improvements to the previous 
privilege concerning the kommerkion. The emperor extended the kommerkion of a 
four per cent rate, previously limited to imported foreign goods, to all the 
transactions without any limit of sort. However, exported goods remained liable to 
the full kommerkion which was a ten per cent rate. As far as the trade locations are 
concerned, the privilege allowed Pisa to access ‘tam in magna Urbe, quam in ceteris 
terris nostrae piae tranquillitatis’ which excluded any past restrictive 
interpretation.191  
                                                          
190 About the Genoese’s Latin versions see Imperiale 1936-1942:2.112. In addition, there are two 
different versions, different in wording but similar in the content. For the Greek, see Miklosich- 
Müller 1860-1890: 3.25-3.37 (issued by Isaac II Angelos containing both Manuel and Alexius’s 
privileges) For Pisa’s version see Müller, 1879:1.43-1.45; 1.52-1.54 (for both Latin-Greek editions). 
See also Zepos 1962:5.457-5.467 and Lilie 1984. For secondary literature the list is long especially for 
Genoa. Again it is important to have in mind Balard’s huge work Balard 1978.  
191 Since the past chrysobulls were restricted to Constantinople and the Aegean Islands. On the matter 
see Jacoby 1994:349-368. 








The grants to Florence were quite different with regard to the kommerkion. 
John VIII, in the commercial privilege given to Florence, reduced the kommerkion to 
two per cent, which was a net gain for Constantinople compared to the privilege 
given to Pisa. Furthermore, the Florentines enjoyed this tax exemption not only with 
regard to imported or to domestic goods, but also for exported wares which, as I 
mentioned, was at ten per cent for Pisa. Moreover, Florentine trade was limited to 
Constantinople, while Pisa’s merchants were free to trade in the empire at large.192 
The Florentine chrysobull mentioned only the city of Constantinople without adding 
any other place such as Morea or the Black Sea domain like Mesembria. Though not 
explicitly stated, the Florentines could not officially do business outside 
Constantinople.193 In conclusion, the Florentine commercial chrysobull do not at all 
resemble Pisa’s privileges. Due to pragmatic reasons, the emperor granted to 
Florence the same buildings used in the past by Pisa since the latter was now subject 
to Florence’s power.194  
 
The problems in the diplomatic composition of the commercial chrysobull 
 
                                                          
192   For Pisa’s privileges see fn. 184. 
193 A possible explanation lies in John’s VIII will to concentrate the foreign merchants in 
Constantinople as he hoped to force the involved cities to contribute to Constantinople’s defence in 
the event of an Ottoman attack. However, there are no specific sources that can support this theory. 
194 On the Pisan colony in Constantinople see Matschke 2002:476; for topographical references see 
Janin 1964. 








There are some unclear points in the commercial chrysobull which need further 
clarifications. The commercial chrysobull has certain unusual features that set this 
grant apart from other chrysobulls given by the Byzantine emperors to foreign 
powers, first in the chrysobull logos. In this period the Byzantine emperors almost 
never issued chrysobull logos for commercial privileges. All previous commercial 
privileges granted by Byzantine emperors in the period after the Fourth Crusade were 
not chrysobull logos but the so-called chrysobull sigillion. The chrysobull sigillion is 
a minor form of the chrysobull logos also defined as ‘small charter of privileges’.195 
The sigillion does not have the prooimion. The commercial privileges given by 
Andronikos II Palaiologos in 1290 to the Catalan merchants is a chrysobull sigillion, 
just as the other privilege granted to the Catalan merchants by Andronikos II in 
1320.196 The privilege given by John V Palaiologos to the Provençal merchants 
(without date) is also a chrysobull sigillion.197 On the contrary, the privilege given by 
Constantine XI Palaiologos to Ragusa’s merchants in 1451 is a chrysobull logos, but 
does not include the prooimion just as the normal chrysobull sigillion.198 The only 
commercial privilege which is a chrysobull logos and that includes the prooimion is 
Florence’s commercial privilege in 1439.199 Clearly this uniqueness is strange by 
                                                          
195 OHBS:132, Angelov 2007:41. 
196 Both the privileges are in Miklosich-Müller 1865: 3.97-3.98. 
197 Miklosich-Müller 1865:3.120. 
198 On the privilege given to Ragusa/Dubrovnik see Miklosich-Müller 1865:3.228, Zepos 1962:5.603-
5.605.  From now on this PhD dissertation will mention Ragusa/Dubrovnik as Ragusa for reasons of 
simplicity. 
199 On the history of Ragusa and its role in the Mediterranean see Krekić 1972, Id. 1986. For the 
negotiations between Ragusa and Constantine XI see Krekić1986. 








itself but is not the only element which marks a difference with previous chrysobulls 
given by Byzantine emperors to foreign powers.  
The commercial chrysobull presents a long and unusual repetition which is an 
odd element for a chrysobull logos. In fact, the dispositio seems to repeat twice, as 
the repetition includes juridical formulas along with the concessions. Therefore, one 
must inquire about the authenticity of the source through the comparison of this 
commercial chrysobull to similar documents. The investigation of past chrysobulls, 
and especially those given to the Italian cities, confirms the absence of any kind of 
repetition such as the one present in the Florentine privileges.  
Some new answers emerge after the investigation of the three other documents. 
The three documents are the chrysoboullos logos given by John VIII to Gemistus 
Pletho in 1426, the chrysoboullos logos given by Constantine XI to Ragusa in 1451, 
and the chrysoboullos logos given by Manuel II in 1405 to the church of 
Monemvasia. All these documents present similar repetitions. The verb διορίζεται 
introduces as usual the formula which precedes the dispositio.200 Then, in the 
dispositio, there are the grants conceded by the emperor. However, after the 
dispositio there is not the eschatocol, which is the final part of the document, for 
another pseudo-dispositio appears and is introduced by verbs such as νέμω, ἔχω and 
κατέχω.201 After these verbs there is exact repetition, word for word, of the same 
                                                          
200 See Appendix I/A. The chrysobull to Pletho is in Lampros 1926:330. 
201 For κατέχω see the chrysobull to Pletho. For ἔχω see the first privilege to the Florentine Commune. 
For νέμω see the privilege to Ragusa and both νέμω and κατέχω in the second privilege to Florence. 








contents present in the dispositio. The repetition, or second disposition, starts for all 
the three chrysobulls with a specific formula: 




The first appearance of the formula is in Michael VIII Palaiologos’ chrysobull 
granted to the monastery of Makrinitissa in 1272.203 This document is, however, 
slightly different in its wording. The same formula appears again only in 1317 in 
another chrysobull granted by Andronikos to the inhabitants of Monemvasia.204 The 
formula appears also in a Latin notarial copy of an imperial privilege which was 
produced probably in a period from 1328 to 1341 by the recipient of the privilege, 
that is, the Provençal merchants. The formula states: 
 Huius etenim rei gratia robore et virtute praesentis privilegii Imperii nostri
205 
 
However, in these documents, after the formula, the repetition is not to the letter. It is 
a sort of summary of the single grants articulated in the dispositio. Manuel II’s 
chrysobull provides the first example of repetition word for word after the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ἔχω applies also for the chrysobull of Manuel II see Τῇ γοῦν ἰσχύι καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος 
χρυσοβούλλου λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου ἕξει . All documents are in Appendix I/A. 
202  Τῇ ἰσχύι γοῦν καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου… 
203 Michael VIII’s chrysobull however does not present a repetition word for word, but it is more like 
a summary of the concessions present in the dispositio.  Moreover, the formula is similar but not the 
same τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου. Also, present with a similar formulation in 
the chrysobull given by Andronicus in 1284 to the inhabitants of Monemvasia. Zepos 1962:5.513-
5.515. 
204 Zepos 1962:5.538-5.541. 
205 Zepos 1962:5.586-5.588. There another Greek privilege granted by John V Palaiologos in Greek in 
Ligenthal 1857:3.712-3.713.  








dispositio.206 This variation from the past diplomatic composition might indicate a 
different standard in the use of the imperial chancery in Manuel II’s reign, due the 
absence of any similar construction in the past.  Therefore, it might be that from the 
end of the thirteenth century a new chancery typology emerged which evolved 
further to new forms during the late fourteenth century.  
This new chancery standard still does not explain the odd diplomatic 
construction of the commercial chrysobull. Evidently, the presence of the prooimion 
is rather odd since it is absent from chrysobulls granted to foreign powers such as 
Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Ragusa etc.207 While the repetition might not be a notarial 
mistake but a change of the imperial chancery, still the repetitions are notably longer 
than they should be.  
Other chrysobulls given at different times which have these repetitions never 
include any juridical formulas within these repetitions, but only the material 
concessions of the dispositio. However, the Florentine privileges are different, as the 
text not only repeats material concessions but also juridical formulas. The absence of 
any scholars’ works and the scarcity of sources about this issue complicate this 
analysis. Despite the common presence of this repetition in other imperial 
                                                          
 206 I have found the earliest attestation of this kind of chancery typology in a chrysobull of Manuel II 
in 1394. See Zepos 1962:1.696-1.698. We must note that the repetition is not always word for word, 
but it can also repeat using different words. See Zepos 1962- 1.702-1.704. The privilege given by to 
the Catalan merchants in 1290 has the formula tῇ ἰσχύι γοῦν καὶ δυνάμει…, but lacks of the repetition 
in the same words. Another privilege given by Andronicus II (1320) still to the Catalan merchants 
does not have the formula, probably because the latter is only a confirmation of the privileges already 
given in 1290.  
207 Dölger 1968:125. 








documents, the fact cannot be ignored that the Florentine commercial chrysobull 
appears to be written in a superficial and careless form.  
Moreover, Florence had no legal Latin copy of the imperial privileges, in 
contrast to Pisa and Genoa which had proper notarial copies of their privileges.208 
Iorga argued about the presence of a copy in Latin of the commercial privileges 
which might be the one published in Pagnini.209 This copy is not authenticated by 
any Byzantine officer, so it is likely that this text was made for the convenience of 
the Florentine Commune since the notarial subscription was an essential 
authentication feature in the Latin chancery.210 What is intriguing is that this Latin 
copy includes the same unusual structure of the commercial chrysobull and appears 
to be a complete translation of the Greek privilege. 
Why the Commune did not produce a Latin authenticated copy during the 
Council is a mystery. Every power normally had the possession of a notarial copy in 
the recipient language to be assured as much as possible in case of any controversy, 
as it was a sort of legal assurance especially with regards to business events.211 
Unfortunately, only further archival research may shed illuminating light on this 
controversy.  
                                                          
208 The logothetes tou dromou usually certified the Latin copy, as it appears in Isaac II’s privilege to 
Pisa where it is written that Demetrius Tornikes, sebastos and logothetes tou dromou, approved and 
certified the document. For the last Latin chrysobull given to Genoa in 1352 see Zepos 1962:5.595-
599. 
209 Pagnini 1765:1.230-234. 
210 Iorga 1899: 3.365. 
211 See all the privileges given by Constantinople to the Italian cities. Only Florence lacks of the 
notarial copy.  See chapter II fn. 186. 








The last reason which creates some doubts about the originality of the 
commercial chrysobull is that Florence never enacted the commercial privilege. 
Florence, even after 1439, seems not to have had a consul, a loggia etc. The first ever 
mention of a Florentine consul in Constantinople is on 3 May 1461 in a letter sent 
from Benedetto Dei to Carlo Martelli which mentioned the presence of Mainardo 
Ubaldini as Florentine consul.212 Obviously, for the latter period the city was already 
the capital of the Ottoman empire. Even the statutes of the foreign Florentine colony 
seem to confirm this hypothesis as the first drafting is in 1480.213 Moreover, we do 
not have any letters sent from the Signoria to Florentine consuls and vice-versa for 
both John VIII and Constantine XI’s reigns. Finally, there is no documentary 
evidence of the eventual appointment of any Florentine to the consular rank in 
Constantinople. The only partial evidence is a document which concerns the right to 
sell alum in Tuscany to certain Florentine merchants. However, the document 
specifies that the act happened in logia dominorum Catalanorum and not 
Florentinorum.214 The only mention of a possible Florentine presence is in the 
notarial signature. However, the signature only affirms that:  
Petrus Samoyragensis, publicum imperiali auctoritate notarius et curie consulatus 
dominorum Catalanorum et Florentenorum in regia urbe Constantinopolis 
cancellarius215 
 
                                                          
212 The letter is in Orvieto 1969:228-230. Chapter VI and VII will have more information about 
Mainardo as it will deal with the first period of the Florentine colony in Constantinople. 
213 Masi 1941 contains the statute done in 1488, yet this is a reference to a previous statute in 1480. 
214 Müller 1879:172. 
215 Müller 1879:169-172. 








Therefore, the document does not mention any effective presence of a 
Florentine loggia but rather seems to imply that the Florentines administrated official 
businesses in Constantinople in the Catalan loggia.216 Yet, due to the lack of sources 
on this matter, it is not clear whether there was an agreement between the Florentine 
Signoria and the Catalans. Finally, this transaction happened in 1437 which is two 
years before the Council and the grants of the privileges. For this chronological 
reason this document cannot be used as a proof of the existence of a Florentine 
loggia in Constantinople under the Byzantine empire. 
Unfortunately, I was not able to find more convincing evidence which could 
prove the commercial chrysobull to be a forgery. Clearly I was surprised to have an 
imperial chrysobull of such low quality and unique in structure and not even enacted 
by the Florentine Signoria, despite the long-time efforts spent by Florence (since 
1397) to obtain commercial grants from the emperors. 
The only hypothesis so far plausible is to suggest a possible inexperienced 
copyist or notary. Of course, this particular mistake is difficult to attribute to a 
Byzantine expert copyist. Especially, since this document is a chrysoboullos logos 
that is by any means the most important charter of the Byzantine chancery. At the 
same time, however, the hypothesis that the copyist was a Florentine notary who 
badly copied or even created from the scratch this commercial privilege is at the 
                                                          
216 The Catalans had a loggia since 1290; see the privilege given to the Catalan merchants in 
Miklosich-Müller 1879: 3.97-3.98. 
 








moment impossible for me to demonstrate. Therefore, for now, I am not able to 
provide an answer to this enigma without speculation. 
The chrysobull dealing with domestic matters 
 
Along with the commercial chrysoboullos logos, John VIII granted another 
chrysoboullos logos which gave to Florence the right to create and elect imperial 
notaries. The document contains three folia glued together. The ductus is in 
Palaiologan minuscule and at the bottom there is attached the customary golden bull. 
As in the previous chrysobull, there are the imperial signature and the three mentions 
of the logos, both in red ink. There are no other authentication marks in the text, just 
as the previous commercial chrysobull. This chrysobull granted to the Florentine 
Commune the right to create public notaries. While there are certainly other 
examples of chrysobulls given by emperors to cities within the Byzantine empire, the 
contents of these documents does not at all resemble those of the Florentine 
privileges. In fact, these privileges often relate to juridical property, tax exemptions 
or property alienation to or from the imperial territory or the city.217 The Florentine 
privilege, on the contrary, differs completely from all other chrysobulls and appears 
in a certain sense unique in the composition.218  
                                                          
217 See for a general description of the chrysobull given to imperial cities Kyritses 1999:229-243. 
218 For the document see Müller 1879:172-174; Lampros, 1972: 335-338.  








There are several other differences connected to the diplomatic composition of 
the document. The presence of the intitulatio is clearly something unique for this 
document when it is considered from the point of view of the late Byzantine 




Moreover, the prooimion is different from the commercial chrysobull. Of 
course, the rhetorical introduction presents typical ideas of the Byzantine conception 
of power. However, the main issue which emerges from the ideological preamble is 
the necessity to give noble concessions in order to promote those (people) who had 
deserved such great honour. This would later assume importance in the political 
contextualisation of this chrysobull. 
The narratio follows more or less the same pattern of the previous 
chrysobull. The document then carries on with the dispositio, that is, the list of all the 
concessions granted by the emperor to the Florentine Commune. This dispositio 
includes some unique grants both of pragmatic and ideological nature. As mentioned 
above, John VIII granted to the Signoria the right to create and elect public notaries 
with imperial authority.220 Moreover, the document clearly states the elected notaries 
                                                          
219 Müller 1879:172.  
220 Müller 1879:173. 








must give an oath of fidelity to the Byzantine empire.221 The public notaries can 
write letters, contracts, acts and agreements. These notarial deeds follow the laws of 
the city in which the imperial notaries would live and work. Moreover, all the acts 
that the notaries produce enjoyed the imperial authority (βασιλικός ἐξουσία). 222 
Besides, the emperor granted the same βασιλικός ἐξουσία for making legal 
illegitimate children to the Signoria, with the exclusion of the illegitimate children of 
the nobility.223 Finally, the future governments which would later be elected kept 
these grants.  
Since the document presents some unusual features, I will analyse in greater 
detail its diplomatic and palaeographic composition. The first problem is to identify 
the typology of this document. This chrysoboullos logos differs in key respects with 
those granted in the past by the Byzantine emperors. The presence of the intitulatio 
at the beginning of the text is an unusual element, as these kinds of documents from 
the thirteenth century onward usually start with the narratio.224 Moreover, just as in 
the first chrysobull, even in this grant the κράτος formula does not follow the usual 
tradition of being the first word of the last sentence. Here the κράτος is the second 
                                                          
221 ἀφ’ ὧν καὶ λήψονται ὅρκον σωματικὸν καὶ ὑπόσχεσιν, ὥστε πανταχοῦ πιστοὺς εἶναι τῇ βασιλείᾳ 
[μου] . The μου is actually an insertion made by Müller. Logically without this insertion the oath of 
fidelity became to the empire (in general) and not my power/the emperor. I think in this case that the 
most correct definition would be empire for the documents mentions notaries. The notaries normally 
are faithful in respect to the laws so the Byzantine empire. 
222 Müller 1879:173. 
223 Idem. 
224 See the other privilege to the Florentines, or the one to the Ragusa Commune. Moreover, the same 
Genoese and Pisan privileges do not have the intitulatio and the ideological prooimion.  See also 
Dölger-Karayannopulos 1968:120-125. 








word in the last sentence. Finally, the golden bull is smaller compared to the bull in 
the commercial chrysobull. 
Since the contents closely resemble Western charters, I will present a 
comparison of this document to some imperial diplomas normally granted by 
Western emperors. A preliminary comparison seems to show some contamination 
derived from Latin diplomatic practice in both the domestic chrysobull and the 
prostagmata. The first element is the presence of the intitulatio which started to 
disappear in the Byzantine chancery from the thirteenth century.225 Besides, this is 
the first time that a Byzantine emperor gave to a foreign power the right to elect 
public notaries with imperiale auctoritate and to make legal illegitimate children.226 
Venice, Genoa and Pisa never received any similar concessions. The several 
irregularities present in the document make me doubt the chrysobull authenticity and 
think it may be the result of a forgery.  
 In fact, a comparison between the commercial document and the chrysobull 
dealing with domestic matters shows further differences between the two documents. 
In this particular case, the prostagmata acquire a special importance, for the 
chrysobull and the prostagmata have features in common, while the commercial 
chrysobull seems a different document. The chrysobull dealing with domestic 
                                                          
225 Dölger-Karayannopulos 1968:120-125.See also Guillou 1991. The imperial diploma given by the 
emperor Sigismund to the Italian Giovanni Francesco Capodilista can be found in Notarile, 3343, f. 
60-62v.  Sigismondus divina favente clementia Romanorum Imperator semper Augustus… Or Albertus 
etc. see Koller 1955:38-40. 
226 Western notaries with imperial authority had this title: notarius publicus imperiali auctoritate. 








matters, contrary to the commercial chrysobull, have the intitulatio, the golden bull is 
relatively smaller, and in the eschatocol there are three crosses rather than one.  
Moreover, the analysis on the text brought up several other issues which seem 
to confirm that the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters is definitively a forgery. 
Even the logoi are slightly different. In fact, the logoi of the chrysobull dealing with 
domestic matters seem more an imitation rather than being the work of the same 
hand. 
                                                                               First difference 
                                                         Logos in the documents 
Commercial chrysobull                                      Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters 
                                            
I have already mentioned the different eschatocol of the commercial 
chrysobull with only one cross and the other document with three crosses. 
Second difference 
Crosses 








Commercial chrysobull                                                                       Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters 
 
Between the commercial chrysobull and the chrysobull dealing with domestic 
matters there are other differences especially in the ductus The first difference is in 
the  between  and which is only in the chrysobull dealing with 
domestic matters and the prostagmata but not in the commercial chrysobull. The 
latter, instead has  which is not present in the other documents. 
Third difference 
Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters                                                                         Commercial chrysobull 
 
 
Moreover, while in the commercial chrysobull appears , on 
the other hand the chrysobull and the prostagmata has . 
Some other very important issues are due to the imperial signature: the commercial 
chrysobull has one “point” between and  and one between  and  while the 
chrysobull dealing with domestic matters has one point between  and  and 
one between  and .  
Fourth difference 








                  Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters                                                                    Commercial chrysobull 
 
The fifth difference concerns the construction of the word leus in the emperor’s 
signature. The domestic chrysobull appears again to be an imitation.  
Fifth difference 
   Commercial chrysobull                                                                            Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters 
 
Another important difference is in the final part of the imperial signature. The two 
crosses at the end are clearly different. The chrysobull dealing with domestic matters 
has two points, while the commercial chrysobull does not have any. Moreover, there 
is an extreme difference between the shapes of the two crosses. The line which 
connects the logos to the cross seems written by a different hand. In addition, the 
















         Commercial chrysobull                                                                       Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters 
  
Another crucial difference is in the indictio of the two documents. The 
commercial chrysobull has the indictio written in numerals, while the other 
chrysobull has the indictio in letters. 
Seventh difference 
Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters                                            Commercial chrysobull  
 
 
I do not think these particular differences are the result of notarial sloppiness, 
for the faults are too many and too drastic. The ending of the imperial signature 








seems the result of notarial ignorance rather than sloppiness. I think, therefore, that 
there are two different hands which signed the chrysobulls as the imperial signature 
in the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters is completely different and likely to 
be an attempted imitation. The chrysobull dealing with domestic matter is the result 
of a forgery rather than of a new particular kind of document given by the Byzantine 
chancery. I will present more proofs especially after the introduction of the 
prostagmata. 
The two complete signatures 















The prostagmata as forgeries 
 
As I have already mentioned, John VIII supposedly granted, together with the two 
chrysobulls, one prostagma for each of the highest offices in the Florentine 
government: the Standard-bearer of Justice and the eight Priors of Arts.227 There are 
three sources related to the prostagmata. One prostagma was granted to Michele 
Fedini Brancacci and transcribed by Giovanni Lami. The second was granted to 
Giacomo de’ Morelli. There is also the Italian vernacular translation in a manuscript.  
This translation is only partial and concerns the prostagma granted to Domenico di 
Tano Petrucci.228  
As far as the classification of the prostagmata is concerned, Dölger and 
Karayannopulos (1968) argued that the documents are kodikelloi rather than 
prostagmata, while Božidar Ferjančić (1967) believed them to be prostagmata.  
Moreover, while Dölger believed the latter to be the original document granted by 
John VIII, Ferjančić supported the idea that this document was a copy from the 
original.229 It is plausible that Dölger’s idea is not completely correct as the 
                                                          
227 For a total of 9 prostagmata. 
228 Morelli’s can be found in the Bibliothèque Nationale Paris, Cod. Gr. Suppl. 821, Fedini’s 
prostagma is a hand-made copy by Giovanni Lami in the eighteenth century. Preserved in the Estense, 
Cod. Campori 1075. The vulgar translation of Petrucci’s prostagma is in Florence, BNCF, Conventi 
soppressi, C4 895 fol. 141r-142r. The other families who received the privilege are the following: 
Alessandri, Cocchi Donati, Marignolli, Marsili, Petrucci, and Carducci. 
See«http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/ceramellipapiani/servlet/action?navigate=Log» s.v. 
Alessandri, Cocchi Donati, Marignolli, Marsili, Petrucci, Carducci; See S. Ammirato, Istorie 
Fiorentine, Firenze 1826, VII, p. 280. 
229 See Dölger 1976 n. 3489. 








kodikellos rarely gives honorific titles and, in general, few of these particular 
documents survive to today. In addition, one must analyse whether Morelli’s 
document preserved by the Bibliothèque Nationale of France is an original or a copy. 
Ferjančić maintained that the menologem seemed completely different from other 
documents. There is, therefore, the possibility that the copyist had the original at his 
disposal and tried to imitate the John VIII’s menologem.  
Brancacci’s prostagma is a hand-copy made by Giovanni Lami.230 Lami’s 
copy, contrary to Morelli’s document, strangely includes the day of the drawing up, 6 
August. The difference is more likely the result of an interpolation, suppression or 
simply a mistake depending on which of the two documents is wrong.  Besides, if 
Lami’s copy is correct the date proposed by the Priorista (and Cambi) is a mistake 
since the latter put the grants of the privileges on 16 August 1439. As discussed 
above, Ferjančić believed Morelli’s document to be a copy while Giovanni Lami 
claimed to have copied the prostagma from the original document. Ferjančić also 
stated that from the middle of the fourteenth century the day in the menologem began 
to appear in the prostagmata following Manuel II’s decree in 1394 which imposed 
the addition of the day in the indictio for all the notarial acts, prostagmata 
included.231 Morelli’s copy makes no mention of the day but only the month of the 
drawing-up. The two prostagmata are also different in content: while the Parisian 
                                                          
230 Preserved in the Estense, Cod. Campori 1075. The one to Morelli is preserved in the Bibliothèque 
Nationale Paris, Cod. Gr. Suppl. 821. 
231 Ferjančić 1967:276, for the decree see Ferjančić 1967:275, the transcription is in Miklosich-Müller 
1862:3.214.  








document (Morelli’s prostagma) finishes with the proper indictio ☩ Μηνὶ 
Αὐγούστου ἰνδικτιῶνος βʹ ☩ written in red, Lami’s copy of Brancacci’s prostagma 
finished with an odd ἕκτῃ Αὐγούστου ἰνδικτιῶνος δευτέρας. The differences are 
noteworthy. The first difference is the two crosses circumscribing the month; the 
second difference is the mention of the day in Brancacci’s document; the third 
difference is the indictio spelled out and not in the traditional Greek numerical 
system. 
Seemingly, Lami made a mistake when he transcribed the document from the 
original, since I cannot explain the lack of the two crosses in the menologem and the 
indictio spelled out instead of the Greek numerical system.232 In fact, all the 
prostagmata so far examined have the menologem always in the midst of crosses and 
the indictio in Greek numerical system. Therefore, I believe that Lami wrongly 
transcribed the word Μηνὶ for ἕκτῃ.233 Moreover, another proof comes from the 
literary sources quoted at the beginning of this chapter: the so-called Priorista and 
the Istorie Fiorentine. The author of the chronicle is Giovanni Cambi.234 However, 
Cambi used Pagolo Matteo di Pietriboni’s Priorista for the period from 1404 to 
1459. Giovanni Cambi was a very influential politician in the second half of the 
Quattrocento (three times Prior of Arts, once also Standard-bearer of Justice). The 
successful career of Cambi might be proof of the good connection between this 
                                                          
232 Ferjančić 1967:274-276. 
233 See at the end of this chapter several examples of original menologemma which could have 
confused the Italian scholar. 
234 Born in Florence on 21 September 1458. See DBI 1974:17.99-17.101. 








Florentine and the Medici’s family, since the Medici had a great influence over the 
election of the Florentine officials in the Signoria. Cambi’s and Pagolo chronicles 
alleged that the emperor granted the privileges on the same day he departed from the 
Florentine Commune on 16 August 1439.235  Therefore, Lami’s transcription of the 
indictio must be wrong.  
Another feature which raises other problems is the presence of the intitulatio. 
According to Dölger and Karayannopulos, the prostagma protocol should only have 
the symbolic invocatio and never has an intitulatio.236 Dölger considered this 
document as a kodikellos, but the presence of the intitulatio is also rare in the 
kodikellos. The presence of the intitulatio in the prostagmata cannot be due to a 
change in the diplomatic composition of the imperial documents. Therefore, I think 
that it is necessary to investigate in further detail the prostagmata. The lack of the 
intitulatio in the commercial chrysobull leads me to believe that there was a specific 
agenda for the addition of the intitulatio to both chrysobulls dealing with domestic 
matters and prostagmata.  
Another interesting element is that the prooimion of the prostagmata is word 
for word, identical to the domestic chrysobull. The commercial chrysobull prooimion 
is slightly different. A prooimion is also rare in a prostagma. The content of the 
prooimion in late Byzantine privileges (chrysobulls in form) stresses the necessity 
for the emperor to promote those who possessed certain kinds of stereotypical 
                                                          
235 See the passage at the beginning of the chapter. 
236 Of course, the invocatio is present. 








qualities.237 The document in the narratio presents the reason why these private 
citizens deserved this honour and afterwards listed the qualities connected to the 
perfect behaviour such as having a noble soul and a good moral standard. The 
dispositio lists all the grants that the Florentines received from the emperor. First, the 
grant includes the receiver among the imperial oikeioi and grants to the receiver the 
privilege to use the imperial insignia in the recipient banner. Moreover, John VIII 
conceded to the receivers the title of Palatine count together with the faculty of 
creating notaries and making legal illegitimate children. Similar to the chrysobull 
dealing with domestic matters, the prostagmata recipient could make legal the 
illegitimate children excluding those of the nobles such as barons and counts. 
Furthermore, in Brancacci’s document there is the presence of the 
Palaiologan/imperial insignia on the bottom left of the page which so far seemed 
rather unusual. What is really interesting is the overall diplomatic structure of the 
documents. As a matter of fact, these prostagmata do not follow the standards of 
other prostagmata given by John VIII or Manuel II.238  Let us look at the eschatocol: 
“Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν εἰρημένον εὐγενῆ 
ἄνδρα Ἰάκωβον Ἰωάννου Παύλου Ντεμορέλης, τὸ  παρὸν τῆς βασιλείας μου πρόσταγμα, 
ἀπολυθὲν κατὰ μῆνα Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ 
ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ ἐννακοσιοστοῦ τεσσαρακοστοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔτους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον 
εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος · ἐπιτεθείσης καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας συνήθους 
καὶ βασιλικῆς βούλλης. 
☩ Μηνὶ Αὐγούστου ἰνδικτιῶνος βʹ ☩” 
                                                          
237 Angelov 2007:145-155. 
238 See for example John VIII’s prostagmata in the Actes de Kutlumus in Archives de l’Athos. 
Lemerle 1988:2.157-2.158; 2.401-2.402. Or the one in Actes de Lavra in Archive de l’Athos. Lemerle 
1979: 3.186-3.187. It is notable that even before the two emperors none of the prostagmata had this 
particular eschatocol. 









The first element that immediately raises questions is the double mention of both 
month and indictio as seen in the sentence “κατὰ μῆνα Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης 
δευτέρας ἰνδικτιῶνος” and by the presence of the menologem. These elements are 
highly unusual. After an analysis of all the prostagmata given by the Palaiologan 
emperors, I can exclude any further presence of both menologem and indictio with 
the month of emission and therefore conclude that only the Florentine prostagmata 
have these peculiarities.  
The second unusual part is the presence of the κράτος formula in the 
prostagmata as normally the κράτος is only in the chrysobull logos.239  The same 
κράτος formula has another strange element. This formula is usually the last word of 
the chrysobull, appearing immediately before the imperial signature. However, in the 
prostagmata the κράτος is in a different position. In fact, there is another formula 
after the κράτος formula and before the menologem which states: 
ἐπιτεθείσης καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας συνήθους καὶ βασιλικῆς βούλλης 
 
Although the formula is not strange, since there are several past documents which 
mention the customary bull attached, the position in which it appears in the 
document is unusual. Normally this formula is after the menologem but never 
between the κράτος formula and the menologem. Furthermore, the position and 
                                                          
239 The sentence is: ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος. 








significance of this formula in this document reminds one of the standard formula 
used in the Western chancery as an authentication feature. The Western diplomas 
always mention the golden bull with formulas such as “presentium sub nostre 
imperialis maiestatis sigillo", or “presentium…”, “sub pendent”.240 The formulas in 
the Latin documents always have the same position just as in this Greek 
prostagmata, that is, before the date of the document emission. 
Morelli’s prostagma in the Parisian manuscript presents another curious 
element. There is the presence of the de’ Morelli’s “arma” (coat of arms) at the 
bottom left of the document. This element is again similar to the diplomatic 
standards of the Western chanceries. Sometimes, when a Latin auctoritas granted a 
privilege which modified the recipients “arma”, the shape of the new arma is 
pictured in the document.241 However, despite the fact that these clues indicate cross-
cultural influence, it still remains to interpret the strange presence of the double 
                                                          
240 See again for example Koller 1955:76-77 presentium sub nostris regalis sigilli appensione 
testimonio litterarum. Furthermore see the diploma given by Frederik III to Pietro de Bonomo, 
secretary of the former, in 1492: Praesentium sub nostrae imperialis Majestatis Sigilli appensione 
testimonio litterarum, or Charles IV in 1376 to John and Bartholomeus de Guarzonibus: presentium 
sub Imperialis nostre Majestatis sigillo testimonio litterarum… or another Frederik’s III diploma to 
Archangel de Balduinis of Trent sub nostril imperialis maiestatis sigilli appensione testimonio 
literarum. These examples also show the continued presence of the formula in the Western chancery. 
241 Koller 1955 “donamus leonem azurum erectum in campo aureo et....que ponitur cum cimerio hic 
depicto”, Frederik III to Arcangel de Balduinis of Trent: vobisque in signum...nobilitatis arma, sive 
armorum insignia vestra, utpote scutum rubeum, et eius medio capra integra azuri coloris extensis, et 
causa ad currendum disposita…et progenitores vestry ut veri sacri Romani Imperii nobiles gestare, et 
deferre consuevistis, melioramus, et colla caprarum tam in scuto, quam supra galea pellibus de varo 
prout haec in medio praesentium pictoris artificio clarius cernitur figurate decoramus. Frederik III to 
Bonomo: auctoritate nostra Caesarea Arma illa et Insignia quae vos…deferre consueveritis, vide licet 
Scutum rubri coloris cuius medium per obliquum a dextero superiori…et praefatae Imperial potestatis 
Nostrae plenitudine exornandaque duximus, confirmamus, adaugemus, exnormausque presentium 
Litterarum tenore adeo ut arma, et insignia ipsa predicta adiecta in memoriam virtutis, et meritorum 
vestrorum Corvo praedicto super capite aurea Corona, quemadomodum in medio praesentium pictori 
arte clarius cernuntur figurata. 








mention of both month and indictio and the presence of the κράτος formula. The 
question can be answered on comparison of the Florentine prostagmata to the 
Florentine commercial chrysobull and other prostagmata of the same period.242 The 
eschatocol of the prostagmata is fully identical to the eschatocol of the Florentine 
chrysobulls. One possible hypothesis is that the Greek copyist or the notary in charge 
just copied most probably from the chrysobull dealing with the domestic grants. 
However, this hypothesis means that the notary was such an amateur that he did not 
realise the colossal mistake. This explanation seems rather superficial since hardly a 
Greek notary or copyist from the Byzantine chancery could possibly make such a 
huge mistake, not even once but at least twice. Besides, it cannot be a mistake since 
the two copies of the prostagmata to come down to us have the same repetition. 
These mistakes seem more likely to be the result of ignorance rather than 
distraction, and only a Latin notary would ignore the difference in the diplomatic 
construction of a Byzantine chrysobull and a prostagma.  
There is another difference between the standard prostagma and the 
prostagmata granted to Florence. Ferjančić, in the aforementioned article, pointed 
out that already from 1394, following a decree of Manuel II, the prostagma had to 
include not only the month and the indictio, but also the day and year of emission. 
The Florentine prostagmata included the year but not the day. Therefore the 
                                                          
242 See Appendix I/B. 
 
 








inclusion of the year is not due to the Latin notary awareness’ of Manuel II’s decree 
but rather to the fact that the notary literally copied word for word the eschatocol of 
the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. Therefore, if the notary copied the 
eschatocol, it is highly probably that the presence of both intitulatio and prooimion is 
due to the notary not realising that he was actually writing twice both month and the 
indictio. Therefore, the notary was not Greek, and surely was doing something not 
really “legal”. 
There is a strong chance, therefore, that the prostagmata, as well as the 
chrysobull dealing with domestic matters, are all forgeries. Later I will present 
further evidence to this end. Ferjančić’s argues that Morelli’s document is not an 
original due to the imperial menologem. In fact, the latter is slightly different from 
the menologem normally made by John VIII, and Ferjančić argued that this might 
have been the work of someone who had tried to imitate John VIII’s original 
signature.  Nevertheless, Ferjančić did not notice the strange repetition of both the 
month and the indictio. Therefore, if Ferjančić proved that the imperial menologem is 
not of John VIII’s hand and there is other clear evidence, such as the copied 
eschatocol, the hypothesis of the prostagmata being forgeries is verified. 
One ought to explain the presence in this forgery of the sentence “ἐπιτεθείσης 
καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας συνήθους καὶ βασιλικῆς βούλλης”. There is no doubt that it was a 
useless risk to add further elements evidently alien to the Byzantine chancery 
tradition if the prostagmata were not authentic. However, this is a forgery made for 








the Western world and not for the Byzantine world. Therefore, it is logical to 
conclude that the Florentine chancery prepared the prostagmata using chancery 
standards fit for a possible Western audience. Moreover, Florence had no worries 
about the possible discovery of a forged document by potential enemies. Few in the 
period would have had enough knowledge of forgeries made in Greek to disprove the 
authenticity of the prostagmata. For the knowledge of the Byzantine chancery 
standard was probably known by only a few highly educated humanists who had in 
the past visited Constantinople or had been part of the imperial court. Even the 
knowledge of Greek was rare and only understood by a few humanists, most of 
whom lived in Florence.243 
 
 
The comparison between some Western Imperial chancery diplomas, a 
despotate privilege following Latin diplomatic standards and the Florentine 
privileges 
 
I will present a comparison between some of the Western diplomas and the 
Florentine privileges. This comparison will give some more accurate insight into the 
                                                          
243 The presence of humanists in Florence has of course ample bibliography. I will refer generally to 
Hankins 1992:69-94, Najemy 2006 and Maxson 2014. 








nature of the forgeries. The comparison does not include the commercial chrysobull, 
which as I have mentioned in the previous chapter is presumably not a forgery.  
For the purpose of this specific comparison, I will use some Western 
ennobling privileges from the end of the fourteenth century to the end of the fifteenth 
century. The reason of this long span of time is due to the similar standards of the 
different German chanceries. The privileges I chose for the comparison are 
Sigimund’s diploma to Capodilista, one 1438 charter given by Albert II to Leonard 
Bishop of Passau which granted the right to create imperial notaries, and three 
charters given by the emperor Frederick III to several individuals.244 Following this 
methodology, it appears that there is a deep connection in the diplomatic formulas 
between the Florentine privileges and Western diplomas. 
The first elements to analyse are the similar formulas present in both the 
Florentine privileges and the Western diplomas. Thanks to this more accurate 
comparison with the Western grants, close translations emerge from Latin to Greek 
in both the Florentine prostagmata and the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. 
For example, the same formula for creating public notaries is the result of a direct 
translation from the Latin formula.245 Moreover, the Western emperor forbade 
                                                          
244 The one from Albert II is in Koller 1955:38-40; Frederik’s III to Bonomo is in Codice Diplomatico 
Istriano Vol. 4, the former to Archangel de Balduinis is in Compendium Diplomaticum I, 
Capodilista’s diploma in Martellozzo Forin 1999:79-119. 
245 See the formula Possit insuper facere et creare notarios publicos seu tabeliones  in  the diploma to 
Capodilista; Frederick’s III diploma to Francesco Gonzaga in 1479  possit et valeat facere et creare 
notaries publicos seu tabelliones..; Frederick’s III diploma to Francesco Bonomo in 1492 possitis et 
valeatis per totum Romanum Imperium facere et creare Notarios publicos seu Tabelliones; Frederick 
III’s diploma to Archangel de Balduinis of Trent in 1476 possis, et valeas…et valeant per totum 
sacrum Romanum imperium facere, et creare notaries publicos, seu tabelliones. Not surprisingly the 








making legal illustrium virorum principum comitum et baronum filiis, the same 
formula appeared in Greek in the prostagmata and the chrysobull logos dealing with 
domestic matters.246 Therefore, the prostagmata and the chrysobull dealing with 
domestic matters used the same Latin notarial formulas translated literally. 
Furthermore, there are other similarities in the diplomatic composition which further 
confirm the resemblance between John VIII’s privileges to Florence with the 
Western privileges. The intitulatio is present in every diploma produced by the 
Western chancery, while it did not exist in the Byzantine prostagmata or 
chrysobulls; however, the Florentine privileges, commercial chrysobull excluded, 
had all the intitulatio just as in the Western charters.247 Besides, there was another 
unusual diplomatic element which was the prooimion, as I have mentioned in the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
latter seem to be is the same Latin rendering from …προχειρίζεσθαι καὶ συνιστᾶν νοταρίους ἤτ’ οὖν 
ταβουλλαρίους… See also the obligatory oath to give to the empire …pro ipso sacro Imperio debite 
fidelitatis corporale prius recipiatis iuramentum in hunc modum…in Capodilista; et pro ipso Romano 
Imperio debitum fidelitatis recipiatis et quilibet vestrum recipiat corporale, et proprium iuramentum 
in hunc modum in Archangel’s diploma; et pro ipso Romano Imperio debitum fidelitas recipiatis 
corporale, et proprium iuramentum in hunc modum in Francesco’s Bonomo diploma; et pro ipso 
Romano Imperio debitum fidelitatis ac quivis vestrum recipiat corporale et proprium iuramentum in 
hunc modum in Francesco Gonzaga diploma. In the Florentine privilege it appears as ἀφ’ ὧν καὶ 
λήψονται ὅρκον σωματικὸν καὶ ὑπόσχεσιν, ὥστε πιστοὺς εἶναι τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου which has the same 
value as the Latin formulas. 
246 (Albrecht II to Leonhard) illustrium tamen principum comitum et baronum filiis dumtaxat exceptis 
and Martellozzo Forin 1999:79-119 (Sigismund to Capodilista) illustrium virorum principum comitum 
et baronum filiis dumtaxat exceptis, (Frederick III to Bonomo) illustrium tamen Principum, Comitum, 
Baronumque filiis dumtaxat exceptis, (Frederick III Archangel de Balduinis) illustrium tamen 
principum , comitum, baronum, et nobilium filiis dumtaxat exceptis; (Frederick III to Franciscus 
Gonzaga)  illustrium tamen Ducum, Marchonum, Baronum, magnorum nobilium natis dumtaxat 
exceptis. The reason for this prohibition can be probably found in the Western tradition. Same as this 
document the Western emperor never allowed a Palatine count to make legal children of the noble. 
This likely comes from the necessity of the sovereign to maintain the control and to be the only one 
allowed to make legal the children of any noble. 
247 (Sigismund to Capodilista) Sigismundus divina favente clementia Romanorum imperator semper 
augustus (Albrecht II to Leonhard) Albertus etc. ; (Charles IV to John and Bartholomeus de 
Guarzonibus) Carolus Quartus, divina favente clementia Romanorum Imperator semper Augustus; 
(Frederick III to Bonomo); Fridericus divina favente clementia Romanorum Imperator semper 
Augustus…; (Frederick to Archangel de Balduinis) Fridericus divina favente clementia Romanorum 
imperator semper augustus. 








previous paragraph. Again, the presence of the prooimion was not at all unusual in 
the Western diplomas, especially in the privileges concerning the honorific title of 
Palatine count, but in the Byzantine prostagmata the preamble is exceedingly rare.248  
For the purpose of comparison, I will now introduce another kind of unusual 
charter. Vitalien Laurent published an interesting article in which he analysed a 
privilege given by a Greek chancery to a Latin individual. The document is the 
argyrobull given in 1419 by Theodore II Palaiologos, Despot of Morea, to the 
Tuscan Mastino de’ Cattanei. Mastino was from Foligno, in Tuscany, and the 
argyrobull is a reward for his merit in the arrangement of the marriage between 
Theodore II and Cleope Malatesta, the daughter of Malatesta IV, lord of Fano and 
Pesaro.249 This argyrobull had tremendous importance as the document granted to the 
recipient and his heirs the title of count; it gives to the recipient the right to use 
‘…insignia nostra aquile auree bicipitis coronate in campo rubeo que licet nulli 
                                                          
248 See for example the prooimion in other Western chancery diplomas giving honorific titles. 
Frederick III to Arcangel de Balduinis Sceptrigera caesareae dignitatis sublimitas, sicut inferioribus 
potestatibus officii, et dignitatis elatione praefertur, ut commissos sibi fideles optatae consolationis 
praesidio gubernet, quod thronus augustalis tanto solidetur felicius, et uberiori prosperitate proficiat, 
quando indesinentis suae virtutis donaria largiori benignitatis munere fuderit subiectos, sicut a 
choruscante splendour imperiali solii nobilitates alie velut e sole radii prodeuntis, ita fidelium status 
et conditiones illustrant, quod primae lucis integritas minorati luminis detrimenta non patitur: imo 
amplioris undique rutilantis iubaris expectato décor profunditur dum in circouitu sedis augustalis 
illustrium comitum, baronum, nobelium, et procerum numerus ad imperii sacrii decore feliciter 
adaugetur.  Another of Albrecht II to Bishop Leonhard von Passau Congruit maiestati regie interdum 
vices suas aliis in partem sollicitudinis rerum hinc est…Or another diploma of Frederick III to 
Francesco, deacon of the Roman Church in 1479 Honorabiles atque devote dilecte iperialis splendour 
maiestatis veluti sol radios ubique diffendens summis tunc laudibus elucescit et eminenti de core 
refulgent quum ad decorandum et ornandum viros multiplicibus virtutibus insignitos benignas aures 
libenter accomodat ac in eis magnificum semperque aliquid et excellens dignatur effundere. 
249 Laurent 1963:216. 








unquam alteri concesserimus…’250 in the family banner and finally an exemption 
from the feudal taxes.251 This document adds more elements for the present 
investigation. One element is the concession of the golden double-headed eagle. 
Apparently, this kind of grant was used even before John VIII’s prostagmata to 
Florence. Another element is the diplomatic composition of the document as the 
privilege entirely uses the Western chancery standards. Moreover, the language is in 
Latin and not Greek.252 Furthermore, there is the presence of both intitulatio253 and 
inscriptio.254 Finally, the same menologem follows the Western chancery tradition 
and is not from the creation of the world but the Nativity of Christ.255 Without any 
doubt, this charter is one of the most interesting experiments of a Byzantine chancery 
emitting a Latin type of document.  
These features in the argyrobull of 1419 do not deny the forged nature of the 
Florentine prostagmata and the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. Actually, 
the despotate document confirms my hypothesis about the forgery. The Florentine 
                                                          
250 Laurent 1963:218-219. About the count title te et descendentes tuos decoramus et ipsius comitatus 
nostri dignitatem vobis omnimode concedimus for the “stemma” …et erogamus spetiali dono gratie 
insignia nostra aquile auree bicipitis coronate in campo rubeo que licet nulli unquam alteri 
concesserimus. 
251 Laurent 1963:218-219. guidis salvoconductu et alio oportuno et requisite suffragio provideri et in 
omnibus benigne vos recipi et gratiose pertractari. 
252 Apart from the imperial signature at the end of the document which follows the Byzantine rule that 
is to be in red ink and in Greek.  
253  Laurent 1963:218-219 Theodorus in Xpo Deo fidelis despotus Paleologus porphirogenitus et 
cetera. 
254 Laurent 1963:218-219 Spectabili et egregio militia domino Mastino de Capitaneis comiti Paleopoli 
de Menelao, dilectissimo nostro salute et gratie nostre ubertatem omnimodam. 
255 Laurent 1963:218-219 Datum in civitate nostra Misitralis anno a Nativitate Domini Nostri Yhu Xpi 
millesimo quadringenteximo decimo nono indicione duodecima et die decimanona junij cum sigillo 
nostro argenteo circumaurato pendent cum cordula sirica rubra et proprie manus nostre in grecis 
litteris rubies subscription iuxta morem nostrum despotatem. 








prostagmata seem more the result of a mixture between a Latin and a Byzantine 
chancery usage, which is coupled with the presence of gross mistakes on a 
diplomatic level, and sometimes even general confusion.256 These diplomatic 
mistakes are not present in the privilege to Mastino de’ Cattanei. Moreover, there are 
other incongruences. In the argyrobull the picture of the banner is not present, while 
in the Florentine prostagma to Giovanni de’ Morelli it is visible in the bottom left of 
the document. Moreover, the argyrobull describes the banner in detail, while the 
prostagmata mentions only the ‘σημείῳ τῆς βασιλείας μου’.257  From the argyrobull, 
it is clear that the Byzantine chancery had experience in drawing up Latin diplomas 
probably connected to the growing presence of Latin oikeioi in the Palaiologan court. 
However, the Florentine privileges do not uniformly follow either of the two 
standards but are a mixed product. I find it hard to believe that the Byzantine 
chancery could make these mistakes since Latin and Greek notaries who were in 
Florence during the Ecumenical Council could have noticed the presence of these 
mistakes. 
 In conclusion, I think that the mixed diplomatic composition of the Florentine 
privileges is another proof of the document’s forged nature. The privilege given by 
the despot of Morea to Mastino de’ Cattanei does not present any kind of mistakes, 
but only unusual features. Actually, Mastino’s argyrobull consequently makes the 
Florentine prostagmata not so unusual for the contemporary audience. Therefore, no 
                                                          
256 See for example the presence of the double mention of both indictio and the month. 
257 The entire sentence is in Müller 1879:156. 








one could have contested the creation of such ennobling privileges to the Florentine 
Signoria.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has set out to analyse and investigate the diplomatic structure as well as 
the contents of the privileges given by John VIII to Florence in 1439. Despite the 
long scholarly tradition of accepting these privileges as genuine, this chapter 
provided enough evidence to demonstrate the exact opposite. As far as the 
commercial chrysobull is concerned, this document is probably original despite 
several incongruences present in the text. The dispositio repeats itself like a pseudo-
dispositio which includes even the juridical formulas of the dispositio. It is true that 
previous Byzantine documents had the repetition, but this feature was limited and a 
sort of summary. The Florentine commercial privilege is the only one that has such a 
long and wordy repetition including formulas not expected in that section. This 
anomaly assumes a paramount importance since the document in the analysis was a 
chrysobull logos which was the most important document enacted by the Byzantine 
chancery in its history. Furthermore, Florence does not seem to have enacted the 
commercial privilege, which is even more unusual. Since 1397, Florence had tried to 
obtain from the Byzantine emperors commercial privileges for its merchants, but 
never managed to succeed. Even with the advent of Medici power (1434) in 
Florence, this aim remained as stated in the letter sent from Florence to Byzantium in 








1436.258 Yet, there is no evidence for the existence of a loggia, a consul or any kind 
of general activity that could confirm the possible activity of the Florentine loggia. 
Finally, the commercial chrysobull is in itself a unique document, since it is the only 
commercial privilege which has the rhetorical preamble. Unfortunately, I do not 
think these are enough reasons to identify this privilege as a forgery. For example, 
Florence could have simply decided not to enact the loggia for the simple reason that 
the kommerkion (four per cent) was not competitive enough against Venice and 
Genoa. Clearly, further researches in the archives are required to give an explanation 
to this enigma.  
 If the commercial chrysobull is genuine then it was a good achievement for 
Florence. In fact, this commercial chrysobull recognised the disappearance of Pisa in 
favour of Florence with the grant of the lodge and the church belonged in the past to 
Pisa. However, contrary to what has been interpreted in the past, the Byzantine 
emperor did not transfer any of the past privileges belonging to Pisa but simply 
recognised the conquest made by Florence. The document mentioned only the 
buildings in Constantinople which passed from Pisa to Florence and said nothing 
more of the past privileges enjoyed by Pisa. 
The negotiations about the privileges probably took place between the 
proclamation of the Union on 6 July 1439 and the grants of the all the privileges on 
16 August 1439, which is a gap of nearly one month. Apart from John VIII’s visit 
                                                          
258 Müller 1879:162-163.  








from 22-23 to the 26-27 of July to Prato and Pistoia, there is no further information 
revealing what the emperor did in that time.259 There is the possibility that during 
this month, the emperor, with the imperial entourage, met with Cosimo and the 
Florentine elite to discuss the possibility of the commercial chrysobull. The lack of 
information from Syroupolos about this period of time could induce us to think that 
was exactly the period of the negotiations. For Syroupolos, this was likely a matter of 
no interest due to the absence in his work of any mention to the privileges. 
Entirely different is the issue concerning the chrysobull dealing with domestic 
matters and the prostagmata. These documents, brought up in the above paragraphs, 
are forgeries. The chrysobull dealing with domestic matters presents too many 
oddities compared to previous chrysobull logos granted by Byzantine emperors. 
Even considering the presence of similar Latin privileges enacted by the Byzantine 
chancery, this document presents a completely anomalous structure in which Latin 
and Greek elements combined without really having a specific reason or order. 
Clearly, the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters tried to follow the standards of 
the Latin chancery. The presence of the intitulatio, or the use of letters instead of 
numerals for the indictio, is only the last elements of this long list of odd elements.  
Even the existence of Latin type privileges issued by the despotate of Morea in 
favour of Mastino Cattanei does not save the chrysobull dealing with domestic 
matters. As a matter of fact, the despotate privilege, although written in Greek, 
follows perfectly the standards of the Latin chancery and is not the result of mixed 
                                                          
259 For the travel in Prato and Pistoia see Braccini 2006:383-397.  








notarial traditions as in the case of the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. 
After a calligraphy comparison, it appears that the hand which wrote the chrysobull 
dealing with domestic matters is not the same. Accordingly, the same imperial 
signature is completely different in the shape of the letters. Therefore, there is little 
doubt that the chrysobull dealing with domestic matter is the result of a forgery.  
 Just as the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters, the prostagmata are the 
result of a forgery. In this case, the evidence is even more convincing. Contrary to 
the past prostagmata given by Byzantine emperors, the Florentine prostagmata 
contains elements which evidently do not belong to this kind of document. First of 
all, there is the presence of the intitulatio that, just as in the chrysobull dealing with 
domestic matters, is never present in the Byzantine prostagma. Secondly, there is the 
presence of the κράτος formula which in the Byzantine chancery is a distinctive 
element of the chrysobull logos alone. Nonetheless, the most striking element is the 
completely unusual eschatocol of the prostagmata. In fact, there is the double 
mention of both month and indictio in the same document. This clear mistake is 
probably the result of a notary copying from another document which I presume was 
the domestic chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. This hypothesis would also 
confirm the odd presence of the κράτος formula since the notary simply copied it 
altogether with month and indictio.  Therefore, I have no doubt that the notary was 
not Greek. Otherwise, he would have noticed the tremendous mistake in the moment 
of the writing. Only a Latin notary, due to ignorance of the Byzantine chancery 








standards, could have possibly made such an error without having the minimum of 
awareness.  
Doubtless, the Council of Ferrara-Florence provided the Medici and Florence 
with a valuable occasion to reinforce the Medici’s power in the Florentine Signoria, 
especially in the Italian political context. The dreadful condition of the Byzantine 
empire in the fifteenth century aided the Florentine ambition. The fact that John VIII 
was ready to accept the primacy of Rome shows the desperation of the Byzantine 
delegation. This desperation paradoxically made the ennobling privileges granted to 
Florence (the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters and prostagmata), a reality, 





















This chapter aims to show the connection between the forgeries analysed in 
chapter two, the Medici needs for political legitimacy, the political and economic 
contextualisation of the privileges and the role of Florence’s humanists in the 
Council. Therefore, this chapter consists of three parts.  
The first part discusses the presence of a vernacular translation of one of the 
prostagma, specifically the privilege given to Domenico di Tano Petrucci, a humble 
coltriciaio.260  In 1439, at the time of John VIII’s grants to Florence, Domenico was 
                                                          
260 Coltriciaio is the tanner. 








serving as part of the Signoria.261 The prostagma is lost, but part of it surfaces in the 
Priorista. The translation was made by Matteo Pietroboni, who was part of the papal 
embassy during the Ecumenical Council and held offices in the papal court since at 
least 1432.262  
  The second part contextualises the forgeries within the political and 
ideological background. Why did the Medici need such forgeries? The Medici had 
several reasons to produce these forgeries. Their purpose concerned both the internal 
control over the Florentine Signoria and also the on-going struggle of Cosimo against 
the duke of Milan and the Albizzi. Even during the Council, the Milanese opposition 
to the Ecumenical Council proved to be a threat as Niccoló Piccinino, Visconti’s 
condottiere, conquered Bologna (1438), Imola (1438) and Forli (1440). 263 
The last part of this chapter focuses on Bruni and the Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν 
Φλωρεντίνων. Florence at the time of the Ecumenical Council had a vast group of 
humanists able to read and write in Greek and some of whom had received an 
excellent Greek education in the past from Manuel Chrysoloras.264 Of these 
intellectual elites, Leonardo Bruni was of particular importance, as the former was 
also chancellor of Florence during the Council. Bruni undoubtedly possessed a 
                                                          
261 The list of the Signoria composition for the time of the grants is in Gutwirth 2001:288. 
262 For an introduction on the life of Pagolo di Matteo Pietroboni see Gutwirth 2001:27-55. 
263 The use of the condottiere was useful because the ruler could have refused any official association 
with him. This would have avoided a real declaration of war because everything was officially due to 
Piccinino’s initiative. In addition, this is exactly what Filippo Maria did with the Piccinino, as the 
latter was officially acting alone without any allegiance with Milan. Some information on Niccoló 
Piccinino are in EI 1936 s.v. Piccinino Niccoló which also includes some bibliography. On Piccinino 
see also Bignami 1934.  
264 Attesting to the presence of Greek grammars in Renaissance Florence. Zamponi 1978:251-269 see 
also Wilson 1992. 








considerable knowledge of Greek. The Florentine humanist was already a well-
known character before the Council. Bruni’s works on Greek literature included, 
among the others, the translation from Greek of Aristotle’s Politics and a Greek 
treatise written by him in occasion of John VIII’s arrival at the Council and 
addressed to the Byzantine delegation.265 Bruni’s first work, the letter from Aristeas, 
was probably published around 1403. Still in the same year, Bruni translated St. 
Basil address to young man on the right use of Greek literature. It was also the time 
of controversy over pagan literature. Bruni’s opera on St. Basil was probably an 
answer to the critics, often coming from ecclesiastical ranks, critical to the recovery 
of ancient Greek literature. Bruni produced a translation of the Nicomachean Ethics 
around 1416 and of the spurious Oeconomica around 1420-1421. Bruni became 
chancellor of Florence in 1427, but apparently this new prestigious office did not halt 
the literary production of the Florentine humanist. In 1437, he completed the 
translation of Aristotle’s Politics at the request of the duke of Gloucester. In 1441, 
Bruni composed a history of the Gothic War of the sixth century.266 His Περὶ τῆς 
πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίνων composed in Greek was delivered as an oration to the 
Byzantine delegation in Florence on the occasion of the Ecumenical Council. Was 
this oration together with the forgeries part of the political needs of the Medici?  
 
 
                                                          
265 The Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίνων of which I will give a proper analysis later in this chapter 
as, in my opinion, it is crucial to understand the reasons for these forgeries. 
266 Wilson 1992:13-22; 29-31.  











The case of the vernacular translation 
 
I would like now to discuss the existence of a rough Florentine translation in volgare 
of the prostagmata given to Domenico di Tano Petrucci.267 The translation is in a 
manuscript in the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale in Florence.268 The author of this 
translation was Matteo di Pagolo Pietroboni. Stuart McManus theorised the 
possibility that there had once been an official Latin copy, for in the scholar’s 
opinion Matteo di Pagolo Pietroboni was a man of medium-low culture, therefore 
unable to translate from the Greek.269 This hypothesis seems to be the result of a 
superficial analysis. Pietroboni, even if he was uneducated in the Greek language, 
could have easily found someone in fifteenth-century Florence to translate the 
document for him. Secondly, the Priorista reduced this translation and stated ‘… with 
more grants and privileges which, to my “memory”, did not come, and so I cannot 
report the thing ...’.270 This statement seems to imply an oral transmission: someone 
had verbally described the contents of the prostagma to Pietroboni. However, this 
hypothesis is not reliable since the vernacular prostagma is a translation, word for 
                                                          
267 Volgare is vernacular. 
268 Florence, BNCF, Conventi soppressi, C4 895 fol. 142r. There are so far two transcriptions of the 
text: one with clear mistakes in McManus 2009 and another one in Gutwirth 2001:290-293. 
269 He theorised the possibility of an official Latin copy based on his suspicion that the scribe was not 
educated enough to translate directly from the Greek. See McManus 2009. 
270 Gutwirth 2001:293 “con più altre autorità e brivilegi che alla mia memoria no mi sono venute a 
noticia, et però // non ne posso fare una notitia”. 








word, from the Greek version.271 The presence of a translation makes it difficult to 
imagine an oral transmission.  Another hypothesis is that Pietroboni had the chance 
to see a partial translation. For the Priorista does not contain the full translation and 
stops at “e brevilegio ridugli e ristituigli e liberagli d’ogni machula”, which is the 
half point of the dispositio.  Nevertheless, what is intriguing is that Pietroboni saw 
only a partial translation. This fact would imply that the work at the time was still in 
progress. Since Domenico di Tano Petrucci was a tanner would make sense if he 
asked for a translation directly from Greek to the vernacular. Interestingly enough, 
Domenico’s privilege is the only translated prostagma to survive.  Still, the only 
solution is that Pietroboni had access to a translation, probably already in the 
vernacular, and not complete since the main reason why Pietroboni stopped his 
translation was due to ‘his memory’.272 The date of this translation should not be so 
difficult to uncover, for the chronicle’s author, Matteo di Pagolo Pietroboni, died 
around 1443-45.273 The translation can be set in the chronological period between 
from August 1439 and 1443-45.274 In conclusion, I do not think is possible to affirm 
that a Latin translation of Domenico’s privilege really existed as Matteo di Pagolo 
Pietroboni probably relied on a vernacular translation. Theoretically, I should now 
determine the eventual reasons of the incomplete translation and if there was a 
                                                          
271 The Greek version did not survive. 
272 Gutwirth 2001:293 che alla mia memoria no mi sono venute a noticia.  
273 Gutwirth 2001:17. 
274 The emperor left Florence on 16 August 1439. 








correlation with the forged prostagmata. Unfortunately, the lack of primary sources, 
at this point, strongly limits any interpretation leaving only space for speculation.275 
McManus brought up other issues, such as the lack of practical use of these 
privileges within the city of Florence. The scholar argued that the new Palatine 
counts did not use the privileges for fear of possible reactions from some of the 
Florentine oligarchs. Due to the Republican tradition in the Commune, the recipients 
of the privileges might not want to attract any unwanted resentment. This assumption 
is particularly weak for one simple reason, since the prostagmata had been actually. 
The Florentines who received this privilege did in fact modify the family banner by 
adding the Palaiologan eagle. If these Florentines feared possible reactions from the 
other Communal oligarchs they would have never publicly used the imperial 
insignia. The only possible fear was with regard to Cosimo the Elder. The Florentine 
statesman surely was always careful whenever there was an attempt to challenge 
Medici authority in Florence. However, as the picture below shows, Cosimo the 
Elder apparently did not forbid these Florentine families from using the new 





                                                          
275 It might be, if the documents are forgeries, that Pietroboni actually found or saw a sketch in 
preparation of the real forgery. By the end of the council Pope Eugenius IV was a strong ally of 
Florence, so the Medici had nothing to fear from him. However, it is simply impossible to prove due 
to the lack of any basic sources. 











Fedini’s banner before and after the Council276 
 
Carducci’s banner before and after the Council277 
                         
 
                                                          
276 The picture is taken from the online version of the Ceramelli-Papiani. 
http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/ceramellipapiani2/index.php?page=Famiglia&id=3081. The link 
also reports that there were other cases of this image but do not specify or give the image. 
277 Carducci was the Standard-Bearer of Justice during the council. Pictures taken from the Ceramelli-
Papiani collection in the Archivio di Stato di Firenze, online version. Direct link: 
http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/ceramellipapiani2/index.php?page=Famiglia&id=1907. 









  The fact that Cosimo the Elder apparently did not object to this modification 
of the Florentine families’ banner introduces a new and important issue. Specifically, 
it is crucial to determine who was behind the forging of these prostagmata because 
they must have been officially commissioned. The only person who had enough 
power to commission such important forgeries was Cosimo the Elder. Without any 
doubt, he was certainly aware or even behind the forging of these prostagmata. 
McManus’ main inaccuracy was to interpret these privileges as addressing specific 
individuals only. For even if it is true that these privileges were given to single 
personalities such as Michele Pancrazio Fedini, Giacomo De’ Morelli or Domenico 
di Tano Petrucci, the recipients were chosen only because they were elected to the 
Signoria in July 1439. In fact, the same privilege specifies that the recipients are the 
Priors of Arts and the Standard-Bearer of Justice of the Florentine Signoria in 1439. 
The temporal duration of these offices was only two months and the recipients were 
in charge between July and August 1439, which is exactly the time of the supposed 
grants. Besides, Cosimo the Elder had enough power to control the elections in 
Florence. Therefore, he was probably behind the Signoria composition in July-
August 1439. 
The non-inheritance of the Palatine count title further confirmed the 
privileges as given to the Signoria as whole.  Most probably, Cosimo the Elder’s real 
goal was to legitimise through the Signoria the entire Florentine Commune and 
indirectly the unofficial rule of the Medici over Florence. The lack of inheritance 








excluded any possible creation of dynastic families and therefore the privileges 
applied only to the recipient. Therefore, I interpreted these prostagmata not as a 
grant for the single person but as an acknowledgment in favour of the Florentine 
Commune. These privileges actually improved the legitimacy of Florence and the 
Signoria in the Italian political scene. In conclusion, I believe that one should 
interpret these prostagmata as a prestigious acknowledgment for the Florentine 
Signoria and not for the single recipient.  
 
The political and ideological contextualisation of the privileges  
 
This paragraph contextualises the forgeries within the political and economic 
setting of the Italian peninsula in the fifteenth century. The historical context will 
provide answers to certain questions, such as why Florence (Cosimo the Elder?) 
commissioned these forgeries. As far as the Italian political situation is concerned, 
Florence from the fourteenth to the first half of the fifteenth centuries was engaged in 
a struggle against the duchy of Milan in both the political and military spheres. 
Cosimo the Elder played a clever political and diplomatic game as the Medici 
enjoyed remarkable success in mediating the support of both the Serenissima and the 
pope. Instead, the Milanese tried to obstruct the Florentine Commune from moving 
the Council to Florence. At that time, therefore, there was an alliance between 
Venice, Florence and the pope against Milan and its allies such as the Western 








emperor and the Council of Basle.278 Unfortunately for the Byzantines this was one 
of the main reasons why most of the European powers deserted the Council sessions. 
Moreover, the ideological challenge was also crucial for the Florentine Commune. 
For the German emperors recognised Milan as a duchy since the end of the 
fourteenth century (1395), and Sigismund, King of the Romans, confirmed this title 
to Filippo Maria Visconti in 1426.279 Also, the duke of Ferrara would receive 
legitimisation by the Emperor Frederick III from 1452. Yet, the Este hold the title of 
Marquise since the thirteenth century.280 Therefore, Florence failed to have a similar 
ideological acknowledgment.281 
Another important element of the historical background is the Medici family. 
Medici power in Florence was relatively new since it dated back to only 1434. The 
previous dominant family, the Albizzi, was much more ennobled than the Medici 
since they were Palatine counts appointed by the Western emperors. The Medici 
lacked any ennobling status since they were merchants. Even if Cosimo the Elder 
exiled the Albizzi with the balìa in 1434, Rinaldo degli Albizzi and his familiars still 
represented an active threat to Florence.282 In fact, Rinaldo allied himself with the 
Duke of Milan, Filippo Maria Visconti, and still hoped to regain his power in 
                                                          
278 For general information about the political-diplomatic situation see Griffiths 1999, Brucker 
1994:80-82, Maxson 2014:161-165 and Najemy 2006:190-199. 
279 First investiture received in 1395. See De Mesquita 1941:174; Filippo Visconti’s investiture see 
Black 2009:77.  
280 On the first duke of Ferrara, Borso I Este, see Pardi 1906 and Lazzari 1945. 
281 Apart when Florence was ruled by duke of Athens Gualtieri of Brienne. See DBI s.v. Brienne, 
Gualtieri di.  
282 Specific office of the Commune was created only for a limited time in order to deal with an 
imminent threat. It was often used as a political instrument to exile political opponents. See 
Rubinstein 1997. 








Florence. 283 The Albizzi therefore were still a threat for Cosimo’s rule over 
Florence. This struggle between the Albizzi and the Medici was also ideological. 
Rinaldo degli Albizzi had the title of Palatine count, just as was granted to his father 
Maso by the Western emperors. Maso received the title from the Rupert III, king of 
the Romans, on the occasion of the latter’s descent into Italy in 1402, and Sigismund 
successively confirmed the title in 1422. In addition, Rinaldo’s son, Ormanno, 
received the honour of joining the imperial familiars just after Albizzi’s exile in 
1435.284  
Moreover, Cosimo the Elder’s rule in the city was not explicitly authoritative, 
but more the consequence of personal ties established with part of the oligarchy. A 
large part of Cosimo’s power in Florence derived from the influence he held on 
electoral procedures. Cosimo had control of the accoppiatori, which was the office in 
charge of determining the validity of every candidate for public offices. In the end, 
the accoppiatori had the power to decide the names to be extracted for the 
Communal offices.285 Clearly, whoever had control of this office was the godfather 
of every election. In contrast to other important cities of the period, Cosimo the Elder 
had weak ideological claims connected to Florence’s rule. Cosimo de’ Medici’s 
potestas had to be more akin to that of a primus inter pares, than to absolutism due to 
                                                          
283 This threat would cease only in 1440 after the Florentine’s victory at the battle of Anghiari against 
Niccolò Piccinino. See Rubinstein 1997, Bayley 1961:266-268. 
284 For Maso see Böhmer 1967:354; for Rinaldo see Böhmer 1967:11.358. Furthermore, Maso’s son 
Giovanni, Palatine count as well, married Francesca Scolari, Matteo Scholari’s daughter. This Matteo 
Scolari was Filippo Scolari’s brother, a well-known man in the Hungarian court of Sigismund. 
Moreover, the emperor appointed Filippo Scolari comes in the Hungarian kingdom, giving the latter 
several privileges regarding mines and making him an imperial familiar. 
285 The Florentine electoral system was supposed to be random. The names of the potential candidates 
were to be put in balls which later would have been extracted. See Rubinstein 1997:30-52. 








the Florentine republican tradition. The Medici potestas had its pillars on the 
alliances with the most prominent Florentine families. These relationships were far 
from being stable and serene all the time.286  
Further evidence of the Commune’s need for imperial acknowledgment 
emerges from the works of Leonardo Bruni, chancellor of Florence, famous 
intellectual and also a pioneer of the Greek translations.287  This chapter is not going 
to reopen discussions about the so-called civic humanism. However, Bruni’s writings 
could give some interesting insights into the political legitimacy which also involves 
the forgeries. I will investigate therefore Bruni’s writings not in a literary 
perspective, but rather use a historical and political interpretation. In particular, all 
the treatises written by the humanist present a clear evolution in his political thinking 
connected to the evolution of the Florentine Commune and the ideological/military 
struggle between Milan and Florence.288 In fact, both the political powers, when not 
battling in the field, fought each other by rhetorical panegyrics in order to improve 
their political status to the detriment of the other.  The first important treatise written 
by Bruni is the Laudatio Florentinae Urbis, composed around 1403-1404, but not 
published until 1430.289 The original purpose of this work was to celebrate 
Florence’s victory over the Duke of Milan, Giangaleazzo Visconti, in 1402. 
However, in the Laudatio, Bruni depicted the Florentine government in front of the 
                                                          
286 Najemy 2006:278-306. 
287 On Bruni’s translation works. See Moulakis 1986:143. 
288 On the ideological struggle against Filippo Maria Visconti’s Milan there are many works. See 
Baron 1966: 357-409 part five (City-State Liberty versus Unifying Tyranny. Particularly on Bruni’s 
role see the following chapter always in Baron 1966:412-430. 
289 On the dating problem see Baron 1967:21-37. 








Italian and foreign audience as a society in which the power equality between the 
citizens led Florentine society to harmony.290 The second document is a letter sent by 
Leonardo Bruni to Sigismund, king of the Romans, in 1413, which presents an 
interesting ideological statement. In this letter, Bruni demonstrates the legitimacy of 
the Commune by appealing to popular government.291 
 
Nostre igitur rei publice gubernatio popularis est, que tertia speties gubernandi 
legiptima fuit a nobis superius nominata 
 
Bruni is using Aristotle’s Politics to defend the political claims of the Florentine 
government. The popular government was, in fact, the third in Aristotle’s categories. 
Leonardo Bruni wrote another interesting and relevant treatise: the Oratio in funere 
Iohannis Strozze. In this work, Bruni again stressed the popular basis of the 
Florentine government. In the same span of time, Bruni also published the Historiae 
Florentini populi (1428) which uses themes and panegyric rhetorical style from 
previous works. What is important is to underline that from the time of the Historiae 
Milan had begun a counterattack. Bartolomeo Capra, at that time serving as the 
governor of Genoa on behalf of the Duchy of Milan, wrote a letter to Filippo Maria 
Visconti in which clues emerges about the rhetorical struggle between Florence and 
Milan. Bartolomeo strongly advised the duke of Milan to hire Antonio Beccadelli 
                                                          
290 Griffith-Gordons-Hankins 1987:116-121. 
291 Dees 1987:5. Letter published in Hankins 2003:26-29. 








also known as the Panormita as court poet.292 This should have been done in 
opposition to both the Historiae and the Oratio, as the same Bartolomeo stated: 
The Florentines have recently caused their deeds to be published in six books…and to 
the degree they extol their own deeds, to that degree are they trying to obscure our own 
deeds…Leonard of Arezzo has just written a funeral oration… those who have read it 




This exchange of rhetorical pamphlets began around 1435.294 In addition, Pier 
Candido Decembrio faced Bruni and the Laudatio.295 The Milanese humanist 
presented Milan as ideologically superior to Florence by depicting the Visconti 
rulers’ actions as motivated by honour. In fact, Decembrio showed the duchy of 
Milan as a timocracy and Florence as an oligarchy. The main difference in this case 
is the use of past auctoritas: to oppose Bruni’s Aristotle, Decembrio employed Plato 
in which oligarchy is a constitutionally inferior system.296 One of the most 
interesting elements is, however, the refutation of Florence’s ennobling origin which 
Bruni previously connected to the Roman Republic and Sulla. Decembrio pointed 
out that Sulla, whom Bruni considered the founder of Florence, was the “wickedest 
of tyrants”.297 In this ideological and military challenge the forgeries created by the 
Florentine Commune and the Signoria started to acquire a paramount importance. 
A good starting point for the contextualisation of the privileges is the 
prooimia of the forged documents. The prooimion of the domestic chrysobull and the 
                                                          
292 Hankins 2000:159. 
293 Passage taken from Hankins 2000:159. The letter is in Guarino da Verona 1916:27-8.  
294 One year after the rise of the Medici and the exile of the Albizzi.   
295 And not surprisingly at the same time the Laudatio was republished.  
296 On the ideological struggle see Hankins 2000:143-179, Baron 1966: 357-409, Id:412-430, 
Komorowski 2012:47-74; on Decembrio and his use of Plato see Vegetti, Pissavino 2005:465-484. 
297 Hankins 2000:149-150. 








prostagmata are word for word identical. Evidently, the prooimia contain ideological 
elements which are crucial for identifying the need of Florence to gain these 
privileges. The prooimia of the “domestic” chrysobull and of the prostagmata 
mainly explain the idea of improving someone from a popular condition as expressed 
by δωρεαῖς προβιβάζοντας εὐπρεπέσιν, that is, to promote the social status through 
gifts. The prooimion of the commercial chrysobull is slightly different from that of 
the domestic chrysobull and the prostagmata since it does not have the expression 
δωρεαῖς προβιβάζοντας εὐπρεπέσιν. Furthermore, this sentence is not seen in any 
other Byzantine prooimia observed so far. I do not think that this absence is a 
coincidence. Actually, one ought to recall the possibility that these “gifts” (δωρεαῖς) 
mentioned in the text are in connection to the ideological sphere. These “gifts” 
actually improved the social status of the Florentine Signoria.  
At this point I will present “the gifts” and show the improvements made to 
the political and ideological status of the Florentine Signoria. The Florentine city and 
government received the privilege of electing public imperial notaries. This 
privilege, that is, the ius faciendi notarios, belonged to the imperial and papal 
prerogatives. Besides, the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters to Florence 
would not have been the first case of such kind of grants. Frederick II Hohenstaufen 
had granted a diploma to Genoa in 1220 in which appeared the following formula 
‘donamus et concedimus liberam potestatem consulibus vel potestati Janue faciendi 
notarios’.298 Therefore, Western emperors at least since the thirteenth century had 
                                                          
298 Puncuh 1996. Frederick II’s diploma is in fn. 286. 








transferred this particular jus to another public authority. Besides, the emperors also 
granted this imperial prerogative to individual personalities and gave titles including 
the above mentioned privileges such as the title of Palatine count.299 This privilege 
represents the ideological independence of the public and private Communal acts.   
The bestowal of the title of Palatine count to the Signoria in 1439 fits this 
historical contextualisation. The title of Palatine counts with the right to create public 
notaries was a traditional privilege of the Western emperors. It was normally given to 
other foreign powers, cities or single personalities and people close to the emperor.300 
The title of Palatine count or Comes Palatii Laternanensis implied a proximity to the 
emperor. In the medieval era, the Western emperors normally granted this title to 
people close to the imperial seat, such as chancellors and doctores legum. Only the 
bishop of Rome and the emperor could grant this honorific title.301  
Lastly, the Florentines who received the Palatine count title also received the 
honour of becoming oikeioi of the Byzantine emperor.  
Several questions need to be answered after this analysis. Probably the most 
important is ascertaining the reason for Cosimo’s absence in any of the documents, 
especially since Cosimo must have been the commissioner of these forgeries. It is 
likely that the reason why Cosimo was not mentioned in any of the privileges lies in 
                                                          
299 See for example Leonard Von Passau, a bishop, who had received from Albert II the right to create 
public notaries without being a Palatine count. The same Frederick III gave the same right to Bishop 
Petrus of Wiener-Neustadt in 1477 see FRA: 113:116. 
300 For example, these cities were free from the political control of any noble within the empire. The 
emperor formally ruled them. In fact, the cities are merely required to pay taxes directly to the 
emperor, while they were in the end politically independent. They could form leagues, made war and 
peace, and some of them even had the privilege to elect imperial notaries.  
301 A brief digression on the Palatine counts can be found in Grendler 2002:183-184. 








his attitude against publicly exhibiting his own power. Cosimo had never received 
any title above orator.302 Doubtless, this lack of public exhibition does not discount 
the fact that Cosimo’s position as the person holding the power in Florence was well 
known.303 The amount of private correspondence between Cosimo and all the powers 
confirm his own influence. Cosimo’s prudent policy was necessary due to the 
strength of the other Florentine families in Florence. These families, even those 
allied with Cosimo, would have never tolerated any Medici attempt to establish an 
absolutist regime.304 For example, Piero de’ Medici, Cosimo’s son, managed to 
attribute to Cosimo the title of pater patriae on 20 August 1464. This title was 
probably more to legitimate Piero’s rule than to attribute an honour to Cosimo, since 
the latter was dead by then. The precariousness of the Medici regime appears clearly 
in the several plots that developed against Medici rule. Piero de’ Medici suffered a 
plot brought about by the Pitti, Acciaiuoli and Soderini in 1468. Furthermore, the 
congiura de’Pazzi seriously put the Medici regime at risk in Florence as the brother 
of Lorenzo the Magnificent was killed by the plotters.305 Without surprise, after 
Lorenzo the Magnificient’s death in 1492, the Florentine Commune exiled Piero di 
Lorenzo de’ Medici (1494), Lorenzo’s heir. All these events confirmed a persistent 
opposition even within Florence, despite the Medici influence on the electoral 
                                                          
302 This title was normally given to ambassadors. See Mattingly 1988:26. 
303 Only by looking at the impressive collection of ASF, MAP one can understand the importance 
given by the foreigner rulers to the Medici’s opinion on the matters. 
304 Acciaiuoli, Soderini, Pitti, Giugni, Pucci etc… 
305 On the congiura see Martines 2003 and Simonetta 2003:261-284. 








procedures.306 Only with Alessandro de’ Medici would the family obtain the title of 
duke, and afterwards, with Cosimo I, the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany from the 
pope in the sixteenth century. Therefore, Cosimo the Elder probably did not want to 
appear in these privileges due to the risk of rousing discontent among his allies. The 
fact that Cosimo was elected Standard-bearer of Justice just in time for John VIII’s 
arrival in 1439 confirms that it was Cosimo’s decision not to appear in the 
forgeries.307 
Another question which might arise is about possible disputes over the 
forgeries from hostile powers. For example, the duke of Milan had every interest in 
reducing the legitimacy of the Florentine Commune. Paradoxically, the Byzantine 
empire’s dreadful condition was an advantage for Florence. Since John VIII was in 
need of help to defend Constantinople, the Byzantine emperor would have offered 
anything in return for any kind of aid. The same impressive delegation that had 
arrived in Italy for the Council showed the determined will of the emperor to reach 
an agreement on the Union with the pope. The Byzantine emperor had nothing to 
offer apart from relics and titles.308 Besides, John VIII, after the proclaimed Union in 
1439, was titled emperor also in the catholic oikoumene with all the prerogatives due 
                                                          
306 A good analysis of the relation between the Medici family and the Florentine Optimates in Cosimo 
and Piero’s reigns is in Najemy 2006:278-306. On the period of Lorenzo the Magnificient see always 
Najemy 2006:341-374. 
307 The confirmation comes from the Priorista. See Gutwirth 2001:287 (the emperor) venuto per le 
montagnie di Pistoia da Ferrara con molta giente, et fugli fatto grande honore. Questa pistola doveva 
andare di sopra alla venuta dello Imperadore.....Chosimo di Giovanni di Bicci, Gonfaloniere di 
giustizia, quartiere di Santo Giovanni. Entrati a di’ primo di gennaio, et finiti a di’ di ultimo di 
febraio 1438 (1439 in Florentine datation system). On John VIII’s travel to Pistoia see also Braccini 
2006:383-397. 
308  Oikonomidès 2003:237; Mergiali-Sahas 264-275. 








to the imperial status, among them the faculty of granting ennobling titles and other 
privileges.309 Besides, the Byzantine chanceries had already granted Latin types of 
privileges, such as the diploma issued by the despotate of Morea chancery, in Latin, 
and granted to the Tuscan Mastino de’ Cattanei in 1419. Further evidence 
demonstrates the Byzantine practice of giving Western type titles. The emperor sent 
a Byzantine embassy to the duke of Milan in 1438, one year before the privileges to 
Florence.310 The mission was to offer to Filippo Maria Visconti the title of vicarius 
imperii. Of course, the title of vicarius imperii does not refer to Byzantine but to 
Western titles. The Western emperor often used the title of vicariatus imperii to 
provide privileges, and consequently legitimacy, to ruling authorities who had the 
power in territories which were formally part of the German empire.311 This title is a 
legitimising act in the recipient’s favour and is also a formal investiture “cum 
beneficiis”. In exchange, the Western emperor received money or a useful ally.  For 
example, the emperor normally privileged the rulers of the Della Scala in Verona.  
 




Whether the duke of Milan accepted the Byzantines’ offer is unknown. Filippo 
Maria Visconti at the time was still hostile to the pope and the Council of Ferrara-
                                                          
309 See for example the Union Bull Laetentur Coeli in which John VIII appears as Iohanne 
Palaeologo romaeorum imperatore illustri et locatenentibus venerabilium fratrum nostrorum 
patriarcharum…The entire text is in Gill 1959:412-415. 
310 Ullmann 1975. 
311 See for example the diploma published by Heinrich Koller about Verona and Vicenza. Privileges 
confirmed by Albert II to Frignano and Paolo della Scala in 1438. Koller 1995:46-47. 
312 See Albrecht II confirm of Sigismund’s privilege to Frignano and Paolo della Scala in Verona and 
Vicenza. Full diploma published in Koller 1955:46-47. 








Florence, especially because he was supporting the Council of Basle. In fact, the 
report clearly states that the Greek delegation was not to give this title to the duke 
immediately. Filippo Maria Visconti should have ceased first the hostilities against 
the pope and the Council. In fact, the Byzantines would have given the title to the 
duke of Milan only in the event that a Union was concluded, as the document clearly 
states.313 
This Byzantine embassy took place after the death of the Western emperor 
Sigismund and Albert II had not yet renewed the ducal title given by Sigismund to 
Filippo Maria Visconti.  Despite this favourable political condition, the duke of 
Milan did not accept the proposal as he continued to support the Council of Basle in 
opposition to Pope Eugenius IV. Furthermore, Filippo Maria Visconti was allied 
with the exiled Albizzi and clearly had no interest in giving a truce to the Medici.  To 
sum up, there was nothing unusual in John VIII granting privileges to Florence, at 
least in the eyes of a Western audience, since there was already a precedent of 
Byzantines giving Latin type privileges. For sure, the biggest success for the Medici 
was to have the emperor as a prestigious guest in the city of Florence, for the latter’s 
attendance justified the existence of these documents. 
In conclusion, seeking an ennobling legitimacy was a crucial point of the 
political struggle between Milan and Florence, just as was the use of constitutional 
categories such as timocracy, oligarchy, tyranny and republic to praise or to diminish 
                                                          
313 Ullmann 1975:352 exhortando ducem quatinus operam daret ut ycumenicum concilium in loco ad 
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reperacione et reintragracione divis orbis monarchie laboraretur ea qua reintegrate facillime 
ecclesiastica monarchia posset reunire. 








each other’s cities. The importance of receiving privileges from an imperial 
auctoritas was even greater due to the political and ideological struggle between 
Milan and Florence, still on-going at the time of the Council. Therefore, I think it is 
of capital importance to remark on the expression δωρεαῖς προβιβάζοντας εὐπρεπέσιν 
that it does not represent a standard of common prooimion, but provides evidence of 
the ideological reason for these specific ennobling privileges. Accordingly, the 
forgeries were an important part of a wider plan that, in the end, allowed Cosimo to 
maintain a prominent and legitimate position against potential enemies, such as 
Milan and the Albizzi. Florence used the Byzantine emperor’s presence to further the 
Commune’s political goals, while Milan and the Visconti tended to lean on the 
Western emperors. The duke of Milan was also in conflict with the pope, since 
Nicola Piccinino conquered some papal cities such as Bologna and Perugia and, not 
surprisingly, was supporting the Council of Basle together with the Western emperor. 
One last element that, in my opinion, further improved the importance of these 
privileges is the lack of any imperial counterpart at the time. The lack of any imperial 
counterpart surely enhanced the value of the privileges given by the Byzantine 
emperor, as John VIII at the time was the sole emperor of the oikoumene.  
 
Leonardo Bruni and the Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίνων 
 
For the purposes of my analysis, it is particularly important to closely analyse 
another work written by Leonardo Bruni in 1439, that is, the Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν 








Φλωρεντίνων.314 Bruni’s involvement in the Council organisation is well known, as 
he even delivered two other orations to John VIII, now unfortunately lost.315 This 
work, written in Greek, is a very short introduction of Florence’s political structure. 
It was addressed to the Byzantines, if not to the same emperor, during the 
Ecumenical Council. 
 
Since you wish to know about the constitution of our city, of what sort it is, and how it 
is constructed, I shall try to describe it as clearly as I can. The Florentine constitution is 
not completely aristocratic or democratic but a kind of mixture of the two 316 
 
Bruni’s treatise is a significant change in the humanist’s political thinking. For the 
first time Bruni denies the popular basis of the Florentine government. The author of 
the ‘Περὶ’ explicitly states that the Florentine constitution is neither completely 
aristocratic nor popular.  
 
Thus, avoiding the extremes, the city looks to the mean, or rather to the best and the 
wealthy but not over-powerful317 
 
This statement is completely contrary to Bruni’s previous works, such as the 
Laudatio Florentine Urbs, but especially the Oratio in funere Iohannis Strozze and 
the Epistula ad magnum principem imperatorem in which he – more than once – 
                                                          
314 See especially the critical analysis of the treatise in Moulakis 1986:141-190. 
315 See primarily Gill 1959:216. Moulakis 1986:141.  
316 The translation is taken by Griffith-Hankins-Thompson 1987:171-174.  
317 Translation in Griffith-Hankins-Thompson 1987:171-174. 








affirmed and defended the popular basis of the Florentine Government.318 In the 
Oratio, Bruni clearly identifies the basis of Florentine government: 
 
Forma reipublice gubernande utimur ad libertatem paritatemque civium maxime 
omnium directa: que quia equalissima in omnibus est, popularis nuncupatur. 
319 
 
Likewise in the Epistula:  
 
Nostre igitur rei publice gubernatio popularis est, que tertia speties gubernandi 
legiptima fuit a nobis superius nominata. Est eius fundamentum in paritate civium et 




McManus pointed out that Bruni addressed the Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν 
Φλωρεντίνων to the Byzantines who were attending the Council.321 Certainly, the 
absence of any Latin translation before 1484 restricted the audience of the text to 
Greek speakers.  Moreover, McManus also argued that since the text was in Greek 
the best way to contextualise the treatise was “within the nexus of Florentine 
relations with the Greeks” and not for the “Florentine consumption”. In the scholar’s 
conclusion, Bruni’s idea was to present the city in an ‘ideological perspective nearer 
to Byzantine sensibilities’.322 This last hypothesis seems to me to be a very 
superficial explanation which does not take into account several elements such as the 
rise of the Medici to power in 1434, the close past connection between Bruni and the 
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319 Viti 1996:717. 
320 Hankins 2003:27. 
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322 Mc Manus 2009:9-10. 








Albizzi’s faction, and the privileges forged in the Commune in 1439. Before giving 
further explanations, I will focus on other scholars’ works. Griffith-Hankins-
Thompson pointed out another possible reason why Bruni changed the political 
conception of the Florentine government.323 In this treatise, Bruni referred to 
Aristotle’s Politics, which the Italian humanist had already translated from Greek in 
1437. The scholars’ conclusions brought together the differences in this new treatise 
with Bruni’s embracing Aristotelian philosophy after abandoning Platonic beliefs.324 
In addition, Griffith, Hankins and Thompson enhanced a particular passage which is 
very important for this analysis. This passage seems to recall Aristotle’s Politics but 
with a very important difference: 
 
With the passage of time…it seemed that political power should no longer be in the 
multitude, but in the hands of the aristocrats and the wealthy, because they contributed 




While Aristotle’s passage stated: 
 
Accordingly, those who contribute more to such a society are accorded more authority 
in the city than those who may be their equals or superiors by birth, but their inferiors in 




Griffith, Hankins and Thompson explained the difference between Bruni and 
Aristotle as a result of Bruni’s disillusionment or realism. The Florentine humanist 
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did not want to admit the discrimination of the civic virtues in favour of the claims of 
birth or wealth. For Baron this change was due to the progressive abandonment of 
the civic army in favour of the use of mercenaries which consequently grow the 
power of the wealthy. Besides, Baron also thought that Quattrocento humanists 
appreciated wealth as ‘the foundation of civic action, and even as a condition for the 
exercise of certain kind of virtues’.  On this matter, Nauert thought that this change 
had its root on the necessity of the ruling class to present themselves as the 
governing aristocracy of the Roman republic.327 The debate has clearly huge 
proportions, yet I believe that the Περὶ must be contextualised strictly for the period 
it was composed and delivered, that is, the Ecumenical Council and John VIII 
Palaiologos’ presence in Florence (1439). In my opinion it is difficult to think that 
this was due to Bruni’s disillusionment or realism, as the treatise would consequently 
assume a polemical shape in clear opposition to the Medici regime. Neither 
McManus’ thesis, in which Bruni attempted to present the city nearer to the 
Byzantine sensibilities, nor Bruni’s disillusionment thesis proposed by Griffith-
Hankins-Thompson, appears convincing enough in this particular political context. 
The solution depends on who had commissioned this work and for what reason. 
Neither McManus nor Moulakis identify a possible commissioner of Bruni’s Περὶ 
which in absence of any evidence must be considered due to Bruni’s personal 
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initiative. Yet, in my opinion, the commissioner of the work was the same Cosimo 
the Elder.328 
Clearly, after his rise to power in 1434, it would have been dangerous for 
anyone to compose a text without Cosimo the Elder’s consent, especially if it 
opposed his regime.329 Therefore, Bruni’s treatise must have been approved by 
Cosimo the Elder. Moreover, since Bruni presented this work to the Byzantines and 
the topic was an introduction to Florentine government when the Signoria was under 
the Medici influence. The absolute importance of the Council for the Medici and the 
precarious political status in Florence seemed to confirm that nothing could have 
been done without the silent approval or encouragement of the Medici.330  
The Council was not only a matter of prestige but also theatre of political and 
economic interests of a certain entity. Even Bruni’s position was probably far from 
being solid, as in the past the humanist had praised individuals connected to the 
Albizzi faction.331 While the Albizzi needed to maintain an apparent popular origin 
due to their ennobled condition in order to avoid an eventual popular coup, which 
would explain Bruni’s previous popular conception of the government, Cosimo the 
Elder’s low-born origin meant he had the opposite problem. In addition, Cosimo the 
Elder was surely aware of Bruni’s previous political involvement and a rhetorical 
                                                          
328 To be more specific they seem not to care if there was even one. 
329 Another famous humanist, Francesco Filelfo, a close friend of the Albizzi, had to flee in 1434. 
During Cosimo de’ Medici imprisonment in 1433, Francesco Filelfo had directly asked Rinaldo degli 
Albizzi for the death penalty for Cosimo the Elder. Therefore, while Bruni’s low profile during the 
Medici rises to power saved him from exile, Filelfo had to pay the extreme political price with his 
exile to Siena.  
330 See fn. 296. 
331 Bruni’s son Donato married Alessandra Castellani, the latter part of an oligarchic family connected 
to the Albizzi. See Field 1998:1133. 








attack composed by Bruni, especially during the Council, would have carried serious 
consequences for the Florentine humanist. Bruni even appeared involved in an 
alleged plot against the Medici in 1437 when he helped Arezzo to get rid of 
Florentine sovereignty.332 This event happened just two years before the Council 
moved to Florence. Cosimo likely ignored Bruni’s involvement in the rebellion of 
Arezzo, or if he had suspected him, the humanist must have persuaded the Medici to 
forgive him.333 Bruni’s position was therefore precarious if compared to other loyal 
humanists and first-time followers of the Medici humanist circle.334 Besides, Bruni 
managed to keep the chancellorship even after the Albizzi’s exile in 1434. Cosimo 
probably considered Bruni’s reputation as a highly renowned man of culture and 
knowledge and the low profile displayed by the humanist during the struggle 
between the two parties most likely saved Bruni from being exiled. It is impossible 
to know if there were pacts between Cosimo and Bruni due to the lack of primary 
sources. Surely Bruni did not the share the same fate of Francesco Filelfo who asked 
for Cosimo the death penalty when he was imprisoned by Rinaldo degli Albizzi in 
1433, thus compromising definitively his power after Cosimo’s return.335 What is 
most likely is that Cosimo the Elder was certainly aware of Bruni’s intention of 
writing this treatise.  
                                                          
332 See Field 1998:1109-1150. For the letter, dated 11 January 1437, which mentioned Bruni’s 
involvement in the plot, see Field in the appendix. The original letter is in ASMi, Archivio Ducale, f. 
14 n. 2. Arezzo was also Bruni’s birthplace from the nickname “L’Aretino”.  
333 Or simply was “unofficially” pardoned by Cosimo de’ Medici.  
334 Humanists such as Carlo Marsuppini, Poggio Bracciolini, Niccolò Niccoli and others.  
335 On Filelfo’s request for the death punishment see Davies 1988:85. On Filelfo’s career in Florence 
see Zippel 1979, on Filelfo in Milan see Adam 1979 and Robin 1991.  








Even if McManus was correct when he stated that the Περὶ was not for a 
Florentine audience, Cosimo could have easily obtained a translation from another 
loyal humanist for the simple reason that this oration was written in Greek.336 
Clearly, the Περὶ was useful for the Medici, as Bruni stated to the emperor that 
power was “in the hands of the aristocrats and the wealthy, because they contributed 
so much to the community.” Bruni, with this sentence, points out to the emperor who 
had the real power in Florence, without compromising the republican tradition of the 
Florentine Commune. The treatise might have been part of Cosimo’s plan to confront 
the Albizzi’s claims in an ideological sphere. In the end, I think that Bruni was 
clearly stating to the emperor that Cosimo the Elder was the real ruler of Florence. 
Therefore, these diplomatic moves could be part of the ideological struggle for 
power in Florence between Cosimo and the Albizzi. On account of these thoughts, I 
think it is correct to interpret the Περὶ as part of the Medici’s agenda to bolster their 
claim to legitimacy over the Signoria. The connection between Bruni’s Περὶ together 
with all the forgeries seems only a small part of Medici’s political plan with regard to 
Florence. This is why McManus’ theory on the Περὶ as a Bruni attempt to depict a 
society nearer to the Byzantine sensibilities is not so convincing. The statement 
“those who contributed so much for the community” is probably referring to the 
payment made by the Medici through their bank for all the expenses of the Florentine 
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Council.337 Scholars might object that Bruni never explicitly mentioned Cosimo the 
Elder in the treatise. The reason for Cosimo’s absence was again the usual prudential 
policy with regard to Florence’s internal politics. 
In conclusion, this treatise surely fit together again with Cosimo the Elder’s 
plans to raise his prominence in the Florentine Signoria. For the first time this 
treatise acknowledged the fact that the Florentine municipality was no longer a 
popular government as in Bruni’s previous works, but rather suggested in a subtle 




This chapter aimed to reveal the connection between the humanist 
background, the forgeries and especially the role of Cosimo the Elder. The Florentine 
statesman cannot be excluded from the discussion since he must have been the main 
decision-maker behind the forgeries and Bruni’s oration to the emperor. At the same 
time, Pagolo Pietriboni’s strange vernacular translation adds only more evidence to 
the reality of the forgeries. Had the Priorista (Matteo di Pagolo Pietroboni) seen only 
part of a rough sketch of the prostagmata? Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
demonstrate what Pietroboni actually saw. Yet, this incomplete translation is yet 
another odd element which adds credibility to the hypothesis of the forgeries. 
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The forged privileges certainly had a specific political and ideological 
context. Cosimo the Elder was in need of imperial legitimacy for his new unofficial 
reign in Florence. Of course, it was difficult for Cosimo to be granted legitimacy 
when he was trying to keep a low institutional profile. This stratagem probably 
indicated that Cosimo the Elder was trying to legitimise the Florentine Signoria as a 
whole. Since he was the one behind the electoral procedures and the shadow ruler of 
Florence, this legitimacy included him as well. The necessity to seek this imperial 
acknowledgment is due to the struggle with the exiled Albizzi and Milan. The 
Albizzi aimed to regain the power lost in Florence and had the support of the duke of 
Milan. The Florentine forgeries effectively countered the ennobled status of the 
Albizzi, since the privileges came from an imperial auctoritas. Therefore, the 
presence of John VIII in Florence was thus perfect for Medici ambitions, since the 
Byzantine chancery already gave or offered in the past Latin type privileges.339  
Leonardo Bruni corroborated the needs of the Medici regime with the Περὶ 
τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίνων. Without surprise, from the time of the Oratio in 
funere Iohannis Strozze (1427-1428) the Albizzi were the major party in Florence 
and, as mentioned above, they had no reason to seek any other form of legitimacy 
due to their ennobled status. On the contrary, the Albizzi had more reasons to stress 
the popular state of the Florentine Commune because they probably did not want to 
appear as tyrants. 
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In this ideological context, the fact that Bruni addressed the Περὶ τῆς 
πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίνων to the Byzantine delegation is further proof of the 
Medici’s political purposes. Bruni was in the impossible position of publishing such 
a delicate treatise without Cosimo the Elder’s full awareness or approval. As stated 
in this chapter, the Περὶ probably was intended for Cosimo the Elder as the true 
holder of power in Florence, that is, ‘those that contributed so much for the 
community’. This sentence is particularly true with regard to the Council, since the 
Medici family lent all the funding necessary for Pope Eugenius IV to bring about the 
monumental event. Without the crucial support of the Medici bank, the Council 
would have never happened.  
In conclusion, the humanist background surely aided the fulfilment of 
Cosimo’s plans. One cannot be sure about Bruni’s level of involvement in the 
production of the forgeries because of the lack of primary sources. The only links 
between Bruni and the forgeries are represented in the Περὶ, and his being chancellor 
of Florence at the time and Greek educated. As stated in the introduction of this 
thesis, the chancellor of Florence did not have political power, but was the only 
notary admitted during the pratiche. If the forgeries have been discussed anywhere it 
was in the pratiche. However, this hypothesis is near to speculation, since the 
pratiche of that year are missing, and therefore cannot be developed further without 
another mandatory research into the Florentine archives.  
 














This chapter discusses the political and economic policies of Florence towards the 
Levant after the Ecumenical Council. Moreover, a special consideration will be 
given to events in Italy as there is no way to present an historical interpretation 
without understanding the complicated and deep interconnection between Italian 
politics and the events in the Levant in the fifteenth century. In particular, Florence 
was a weaker power compared to the kingdom of Naples and Venice. Florence had 
to deal with several obstacles presented by its more powerful opponents, such as 
Venice, Genoa and Naples. The Florentine seaport was in the Tyrrhenian Sea, which 
meant that Florentine galleys were required to cross Neapolitan, Papal and Venetian 
waters in order to reach Constantinople. Furthermore the endemic wars in Italy, 
especially those between Genoa and Naples, caused more problems and endangered 
the waters around Porto Pisano. Therefore, I will interpret in this chapter the political 








and economic decisions made by the Florentine Commune connected to the Italian 
and Levantine events in the fifteenth century.  
The aim of this chapter is also to explore the relations between Florence and 
Byzantium in the Levant in the period 1439-1453, that is, the period between the 
Ecumenical Council and the fall of Constantinople. I will question whether the 
privileges granted by John VIII effectively improved Florentine commerce in the 
Levant. Moreover, I will examine whether the Commune introduced proper policies 
for its Levantine galley organisation.  
The first two parts introduce the consequences of Alphonse V’s conquest of 
Naples (1442). Florence lost its traditional bond with the Angevin dynasty and was 
even attacked by Alphonse V. The chapter focuses on the pragmatic consequences of 
the war on Florence’s policies. The appearance of Alphonse V, the king of Aragon 
and Sicily, (1435-1442) shaped future events in Italy and also influenced Levantine 
history starting with the conquest of the kingdom of Naples from the Angevin house. 
The kingdom of Naples was one of the most important trading places for the 
Florentine merchants and bankers who traded there since the thirteenth century.  
The third part focuses on the new political balance in Italy after Francesco 
Sforza’s conquest of Milan in 1450. The alliance between Florence (Medici) and 
Milan (Sforza) was the beginning of a new political background in Italy. With Milan 
supporting them, the Florentines finally were able to find a powerful military ally to 
replace the lost alliance with the Angevins in Naples.  








The fourth part discusses the consequences of the fall of Constantinople for 
Italy, which would lead the Italian city-states to sign the peace of Lodi (1454). This 
peace finally terminated all the wars in Italy and opened new opportunities for 
Florence to develop its own maritime practices further.340 This section of the chapter 
makes frequent connections between Italy and the Levant and will show the 
interconnections that existed between these two parts of the Mediterranean world.  
The final sections of the chapter are strictly concerned with the relations 
between Florence and Byzantium (1439-1453). They introduce the embassies sent to 
Florence and explain the reason for Florence’s refusal to every request for help sent 
by the Byzantine emperors. 
This chapter will also introduce the Ottomans. After the fall of 
Constantinople on 29 May 1453, the Ottomans would become instrumental to the 
political choices of the Italian powers. Fear of the Ottomans, although already 
present before the fall of Constantinople, became a political factor for internal Italian 
politics. In addition, the “Turkish menace” became an ideological element in the 
decision over whether to negotiate or declare war, or to organise a new crusade to the 
East. The main powers in Italy concerned over the Turkish advance were Venice and 
Genoa. Florence did not possess a colonial empire in the Levant, which made 
Florence less concerned with the Ottoman presence.  
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Due to the complicated events that once again reshaped the political 
geography in Italy, it is necessary to give a brief introduction to the new major 
protagonists, in particular Alphonse V (1396-1458) and Francesco Sforza (1401-
1466). The island of Sicily had ceased to be part of the Angevin possessions since 
1282 due the Sicilian Vespers, which brought the crown of Trinacria (Sicily) under 
Aragonese influence. Alphonse V, who inherited this prosperous empire deeply 
rooted in the Mediterranean, decided to turn his attention over the kingdom of 
Naples. 
Map of the chronological conquest of the house of Aragon341 
 
The last queen of the Anjou-Durazzo dynasty Joanna II (1373-1435) died in 1435 
without an heir. At that time two individuals claimed the kingdom of Naples. René of 
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Anjou, whom Joanna II had acknowledged as her heir, and Alphonse V of Aragon, 
who had been the formerly designated heir. Alphonse V claimed the kingdom of 
Naples and invaded the south of Italy. However, the Aragonese suffered a major 
defeat near Ponza in 1435 at the hands of the Genoese fleet, an ally of the Angevins, 
who destroyed the royal fleet and captured Alphonse V. As a prisoner of Genoa, the 
king of Aragon was brought to Milan and the court of the duke, Filippo Maria 
Visconti. The duke of Milan, instead of giving the coup de grace, stipulated an 
alliance with Aragon and released Alphonse V.342  
The benefits of the alliance with the Aragonese for Milan are clear. With 
Alphonse V king of Naples, Florence would have been surrounded from north to 
south. Moreover, Alphonse V possessed an experienced army and a powerful fleet, 
which would be helpful for Milan. Fortunately for Florence, this new alliance 
provoked the anger of Genoa. Genoa was a long time competitor of the Catalans, 
especially in the Tyrrhenian Sea. The anti-Milanese party in Genoa successfully 
rebelled against the duke and exiled the philo-Milanese party from the city. In 
addition, Pope Eugenius IV was not enthusiastic about the Aragonese presence in 
Italy. The pope backed the Angevin claimant, René of Anjou, and issued a bull 
which confirmed the rights of the Angevins over the kingdom of Naples.343 Florence, 
despite its formal neutrality, secretly backed the Angevins/René of Anjou together 
with Genoa. The Florentines were worried about an eventual dynasty change in the 
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Neapolitan kingdom, since Alphonse V was in alliance with the duke Filippo Maria 
Visconti, who was an enemy of the Signoria. Moreover, the Florentine Signoria was 
concerned about its trade networks which were particularly solid in the Angevin 
kingdom of Naples. All Florence’s efforts were in vain as Alphonse V entered 
Naples in 1442 to celebrate his new acquisition. René of Anjou fled the kingdom for 
the safety of Florence. From there he was conducted to Porto Pisano and on to 
France. Florence did not help René of Anjou only for past bonds of friendship. Most 
likely, Florence wanted to preserve its friendship with the Angevin house because it 
could still be used a threat against Alphonse V due to the claim of René of Anjou. 
This aim becomes evident during the (second) Naples-Florentine war (1442-1447) 
when Florence called René of Anjou to Italy.  
Francesco Sforza was the son of the renowned Muzio Attendolo Sforza 
(1369-1424). Muzio had been a famous condottiere who, in the past, had contributed 
to Florence’s conquest of Pisa in 1409. His son, Francesco Sforza, after the father’s 
death (1424), obtained territories in Benevento and offered his service to the queen 
of Naples, Joanna II in 1424. At this time the Aragonese were already attacking the 
Neapolitan kingdom. Naples itself already was under the control of the Aragonese. 
Francesco Sforza managed to free Naples on 24 April 1424 and on 2 June of the 
same year he defeated the troops of Braccio da Montone, an Aragonese condottiere, 
in the battle of L’Aquila.344 After these two battles, Sforza abandoned Queen Joanna 
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II for the duke of Milan Filippo Maria Visconti. The condotta of Sforza in favour of 
Milan, despite highs and lows, was to continue at least until 1431. In that year, the 
duke of Milan offered to Francesco Sforza his only child, Bianca Maria Visconti, in 
marriage. The marriage between Sforza and Bianca Maria Visconti took place later, 
in 1442. Sforza’s marriage with Bianca Maria Visconti was a noteworthy occasion 
for the Italian condottiere that gave him a minor claim to the duchy of Milan.345   
Filippo Maria Visconti died in 1447, leaving no heir besides his daughter 
Bianca Maria Visconti. However, Visconti’s last will granted the Milanese duchy to 
Alphonse V who had conquered the kingdom of Naples by this time (1442). In this 
period of political uncertainty, the Milanese aristocracy proclaimed the Repubblica 
Ambrosiana in Milan and hired the condottiere Francesco Sforza to fight against the 
new threat from Venice. In fact, the Serenissima saw in Visconti’s death and the lack 
of a clear successor the occasion to weaken or even conquer the Milanese duchy. 
In 1448, Sforza defeated the Venetians at Caravaggio, but afterwards the 
Serenissima made a deal with Sforza which resulted in Sforza changing sides. 
However, the Venetians would soon regret this decision, as Sforza’s party within 
Milan managed to take over the city and opened the doors to the condottiere. Sforza 
entered Milan in 1450 and became duke of the city. Venice did not accept Sforza’s 
volte face and carried on the war against Milan. The acquisition of Milan made by a 
strong and charismatic character like Sforza completely ruined the Venetian plan. 
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Venice therefore signed an alliance with the Repubblica Ambrosiana.  However, due 
to the pro-Sforza uprising in Milan under the command of Gaspare Vimercati, 
Sforza’s party leader, the alliance between Venice and the Repubblica Ambrosiana 
was destined to fail. Furthermore, the uprising resulted in the murder of the Venetian 
ambassador who was in the city to coordinate strategy against the condottiere. 346 
Italy 15th century (1454-1494)347 
 
 
The triumph of Alphonse V and Florence’s fears 
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Alphonse V entered Naples in 1442. The stratagem used by Alphonse V to conquer 
Naples is notable as it was the same tactic Belisarius had used to conquer Naples in 
536, that is, to pass through the city sewers. What is even more interesting is that by 
1442 Leonardo Bruni had already published his Gothic War (1441) in which 
Belisarius’ tactic is present. Whether Alphonse V took his inspiration from Bruni’s 
work is impossible to show, but if this were the case it would be rather ironic since in 
1447 Alphonse V attacked Florence.348 Yet, it is important to focus the attention on 
Alphonse V’s celebration.349 
Alphonse V organised a great celebration for his victory against the 
Angevins. This celebration is described by Angelo de Tummulillis (1396/1480/1485) 
in his chronicle Notabilia temporum. The chronicler witnessed Alphonse’s 
celebration and described with some detail the role of the Florentine community in 
the event. In this grandiose ceremony emerged the worries of Florence’s merchants, 
who were afraid they might lose their traditional privileges to the new dynasty in 
Naples. Moreover, the Florentines were afraid of an eventual war of Alphonse V 
against the city of Florence.350 For the role played by the Florentine merchants 
during the celebration is quite evident. Florentine merchants appeared second in 
importance to Catalan merchants in Naples. The reason for Florence’s decision to 
celebrate Alphonse V’s victory in such magnitude is evident from de Tummulillis’ 
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chronicle. Florence feared that the new ruler might soon move against Florence. 
Besides, its traditional bond of friendship with the Angevins, Florence had in Naples 
many interests and needed to preserve its past privileges. Without surprise, the 
Florentine community in Naples celebrated with much emphasis, second only to that 
of the Catalans, and offered clear signs of peace to Alphonse V. For example, 
Tummulillis’ chronicle states that the Florentine merchant community wished 
Alphonse V to preserve the protection of God and the freedom of the Florentine 
Commune. Moreover, the same text repeated the particular concept such as 
“Alphonse, king of Peace, may Christ exalt you with prosperity and look to the 
beautiful in Florence in freedom”.351   
Evidently, Florence’s diplomacy was intended to show friendship to 
Alphonse V. Fortunately for Florence, Alphonse V had other problems to deal with 
at that time. He needed to obtain legitimacy as king of Naples from the pope. The 
pope continued to support the Angevin dynasty and was concerned with the new 
situation in the kingdom of Naples. Alphonse V offered help to Pope Eugenius IV 
against Francesco Sforza, who was at the same time fighting in the Marca 
Anconetana, a territory considered to be part of St. Peter’s patrimony. Alphonse V 
offered his assistance to the pope in exchange for the pope’s blessing and legitimacy 
as king of Naples. 352 This help and the mediation of Cardinal Borja (the later 
Calixtus III) and Ludovico Trevisan, the Patriarch of Aquileia, Pope Eugenius IV 
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properitate E guarde il bello Fyorenza in libertate. 
352 Santoro 1968:19, Caselli 2010:23. 








legitimated Alphonse V as king of Naples on 6 July 1443.353 One year later, 
Eugenius IV also confirmed the rights of Alphonse V’s illegitimate son, Ferrante I, 
in the kingdom. Consequently, Alphonse V was now free to turn his attention to the 
Italian political situation. Two events in 1447 accelerated the Aragonese plan for 
Italy – the death of both Pope Eugenius IV (23 February) and the duke of Milan, 
Filippo Maria Visconti (13 August). 
The Florentine-Aragonese war 1447-1449 
 
Newly elected Pope Nicholas V granted to the king of Naples free passage for his 
troops travelling through the Patrimonium Sancti Petri. Clearly, Florence had begun 
to watch this measure with alarm, as it was the closest power bordering papal 
territory. Freedom of passage through St. Peter’s Patrimony meant that Alphonse V 
could assault Florence without transporting troops by sea.  
The Florentine Signoria was certainly justified in manifesting fear of 
Alphonse V during the celebration of the conquest of Naples. Matteo Palmieri 
reports that on 9 August 1447, without any apparent reason, Alphonse V sent an 
army from Tivoli to occupy Cennina, a small town on the Florentine border. After 
the attack failed, the Signoria sent Giannozzo Manetti as its ambassador to negotiate 
with Alphonse V. Giannozzo Manetti was a very prominent humanist: the decision to 
give to him the role of ambassador depicts the gravity of the situation. All these 
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events took place before the death of the duke of Milan. Filippo Maria Visconti’s 
death left Alphonse V with no allies, but with a precarious claim on the Milanese 
duchy. Still, the road to Milan was made difficult by Venice and Florence. Therefore, 
Alphonse V asked the Florentine Signoria to stop supporting Venice. Moreover, the 
king of Naples also requested that Florence leave the alliance with Venice, to ally 
with him and to pay several indemnities.354 The king of Naples sanctioned such harsh 
conditions for peace that Florence was forced to refuse them and to continue the war.  
After Filippo Maria Visconti’s death, Alphonse V invaded and conquered 
Castiglione della Pescaia, a town near Piombino.355 The Aragonese troops reached 
the city by passing through papal territories, thus validating Florence’s alarm. 
However, given the distance between Naples and Castiglione, Alphonse V found his 
supply lines becoming dangerously long. His only solution was to arrange logistic 
support through the fleet, since the Florentine fleet was no match for the Aragonese 
galleys. However, what Alphonse V really lacked was a reliable seaport close to 
Tuscany for his logistic operations. Porto Pisano was too difficult to attack, due to its 
fortifications and the presence of both the Genoese and Florentine fleet. Alphonse V 
decided to move towards Piombino, a small but strategic seaport in Tuscany.356 With 
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355 It is interesting that Bartolomeo Facio, in his Rerum gestarum Alfonsi regis libri X, depicted the 
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Commune. Facio 2004:419-421. See Soldani 2007:25 and Ryder 1990:276-283. 
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the conquest of Piombino, Alphonse V could gain an important seaport for his 
logistic operations and stop using the long passage through St. Peter’s Patrimony.357 
Thus, Alphonse V attempted to gain an agreement with Siena, which had a certain 
influence on Piombino’s lord, Rinaldo degli Orsini. The Orsini were officially in 
accomandatizia with the Sienese Signoria.358 Siena attempted to find an agreement 
between Piombino and Naples but failed. Consequently, the lord of Piombino turned 
to Florence for help. 
At the same time, Florence was not caught by surprise with Alphonse V's 
attack. Palmieri reports that Florence started to hire condottieri and added new taxes 
before the war had even started.359 On 15 July 1448, a Florentine fleet full of 
supplies engaged battle with the Aragonese fleet. Alphonse V defeated Florence and 
even captured two of the Florentine galleys.360 The success of Alphonse V was only 
temporary. Sigismondo Malatesta, formerly condottiere for Alphonse V, and now 
hired by Florence, defeated the Aragonese forces. Alphonse V had to lift the siege 
and call back his troops from Piombino. This battle ended the first of the war 
between Alphonse V and the Signoria of Florence, but the result did not settle the 
political tension between the two powers. Alphonse V’s defeat at Piombino was only 
a temporary halt to the military war but did not stop the clash between Florence and 
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Naples. The fight continued on another front. Alphonse V, since he was unable to 
subdue the Florentine Commune through weapons, decided to start an economic war.  
In the medieval period, normally wars were not followed with policies 
against the commerce against the enemy of the moment.361 As Del Treppo pointed 
out all rulers were cautious in giving the right of rappresaglia (retaliation on wares) 
or even in expelling the merchants of the antagonist power. Indeed, expulsions of 
merchants or embargoes were extremely rare since these decisions caused collateral 
economic damage, even to the perpetrator. The main problem was the difficulty in 
replacing the businesses and all the money generated by the expelled merchants. This 
problem was especially valid in the case of Florence and the kingdom of Naples, due 
to the considerable presence of the Florentine merchants in the kingdom since the 
thirteenth century. Without doubt, a decision of such gravity confirmed the will of 
the Neapolitan king to bring Florence to its knees.  
The king of Naples in 1447 decided to issue a prammatica, which formally 
expelled Florentine citizens from the kingdoms of Naples and Aragon.362 At the 
same time he recalled all the Catalan merchants in Pisa and Florence and ordered all 
his subjects living in Rome to stop any business with Florentine banks. On 20 
February 1447, the Florentine Signoria received news of the capture of some 
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Florentine merchants who were on-board the galley of the Catalan Villatort.363 
Another ruling on 19 January 1448 prohibited Aragonese subjects from wearing any 
cloth made of panni fiorentini, which was the traditional cloth manufactured in 
Florence. This provision of Alphonse V was aimed precisely at severely affecting the 
revenues of the oligarchs in Florence, since the panni lana production was one of the 
backbone of the Florentine economy. Moreover, the Aragonese fleet patrolled the sea 
near Porto Pisano in a de facto blockade of Florence itself. 
New alliances 
The importance of Sforza’s rise in the duchy of Milan (1450) rests in the 
emergence of a new political balance in the Italian peninsula. The old alliances 
crumbled to make space for new ones. Florence abandoned its alliance with Venice 
after Francesco Sforza’s acquisition of the duchy of Milan. This was a shift of 
paramount importance considering that from the end of the fourteenth century 
Florence and Milan had been in an almost constant state of war against each other. 
With Florence’s decision to sustain Sforza in his war against the Serenissima for 
Milan, a war against Venice was unavoidable. Florence decided to call the French 
against Alphonse V so as to avoid any merging of forces between Venice and 
Naples. The calling of the French always appears to represent a delicate matter. In 
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this case, René of Anjou, who was still a legal claimant of the kingdom of Naples, 
was the perfect ally to add more power to the Florentine-Milanese coalition.364  The 
Florentine Signoria first had to persuade Francesco Sforza of the necessity to 
summon René of Anjou.365 The new duke of Milan was fearful of the claims held by 
the house of Orleans, due to the marriage between Valentina Visconti (1368-1408), 
daughter of Giangaleazzo Visconti (1351-1402) with Louis I, duke of Orleans (1372-
1407).366 Moreover, Sforza remained a “usurper” since neither the emperor nor the 
pope had acknowledged his new position in Milan. Florence sent Angelo Acciaiuoli 
to Milan with the task of persuading Sforza to accept the French call, in which task 
he was successful. 367  
At the same time, Sforza’s rule over Milan and his alliance with Florence 
pushed Venice to seek a league with Alphonse V.368 The Venetians also sent an 
ambassador to Florence to ask, once and for all, to dismantle their league with 
Sforza. This Venetian embassy was one of the most important turning points in 
                                                          
364 For the call of the French see Ilardi 1959:129-166. 
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367 Charles VII of France was not an Angevin, but he had married Marie of the Angevin house, who 
was the eldest daughter of Louis II Angevin, king of Naples from 1389 to 1399. See the document in 
which the Acciaiuoli wrote “ lo so che la S.V. non vorebbe potential di franciosi in Italia: ma io 
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Florence’s diplomacy in the mid-fifteenth century, and their answer determined the 
emergence of a new balance of power in Italy. Florence replied that Venice had no 
right to order a faithful ally like Florence to abandon Francesco Sforza. Moreover, 
the Signoria added that there was no will to break the lega with Venice since they 
continued to consider the Serenissima a friend. Simply speaking, the Florentines 
forced Venice to break their alliance. This new diplomatic realignment dragged 
Florence into a new war. Just as in the past, Venice and Naples attacked Florence 
and Milan. Furthermore, in 1451 Venice and Naples decided to expel all Florentine 
merchants in their territories. The Florentine position was even more tangled for the 
two major Italian naval powers closed any possibility for Florence to organise any 
state-galley expeditions.369   
It emerges from the letters between Sforza and the Medici that in 1453, 
Florence began to suffer from the war. Sforza desperately asked for money from 
Cosimo the Elder in order to keep up the war against the Venetians. The Milanese 
ambassador, Nicodemo Tranchedini, had the impression that Cosimo the Elder was 
not convinced about Sforza’s real power. Everything soon changed in Italy due to 
news from the Levant. On 29 May 1453 Mehmet II conquered Constantinople and 
put an end to the long history of the Byzantine empire. 
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From the fall of Constantinople to the peace of Lodi: the beginning of a new era 
(1453-1454) 
 
The fall of Constantinople is one of the most important turning points of European 
history. The event sent a shock wave of reactions across Western Europe and the 
"Turkish menace" entered lastingly the mind-set of Italians. A vast literature on the 
subject, also known as crusading literature, grew exponentially and the fear of a 
Turkish invasion of Italy became a topos.370  
The political reactions of Florence to the fall of Constantinople are revealing. 
The news came immediately to Chios and Crete and finally arrived in Italy, mostly 
provoking consternation and incredulity.371 The Florentine political reaction to the 
fall is interesting, since private and public reactions were practically the opposite of 
one another. The earliest source on Florence and the fall of Constantinople is the 
letter sent to the Florentine Signoria by Niccolò Soderini in Genoa. The letter, 
written on 8 July 1453, officially announces to the Florentine Signoria the conquest 
of Constantinople by the Ottomans. Beyond the natural grief provoked in Genoa by 
the news, the letter also mentioned the capture of a Genoese ship which was full of 
Florentine wares. 
                                                          
370 On crusading literature see especially Hankins 1995, Bisaha 2004, and Housley 2004:13-37.  
371 Some sources indicate the fact that at first the Latins did not believe that Constantinople had been 
captured by the Ottomans, or even that the city had been retaken by the Latins. See in general Pertusi 
1976/2. 








That you have several ways to harm the Aragonese king and revenge them from this 
offence … and that you will be happy doing so for all the wares that were loaded, 




The Florentine Signoria wrote a very interesting letter to Soderini on 17 July 1453 in 
which the official reaction of the Florentine government can be seen: 
We cannot express to you how greatly  we were overcome with despair at the sad 
tidings of the loss of Constantinople; all Christian princes … should make peace with 
one another, and all other Christians should dress themselves in the mourning to 
demonstrate their anguish; and they should be so utterly ashamed that they are impelled 
to recover the lost places. But if they do not, as they will not, all Christendom will be 
injured and shamed forever.373 
 
The Florentine letter seemed in line with all Western reactions. Besides the formal 
and sympathetic manifestation of grief, Florence’s diplomatic stance was to stress 
Christian unity and to desire universal peace.374 Robert Black suggested that this 
letter proved Florence’s genuine feelings towards the crusade, contrary to what had 
been suggested in the past by scholars such as Pastor and Babinger. However, I 
strongly believe that the feelings of peace and unity mentioned in the letter were only 
due to the Florentine attempt to adhere to a general peace in Italy. Specifically, the 
Florentine government pressed for a general peace for reasons that, of course, did not 
include the organisation of the crusade, but rather concerned Florentine trade.  
There are several reasons Florence needed the peace. Florence suffered from 
the expulsion of its merchants from Naples and the Serenissima’s territories. 
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Moreover, the Venetian/Neapolitan commercial aggression cut off the Florentine 
Signoria from all the sea routes and forced the former to reallocate all their galleys 
for warfare.375 The reasons for Florence’s will for peace were pragmatic and not 
ideological. Of course, Florence could not have expressed happiness at the fall of 
Constantinople to an Islamic power, which makes me doubt the “genuine anguish” 
used by Black to describe Florence’s reaction to the fall of Constantinople.376 The 
strongest objection to Black’s interpretation comes from another source, a personal 
communication between Francesco Sforza and the duke’s ambassador in Florence. 
The document is a very interesting letter from the Milanese ambassador to Florence, 
Nicodemo Tranchedini. The letter, dated on 7 July 1453, is a comment by 
Tranchedini on what happened in Florence after the news of the fall of 
Constantinople. The letter shows feelings that do not exactly match with the 
Florentine Signoria’s official reaction.  
I (Tranchedini) also wish that it may go ill with the Venetians, but not in a manner to 
the detriment to the Christian faith. I doubt not that your feeling is the same. Would to 
God that Pope Nicholas had built less and had believed me! How often have I told him 
that, besides its other innumerable advantages, the pacification of Italy would greatly 
tend to the honour of His Holiness!377 
 
Cosimo the Elder (or someone important in the court) apparently expressed 
satisfaction at the fall of Constantinople which provoked the shock of the Milanese 
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Florence.  
377 Pastor 1891:284.  








ambassador. Black, in his book about Benedetto Accolti and the Florentine 
Renaissance, overlooked the importance of this letter. In his work, the letter is simply 
mentioned in a footnote and Black simply states that “some Florentines were said to 
have rejoiced over losses suffered by their enemies in Constantinople”.378 This 
source must be taken more seriously for two reasons. The first is that Tranchedini 
was not referring to people, but most likely to the Florentine Signoria. ‘I also wish 
that...’ seems to point out that the Milanese ambassador was talking about the 
Florentine sovereign in a matter regarding the common enemies. I cannot be sure if 
the people “satisfied” were the Medici since the lack of a direct accusation. 
However, Tranchedini, and every Milanese ambassador in Florence, were the 
connection point between the Medici and the Sforza due to their alliance.379 It was a 
duty of the Milanese ambassador to deliver any news from Florence to the Milanese 
duke. The second reason concerns the political alliance between Florence and Milan. 
This alliance was quite solid, which makes it difficult to believe that the Milanese 
ambassador wanted to smear Florence.  
Finally, the third reason is that Tranchedini, in his letter, is openly referring to 
the end of the Byzantine empire since he mentioned “the detriment to the Christian 
faith”. This “detriment of the Christian faith” cannot simply refer to the losses of the 
Venetians, as Black stated, but surely refers to the fall of Constantinople itself, since 
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the latter was still the second city in order of importance in the Christian world. 
Therefore, it must be stressed again that the gravity of the words used by the 
Milanese ambassador, which implied that someone within the Florentine Signoria 
was not so displeased with the fall of the second patriarchal city into the hands of an 
Islamic power. Accordingly, the Signoria had every pragmatic reason to be satisfied 
with the fall of Constantinople since it effectively caused economic damage to 
Venice. Of course, this satisfaction was well hidden when the city wrote to Soderini, 
and afterwards to Pope Nicholas V.  
To sum up, realpolitik made Florence less willing to support any crusading 
plan. The Venetian reaction and the policies adopted by the Senate after the fall of 
Constantinople confirms further that the conquest of Constantinople represented a 
new opportunity for the Florentine establishment. Venice and Genoa were heavily 
involved in the Levant and were afraid for their outposts there. After the Ottoman 
conquest of Constantinople, large territories of the Serenissima and Genoa in the 
Levant became Ottoman targets due to their proximity to Constantinople. Rather than 
seeking peace in Italy, Venice opened the negotiations with Mehmet II to secure 
peace and the reopening of the Levantine commerce. Accordingly, the Venetian 
Senate considered Francesco Sforza to be a more imminent threat than Mehmet II. 
This decision to make peace with Mehmet II in 1454 was due to mercantile interests, 
the pressure from the Milanese in Italy and the Ottomans’ threat against the Venetian 
colonies in the Levant. These reasons pushed the Senate to negotiate peace with the 








Ottomans and to refuse the papal plan for a crusade. A letter from the Senate sent to 
the archbishop of Ragusa states: 
We also consider that our cities and places in Greece and in our other parts have been 
living in peace, as we said, for two hundred years and therefore they are neither fortified 
nor ready for the danger now evidently present.380   
 
 
Venice had already sent an ambassador to the Ottomans before the fall of 
Constantinople. After Mehmet II’s conquest, the Venetian Senate ordered 
Bartolomeo Marcello to rescue the Venetian prisoners in Constantinople and to 
negotiate peace with the sultan, although the latter remained a secret of state.381  
The Venetian Senate was not the only power to fear the Ottoman threat in the 
Levant. Pope Nicholas V ordered the arming of five galleys in Venice at the Curia’s 
expense and sent the Genoese Angelo Ambrosini to the Levantine Sea with three 
galleys. Ambrosini’s expedition finished as soon as the Genoese found the waters 
completely occupied by the Ottoman fleet and barely managed to escape.382 Just as in 
Florence, the Venetian attitude to the crusade differed from their official statements. 
Despite Filelfo’s affirmation that the Venetian Doge made an impressive speech by 
declaring that the Serenissima would avenge Constantinople, the reality gleaned 
from the Senate correspondence to the Venetian ambassadors in Rome present the 
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opposite picture.383 On 12 October 1453 the Venetian Senate sent clear instructions 
to Orsato Giustiniani and Cristoforo Mauro, ambassadors from the Serenissima to 
Rome.384 Venice wished to keep the on-going negotiations between the Serenissima 
and the Ottoman sultan completely secret. What the Venetians really wanted was to 
keep safe their territories in the Levant and not to embark on a difficult and 
especially expensive crusade.  
The duke of Milan was seemingly less affected by the Byzantine defeat, for 
Milan had no stakes in the Levant, unless one considers their interest on behalf of 
Genoa.385 Yet, at the time of the fall of Constantinople, Genoa was still an 
independent Commune. Only afterwards, Francesco Sforza would manage to acquire 
the city in his dominion. It is possible that the fall of Constantinople represented 
good news for the Sforza. The duke of Milan was at that time completely entrenched 
in heavy fighting against the Venetians in the Bresciano.386 The kingdom of Naples 
was also involved in the Levant due to the increasing influence of the Aragonese 
fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Alphonse V chose, like Venice, to 
focus on the Italian war and Naples sent no forces to the Levant.387  
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Meanwhile, Pope Nicholas V, who was concerned by the fall of the Byzantine 
capital, decided to send ambassadors to all Italian powers to arrange for a peace.388 
The pope thought to use the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople as the unifying 
cause among the Italian powers. The pope’s final goal was, of course, a crusade 
against the Turks. For this purpose, the pope issued a bull calling for a crusade 
against the Ottomans and requested contributions from all the Christian powers, 
threatening excommunication in case of refusal. However, Pope Nicholas V failed in 
his peace-making initiative. It was rather the personal initiative of Fra Simonetto da 
Camerino, an Augustinian monk, who finally produced the peace agreement. Yet, 
one must stress that the Venetian Senate gave to the monk the official mission, 
proving the clear aim of the Venetians to find a general peace after the fall of 
Constantinople.389 The pope’s aim at the peace of Lodi (9 April 1454) was the 
crusade against the Turk, but by that time Venice and Genoa were at peace with 
Mehmet II. Furthermore, Genoa and Venice did not want to take further actions 
which could damage their commercial interests in the Levant.390  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
influence in an area traditionally tied to Venice and Genoa by emerging as a defender of the Christian 
faith in the Eastern Europe. See on this Ashtor 1984:24-25; Marinescu 1994:24-28, Id. 198-200.  
388 Iorga 1902: 314, see also Pastor 1871:274-275. 
389 On the mission of Fra Simonetto see Pope Pius II who reported the successful initiative by the 
monk, whom Pius II defined as “a man of unimpeachable integrity” See Piccolomini 2013:268. 
390 On the relations between Venice and the Ottomans see Preto 1975; Beck-Manoussacas-Pertusi 
1977; on Genoa and the Ottomans see Balletto-Pistarino 1995, Fleet 1999. 









Byzantium and Florence (1439-1453) 
 
This section discusses the diplomatic connections between Florence and Byzantium 
between the end of the Council in 1439 and the fall of Constantinople on 29 May 
1453. This paragraph will explain why Florence abandoned Constantinople after the 
end of the Ecumenical Council. My argument here is the importance of analysing 
events in the Levant and in Italy together and not separately.  
After the Ecumenical Council, the Byzantine emperor expected substantial 
assistance from Western powers, especially for the doctrinal price paid by the 
emperor in the form of the Union. The emperor John VIII decided to send to the 
pope an embassy around 1441-1442 to request the promised crusade. For these 
reason, John VIII sent to Florence the Franciscan monk Iacopus de Primaditiis, since 
the papal Curia was there at the time.391 The pope and the curia were in Florence due 
to rebellion in Rome, connected to the Council of Basle, which forced Pope 
Eugenius IV out from Rome in 1434. Jacob (Iacopus) arrived in Florence in 1442 
with letters from John VIII. The letters contained requests for help and military 
support. However, the Florentine answer was a polite refusal.392 This kind of refusal 
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was going to become a rhetorical theme, especially for the later Byzantine embassies 
to Florence.393  
Another embassy led by Theodoros Charistinos arrived in Florence in 
1443/1444. Charistinos travelled from Venice to Siena to Florence where his mission 
was to ask for support, specifically in the form of contributions and military 
resources.394 Again, the Greek ambassador’s request was met with refusal masked in 
kind words and reflecting Florence’s disinterest in the fate of Constantinople. The 
reason behind these refusals is possibly related to the Florence’s reluctance in 
helping a Byzantium that was heavily influenced by Venice and Genoa. Moreover, 
the war in Italy deeply affected the political and commercial policies of the Signoria. 
A further reason that cannot be excluded is the non-competitive privileges given by 
John VIII to Florence at the end of the Ecumenical Council in 1439. Despite Cosimo 
the Elder’s direct request in 1436 to the Byzantine emperor for the same commercial 
privileges as the other Italian cities (Genoa and Venice), John VIII decided to lower 
the kommerkion only to two per cent in 1439.395 Florence, therefore, was not 
competitive in Constantinople, especially compared to Genoa and Venice. As a 
result, after 1439, Florence became unconcerned with the fate of the Byzantine 
                                                                                                                                                                    
very et devote filii vestry totis affectibus condolemus.... That the letter is for Florence and not the pope 
is clear as it mentioned civitates nostra which in that case is Florence. It would not have made any 
sense to refer to Rome or the papal curia as a city.  
393  Djuric 1995:227. 
394 The passing from Florence of Charistinos is known because the Commune issued a safe conduct 
for the Greek ambassador. See Djuric 1995:227.  
395 The letter is mentioned in chapter 1 since it relates to an event before the Ecumenical Council. See 
fn. 139. 








empire. At the same time, the Byzantine empire began to press the Florentine 
Signoria to join the struggle against the Ottomans.  
The Byzantines expected the full cooperation of the Latin powers for the 
organisation of the crusade. After the pope achieved the Union with John VIII, he 
opened negotiations with Western Christian powers for the so-called crusade of 
Varna. There are no documents implying or even suggesting that Florence sent any 
kind of help (military or monetary) to support the crusade expedition.  The only 
Florentine activity which can be connected to the crusade of Varna is banking. A 
receipt from the Apostolic Chamber states that Cardinal Ludovico Scarampi sent to 
Cosimo the Elder the sum of 2.000 florins. This money was to help Cardinal Cesarini 
in Hungary in the organisation of the crusade.396 This activity does not prove any 
Medici involvement in the crusade of Varna. On the contrary, the source seems to 
confirm the involvement of the Medici bank (Cosme de Medicis et sociis) in what 
was a profitable business.  
Therefore, Florence sent no help to Byzantium and refused all Byzantine 
requests on this matter. As for the crusade, the Levantine Genoese decided to help 
Murad II, the Ottoman sultan, to cross the straits.397 If Genoa, a city still with 
noteworthy interests in Constantinople, decided to avoid the crusade in fear of 
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Florentine Signoria, contributed to the Varna crusade for crusading fervour or as a result of a will to 
help Constantinople. 
397 Imber 1988:5, 30,128. 








empowering the Venetians, it is not a surprise that Florence would do the same. The 
crusade’s defeat in Varna (1444) scared the despotate of Morea as well. In 1446, the 
Commune sent to Demetrios Palaiologos, Despot of Morea, a letter which is an 
answer to what must have been the request of a past embassy from the despotate of 
Morea. The letter is without any specific requests. The Commune simply thanked the 
despot for his kind words without making any promises.  
The despot’s initiative did not stop with the embassy in 1446. Another embassy 
arrived in Florence in 1451 with the offer of commercial privileges in the despotate. 
The despot’s ambassador, Athanasios Lascaris, is supposed to have given an 
argyrobull to Florence when he was travelling to Naples to meet Alphonse V of 
Aragon with the aim of discussing matters with regard to a new crusade.398 The main 
difference between the privileges given in 1439 and the despotate offer in 1451 is the 
fact that Florence never asked for privileges from the despot of Morea. This lack 
might means that Florence had no commercial interests in Morea. Perhaps, Florence 
was satisfied with its commercial ties with Athens, or did not see any potential in the 
Morea’s market. By any means, the grant of the argyrobull must be contextualised as 
the Byzantine despot’s initiative to involve Florence in the struggle against the Turks 
with material grants. However, none of these initiatives seemed to have success since 
Florence never agreed to provide help or subsidies.   
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The last of the embassies from Byzantium arrived in Florence in 1451. Of this 
embassy there is an annotation written by an anonymous Florentine chronicler. In 
addition to the usual requests for help, Florence discovered that the Venetians had 
pressed the emperor to expel the Florentine merchants from Constantinople: 
1451: Bernardo di Uguccione Lippi became Standard-bearer of Justice. In the same 
time the ambassadors sent by Constantine Palaiologos, emperor of Constantinople, 
arrived in Florence ... Here, they asked for help to the (Florentine) Signoria against the 
Turks. They (the ambassadors) said that the emperor, their Lord, had been requested 
from the Venetians to expel from his empire the Florentine merchants. Yet, he 
(Constantine) did not accept these requests since he knew about the courtesies used by 
the (Florentine) republic in favour of John VIII, his brother, when he was in Florence at 
the time of Eugenius IV and the Churches’ Union. The ambassadors also referred that 
the Venetians made the same request to Ragusa. The emperor gave to them (the 
Venetians) the same answer.399 
 
Here, the ambassador is probably Andronikos Bryennos Leontaris, who is reported to 
have been in Italy in this period of time.400 Andronikos’ mission was to get help and 
subsidies. The Byzantine ambassador came to Florence after visiting Venice, which 
was the natural starting point for every Byzantine mission to Italy. 
The war between Florence and Venice in Italy apparently had side effects in 
the Levant, as well. Venice was pushing the Byzantine emperor to expel all 
Florentine merchants from Constantinople. However, Constantine XI (1449-1453) 
refused to heed the Venetian’s advice and even told the Florentine Signoria about the 
Venetian request.  Constantine XI was most likely trying to approach Florence in an 
attempt to reduce the Venetian influence in Constantinople. This was not the first 
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such attempt. Constantine XI had previously attempted to put some new taxes on 
Venetian wares, provoking the anger of the Venetian Senate and the consequent 
withdrawal of his provision. Once more, the Byzantines hoped that by involving 
other Western powers they would receive more help from the West. In a way, this 
idea was not wrong since the main reason for Florence’s disinterest in Byzantium’s 
fate was evidently Venice’s influence over Constantinople. Therefore, this embassy 
may have been part of a bigger plan by Constantine XI to attempt to open 
Constantinople to more Western powers and consequently to give pragmatic reasons 
to them for defending the city. However, Florence was well aware of the Venetian 
grip on Constantinople and therefore refused to help Constantine XI. Besides, there 
are no documents which confirm any kind of help sent from Florence to Byzantium. 
Nobody can deny that the Byzantine delegation created a huge impression on the 
Florentines. Clear evidences about the Byzantine cultural impact on Florence emerge 
from the artistic composition of the period. One example is the medal coined by 
Pisanello which represents the emperor John VIII; another evidence is the almost 
certain presence of John VIII in Gozzoli’s Cavalcata dei Magi. However, one thing 
is cultural impact, another thing is to pursue policies which are mainly determined by 
political and economic reasons. Florence and its elite might have been well 
impressed by the cultural and exotic presence of the Byzantine delegation. Yet, the 
policies and decision enacted by the Florentine Signoria did not match the 








Byzantine’s expectations. In conclusion, the cultural sphere did not affect the 
coherence of Florence’s diplomacy.401      
 
Why Florence abandoned Byzantium. 
 
The Florentines did next to nothing to prevent the fall of Byzantium. Every time a 
Byzantine ambassador visited Florence, the Signoria gave only gracious words, and 
never offered material help such as subsidies or military support. Moreover, after the 
Ecumenical Council, Florence never sent any letters or embassies to Constantinople. 
Despite the commercial privileges offered to Florence by John VIII, it seems that the 
Signoria did not have any reasons to defend the city. One of the main reasons is the 
extreme pragmatism of Florence’s diplomacy. Before the Ecumenical Council, it was 
clear that Florence wanted these privileges as the Signoria had presented similar 
requests since 1397. The moment in which John VIII finally fulfilled the Florentine 
ambitions also marked the end of Florence’s need for the Byzantine emperors. The 
Signoria was perfectly aware that what it had received in 1439 from John VIII was 
the maximum which it could have ever obtained.  
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Another reason for Florence’s disinterest in Byzantium’s fate was 
commercial. The commercial privileges granted by John VIII set the kommerkion at 
two per cent, which was not enough to compete with the commercial power of the 
Venetians and Genoese. Besides, there was no chance that the emperor could 
improve Florence’s privileges to the same level enjoyed by Venice or Genoa. Venice 
was interested in keeping Constantinople as its own commercial territory and Genoa 
wanted to preserve its superiority in Pera. Finally, the Venetian or Genoese 
intermediation of Florence’s wares produced considerable revenue for the two cities. 
It makes sense that both Venice and Genoa wanted to keep this commercial 
intermediation and the only way to do so was to keep Florence out of the 
Constantinopolitan market.  
One of the manifest reasons for Florence’s political shift towards Milan was 
its other aim at reducing the preponderant Venetian supremacy in Italy. Yet, this 
political alignment had consequences also in the Levant. For it marked the definitive 
end of Byzantium’s hopes to expect help from Florence. When the war with Venice 
broke out in 1450/51, the small residual chances of possible Florentine help fell 
below zero, since Florence would have never helped its major enemy.  
 Another reason lay with the anticipated end of the Byzantine empire. Greek 
migrants and refugees were entering Italy already in the 1440s. Florence was aware 
that Constantinople’s days were numbered and that the city could not be defended in 
the event of a serious Ottoman attack. Clearly not equal in number to Venice, there 
was also a small community in Constantinople of Florentine merchants that most 








likely had a communication channel with the Signoria.402  One of these merchants 
was almost surely Jacopo Tedaldi, who fought during the Ottoman siege in 1453.403 
This Florentine merchant apparently was resourceful, since he found salvation on a 
Venetian galley and later arrived in Crete. Here, despite the war between Venice and 
Florence, he was freed by the Venetian authorities due to his contribution during the 
siege. In the Ottoman period, Tedaldi would become an intimate of the sultan. Due to 
Tedaldi’s prominent role in Constantinople, it is not difficult to imagine that he 
might have had good ties also in the Byzantine court so that he could have kept the 
Florentine Signoria up to date with useful information. Other merchants who might 
have provided information to Florence are Bettino and Zaneto Bartoli. The first was 
the one whom the Signoria appointed for the embassy to Manuel II in 1421. The 
second was Bettino’s son, Zaneto, who most likely kept a communication channel 
with the Signoria as well. Presumably, Florence was aware of the desperate 
conditions of Constantinople and simply decided to await more favourable 
conditions to improve its commercial power. The Commune evidently wanted to 
avoid any delay of Byzantium’s end for it was against its own interests. The probable 
relief shown by someone within the Florentine Signoria towards the fall of 
Constantinople further confirms this hypothesis.  
Another issue that contributed to Florence’s reluctance is the Italian political 
situation. The Neapolitan conquest by Alphonse V caused Florence to lose its solid 
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alliance with the Angevins and marked the beginning of a period of wars. There were 
more consequences following two wars fought by Florence. The first war against 
Milan-Naples (1443-1447), the second against Naples-Venice (1450-1455) with the 
difficult defence of Piombino (1448), required all of Florence’s resources. The 
Medici banks, for example, sustained Sforza in his war against Venice, and paid 
Sigismondo Malatesta’s compensation for defending Piombino.404  
The relationship with the despotate of Morea presents a similar situation. Just 
as with Byzantium, Florence never sent any embassy to the despot of Morea. 
Moreover, the Commune never answered positively to any requests from the despot. 
Florence received an ambassador from the despotate of Morea after the fall of 
Constantinople in the person of Iohannes Zamblaco, who arrived in Florence on 18 
June 1455. The despot of Morea, Thomas Palaiologos, sent Iohannes to Florence to 
ask for help and support for the last Palaiologan domain. Again, in this case Florence 
kindly refused the ambassador’s requests. The only difference from the past was that 
at the time of the despot’s embassy Florence already had a diplomatic channel open 
with Mehmet II, as a letter in 1455 clearly shows.405  For the time being, Florence 
had no intention of breaking its diplomatic engagement with the sultan in what was a 
promising beginning for its commercial power in Constantinople. 
Other elements that had an impact on Florence’s refusals were the lack of an 
effective league between Latin states against the Ottomans. In fact, this league could 
not have been formed because of the Italian wars and the bluffs played by Alphonse 
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V, who had no interest in leading the crusade.406 Seemingly, all these elements 
affected a situation already compromised for the other reasons. It was obvious that 
without any external help the fall of Constantinople was only a matter of time. 
It is likely that the Commune considered Constantinople, at least after the 
Council, as a fulfilled political and economic goal. Florence’s policies regarding the 
Levant were not dictated by ideological issues such as the common enemy 
represented by the Turks or the fate of fellow Christians like the Byzantines, but 
simply pragmatic reasons. Byzantium was no longer part of Florentine plans because 
the city could not have gained anything more.  
 
Florence and commerce with the Levant 1439-1453 
 
Due to the conflict between Florence and the Aragonese from 1449 to 1454, Florence 
could not expand further into the Levantine market.407 The Florentine fleet was 
clearly inferior to the Neapolitan and Venetian’s naval power. Not surprisingly, 
Florence did not dispatch any galleys from 1447 to 1455.408 Between the end of the 
Council and the fall of Constantinople only a single galley went to Romania.409 
Giovanni Tosinghi’s galley, however, was not the most fortunate, since it sank 
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around 1444 in Romania and a certain Neri di Cambi died in these circumstances.410 
The wars against Venice and Naples temporarily stopped Florence’s ambitions for its 
own state-galley system to the Levant. Florence had to find, again, a way to transport 
its wares. The solution was Genoa. The letter sent by Diotisalvi Neroni on 28 
January 1452 to the Commune perfectly depicts the combined policies enacted by 
both Milan and Florence.411 Genoa was surely more than happy to transport 
Florence’s wares since the percentage paid was around one percent of the wares 
value.412 
The Venetian expulsion of all Florentine merchants in 1451 was the main 
reason for this change. Venice wanted to bring Florence’s economy to its knees 
through a trade embargo, just as Alphonse V was doing at just the same time. The 
reason of this harsh decision was most likely the aim to disrupt the cash flow from 
Florence to Francesco Sforza, and to hit Florence at its hearth, that is, the 
manufacturing and selling of cloths.413 Florence, to avoid the collapse of its trade, 
found in Genoa the perfect commercial broker for its cloth. In this way, Florence 
managed to keep its trade routes and to avoid the collapse of its economy.  
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Florence returned to practically the same status it held before the conquest of 
Porto Pisano, since the naval blockade formed by Naples and Venice was impossible 
for the Signoria to break. Therefore, the Commune relied once again on the personal 
initiatives of Florentine individuals such as Bernardo Salviati. In 1442 Bernardo 
Salviati, a Florentine merchant with strong connections to the Levant, obtained from 
the Knights Hospitaller a bulla which gave him the right to extract alum in specific 
territories of the Order.414 The reason for Florentine interest in the Knights 
Hospitaller and the alum was twofold. The Aegean islands and the Levant in general 
were utterly dominated by Venice and Genoa. The alum commerce was mainly in 
Genoese hands thanks to its monopoly over the mines in Phocaea.415 Florence had 
every interests in reducing the city dependence from the Genoese alum.416 The 
Florentine cloth manufactories completely relied on the alum import since this 
component was an important dye fixer. This necessity for this component was 
already clear in 1436 when the first contract was set up by several Florentine 
merchants, in which they obtained a share in the alum market from the Genoese in 
Phocaea.417 The contract between Salviati and the Knights Hospitaller further proves 
Florence’s goal in bypassing the Genoese intermediation. Bernardo Salviati had solid 
connections with the Knights Hospitaller, including his own familiars. Anastasio 
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Salviati, for example, was a knight of the Order.418 Generally, the prominent role of 
Bernardo in the Levant is notable and known among the Medici. For in 1452 when 
he received from the Medici 5.000 florins to be invested in Rhodes.419 There was, 
therefore, a personal interest on the part of Cosimo the Elder to support Bernardo 
Salviati and the Levant, which attests to the Medici’s personal interest in the Levant. 
Unfortunately, the sources are very scarce when it comes to the only 
Florentine “stronghold” in the Levant, that is, the duchy of Athens. The only letter 
present in the Medici archive merely relates information about horses and nothing 
really important emerges about the political relationship.420 Of course, there was a 
relationship between Florence and Athens, especially considering the connection 
between the Florentine Acciaiuoli and the Athenian branch of the family. However, 
if these contacts existed, they must have been mainly social, or in any case not 
political. The reason for the absence of official contacts is because Florence had 
already received privileges from Antonio Acciaiuoli so there was nothing else to 
request from the dukes.  
The fall of Athens to the Ottomans must have provoked some kind of 
reactions in Florence, yet the sources are silent on the matter. None of the 
governmental sources mention any official reaction of the Florentine Signoria to the 
end of the Acciaiuoli’s domination in Athens. The reason of this lack might due to 
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the necessity of the Florentine Signoria to maintain good relations with Mehmet II 
since it is of these years the first travels of the Florentine galleys to 
Constantinople.421 Most likely, the fall of Athens affected more the families who 
were personally involved in the duchy, above all, the Acciaiuoli. Unsurprisingly, the 
Acciaiuoli would later become among of the most important sponsors for the crusade 
in open opposition to the Medici’s reluctance.422 
On a side note, one must mention that there were other Florentine families in 
Athens, such as a branch of the Pitti, who lived in the duchy territories. The Pitti 
were one of the most important families in this period and were at the time second 
only to the Medici. The first mention of a Pitti presence in Athens is in 1424 after the 
marriage in Athens between Nerozzo di Luigi Pitti and Laudomia daughter of Franco 
Acciaiuoli.423 In the aftermath of the Ottoman seizure of Athens in 1458, the Pitti of 
Athens were left with almost nothing and had to request help from Florence.424 
Despite these connections between Florence and some Florentine families in the 
Levant, almost nothing emerges from the archives. Therefore, I have to conclude 
that, even if personal communications existed between Athens and Florence, a 
political communication between the two cities was not present. The reason of this 
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absence lies again on the pragmatism of Florence’s diplomacy which “abandoned” 
Athens and the Acciaiuoli to their Ottoman fate.  
It might also be noted that the fall of the duchy of Athens provided the 
opportunity for the Florentine Signoria to strengthen its ties with Mehmed II without 
need for reference to the intermediation of local interests and dynastic enclaves in the 
Aegean whose gradual elimination was Mehmet II’s firm intention after 1453.  It was 
the Florentine Signoria who was the main beneficiaries of the demise of the 
Acciaiuoli in Athens. 
Conclusion 
 
Florence had difficult times in the years after the Ecumenical Council (1439- 
1453), especially when it came to further developing its commercial and political 
influence in the Levant. The reasons were, of course, the wars in Italy, the Venetian 
and Genoese predominance in Constantinople, and the embargoes enacted by Venice 
and Genoa. Without surprise, Florence could not even send galleys from 1447-1454, 
which strongly limited any kind of diplomatic initiatives directed to improve the 
commercial or political influence in the Levant. Despite this severe limitations, 
Florence still tried to use alternative channels, such as the initiative of personal 
individuals like Bernardo Salviati, to at least maintain some commercial links, such 
as in Rhodes. A further solution found by Florence in order to avoid the economic 
collapse was again to use a commercial broker, in this case Genoa.  








As far as Constantinople is concerned, Florentine privileges represented the 
end of any Florentine interests in the city’s fate. Florence’s endangered situation due 
to the wars in Italy, the Venetian predominance in Constantinople, the hopeless 
condition of Constantinople, are all logical reasons for Florence’s continued refusal 
to Byzantium’s requests for aid. Constantine XI did not have anything else to offer to 
Florence other than a sterile and long outdated idea of crusading against a common 
enemy of the faith, which was not of interest for the Medici. As far as the Venetian 
influence is concerned, Byzantium was aware of the heavy grip held by Venice. 
Constantine XI, in particular, tried to lessen this chain through the grants of new 
privileges to Ragusa (1451), his refusal to expel Florentine merchants (1451), and 
new taxes on Venetian wares (1450).425 Yet, everything was made in vain. In the 
end, it came without surprise that the only powers which provided minimum support 
during Mehmet II’s siege in 1453 were Venice and Genoa.   
Florence’s diplomacy displayed a pragmatic coherence in its policies. After 
John VIII’s privileges in 1439, Florence reached the maximum benefit it could 
obtain from Constantinople. With a Byzantine empire so heavily in debt to Venice, 
there was no possibility to crush the choking bond between the Serenissima and 
Constantinople. Therefore Florence looked for other places to improve its mercantile 
activities. Constantinople, the Aegean islands, and especially the Black Sea were 
beyond its reach due the massive and much stronger presence of either Venice or 
Genoa. Therefore, the Commune used its traditional connections with the 
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Hospitaller. These connections went back in a period even earlier to Niccolò 
Acciaiuoli’s time. Rhodes was an important port of call for Florentine galleys and a 
place of residence for many Florentines, some of them even part of the Order’s 
army.426 The same island was also a discreet market place being in the middle 
between Cyprus, Alexandria and Asia Minor. The attempts made by the Florentine 
Signoria evidently recalled the period when Florence was without a seaport and had 
to rely mainly on private citizen initiatives, such as Bernardo Salviati.  
However, the geopolitical map of the Mediterranean was due to change after a 
dramatic set of events. Constantinople, virtually powerless in front of the Ottoman 
threat, was under pressure from Pope Nicholas V, for the latter wanted the Union to 
be enacted in Constantinople. The fate of the city, divided again by the struggle of 
the Unionist against the Anti-Unionist, appeared already sealed. In Italy, another war 
erupted between major powers. The war put Milan and Florence against Naples and 
Venice. The time was perfect for Mehmet II as he was surely aware of the extreme 
weakness of the Latin-Greek coalition and therefore put Constantinople under siege 
in 1453. To the Byzantine desperate requests of help, Venice and Genoa responded 
feebly while Alphonse V used the money collected from the tithes, for his Italian 
wars.427 Constantinople fell on 29 May 1453. For Genoa and Venice the conquest of 
Constantinople represented troublesome news. Yet, in Florence, despite the sadness 
expressed by the formal letters, an indignant report sent to Milan by the Milanese 
                                                          
426 See Luttrell 1999:8.317-8.326 and Chapter I of this PhD dissertation. 
427 Alphonse V promised to send Bernat de Villamarí and a fleet to Constantinople, but the only 
tangible help we know of is only a single galley carrying grain to the besieged. See Caselli 2010:37-
62. Also Cfr. Marinescu 1994:225, Id.:227-232 and Navarro Sorní 2003:73-74. 








ambassador Tranchedini showed instead the probable satisfaction of the Florentine 
Signoria. Despite the different faith between Florence and the Ottomans, the 
prominent oligarchs of the Commune were aware that the fall of Constantinople 
weakened their major rival, Venice, both in the Levant and in Italy.  
To sum up, the period from 1439 to 1453 was one of the lowest for Florence in 
terms of commercial and political opportunities in the Levant. The wars in Italy 
seemed to undermine the efficiency of all Florentine trade and put in serious risk 















FLORENCE AND THE OTTOMANS (1455-1464) 
 
To the Illustrious and undefeated prince and most excellent lord. Our citizens who have 
been in your magnanimous court and lands reported that all the Florentines freely can 
travel and are treated with kindness and favourably by your exalted Majesty and your 
officers as well. For these actions our people are happily grateful … you would concede 
to all the Florentines ... free safe conduct and full security to all the places of your 
powerful domination, both by land and sea, and with their ships, galleys and boats, with 
all the wares, their things and items … and freely without receiving any offence or 




The rise of a new power in the city, far more powerful than the weakling Byzantine 
empire, marked a new beginning for the political and economic balance within 
Constantinople.429 At the time of the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans, the city 
was almost completely depopulated and most foreign merchants had fled. However, 
the desperate condition of Constantinople constituted a good opportunity for the new 
masters to reshape the city on a large scale. As a result, Mehmet II immediately 
                                                          
428 Full text is in Müller 1879:182.  
429 On Florence and Ottomans relations see Pagnini 1765, Berza 1944, Origone 1988, Babinger 1951, 
Id. 1963, Id. 1978, see also Camerani 1939, Vedovato 1939, Tanzini 2010 and Fleet 2011, İnalcik 
1997, Id. 1998. All these works present general aspects of Florentine-Ottoman relation without being 
too much specific about.  








repopulated the city and revitalised its crippled economy.430  Moreover, the Ottoman 
sultan also aimed to limit the influence of both Venice and Genoa.  
The initial policies enacted by the Ottoman sultan clearly showed that he still 
understood the necessities of having a vital merchant community in the city, without 
the supremacy of the Venetian and Genoese merchants. Venice and Genoa 
committed political mistakes during the siege of Constantinople. Venice chose to 
defend the city of Constantinople and broke the truce which it had recently signed 
with the Ottomans in 1451. Consequently, in the fallout from the conquest of 
Constantinople, the sultan had justified reasons to threaten the Venetian community 
harshly and even beheaded the Venetian bailo.431 On the other hand, the Genoese 
colony of Pera negotiated with Mehmet II an official position of neutrality before the 
siege. However, some letters sent from Lomellino, the Genoese podestà of Pera, to 
Genoa state that an unofficial force from Pera had participated in the defence of 
Constantinople. Besides, the letter from Lomellino confirms that he brought 
mercenaries to Constantinople from Chios and Genoa to defend the city.432 The 
Ottomans found few Genoese corpses from Pera in the city, and this episode gave 
justification for Mehmet II to tear down Pera’s walls.433 It is true that Giovanni 
                                                          
430 İnalcik 1998:275-376. 
431 Runciman 1965:150 Philippides 2011:246-247. For the fall of Constantinople see the latest and 
outstanding work of Philippides 2011. Another important work is the two volumes of primary sources 
of Pertusi 1976.  
432 A letter sent from Lomellino the Genoese podestà of Pera indicate that an unofficial Genoese force 
was present see İnalcik 1998:282. The letter is published in Pertusi 1976:1.39-1.51. 
433 İnalcik 1998:281. 








Giustiniani Longo, a Genoese citizen, was present in Constantinople during the 
siege, but he was most probably a condottiere.434  
Meanwhile, in Rome, the situation was even more complicated after the death of 
Pope Nicholas V. All the popes who followed (Calixtus III, Pius II, Paul II and 
Sixtus IV) strived to unite the Christian princes under a single Christian banner. 
However, political fragmentation within Italy brought about the failure of each 
attempt. The era of Italian predominance over Constantinople was over.  
Mehmet II had no doubt that Constantinople should be the capital of the 
Ottoman empire. Invitations were sent by the sultan to all the political powers 
present in this city before its fall. The sultan promised that the merchants could 
return to the city without any risk of retaliation, and even guaranteed the return of 
most of the merchants’ belongings. Of course, new agreements were to be made 
between the old mercantile powers and the new ruler of Constantinople. 
Accordingly, the new treaties with the Ottoman empire for Venice and Genoa raised 
the kommerkion up to two per cent, a clear increase from the free charges enjoyed by 
the two cities during the Byzantine empire.435  
Within this completely new political and economic context, Florence finally 
had the space to expand its commercial power into the Constantinopolitan market. 
This chapter therefore presents the overtures made by Florence to the sultan on the 
                                                          
434 Strictly speaking, a single mercenary, and therefore Genoa could not have been accused. On 
Giustiniani see Philippides 2011:376-387. 
435 For Venice see Romanin 1855:4.261-4.262. The entire text is still in Romanin 1855:4.531-4.537. 
For Genoa see İnalcik 1998:276-277. 








basis of mostly unpublished primary sources. Did Florence or the sultan begin 
official negotiations? The specific year and date of the Florentine initial presence in 
Constantinople are as yet unknown. This chapter will give a specific date to the 
event. An anonymous 1456 letter, probably sent from a merchant in Constantinople 
to Giovanni de’ Medici, Cosimo the Elder’s eldest son, and potential successor to the 
Medici regime, sheds a great deal of light on the situation.436 This unpublished letter 
mentions the possibility for Florence to obtain substantial concessions from the 
sultan, thanks to the favours of his personal physician, most likely Jacopus of Gaeta 
(?-1481) in Ottoman sources as Ya’kub Pasha. Jacopus of Gaeta was a Jew who had 
studied medicine in Italy and later arrived in Edirne during the reign of Murad II.437 
Ya’kub Pasha then became Mehmet II’s personal physician and received from the 
sultan complete exemptions from taxes.438  
Furthermore, by 1455 Florence had already written an official letter to the 
sultan to show the gratitude and good treatment received by the sultan. Accordingly, 
in the period even before 1455, there were already Florentines in Constantinople, 
although without any official capitula.  
 
 
                                                          
436 Giovanni di Cosimo de’ Medici died in 1463, therefore making Piero di Cosimo de’ Medici the 
new “heir”. The letter is in ASF MAP f. 137 n. 76.  
437 Lewis 1952:550. 
438 Lewis 1952:550-551 for a detailed article on the life of Ya’kub Pasha see Babinger 1951(2). 








From the peace of Lodi to the arrival of Florentine galleys in the Levant (1454-
1458) 
 
After widespread wars throughout the Italian peninsula, the various powers of Italy 
were nearly completely exhausted. On more than one occasion Florence had refused 
to subsidise Sforza in his war against Venice due to lack of funds. This period was 
not one of the most serene for the Serenissima either. Venice had witnessed the loss 
of Constantinople and the slaughter of part of the Venetian oligarchy in the city. 
Moreover, the war against Sforza and Milan heavily affected the Venetian economy. 
Similarly, Genoa was at risk due to the naval war against Naples, and the city was a 
sad spectator due to the end of Pera’s independence. Alphonse V of Naples had 
several financial problems with the Neapolitan barons due to the numerous wars he 
had waged in the period. Pope Calixtus III, after the death of Nicholas V, inherited 
the burden of the “crusade”. In fact, the most important initiative of every new pope, 
at least until Mehmet II’s death in 1481, was to retake Constantinople and stop the 
Ottomans from expanding into Europe. Florence finally had a chance, thanks to the 
peace of Lodi, to organise the Levantine communal galleys that had to cease their 
operations due to the wars. Thanks to League of Lodi, the internal situation in Italy 
was at last in a precarious peace, since also Alphonse V had been reluctantly forced 








to join the Lodi league one year later (1455).439 The king of Naples was uncertain 
about the league because he wanted to continue the war against Genoa. Since it was 
more important for Florence and Milan to make this deal with Alphonse V, Genoa 
was left out of the league of Lodi. The league of Lodi was a defensive alliance 
binding together the most important Italian city-states, including Florence, Milan, 
Venice and the kingdom of Naples. In reality, the pragmatic purpose of the league of 
Lodi was to avoid more wars breaking out in the later years. 
Therefore, Florence finally had the opportunity to ask to the pope and Alphonse 
V for the required safe conduct of its galleys. Safe conduct from the pope (as it was 
necessary to trade with the heathens) and from Naples was mandatory, since the 
Florentine galleys had to cross papal and Neapolitan waters to travel into the 
Levant.440  
At the same time, in 1455 (just 2 years after the fall of Constantinople and right 
after the peace of Lodi) Florence requested the required securities from Mehmet II in 
favour of Florentine state-galleys.   
 
 
                                                          
439 For Calixtus III’s policies see Navarro Sorní 2003, Sciambra-Valenti 1968. For the peace of Lodi 
see Mattingly 1988:71-78. For the relationship between Alphonse V and Calixtus III see Caselli 
2010:87-99. 
440 Florence already by 14 October 1455 had sent ambassadors to Rome. Their mission was to obtain 
the safe conduct from the pope. See Appendix II n. 6. Florence did not ask Genoa since it had good 
relations with the city, from the expulsion of Visconti's Milan in 1435. This event aligned Genoa 
together with Florence and the later Sforza's Milan. See Machiavelli 1847 chapter 5 book 2 p. 212. 








The problem of the safe conduct  
Despite the goodwill of the sultan, Alphonse V again blocked Florence’s plans. 
From 1456-57, the Signoria sent two embassies to the pope and Alphonse V for the 
required safe conduct. These embassies were the first occasion in which Florentine 
sources mention very clearly the intention to dispatch the communal galleys to the 
Levant rather than to other places, such as the common routes to the West.441 While 
the pope did not present any difficulties, Alphonse V refused the Florentine request. 
442 Alphonse V gave no “official” safe conduct to Florence as a result of the so-called 
“Gambacorta” matter”.443  
The Gambacorta were a renowned family in Pisa, often appointed to the city’s 
highest offices. However, around 1455, the Gambacorta were stripped of all wealth 
and exiled from Florentine territories. 444  Afterwards, they asked for help from 
Alphonse V. The latter promptly offered the Gambacorta a place in Naples. Not 
surprisingly, the Gambacorta merely presented a good pretext for the Neapolitan 
king to stop Florence from expanding into the Levant. As mentioned, Alphonse V 
aimed to expand his own influence in the Levant. For example, Alphonse V’s help to 
                                                          
441 The so-called “galere ponentine”. 
442 In this sense, it is important that the Florentines immediately specified that they were not going to 
sell any kind of weapons, but cloth for economic welfare of the Florentine Commune.  
443 See ASF Responsive e Copiari I 15v-16r 10 febbraio 1455. In Appendix II n. 9 See also ASF, 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria 41 107-108 17 Augusti 1457. In Appendix II n. 49: in reditu oratores 
nostrum intelleximus ob quas rationes et causas Maiestas Vestra salvaconductus nobis concessum 
poteri remeturi ad partes orientale profectur non expediri perseverit... ASF, Signorie Missive I 
Cancelleria 41 173-175 letter to the duke of Milan. In Appendix II n. 54. noi abbiamo avviso di 
quanto gli ambasciatori della vostra illustrissima Signoria hanno parlato colla maestà del Re di 
Raona in favore che la sua Maestà ci conceda salvocondotto per le nostre galee di Levante. 
444 Machiavelli speaks about the Gambacorta and his role as lord of Val di Bagno. See Machiavelli 
1847:294-295. 








Skanderbeg, the leader of the Albanian resistance against the Ottomans, aimed to 
enhance Aragonese influence in Albania.445 Other examples are the three famous 
expeditions of Bernat of Villamarí in the Levant and the conquest of Kastellorizo in 
1461.446 Indeed, Alphonse V was particularly wary of giving any kind of guarantee, 
such as the safe conduct, to another potential rival in the Levant. Safe conduct was a 
very important instrument, as it meant protection against corsairs. For Florence the 
safe conduct was crucial since they lacked any military sea-power.  
At first, Florence decided to ignore the refusal of safe conduct and, not 
surprisingly, suffered from Aragonese-sanctioned piracy from 1455.447 Moreover, 
the lack of safe conduct was used to legitimise Alphonse V’s action against 
Florentine ships in Neapolitan waters that is, part of the Tyrrhenian Sea, as a 
violation of territory. Furthermore, the Florentine seaport was not in good condition 
due to the continuous war between Genoa and Naples. Alphonse V asked for the 
exclusion of Genoa from the treaty of Lodi since his likely aim was the 
                                                          
445 Since 1451 Alphonse V’s diplomacy turned decisively to Albania and its main leader Skanderbeg. 
Among the diplomatic negotiations between the two parties it is noteworthy the offer of fealty 
promised by Skanderbeg to Alphonse V and the Aragonese attempt to monopolise the selling of salt to 
the Albanians to the detriment of Venice. See Caselli 2010:80-86, also Marinescu 1994:163-176, Del 
Treppo 1972:226-230. 
446 Kastellorizo is an island just south of Antalya, modern Turkey. 
447 See ASF Signori Missive Cancelleria 40 280-281. In Appendix II n. 16. ASF, Signori Missive I 
Cancelleria 40 290-291. In Appendix II n. 17 the source mentions the capture of Bernardo of 
Ugucciano’s boat which was carrying grain. ASF, Signori Missive Cancelleria 40 417. In Appendix II 
n. 25 the source which mentions that Bernardo Salviati’s boat and conducted by Giannozzo Salviati, 
was captured and robbed around Cyprus. On the prince of Taranto, Giovanni dal Balzo Orsini, see 
Squitieri 1939:138-185 and Carducci - Kiesewetter – Vallone 2005. 








predominance in the Tyrrhenian Sea.448 Thus, the Genoese-Aragonese war had heavy 
consequences for Florence as Porto Pisano became a theatre of naval clashes 
between Genoa and Naples and thus seriously undermined the efficiency of 
Florentine seamanship.449 Therefore, despite of the peace of Lodi, a stable political 
situation was still far from becoming reality.  
Another reason for tension between Aragon and Florence was that Florence 
owed a certain sum to Giovanni Antonio da Foscia, an Aragonese advisor and 
subject.450 The first papal sentence on the matter of Giovanni da Foscia was 
unfavourable to the Commune.451 Unsatisfied, the Florentine ambassadors Giuliano 
Antonio di Piero Ridolfi asked for mediation with Alphonse V on behalf of the 
Signoria.452 However, Alphonse V ordered Florence to pay to Foscia a certain 
amount of money in return for safe conduct limited to the western part of the 
Mediterranean Sea and without permission to carry Genoese wares, as they were at 
war against Alphonse V.453 Undoubtedly, Florence used all the cards at its disposal 
to obtain this safe conduct. Florence requested the mediation of the duke Francesco 
                                                          
448 About Alphonse V’s aim to have the control in the Tyrrhenian Sea see Del Treppo 1972:327. The 
author observed that Alphonse V’s war against Florence was also a struggle for the control of the 
Tyrrhenian Sea routes and the defence of the Catalan interests.  
449 For the attack made by Genoese pirates in Porto Pisano against the Catalans see ASF Signori 
Missive I Cancelleria 40 267, in Appendix II, n. 14; for the war between Genoa and Alphonse V and 
its consequence to Porto Pisano see ASF, Signori Responsive Copiari I 21-22, in Appendix II n. 15. 
See also ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40 280-281, in Appendix II n. 16. 
450 ASF, Responsive e Copiari I 39v-41v, 2 September 1456. In Appendix II n. 26. The document 
mentions Foscia as Johannis Antonii de Foxa consiliari et civis nostri dilecti (where nostri is 
Alphonse V). 
451 The papal sentence emerges from Alphonse V’s letter to Florence in ASF, Signori Responsive 
Copiari 47r-48v, in Appendix II n. 32. 
452 ASF, Signori, Signori Otto di Pratica Dieci di Balia Legazioni e Commissarie Missive, 77, in 
Appendix II n. 128.  
453 ASF, Responsive e Copiari I 44v-45r, in Appendix II n. 29. 








Sforza of Milan and proposed to make a joint embassy (Florence and Milan) to 
improve the chances of persuading Alphonse V to grant to Florence the safe 
conduct.454 Florence also contacted the duke of Calabria to act as a mediator.455 
However, Alphonse V was only using these as pretexts in order to refuse safe 
conduct to Florence and maintain Aragonese predominance in the Levant. This safe 
conduct would have never been granted were it not for the death of the king of 
Naples on 27 June 1458. Alphonse V’s death resulted in the pre-planned split of the 
crown of Naples from Aragon, and removed one of the biggest obstacles for Florence 
to gain a commercial foothold in the Levant. Ferrante I, Alphonse V’s illegitimate 
son, became king of Naples following his father’s death. Meanwhile, the kingdom of 
Aragon, along with the crown of Sicily, passed to Alphonse V’s brother, John II.456 
The first travel of Florentine state galleys to the Levant 
Not surprisingly, after Alphonse V’s death Florence decided to immediately 
dispatch two galleys to the Levant in 1458. Meanwhile, Florence sent a letter to 
Mehmet II on 1 September 1458, their second since 1455. Florence announced to the 
sultan that the Commune had sent two galleys to the Levant, specifically to 
                                                          
454 ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 41 173-175, in Appendix II n.54. The use of the term “di 
nuovo”, which in English means “again”, leads me to think that this was not the first time Florence 
had asked Milan to help the former in procuring safe conduct from the Aragonese. 
455 The duke of Calabria was the future Ferrante I, illegitimate son of Alphonse V. ASF, Signori, 
Missive I Cancelleria 41 173-174, in Appendix II n. 52. 
456 Sicily was an important port of call, especially for the Levantine trade. It was mandatory for the 
Florentine galleys a stop there, also to load/unload wares. See Mallett 1967:67 who mentions the 
presence of two ports of call in Sicily for the Florentine galleys: Palermo and Messina. 








Constantinople.457 The particular importance of this letter emerges from the fact that 
Florence not only wrote to the sultan, but also to the other powers whose territories 
were on the Levantine route of the Florentine state-galleys, such as the prince of 
Taranto, the new king of Naples, Ferrante I, and the new king of Sicily and Aragon, 
John II.458 Moreover, the Florentine Commune asked the pope for the customary 
permission to engage in commerce with the infidels, which was necessary in order to 
avoid any kind of ecclesiastical censorship.459 Here, the importance is that this letter 
proves that this Florentine request was the first proper attempt of the city to organise 
its galleys for the Levantine route. It would not makes sense to ask permission to 
trade with the heathens if that was not the first official travel.460  
Despite Alphonse V’s death, the Florentine galleys had to rely on luck to travel 
through the Tyrrhenian Sea. In fact, some Neapolitan galleys from Gaeta, a seaport 
in the kingdom of Naples, tried to assault the galleys. Only the wind saved the 
Florentine galleys from capture.461 It is not clear whether Ferrante I himself ordered 
                                                          
457 ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 42 92. ...galeas duas ad loca vestro imperio subdita et 
persertim bizantium mittere instituimus mercibus plenas quas earum magni navium a nobis propositi 
etiam in pervenitis vestris discrabere et res alias emere commissione ... si ita eis per suo et rei per 
nostre commodo videbitur et quam eiusmodi hominibus naves ducertibus mercature gratia... 
458 The prince of Taranto’s galleys were more than a simple threat for the Florentine galleys. In some 
cases Taranto’s galleys were responsible even for proper robberies to the detriment of Florence. See 
ASF, Legazioni Commissarie 14 58-65,77-81; ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40 238; ASF, 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria 41 91. 
459 Signori, Legazioni e Commissarie 15 13-14, in Appendix II n. 61.  
460 ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 91 to the prince of Taranto, in Appendix II n. 59. The letter to 
Ferrante is in ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 92, in Appendix II n. 60. This letter is similar to the 
other one sent to the prince of Taranto. Both had the same date, 5 September 1458. As for the king of 
Sicily he was John II in Aragon, and the letter is in Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 42 112-113, in 
Appendix II n. 62. 
461 ASF, Signori, Legazioni e Commissarie 15, 15-19. Commission given to Angelo Acciaiuoli and 
Luigi Guicciardini in Naples, in Appendix II n. 63.   








the attack or if it was the result of the personal initiative of his galleys commander, 
Bernat of Villamarí.462 
The political circumstances suggest that Ferrante I may have had something to 
do with the attack. Probably, the Neapolitan king wanted to show Florence that 
although he was the illegitimate son of Alphonse V, he was not going to accept 
challenges to his authority such the travel of Florentine state-galleys in the 
Neapolitan sea without safe conduct.463 In the end, the Florentine state-galleys 
managed to arrive safely in Constantinople through the Neapolitan waters without 
suffering any other troubles. For the lack of any complaint sent by the Signoria, 
makes likely that the Florentine galleys safely managed their journey up to 
Constantinople.  
These galleys were probably not going to Constantinople merely for the 
purposes of trade. Instead, this voyage was probably an attempt by Florence to 
negotiate commercial privileges with Mehmet II in person. This interpretation is 
based on the first letter the Commune sent to Mehmet II just after the fall of 
                                                          
462 The letters and the commissions from Florence do not clarify who was responsible. For example: a 
letter sent from Florence to Benedetto Giugni, Florentine consul in Naples, ordered him to present a 
complaint to Ferrante I, hoping that this action happened without the king’s knowledge. ASF, Signori, 
Missive I Cancelleria 42 118-119, in Appendix II n. 64. The ambassadors’ instruction, dated on 14 
October 1458, are in ASF, Legazioni Commissarie 15 19-20, in Appendix II n. 65. However, a 
commission given to Pietro di Bartolomeo Bardi to the same Bernat of Villamarí states: bisogno non 
offesa o molestia alcuna ma subsidio et aiuto speravano et siano certi che alla Maesta del Re questa 
cosa da lui saputa giovissino nuova gli sia molesta per l’amore et la benivolentia che e riposta. One 
must also recall that Florence was aware that its ships did not enjoy safe conduct see Bardi’s 
commission is in ASF Legazioni Commissarie 15 23-25, in Appendix II n. 66. 
463 That is to say that Florence did not ask for any safe conduct from Ferrante I since the first requests 
are from 1456. See Appendix II n. 60.   








Constantinople. In particular, a part of the text indicate this reason for sending these 
galleys to Mehmet II.464 
 
This part seems to indicate that Mehmet II approached the Florentine 
community in Constantinople first. Only after this letter did Florence write to Naples 
and Taranto for safe conduct. Therefore, the real reason for this voyage was to 
negotiate with the sultan for commercial privileges. It was risky to send letters 
directly to Mehmet II, as in that period letters were often intercepted by other 
powers. Surely, this moment of time was not ideal for Florence to be caught in 
negotiations with the Ottoman sultan while Pope Calixtus III was trying to organise 
the crusade.465  
A further proof of Florence’s plan with regard to the Levant is the text of the 
provision enacted by the Commune with regard to Levantine galleys. First of all, this 
provision states that, at first, Florence planned to send only one galley, but due to this 
provision this number increased to two. Secondly, the provision also mentions the 
necessities of sending an expensive gift to Mehmet II.466  
There is another letter which states, without doubt, the purpose of the galleys’ 
journey. The letter was written by an anonymous sender on 9 December 1456 and 
addressed to Giovanni de’ Medici, Cosimo’s son. In terms of chronology this letter is 
                                                          
464 Müller 1879:182. 
465 See fn. 423 and 435.  
466 Müller 1879:293. 








exactly just before the new provision about the Levantine galleys and the gift to the 
sultan. 
The Signoria should make a decision on this matter (the election of a Florentine consul 
in Constantinople) and (to choose) me or someone else ... For it would be useful the 
presence of a consul which would give prestige to our Signoria and help to our 
merchants, and I am sure…that the Turkish Lord…will grant us everything….thanks to 
mine close friendship with his physician, from whom I can obtain everything … and we 




This letter is a petition made by an anonymous to Giovanni de’ Medici, eldest 
son of Cosimo the Elder. The author asked clearly to Giovanni de’ Medici to 
petition the Signoria that he would be the perfect consul for Constantinople 
thanks to his personal networks with the personal physician. Even if the sender 
is anonymous, this letter provides us with other important facts. First, there 
was, already in that period, a considerable Florentine community in 
Constantinople. The Florentine community in Constantinople was probably not 
as large as those of Venice and Genoa, but big enough to attract the sultan’s 
interest. The galleys’ journey was undoubtedly connected to the anonymous 
letter, since the Commune dispatched the two galleys after the letter was sent. 
It might have been the case that the anonymous letter had some consequences 
for the decisions of the Florentine Signoria, because early on the Commune 
                                                          
467 ASF, MAP f. 137 n. 76 ...che quando per la detta Signoria si deliberasse tal chosa o  per me o per 
altri che fusse in questo luogho stare assai per giovare e avendo a me chare chome se in ... in ogni 
modo fa di me sicuro ci sia  un chonsolo sia perhonore della nostra Signoria e hutile de merchatanti, 
e sono certo che a qualunchore dal signiore Turcho per la nostra communita si recherie alchune 
chose la fare abbiano voglia inpero intende in ogni modo de far buone quante cera si che ci 
concedera tutto per utile del suo paese  isto isandosi che io ... una intrinsicha amizizie chol suo 
medicho. Il quale puo de lui quello che gli piace e chosi anchora ciabiamo degli altri amici sicche son 
certo dallui avremo tutto. 








decided to send only one galley, but afterwards that number increased to two. 
Moreover, there is another unpublished letter dated on September 1458, which 
further confirmed that the Commune sent two galleys, full of wares, to 
Constantinople.468 
 
The first “capitula” or ahd-nāme: a reconstruction and an interpretation. 
 
I believe that it is crucial to understand precisely when Florence obtained the 
commercial privileges from Mehmet II since all the important written evidence 
(including the privileges themselves) has been lost.469 Certainly, there must have 
been a written agreement between the sultan and Florence, otherwise the Signoria 
could not have traded or establish a convoy within the Ottoman empire. Furthermore, 
this written agreement must be identified as a proper ahd-nāme, that is, the official 
capitula given by the Ottoman sultans to other foreign powers. Previous scholarship 
has been unable to provide a satisfactory answer in terms of chronology for this 
                                                          
468 ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria, 42 c.92 Müller curiously skipped this letter, or probably failed 
to notice it in his publication: serenissime rex…galeas duas ad loca vestro imperio subdita et 
persertim bizantium mittere instituimus mercibus plenas quas earum magni navium a nobis propositi 
etiam in pervenitis vestris … et libere res suis vendere et pretium ex eis…res per illis alias possint 
consequi seco … quos rectores navium esse voluimus omni favore auxilio et benivolentia persequatur 
prestans eos ab iniuriis tutos ac secures ut quam famam de virtutibus vestris accipimus…  
469 Camerani 1939 and Vedovato 1939 tried to find what happened to the lost copy, without success. 
Most probably, it was lost somewhere in Pera in the monastery of the Padri Zoccolanti see Camerani 
1939. 








agreement.470 Fortunately, I have found enough unpublished materials from the 
Florentine state archive to determine with some exactitude when the sultan signed 
these “capitula”.  
Indirect sources concerning the capitula allow for the establishment of 
chronological boundaries. The terminus post quem might be connected to the 
departure of the Levantine galleys in 1458, as it is evident that before this date, there 
were no privileges granted to Florence by the Ottoman sultan. This theory is further 
confirmed by the anonymous letter in 1456, which is the first proof of on-going 
negotiations between Florence and the sultan. The terminus ante quem can be dated 
in 1462-1463, since on 28 June 1463 the Signoria sent a letter to its consul in 
Constantinople Mainardo degli Ubaldini: 
And to send to his (Mehmet II) lands our galleys, not only in this year but forever... as it 




At the time of this letter Florence had already received commercial privileges 
from the sultan. Moreover, there is another letter sent directly to Cosimo the Elder by 
Carlo Martelli on 3 May 1463.472 This letter does not explicitly state the commercial 
privileges or capitula like the Signoria’s letter to the consul of Constantinople in 
                                                          
470 Camerani 1939:83-101 set the privileges from 1455 to 1460, İnalcik 1977:87 even set the 
privileges in 1469. 
471 ASF, Signori Otto di pratica Dieci di balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77, in Appendix II n. 
128. 
472 ASF, MAP, f. 16 n. 87.  








1463, but mentions the presence of “our consul”.473 The presence of a Florentine 
consul alone must be an evident proof of the agreement between Florence and the 
Ottomans. Of course, Florence could have a consul in Constantinople only after the 
capitula granted by Mehmet II. Therefore, the sultan must have granted these 
privileges before the date of these two letters (1463). The final proof is again indirect 
but, in my opinion, is the definitive proof needed to find a more specific date of the 
commercial privileges given to Florence. The evidence in this case is the text of a 
provision enacted by the Commune on 24 July 1460, just three years before 
Martelli’s letter. This provision introduced important modifications to the Levantine 
commercial organisation.474 Moreover, this document introduced the Levantine 
routes for the first time, which had up to that point been absent or rare in the 
Florentine documents. Therefore, before this provision the Levantine state-galleys 
lacked a proper organisation. Moreover, the provision established the necessity to 
organise a permanent trade for the Levant. There must be a reason for Florence to 
decide, at this specific moment, to set up the ports of call for the Levantine routes. 
Perhaps it is not a coincidence that this provision was enacted between the return of 
the first group of Florentine state-galleys from Constantinople and the first 
attestation of the capitula in 1463. Therefore, I have identified the period of time in 
which Mehmet II signed the capitula in favour of the Florentine Signoria with the 
                                                          
473 Lo nostro consolo scrive achotesta magnifica Signoria et a la magnificenzia vestra et chonforto 
che il manda di qua. Moreover, a letter from Benedetto Dei published in Orvieto 1969:228-232 
mentions the presence of the Florentine consul in Constantinople. The letter is dated to December 
1462. 
474 Müller 1879:295-296. 








first journey of the Florentine galleys in 1458.475 This provision represents 
convincing proof because the emission date was after Florence’s request to the pope 
for permission to trade with the Ottomans, which mentioned that no weapons or iron 
could be carried in the galleys. In conclusion, I believe that it is reasonable to 
chronologically contextualise the grant of the “commercial privilege” to Florence 
between 1458/1459. 
What is essential now is to reconstruct, as much as possible, the content of the 
capitula, that is, the specific concessions. Since there is no written evidence, the 
reconstruction will be based on any possible indirect primary sources relevant to the 
specific concessions of the privileges. First of all, Mehmet II obviously gave the 
authorisation to have a Florentine consul in Constantinople, who also happened to be 
the first ever Florentine consul in Constantinople.476 Secondly, the rate of the 
kommerkion regarding Florence’s imports and exports was definitely superior to that 
of major competitors, that is, Venice and Genoa. One helpful source collection is the 
Actes de Mehmed II et de Bayezid II du Manuscripts Fonds Turc Ancien 39, 
published by Beldiceanu in 1960. In these acts, Genoa and Venice were present, 
while Florence does not appear. It is probable that at the time of the acts, Genoa and 
Venice still had a higher volume of business in the Levant, so there was no need to 
specify the presence of Florence in the document redaction. However, Genoa and 
                                                          
475 Specifically in this group were the galleys captained by Francesco di Paolo Vettori. Mallett 
1967:163. 
476 The first mention of Mainardo Ubaldini as a consul is in the letter from Carlo Martelli to Florence 
in May 3 1461. Mainardo degli Ubaldini will stay in charge until his death in 1470 see Müller 
1879:215 letter dated 1471 26 October in Florentine style.  








Venice did not enjoy free exemptions as they did in the Byzantine period.477 
Unfortunately, the documents on the Constantinopolitan customs lack an accurate 
date.478  
Only one document gives an insight about the commercial tax regulations in 
Constantinople during the regime of Mehmet II. Beldiceanu dated the document to a 
period after the conquest of Constantinople.479 Therefore, this source must be 
approached carefully and taken with all the limits imposed due to such an ambiguous 
date. I assume that the document date should not be earlier than 1463/64 because 
Venice, in this particular document, is not present, unlike in other trading documents 
in the Ottoman empire. In fact, Venice’s absence from this specific document 
confirms that that Serenissima and the Ottoman sultanate were at war at the time.480 
However, this regulation only mentioned generic etoffes franques which paid a 
kommerkion at four per cent without any specification with regard to the eventual 
seller.481  
In addition, Beldiceanu published another document regarding the commercial 
brokering on cloth and textiles between Constantinople and Galata, but still without 
an emission date. This document concerns the regulation of the brokerage tax on 
                                                          
477  Depending on which wares and city and period of time, this varied between three to five percent. 
Beldiceanu 1960:126-130. 
478  Probably lost or buried, at the very least Beldiceanu did not provide such information. 
479 Beldiceanu 1960:116. “Apres le 29 mai 1453”. The reason given by the scholar was that the 
document mentioned Constantinople. Thus it is a very generic attribution.  
480 And the peace between Venice and the Ottomans was only signed in 1454. 
481 It is important to remember that, for example, Genoa in that period was transporting Florentine 
cloth to the Levant because of the general Italian wars that make impossible for Florence to send any 
commercial galleys. 








cloth and textiles and specifically mentions the Florentine panni.482 Beldiceanu dated 
the document to a period after 1461, which seems perfectly in line with the 
hypothetical date (1458-1459) of the grants to Florence.483  
If a merchant not Muslim sells [his wares] through the intermediation of a dellal, the 
seller and the buyer, same if the latter is Muslim, must pay the tax (dellaliq). If [the 
merchant] sells without the intermediation of a dellal, he will pay [the tax] for himself 
and the buyer. And one is to receive [the following brokerage tax]: 2 aspers from the 
seller and 2 aspers from the buyer for piece of cloth…from Florence or another piece 
which is similar… 
 
The document specifies that the brokerage tax on Florentine panni was surely one of 
the lowest which definitely represents an advantage for Florentine exports in the 
Constantinopolitan market.484 The document does not mention the nationality of the 
merchant, but only the origin of fabrication. Besides, this document only concerns 
the payment of the dellaliq, or brokerage tax.485 None of the documents published by 
Beldiceanu mention the kommerkion, or the percentage of tax that Florentine 
merchants had to pay on imports and exports. An immediate thought would be that 
Florentine merchants were asked for the normal kommerkion imposed on all the 
“Franks” transporting wares to Constantinople, that is, between three and five per 
cent. However, another source tells us a different story. The letter sent by the 
                                                          
482 This was one of the main exports of the Florentine establishment. See in general Hoshino 1980; 
Hoshino 2001 De Roover 1999, Tognetti 2002. 
483 The document is without date but Beldiceanu put it in 1461 as “le document mentionne au 5 le 
bezzazistan de Constantinople”. Beldiceanu 1960:126. 
484 For example, cloths of Mallorca and Catalonia kind, were at 5 aspres while those of England and 
Bergamo were at 3 aspres.  
485 Fleet 1999:106. 








Signoria in 1462 to the Florentine consul in Constantinople, Mainardo degli Ubaldini 
states: 
…that if he could remove the kommerkion…from our galleys just as they were removed 
in Constantinople…486 
 
This unpublished letter is surely an important discovery in terms of the political and 
economic relations between Florence and the Levant. The letter evidently specifies 
that the Florentine kommerkion was zero, just as the free exemptions enjoyed by 
Venice and Genoa under the Byzantine empire. The term “levare” is particularly 
strong and clearly marks the complete removal of any custom tax. Furthermore, the 
letter confirms that for the first time Florence had a commercial advantage over 
Venice and Genoa since the two Italian cities had to pay the kommerkion at two 
percent.487 
This advantage with the relatively low dellaliq payment for the Florentine 
panni, confirms Florence’s commercial superiority in the exports of Florentine panni 
to Constantinople.488 Another question still unanswered is whether Constantinople 
was the only Ottoman market at the disposal of the Florentine Commune, or if 
Florentine galleys could approach other places within the Ottoman empire. Of 
course, only the original capitula could have this information. In this particular case, 
                                                          
486 ASF, Signori Otto di Pratica Dieci di Balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77, in Appendix II n. 
128. 
487 On Venice’s kommerkion see Preto 1975 and İnalcik 1977:87. On Genoa and the Ottomans see 
Basso 2008, Pistarino 1995, Fleet 1999. 
488 The dellaliq is the brokerage tax. See Beldiceanu 1960:126.  








the aforementioned letter sent from Florence to the consul Mainardo degli Ubaldini 
in 1463 is very useful. 
The letter reads: 
… with respect to our capitula, it is necessary to obtain permission to send our galleys to other 
places, seaports and especially in Phocaea besides Constantinople, ......489 
 
The letter states, without any doubt, that the original capitula restricted the 
Florentine galleys route to Constantinople, since it is a clear request made by the 
Signoria to the Florentine consul in Constantinople to petition the sultan for new 
trading places to be made available to the Florentine state-galleys. One of the real 
Florentine goals was the alum, which was essential dye-fixer for the Florentine panni 
manufactories. The letter mentions, for example, Phocaea, one of the most important 
places for the alum extraction.490 Nevertheless, Mehmet II wanted to continue the 
trade in Constantinople in order to maintain the control over the foreign merchants 
while re-establishing the former Byzantine capital to its previous greatness through 
the revitalisation of Constantinopolitan trade.491 Yet, this restriction was valid only 
for the Florentine state-galleys. The individual merchants were not affected by the 
prohibition to trade in other territories within the Ottoman empire. The letter 
mentions only “our galleys” which is a clear reference to the state-galleys.492 If that 
                                                          
489 ASF, Signori Otto di Pratica Dieci di Balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77. In Appendix II n. 
128.  
490 Strathern 2007:136. Tolfa mines were discovered around 1462, but the Medici would have taken 
possession only in 1464.  
491 This theory is shared by every single scholar. I recommend in general İnalcik 1973.  
492 le galee nostre, our galleys. 








was not true, it would be impossible to explain for example, the presence in Bursa of 
Florentine merchants already witnessed by the Burgundian traveller Bertrandon de la 
Broquière in 1432.493 Finally, around 1476 Mehmet II must have granted new 
consulates to Florence since in this year we have a letter which states the presence of 
a Florentine consul also in Adrianople.494 
After the locations for trade presented in the Ottoman capitula, I will try to 
reveal the single legal concession within the privileges granted to Florence. 
Normally, every privilege granted by one authority to another always included legal 
aspects, which regulated the status of the foreign community in the territory, such as 
cases of judicial controversy or a merchants’ death in foreign territory. I will base my 
analysis on indirect references to reconstruct this aspect of the privileges since the 
lack of any written official document. At first the Florentine consul had no 
jurisdiction over the Florentine community in Galata. This lack of authority is proven 
by the several problems arising between Florentine inhabitants and the consul. 
Therefore, on 22 March 1474, the Signoria petitioned the sultan to grant to the 
Florentine consul the power of prosecuting whoever jeopardised public order in the 
community. 
Most glorious emperor, we beg you that (you will grant) full power to our consul so that 





                                                          
493 De La Broquière 1892:137. 
494 ASF, MAP, f. 33 n. 542. The Florentine consul name was Agnolo Buondelmonti who was dead by 
the time of this letter for the plague.  
495 Müller 1879:219. 








While to the Florentine consul the Signoria wrote: 
 
…we (the Florentine Signoria) have written to the Great Turk, begging him that he 
would give faculty and power to you in order to punish those who act against the law 
and that you may exercise your office to preserve the city’s dignity and that you will 
manage to force our citizens at the moment under your jurisdiction in living orderly so 





The consul lacked of any kind of judiciary power over the Florentine 
community in Constantinople before 1474. Some of the Florentines in 
Constantinople took advantage of this weakness and created some problems. The 
consul had to rely on Ottoman officials and Mehmet II to govern the Florentine 
settlement due to the lack of any coercive power.  The reason of this consular 
weakness might be due to the sultan’s will to maintain full control and to leave the 
foreign merchants with only the necessary market privileges.  
There were other problems for Florentine merchants. For example, there was 
always the risk of a Florentine merchant dying in Constantinople. What would have 
happened to his personal properties was not clear. In the absence of any specific 
regulation, the local authorities could have taken the belongings of the deceased. Of 
course, in the case of a merchant’s death, the value of the belongings might have 
been considerable. The Signoria sent another letter to the consul on 5 December 
1467 and ordered him to petition the sultan to protect the goods of dead 
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Florentines.497 Accordingly, before 1467 there was no legal guarantee on the 
property of the deceased and everything depended on the will of the local authorities. 
We must still discuss the material grants of the privilege, such as whether 
Florence had the right to have a loggia or a church for the Florentine community in 
Constantinople. Again some primary documents present some interesting details. 
The consul did possess a proper house already by 1461, which was eventually seized 
by a senior member of the Ottoman court. Benedetto Dei’s letter, written in 1461 to 
Carlo Martelli, describes this episode. Carlo Martelli was part of the Martelli 
household, close to the Medici, and at that time a resident of Rhodes. 
…the house of our “natio” had been taken and this house belonged to the consul…that 
Istasinna (the name in the text) wanted it. And now he (the consul) is staying in the 
church …498 
 
This letter is also precious because it testifies to the existence of a church given 
to Florence as a worship place in Constantinople.499 So, I can confirm that the 
potential capitula given to Florence by Mehmet II included several privileges (limits 
of travel, church, consular house etc.), which past scholarship was not able to 
describe.  
                                                          
497 Müller 1879:206-207. 
498 Letter published in Orvieto 1969:229-232. The letter is in Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana 
Ashburnham 1841, p. II n. 2. 
499 The letter does not state explicitly if it was the same church given to the Florentine community, 
that is, the one of St. Peter and Paul.  








To sum up, Florence definitely received the ahd-nāme from Mehmet II, despite 
the fact that there is no trace on the documentary resources. This privilege must have 
been issued no earlier than 1458, but no later than 1460. The capitula were indeed 
favourable to Florence. Despite the travelling limitation to Constantinople, the 
Florentines paid no kommerkion on their wares, while Genoa and Venice had to pay 
a sum between two to five per cent depending on the wares. This economic and 
political privilege empowered Florence for the first time in history, making it the 
most competitive power in the Levantine market. The capitula made Florence 
superior even to Genoa and Venice. Florence had the right to have a house (a loggia) 
and a church (Dei’s letter to Martelli), although at first the situation was a bit 
unstable.500 Since all juridical powers were in the hands of the sultan and the 
ministers, in the beginning the Florentine consul was unable to properly control the 
Florentine merchants in the colony. Turmoils in the Florentine settlements and 
struggles between merchants and the consul were quite normal, especially if the 
consul did not have enough coercive power over the merchants.501  
Florence, Calixtus III and the Ottomans (1455-1458)  
 
Generally, scholars have conceived of Florence as opportunistic in the great mosaic 
of relations between the Italian states and the Ottoman empire. This analysis appears 
                                                          
500 The episode of the requisition of Mainardo’s house by the Ottoman official see fn. 492.  
501 See the cases of Naples and the same Constantinople in the letters sent by the Signoria to the 
Florentine consul in the city fn. 671. 








an oversimplification. Florence was still a Christian power, and because of that they 
could not decisively side with the Ottoman empire. Such a position would risk the 
accusation of friendship with the Ottomans, which in itself was a perfect casus belli 
for a potential hostile power to justify an attack against Florence. This was even 
more dangerous for Florence, since the Commune lacked a proper army and relied on 
the duke of Milan for its military defence. Instead, the kings of France were virtually 
untouchable, and therefore could have improved their relations with the Ottomans 
without fear of any reprisal.  
Therefore, it was necessary for Florence’s diplomacy to show a maximum of 
neutrality. This plan became part of the “balance-of-power policy” pursued since the 
peace of Lodi in 1454.  This diplomatic position was intended to prevent any Italian 
power becoming too powerful in Italy, and at the same time maintain Florence’s 
advantage in the Levant.   
It was not an easy mission since every pope in the second half of the fifteenth 
century was determined to organise the crusade to combat the growing Ottoman 
power in Europe. The Ottoman empire, therefore, had a certain influence on the 
Italian diplomatic relations of this century. This part of the chapter aims to present 
those relations between Florence and the Ottoman empire connected to the popes’ 
initiatives to call for a crusade. After Pope Nicholas V’s death, the Conclave elected 
in 1455 the Spaniard Alonso Borja, former secretary of Alphonse V, as pope. His 
elevation caused concern in most Italian states due to Borja’s relationship with 








Alphonse V. Nevertheless, these fears disappeared when the new pope swore an oath 
to free Constantinople from the Turks.502 In 1456, the new pope sent letters to the 
entire Latin world and urged them to create a fleet for the crusade against the 
Ottomans.503 The pope also sent a letter to Florence in 1456 to remind the Commune 
of the subsidies which the Florentine Signoria had promised to his predecessor. Yet, 
for the time of Pius II’s letter Florence had already established a relationship with 
sultan Mehmet II.504 Thus, the papal initiative came at a very delicate moment for 
Florence as the Commune had no intention of interrupting the negotiations with 
Mehmet II and joining the papal crusade. Florence’s diplomacy tried, therefore, to 
please the pope in other ways that did not imply contributions to the crusade.  
One of the solutions found by Cosimo the Elder to please the pope was to take 
care of the problem for the papal see represented by Giacomo Piccinino.  Giacomo 
Piccinino was the son of the most famous Niccolò Piccinino. In this period, Giacomo 
Piccinino was trying to create a state with his army in the papal territory (likewise 
emulating the famous Sforza) and was diplomatically fluctuating between Florence 
and, for him later tragically, Naples.505 Indeed, he represented an element of extreme 
                                                          
502 Caselli 2010:65-66, Ryder 1990:407-408 and Setton 1978:2.165. 
503 Sciambra-Valenti 1968 contains all the “brevi” which were sent. The papal plan was to create a 
fleet under the command of a Pontifical Legatus. The fact that the pope’s fleet was a diversion is 
made known in the letter sent to the emperor (Sciambra-Valentini1968:76) in which the pope 
pressured the emperor to help the Hungarian king, while the fleet is keeping the Turks busy. In fact as 
it appears from the letter to the king of France (idem), the Turks had crossed the Danube and were 
engaging in combat in Hungary. 
504 The letter from the pope is in Sciambra-Valentini 1968:74. As for Florence’s negotiations with 
Mehmet II, it is worth remembering the first letter sent by the Florentine Signoria in 1455 to Mehmet 
II and the anonymous letter sent from Constantinople in 1456. 
505 For the relation between Piccinino and Ferrante I see Ferente 2005. For Piccinino in Siena and in 
general see Banchi 1879:44-58, 225-245. 








instability and danger for the Papal See.506 Florence paid a condotta to Piccinino to 
prevent the condottiere from creating troubles near the Sienese territory.507 One of 
the reasons for Florence to “corrupt” Piccinino could have been to avoid any 
contribution for the crusade by doing this favour to the pope. However, this 
Florentine initiative with regard to Piccinino was not enough for Pope Calixtus III, 
who reminded Florence that the crusade was an expensive matter and he expected a 
contribution from the Medici in the future. The Florentine diplomatic method in this 
case was only a temporary solution to delay contributions to the crusade. The 
eventual contribution of Florence to the crusade would present a problem in 
negotiations with the sultan. The sultan’s fame for dealing harshly with the Italian 
powers was surely known in Florence. Reports of the treatment reserved for Venice 
and Genoa after the fall of Constantinople were widespread, and it makes sense that 
Florence did not want to meet the same fate. Fortunately for the Medici, Florence 
was not the only power that was not willing to contribute to the crusade. Venice and 
Naples responded coldly to Pope Calixtus III’s request. Venice, after the fall of 
Constantinople, was determined to keep the truce they had signed with the Ottoman 
sultan and to rebuild its Levantine trade. This attitude appears in the letters sent to 
Bartolomeo Marcello. Bartolomeo Marcello was travelling to Constantinople at the 
time of the siege in order to meet with the sultan. After the fall of the city he did not 
                                                          
506 For example, in a letter sent in 1455 from Bartolomeo Visconti, bishop of Novara, to Francesco 
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taken in debt more than 70.000 ducats that would have been better spent against the Turks. Letter is 
in Pastor 1891:2.45. 
507 Sciambra-Valentini 1968:81. 








stop and carried on his journey. The Venetian Senate was satisfied on this choice and 
remarked on the necessity of signing a truce with the sultan. A truce was effectively 
signed in 1454 and followed the concession by Mehmet II of the ahd-name to Venice 
so that Venice could resume its trade to Constantinople.508 Just as Venice, Alphonse 
V of Aragon was more interested in defeating the Genoese rather than wasting his 
fleet in the Levant and joining the crusade. Alphonse V’s attitude towards Genoa is 
confirmed by the Genoese complaints to the pope about the continuous harassments 
made by Bernat de Villamarí, the Catalan commander.509 
Accordingly, to the detriment of Pope Calixtus III’s hopes for the crusade, 
Florence shared the indifference of most Italian powers. The Florentine expedients 
used in order to avoid the crusade started to become common. Florence was ready to 
contribute to the crusade, but only after all the Christian powers had done the same. 
Florence apologised but due to the current wars it was unable to provide the 
necessary contribution.510 
In no way did Florence want to show that they were openly against the crusade, 
but at the same time the Florentine Signoria did not want to be the first contributor 
and sponsor for the expedition. Florence still needed to maintain good relations with 
the pope both for their Levantine trade and for Florence’s business in Rome. Only 
                                                          
508 ASV, Senato Mar , Reg. 4 f.187. On Bartolomeo Marcello see DBI 2007:69 s.v. Bartolomeo 
Marcello. 
509 See Sciambra-Valentini 1968:106. After Alphonse V’s death, the pope appeared to be pleased by 
the news, and even sent a soldier to pillage the Neapolitan ambassador’s quarter. Pastor 1891:2.560-
2.562. 
510 See for example ASF, Consulte e Pratiche 56 5v-6r or ASF, Legazioni e Commissarie 15 25-27. 








the pope could grant to the Signoria the required “freedom” to trade with the 
Ottoman sultan.511 Moreover, Florentine galleys needed the necessary safe conduct 
from the pope for their galleys travelling to the Levant.512 Florence’s banking 
interests in Rome, including those of the Medici, the Pazzi and others were also at 
stake. The Medici held the apostolic depository, which was an important source of 
political influence and revenue in Rome. 
These are all elements which explain the delicate diplomatic position of 
Florence in between the Ottoman empire and the pope. Robert Black describes 
Florence’s attitude toward the proposed crusade in his book “Benedetto Accolti and 
the Florentine Renaissance”, in which he argues that until 1456, Florence was 
favourable to the crusade project, but the Commune changed its position when the 
possibility of more favourable conditions presented itself in the Constantinopolitan 
markets. However, this is impossible since the negotiations between Florence and the 
Ottomans had already begun in 1455. My theory is that Florence was not favourable 
to the crusade project but was trying to gain time to conclude the negotiations with 
Mehmet II. This theory of mine is further proven by the anonymous letter in 1456. 
Moreover, the instruction given by the Signoria in 1456 to Antonio di Ridolfi, future 
ambassador in Rome, specifically states:  
You will pray again to our Holiness that he would concede to us a safe conduct for our 
boats and merchants, which are going to go to the Levant and to Constantinople and 
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512 Because the Florentine galleys departed from Porto Pisano, it was necessary for them to cross 
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with full power, and that our Holiness would have no doubt that our galleys will not 
carry any weapons or subsidies to the Turks, and that we rather prefer to die.
513 
This instruction is the real reason for Florence’s initial willingness to support Pope 
Calixtus III’s crusade plan. Florence’s interest in the crusade was merely political. 
The Florentine Commune did not want to irritate the pope because it needed safe 
conduct for the Florentine galleys, which the Commune already had planned to 
dispatch to the Levant. Black makes a further argument. He states that, contrary to 
other states (such as France), Florence allowed the papal preachers to exhort and 
collect the tenth of the tithe in Florence (1456-1457) for the crusade. For Black, this 
was convincing evidence of Florence’s will to contribute to the Pope Calixtus III’s 
crusade. Just as I stated above, Florence was in negotiations with Mehmet II exactly 
when the papal preachers were in Florence. Therefore, Florence’s supposed will to 
contribute to the crusade can only be interpreted as the Commune’s attempt to 
maintain serene relations with the pope. For by the time of Florence’s alleged 
cooperation with the pope, the Signoria was still waiting for the permission of 
commerce and the safe conduct from the pope. An ambiguous or hostile attitude 
from Florence toward the papal initiative might have led to the refusal of Florentine 
requests. Black’s theory seems to be incorrect because it implies that Florence 
decided to leave the crusade only at the last moment. Black even states that Florence 
“openly voiced support for papal crusading effort” which really seems a very strong 
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and inaccurate sentence with regard to the period. 514 In fact, Florence was already in 
negotiation with the sultan in 1455, seemingly even from an earlier period. For the 
first letter in 1455 states that contacts had been already made in Constantinople.  
Florence had its own political influence over the papacy which it employed in 
case of controversies between the Commune and the Holy See. The popes needed 
access to the Florentine banks. The Medici bank especially helped the popes for two 
reasons. First because it was still a profitable business and second because the popes 
would be in debt with the Medici and therefore exposed to Florence’s political 
influence. Without surprise, the pope granted to Florence both the safe conduct and 
permission to sell wares to the Ottoman sultanate.515 Babinger and Pastor argue that 
Florence played both sides against each other with the crusade and their Levantine 
interests.516 However, I think it is impossible to speak about “sides” in the case of 
Florence. Florence’s diplomacy was elaborately coherent towards its determined 
goals. The Levantine goal was, for Florence, one of the oldest goals, going back even 
before the Medici took power in 1434.517 This goal did not change after Cosimo the 
Elder seized power in Florence. The Medici managed to organise the Ecumenical 
Council and had even demanded from John VIII the same privileges held by the 
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other Italian cities.518 Besides, Florence was not the only power trying to avoid 
crusade obligations. The kingdom of France and Ragusa refused the collection of the 
tenth and the king of Portugal, despite all the promises of personal participation in 
the crusade, never showed up.519 The main reason for Ragusa’s refusal is due to 
political elements. Just as Florence, Ragusa wanted to maintain friendly relations 
with the Ottomans. Moreover, the geographical position of Ragusa was dangerously 
close to the Ottoman empire and a false move could have resulted in an Ottoman 
attack against the city. In all probability, the general reluctance of the Christian 
powers to answer Pope Calixtus III’s initiative facilitated their attempts to temporise 
the papal request whilst negotiating with Mehmet II.  
The organisation of the crusade was temporarily halted when Pope Calixtus 
III died in 1458. This halt did not last long. The new pope, Aeneas Sylvius 
Piccolomini, would become even more influential and even more determined than 
Calixtus III to bring about the crusade.  
Florence, the popes and the Ottomans (1458-1463) 
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the period between 1458 and 1464 was the 
most important time in the history of Florence's engagement with the Levant. This 
period was a promising one for Florence since the city had begun official trade with 
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Constantinople, thanks to the privileges received around 1458-1460. However, the 
pontificate of Pius II threatened Florence’s commercial success with a new vigorous 
resumption of the crusade. Pius II decided to call a congress in Mantua in 1459 and 
pressed all the Latin powers to attend, including Florence.   
Needless to say, this event raised serious problems within the Florentine 
Commune, especially when three galleys were preparing to depart to Constantinople 
in 1459.520 Florence, at this precarious time in history, was entirely unwilling to 
compromise the Signoria’s new favourable position in Constantinople with a 
crusade. Surely, the city’s diplomatic posture had nothing to do with its religious 
fervour, but rather was the mixture of commercial and political interests, such as the 
banking business in Rome and the need to have good relations with the pope. Thus, 
when news of the convocation at Mantua reached Florence, the Signoria decided to 
delay the departure of its ambassadors in order to gain some time for the three 
galleys in the Levant. However, in 1459, Pope Pius II, immediately following his 
election to the Holy See, had already published his papal Bull, “Vocavit Nos Pius”, 
ordering all the Christian powers to meet in Mantua to discuss the crusade against the 
Turks.521 Florence adapted by instructing its ambassadors sent to Rome to present 
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congratulations for the pope’s election, but to avoid any kind of promises, especially 
regarding any help against the Turks.522 
 The position of the Signoria in the pratiche shows a vivid debate among its 
oligarchs. Florence was willing to risk neither its positive papal relations nor the 
trade with the Ottomans. These pratiche show some division among individual 
Florentine oligarchs. One position in the pratiche argued that the crusade was in the 
interests of Florence while the other one pointed out that only Venice could have 
obtained profits from the eventual crusade. A peculiar position was that of 
Giovannozzo Pitti, who argued that Florence should have done something for its 
“good Christian name”. The “good Christian name” was the best way to avoid any 
possible accusation of being on good terms with Mehmet II. This accusation would 
have put not only the Florentine commercial and political interest in Rome at risk, 
but also threatened the territorial integrity of the Commune. In fact, any kind of 
accusation of favouring the Ottoman empire could have given legitimacy to any 
hostile act against the Commune, which is worth reminding, was militarily inferior 
when compared to the other major powers in Italy such as Venice or Naples. Unlike 
France, Florence was not strong enough to stand openly against the crusade without 
risking military retaliation from other powers. In the end, what the Signoria told the 
ambassadors once again concerned the pragmatic policy of preserving the political 
balance of power in Italy. The ambassadors had to explain to Pope Pius II that 
                                                          
522 ASF, Legazioni e Commissarie 15, 25-27, in Appendix II n. 67. The official explanation was that 
Florence was still recovering from the past wars. 








Florence had already given permission to collect the crusade tenth. But they had also 
to underline the fact that Florence was not in a good situation to provide more 
material help to the crusade. 
Pope Pius II, probably aware of Florence’s manoeuvring, decided to stop in 
Florence on his way to Mantua and urge the Signoria to join the crusade. Florence 
spent 13.500 florins hosting Pius II and treated him respectfully, but refused to make 
any official promise. When Pius II finally reached Mantua, the pope was completely 
disillusioned by the lack of participants.523 Indeed Venice, not Florence, was the last 
power to send ambassadors to the congress. Venice had signed a truce with the Turks 
in 1455 and tried every effort to maintain its commercial position in Constantinople. 
Like Florence, Venice had no intention to come out publicly against Mehmet II, 
particularly after what happened to the Venetian Bailo and merchants in the 
aftermath of the fall of Constantinople. When the congress in Mantua finally began, 
the pope asked for contributions from every political power.  Florence initially 
refused, but after a private meeting with Pius II, the Signoria agreed to some very 
vague promises.524 There is a need to understand whether Florence wanted to boycott 
Pius II’s initiative or simply maintained a coherent diplomacy in preserving the 
Signoria’s political and commercial interests. 
In general, scholars hold two opposing theories about Florence’s attitude 
towards the crusade: Babinger and Pastor have argued that Florence tried to boycott 
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the crusade; while Black has tried to show Florence’s positive, if secret, attitude 
toward the expedition.525  I certainly cannot read Cosimo’s mind, nor that of any 
other Quattrocento protagonists. However, I do not think that either of the above 
theories is correct. Evidently, Florence had vital interests in the Levant, and 
commercial advancement in Constantinople was surely an important part of the 
Signoria’s policies. Yet Rome and the papacy were also central for Florence’s 
politics, as well as for the Florentine economy, due to the banking presence and the 
lucrative business which Florence had in the papal court. Moreover, if Florence had 
been so bold as to compromise the papacy’s policies on the crusade, as Pastor and 
Babinger suggested, then Pope Pius II would have never granted the monopoly of the 
newly discovered alum mines in Tolfa to the Medici in 1464. The Tolfa mines were 
to become a good opportunity for the pope to ban all importation of “Turkish” alum. 
Florence was evidently completely unwilling to give up its commercial progress in 
the Levantine market, but at the same time the Signoria understood the opportunities 
present in Rome at the papal court. Besides, the accusation of friendship with the 
Ottomans could have exposed Florence to possible retaliation from neighbouring 
powers. 
  The consequences of the congress of Mantua seem to confirm that Florence 
was determined not to displease either the pope or the Ottoman sultan. During the 
congress of Mantua, Florence asked for a secret meeting in which it effectively 
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agreed to Pius II’s requests on the tithes.526 Evidently Florence did not want to 
appear openly in favour of the crusade but at the same time wanted to keep the pope 
satisfied. This political attitude explains the secret meeting with the pope. There were 
also other problems during the congress. At the time of the congress, Florence had 
dispatched state-galleys to the Levant. The question is whether the Florentine 
establishment, in the end, agreed to fulfil the secret promise made to the pope in 
Mantua. The answer is that Florence did not give the subsidy promised at Mantua to 
the pope. When Pope Pius II returned from Mantua he even stopped in Florence and 
reprimanded the city for not having fulfilled what the Florentine ambassadors had 
promised in secret during the congress. Still the pope decided not to force the 
Signoria, but adopted a diplomatic approach. The pope had received from the 
Florentine ambassadors in Mantua promises of three tithes: a tenth on the clerks, a 
twentieth on the Jews and a thirtieth on the laity. When in Florence, Pius II asked the 
Signoria how it was going to carry out this promise. Florence apologised and 
presented several difficulties related to the task, such as bureaucratic impediments, in 
order not to be the first crusader power to displease the pope, and asked for a 
postponement. The pope thought that the postponement did not include the church 
tithe. As a result, after a few days, Pius II asked for the church tithe, thus 
embarrassing the Florentine establishment. 
Florence agreed to give subsides to the pope in order to gain time. Soon it 
became clear that the pope had serious problems in collecting the requested tithes 
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almost everywhere, including Venice.527 Venice’s reluctance was a serious problem 
for Pius II. In fact, any crusade without Venetian participation was unthinkable, 
especially considering the magnitude of Venetian fleet which could have amounted 
to 180 galleys during the fifteenth century.528  Florence used the reluctance of the 
other states to gain more time.529 Despite Florentine opposition, the pope did not 
intend to let loose his grip on Florence. Pope Pius II turned to the Milanese 
ambassador and sent a clear, even if somewhat indirect message, to the Florentine 
Commune: if Florence would not pay the promised subsidies, the pope was ready to 
censure the city. The summoned Communal pratica in 1460 finally surrendered and 
allowed the pope to collect the tenth on the clergy.530 Finally, by 1461, Florence had 
delivered its contribution to Rome.531 
  In Black’s opinion, the decision of the pratiche represented ‘another turning 
point in Florentine diplomacy with regard to crusade’.532 However, I still cannot see 
how this contribution can be regarded as evidence of Florence’s willingness to 
become an enemy of the sultan and a crusade sponsor. Again, my interpretation is 
that Florence never placed itself decisively in both sides. Florence followed its own 
political agenda. In fact, this choice was in keeping with Florence’s aims and not to 
close to itself off to profitable opportunities within and outside Italy.   
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This interpretation can be seen immediately after Florence’s contribution in 
1461 and the political evolution in the Levant with the Venetian-Ottoman war (1463-
1479). In 1463, the relations between the Ottoman sultanate and Venice had already 
begun to deteriorate. Needless to say, in 1463, Venice was most interested in the 
resumption of the crusading initiative, while Florence clearly had some concerns. 
Besides, Florence faced three problems in that period. The first was that, at the start 
of the Ottoman-Venetian war (1463-1479), the Florentine Commune had already 
sent galleys to Constantinople. The second problem was that in 1463 the Florentine 
community in Constantinople and in the Ottoman empire had begun to be 
considerable in its amount. Therefore, angering Mehmet II would have put the entire 
Florentine community at risk and the lucrative businesses established by the 
Florentine merchants there, as well. The third problem was due to the political 
decision of the duke of Milan. In fact, the political position of Florence at this time 
was more complicated since its most important ally, Francesco I Sforza, had decided 
to help the pope and the Venetians.  
The Milanese ambassadors, Otto Carretto and Ugo Niccolini, sent a letter in 
1463 of recommendations to the duke of Milan. This letter is very important because 
it gives hints about the political situation within Florence as well.533 Florence, in the 
Milanese ambassadors’ opinion, shared with the king of France the same idea about 
crusade subsidies.534 The Milanese diplomatic line in the letter was an attempt to try 
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to get the Florentines involved in the crusade. It also shows an awareness of the 
perplexity of the Commune. The Milanese ambassadors tried to negotiate with the 
duke of Burgundy and reached an agreement that all the conquests of the crusading 
army would be under the name of Christ – meaning the pope- but not Venice. 
However, the Milanese ambassadors did not believe Venice would have ever 
accepted such a proposal, and therefore this diplomatic line would risk alienating any 
possible support for the crusade.535 Florence, in the words of the Milanese 
ambassadors, ‘seems completely alien to this endeavour’.536 The reason for the 
Florentine alienation was Florence’s commercial expansion in Constantinople. 
Florentine contributions to the pope would help Venice in recovering its former 
power in the Levant. However, the position of Pope Pius II was clear: in Mantua 
every power agreed to subsidise the crusade with the tenth (clergy), the twentieth 
(Jews) and the thirtieth (laity) of the tithes and even requested that the Florentine 
ambassador negotiate with the king of France and other foreign powers.537 Florence 
expressed its official position in a letter sent to the pope on 1 October 1463.538  
The Florentine position was particularly articulated and presented with the 
intent of persuading the pope to abandon his crusading plan. The first objection to 
the crusade states that attacking the Turks would push the other Islamic powers to 
join the war together with the Ottoman empire, since they feared becoming the 
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crusade’s next target after the eventual defeat of the most powerful Islamic power. 
The second point concerns the great expenses for the crusade. If the crusade should 
fail, all the tithes collected would be lost as well. This would bring disgrace and 
infamy to the Christian world. The third point stresses the past Italian wars that 
greatly compromised the prosperity of the Florentine Commune. Finally, Florence 
warned the pope of the risk carried by the extreme expenses for the crusade. Florence 
expected few Christian powers to undertake the crusade, therefore he warned the 
pope of the risk in spending moneys for a crusade destined to fail at the first 
occasion. Florence stated that it was inconceivable that the crusade would begin with 
the participation of only the duke of Burgundy and the Italian city-states and no other 
major Christian powers. It is plausible that Florence, with this argument, was trying 
to align itself with France and England in the crusade matter without standing openly 
against the crusade. The commercial justification also made up a part of the letter. 
The document states that the sea trade was now the only business for Florence. 
Moreover, Florence informs Pope Pius II that the city had already sent the galleys to 
Constantinople. Finally, the Florentine community in the Ottoman empire would be 
at the mercy of the sultan if the latter would discover Florence’s involvement. This 
letter presents several interesting insights into Florence’s diplomatic line with the 
Holy See on the crusade. Obviously Florence did not intend to contribute or even 
consider participating in a crusade which would only be helpful to Venetian power in 








the Levant.  Therefore, I disagree with Black’s statement that Florence ‘was prepared 
to back Pius II’s crusade by the end of September 1463’.539 
 In March 1463, an ambassador from Venice urged Florence not to send their 
galleys to the Levant. The “official” Venetian reason was that the Turks could have 
taken the two Florentine galleys and used them against the Venetians. This embassy 
is interesting as it testifies that Florence was regularly dispatching galleys to 
Constantinople and that Venice was not exactly pleased about that. Another proof of 
Florence’s organisation is in a diplomatic instruction from 19 March 1463 to Piero 
Acciaiuoli in Rome. The instruction sent to the Acciaiuoli mentioned that it was now 
a habitual custom to send galleys to Constantinople every year.540 The Venetian 
threat was a problem for Florence as the same Signoria told the consul, Mainardo 
degli Ubaldini, in Constantinople on 28 June 1463: 
We (the Signoria) are moved mainly for the honour and the welfare of this city 
(Florence) and for the care of all our merchants and their properties, we order that you, 
… should go as fast as possible to the sultan, and on our behalf you will tell him not be 
surprised if we have delayed the dispatch of our galleys …since the seas are full of a 
great number of armies. We suspect they might assault our ships, but our intention is 




Venice, however, was not going to quietly accept that Florence would trade 
with the sultan while the Serenissima was at war against the Ottoman empire. Febo 
Capella, ambassador of the Serenissima, had already visited Florence to dictate a halt 
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to any travel to the Levant.542 Of course Florence did not accept the Venetian 
request. Therefore, Florence was aware that the danger to its trade with the Levant 
did not come only from the impending crusade, but also from the Venetian war 
galleys. The Florentine commune sent instructions to its ambassador in Rome on 15 
October 1463. The instructions evidently stated that Florence was concerned about 
Venice’s potential initiatives against the Florentine galleys. This was true since 
Venice also sent an ambassador to Milan which made the Signoria scared since the 
instructions to his ambassador in Rome state that ‘if we (Florence) will send the 
galleys in any way and in any place the Venetian captain would take and spoil them 
as enemy vessels’.543  
Florence, instead of beginning a dispute with Venice, decided to directly ask 
for the protection of Florentine state-galleys from the pope. The importance of this 
diplomatic approach was not only to find protection for the Florentine state-galleys, 
but at the same time to avoid, as much as possible, any involvement with the crusade. 
Florence wanted to preserve the security of its state-galleys, but at the same time 
knew that, in exchange, the pope would require the contribution to the crusade as the 
new letter to the Florentine ambassador in Rome states: 
Once we wrote to you…to say to the Holy Father that here in Florence we have 
reassured the Venetian ambassador that our galleys would not cross the strait 
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(Bosphorus), and in case you have not yet spoken with his Holiness, do not do it. 
Instead, you should only say to the pope that we had instructed our captain (captain of 
the galleys) “in the right and proper way”… we received a letter from Dietisalvi 
(Neroni, the Florentine ambassador in Milan) which stated that the duke of Milan wants 
to give us support on this matter. Moreover he (Dietisalvi) had suggested that if we 
attend this impresa (the galleys travel) we need to receive assurances from the pope. We 
want you to find an understanding with the Milanese ambassador… do not say that you 
have any kind of authorisation to negotiate for the crusade.
544 
 
What is evident from this letter is that Florence did not intend to contribute to 
the crusade and asked the Florentine ambassador in Rome to find a compromise and 
an understanding with the Milanese ambassadors.  This understanding between 
Florence and Milan was finally found as a letter written by the two Milanese 
ambassadors, Otto Carretto and Augustino de Rubeis on 19 October 1463 confirmed. 
Florence was ready to promise, in secret (again), that after four or five months, after 
the safe return of the state-galleys to Florence, the Signoria would contribute to the 
crusade. The official excuse for the request of a four-five months delay was that 
Florence needed time to withdraw men and wares from Constantinople as the text 
states: 
As for what your Excellence (the duke of Milan) wrote to the Florentines, that they will 
pay their debts but they would need five months of time, or four at least in order to call 
back the wares and the men (from Constantinople)…and that your Holiness should 
press the Venetian ambassador in order that the latter writes to Venice the opportune 




                                                          
544 Pastor 1904:216.   
545 Pastor 1904:219.  








Pope Pius II, not without reason, had serious doubt about the Florentines, as he 
himself states: 
We (the pope) believe that the Florentines do not have the will, and look for 
justifications and they are going to promise, just as they did in Mantua, in which they 
used the same trick of promising in secret and to use the duke of Milan as their 
guarantee… 
 
The crusade bull, published on 22 October 1463, put more pressure on 
Florence, since it followed the agreement made in Venice between the Serenissima 
and the king of Hungary on 17 October 1463.546 On 24 October 1463, Florence 
ordered its ambassador in Rome to say to the pope that Florence was ready to do 
everything necessary if only Pope Pius II would protect the Florentine state-
galleys.547 Apparently Pius II’s doubts grew when the Signoria sent another letter to 
its ambassador in Rome on 5 November 1463, restating what they had already told 
him on 24 October 1463. The main reason for this reminder was a letter received by 
the Signoria from Venice. The letter related that the Serenissima was to allow its 
galley captain in the Levant ‘to do and make everything he judged was to the 
detriment of the Turk…and that surely they (the Venetians) believed that if the Turks 
would take our galleys, he (the sultan) could have hurt them (the Venetians).548  
Florence, therefore, asked the ambassador to again give assurances of 
Florence’s contribution to the crusade only when the Pope received from Venice a 
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letter guaranteeing the safety of Florentine state-galleys.549 Finally, the efforts of the 
two combined embassies of Florence-Milan to the pope satisfied the Florentine 
hopes. Dietisalvi Neroni, Florentine ambassador in Rome, states on 8 December 
1463 that he reached agreement with Pius II. The agreement protected Florentine 
state-galleys, and in exchange Florence would give the tenth, twentieth and thirtieth 
of the tithes.550 Clearly, this agreement was a major victory for Florence, since the 
city offered to the pope what it had already promised at the famous congress of 
Mantua in 1459. This success was the result of the effort of the duke of Milan who 
pressed the pope to accept Florence’s requests. In Black’s opinion, ‘the Florentines 
may have felt better disposed to cooperate with the crusade now that the most 
dangerous part of the voyage had been completed by their galleys’.551 Instead, the 
Florentines were afraid of the return of their galleys from Constantinople. The next 
paragraph will show that this statement is a bit simplistic.  
 
The deaths of Cosimo and Pius II (1464) 
 
In 1464, Cosimo the Elder and Pope Pius II died, which suspended the entire project 
of the crusade. Thus, it is important to give attention to the events of this year, as 
Florence’s diplomatic line with regard to the crusade became even more 
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sophisticated due to political pressure from the pope and the military threat from 
Venice. I think it is difficult to affirm that the halt to the crusade was due to Cosimo 
the Elder’s death.552 Cosimo the Elder had no intention to contribute to the crusade, 
and Florence tried to avoid the crusade as much as possible without provoking a 
definitive break with the Holy See.553  
The pope wrote a letter to Florence on 29 January 1464, reminding the city 
what it had promised and had never fulfilled.554 Apparently, Florence had not even 
collected the tithes they had promised to the pope at the congress of Mantua and had 
vowed again to Pope Pius II for the protection of Florentine galleys in 1463. 
Afterwards, the pope continued to remind Florence of the promises made to him by 
Florence even after the Florentine state-galleys had returned safely from 
Constantinople. From another letter sent on 4 April 1464 by the Milanese 
ambassador, Otto Carretto, to the duke of Milan, it emerges that Pope Pius II had no 
clue about what Florence was willing to do for the crusade and even proposed to 
Florence to keep the tithes in exchange of an armed support.555 
Still, Pius II wrote another letter on April 23 1464, from Petriolo, to the duke 
of Milan to ask him to press the Florentines to carry out their promises to the 
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crusade.556 The pope was probably a bit upset since it recalls in his Commentarii that 
Florence had been making these promises for some time. Moreover, this letter 
confirms that the pope still did not have any clue about the Florentine attitude 
towards the crusade. Lastly, the fact that the pope wrote this letter to Milan and not 
Florence rise up more suspects about the “willingness” of Florence to fulfill their 
promises.557 
Due to Florence’s evident difficulties fulfilling its promises, the pope asked 
to Stefano de Nardinis the Archbishop of Milan, to write to the duke of Milan. In this 
letter the pope stressed the lack of troops sent by Florence. Pope Pius II sent this 
letter on 11 August 1464, that is, just eight days before the death of the pope.558 This 
letter is crucial to understanding if Florence gave the tithes (tenth, twentieth, and 
thirtieth) promised at Mantua. The letter states that the ‘Florentines did not intend to 
make this expense if not for the tenth, the twentieth and the thirtieth of the tithes, and 
but due to the plague (moria) and Cosimo’s death, this (the tithes) would not have 
taken place’.559 Therefore, eight days before the death of Pius II, Florence had still 
not fulfilled the promise continuously repeated since the congress of Mantua. It is 
true that Black has discovered an important unpublished document, which states that 
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papal preachers started a money collection on 26 May 1464, but apparently the 
money collected was only a very minor part of what Florence had promised.560 
Cosimo the Elder’s death might have given the final blow to the crusade, and 
this fact cannot be denied. Yet, Cosimo the Elder tried by all means to avoid any 
possible Florentine contribution until his last days, and with some success. Eight 
days before the pope’s death, the only “promise” Florence actually seems to have 
fulfilled was to send three galleys that at the time were being repaired in Porto 
Pisano, as stated in a provision of the Florentine Commune on 16 April 1464.561 
Therefore, it was not the death of Cosimo the Elder that put an end to the crusade, 
but the Florentine Signoria’s use of his death as an excuse, in the same way as 
Cosimo had done until his last breath.  
Conclusions 
With the death of Pope Pius II on 19 August 1464, the planned crusade came to an 
end. At the same time, the Florentines somehow managed not to be involved in either 
                                                          
560 Black 1985:258 n. 160. Unfortunately undated. The document is in ASF, Conventi Soppressi 88 n. 
23 , fol. 203v. Pagammo l’an posta et tassa ci posono i commess. Di Papa Pio pe’ fatti del Turcho... 
in fl. XXX larghi.  
561 ASF, Provvigioni Protocolli 11r Informati magnifici et potenti domini priores libertatis et vexillifer 
iustitie populi florentini quod de mense decembri provisum preteriti domini qui tunc presidebant in 
officio sunt requisti cum magna instantia pro parte summi ponteficis per eius proprium oratorem ad 
haris donationem tunc transmissum quod ipsi donatione placet venirede ipsi summo pontifici tre 
galeas...grossas et dues subtiles que tunc reparant fieri pisis de novo per officio consulum maris et 
ipsi domni quilibet dicta requisitio facta fuit habito prius super hoc consilio multorum sapientum 
civium ipsum ex consilium penitus seuquentes intellecto a dicto oratore quod ipse hec suprasede per 
aliquis opus neuiebat et pp responsium ad posita sibi fieri absque numia mora postulabat cum ...et rei 
qualitas non pateretus congregati ...consilia oportuna habito super hoc prius consilio multorum 
sapieritum…quod dicta donatio facta per dictos dominos dicto summo pontefice de dictis tribus galeis 
de quibus et per itsuper narratur intelligatur esse et sit vigore pritus provisionis approbata totaliter et 
confirmata e valesse et vale et observare debuisse....See also Mallett 1967: 35 and Black 1985:258. 
 








the crusade or the Venetian-Ottoman war. A conclusion will be drawn as to the 
interpretation of the acts committed by Florence with regard to the crusade. There are 
two opposing views among historians on this subject: Babinger and Pastor from one 
side and Black from the other. Babinger and Pastor both declared that Florence had 
tried to sabotage the crusade as a result of the city’s economic situation in 
Constantinople, while Black opposes this theory by arguing that Florence effectively 
contributed with the three galleys sent to the Pope. In my opinion, both of these two 
interpretations are simultaneously correct and simplistic.  
Florence tried to avoid any form of help to popes Calixtus III and Pius II in 
their crusade plans. The minimum effort made by the Commune was to send three 
galleys that, at the moment, were under repair in Porto Pisano. It is unfortunate that 
there are no other sources describing the state of these three galleys, but my 
impression is that these ships were not of the best condition. The reason for sending 
these ships was probably to give Pius II something less expensive than the tithes 
collection or even to pay for the military support.  
Evidently, Florence’s foreign policy stance had been consistent since the 
congress of Mantua, which was to keep and preserve the interests of the Signoria. 
They succeeded in the negotiations with the sultan and improved the position of the 
Florentine merchants in Constantinople. Moreover, the Florentines maintained the 
role of bankers and obtained privileges from the pope in Rome. The Medici bank 
was still the official papal bank, together with other Florentine banks, such as the 








Pazzi. In Constantinople, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Florence 
obtained the eagerly desired capitula, and made their merchants even more 
competitive with no kommerkion on their wares. In this period, Florentine galleys 
began to travel to Constantinople on an annual basis, although Florence remained a 
poor naval power. This lack of military power made the city a hostage to corsairs and 
potential “enemies”, such as the king of Naples or Venice. Florence’s diplomacy also 
emerged victorious in dealing with both the pope’s requests for support to the 
crusade and the fate of the Florentine galleys at risk of Venetian attacks. The 
promises to the pope were enough to prevent Venice from attacking Florentine 
galleys, and in the end Florence even managed not to fulfil all its promises.   
What Florence wanted to do was to maintain the balance, both with Rome and 
Constantinople, and to avoid any risk of irritating either the pope or the sultan. 
Interestingly, Florence did not clearly manifest its refusal (as the kingdom of France 
did) towards the crusade, but indeed sent ambassadors to Mantua, an improvement 
over other powers who did not send any representatives. The Florentine ambassadors 
had the duty of making as few promises as possible in order to avoid obliging the 
Florentine Signoria in any way, and at the same time without risking the anger of the 
sultan so that the Florentine colony in Constantinople was not compromised. 
Florence was clearly aware that Pope Pius II’s crusade was a favour to Venice. This 
political fact was even confirmed by Pius II, who replied to what must have been a 
horrified Florentine ambassador, that it was better being conquered by the Venetians 








rather than the Ottomans.562 Cosimo the Elder could not have simply refused the 
papal request because of Florence’s many interests in Rome, such as the apostolic 
depository or the alum in Tolfa which were in Medici hands.  
Florence, therefore, elaborated a temporising policy. The first basic rule was to 
order the Florentine ambassador in Rome not to promise anything publicly on behalf 
of the Florentine Signoria. The only promise the Florentine ambassadors made was 
in secret after the end of the congress in Mantua. This was to be the only case in 
which Florence explicitly promised to contribute to the crusade. From that moment, 
Florence began to subtly use the duke of Milan as a guarantee of their promises. This 
policy helped Florence not to be tied with the pope directly, and was used by 
Florence’s diplomacy until the death of Pius II. The third method was to delay any 
promises by using problems which did not sound petty. For example, the journey of 
the galleys to Constantinople was the perfect picture. Two were the main defences 
used by Florence’s diplomacy in order to avoid any contribution on this occasion, 
that is, the Venetian threat or the possible anger of the sultan. Florence most likely 
reminded the pope that it was impossible for the Commune to contribute if the three 
galleys were going to be attacked by Venice, since this attack would produce 
economic damage. The possible reprisal of the sultan was used when Florence asked 
for four/five months more in order to evacuate the Florentine colony in 
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Constantinople. The letter sent to Mainardo degli Ubaldini on 28 June 1463 clearly 
states that there was no intention at all of evacuating the colony of Constantinople, 
and also demonstrates Florence’s will to improve its commercial transports to 
Constantinople.563 The reason why I do not agree with Babinger and Pastor, who 
accused Florence of trying to boycott the crusade, is in line with what I have written 
so far. Florence simply wanted to preserve its commercial power in Constantinople 
and to avoid as much as possible all the complications that could have harmed the 
Florentine colony in the city. This does not mean that Florence wanted to boycott the 
crusade, rather it simply wanted no part of it. Not only was the crusade considered a 
favour to Venice, but there was a great deal of concern over the fate of the Florentine 
merchants in Constantinople, and Florence’s privilege received from the sultan in 






                                                          
563 ASF, Signori Otto di pratica Dieci di balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77. In Appendix II n. 
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Florence between Italy and the Levant: the Venetian-Ottoman war (1463-1478) 






In this sixth chapter I will present the events and the diplomatic evolution of 
Florentine-Ottoman relations from Cosimo the Elder’s death until the Pazzi plot 
(1478). 
The first issue I will address in this chapter is Florence’s involvement in the 
Venetian-Ottoman war (1464-1479). The role of Florence during this long war is still 
unclear. The question is whether Florence played an active part in supplying the 
Ottoman war effort or even spying on their behalf. It may also simply be the case 
that Florence took advantage of the war for their economic and political interest. 
Most of the sources used for this chapter are currently unpublished and the result of 
my personal investigation in the Florentine Archive. I will particularly use the 
pratiche, which are the discussions among the most prominent citizens in Florence 
about the most important matters such as the relations with the pope, Venice and the 
Ottomans. Thanks also to this particular source, I will present the Florentine attitude 
towards the Italian and Levantine events. This investigation will reveal the eventual 








emergence of any connections between events in the two sides of the Mediterranean 
Sea. 
The second issue addressed in this chapter is the emergence of Ottoman 
power in Italian politics. As a matter of fact, the events in the Levant and the rapid 
expansion by the Ottoman sultan caused intense reactions, especially in Italy. The 
truce signed at Lodi in 1454 was instrumental in keeping the peace in Italy, 
especially for Florence. The Florentine Commune was aware of the potential threat 
still represented by Venice and the kingdom of Naples. Florence’s diplomacy was 
aware of the risk of having a potentially hostile kingdom of Naples, especially given 
its proximity to Florentine borders and the military power at the disposal of Ferrante 
I.  
The political background in the fifteenth-century Mediterranean Sea was a 
mosaic of potentially explosive elements. The peace treaty signed in 1455 between 
the sultan and Venice two years after the conquest of Constantinople was a 
temporary armistice that was not to endure for long. Venice was still a strong power, 
in terms of commercial volume in the Levant, despite the fall of Constantinople in 
1453.564 However, the rise of the Ottoman empire greatly affected Venice’s 
predominance. Venice and Genoa were no longer the only uncontested powers. 
Moreover, they were no longer enjoying the strong status and commercial monopoly 
they held in the Byzantine period. The Ottoman empire, led by Mehmet II, did not 
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intend to coexist with such a powerful neighbours, which represented a potential 
threat with a capacity for damaging the Ottoman empire thanks to their powerful 
fleet. In fact, Venice was more worried about losing its control in the colonies, such 
as in Greece and in the Levant, and the economic interests in the Constantinopolitan 
market due to the loss of its monopoly.  
The Venetians’ problems were not only connected to the fall of 
Constantinople. In the first chapters of this thesis, I stressed that Florentine 
merchants, due to the unfavourable kommerkion in Constantinople, often used 
Venetian galleys (and later Genoese) to transport their wares. The same Venetian 
doge, Tommaso Mocenigo, remarked how great the revenue was for the Serenissima 
in transporting Florentine wares to Constantinople.565  Of course, the loss of the 
Florentine wares represented an economic loss for Venice, which created uncertainty 
in an already troublesome period for the Serenissima. Finally, Mehmet II likely 
decided that his power was enough to further weaken his strongest opponent. The 
sultan needed the truce in 1455 to gain time and consolidate his hold over 
Constantinople. In fact, Constantinople, at the time, counted entire neighbourhoods 
as completely empty or scarcely populated.566 Mehmet II understood that the 
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Florence, Venice, the Turks and the Venetian-Ottoman war (1463-1479)  
 
In 1463 Mehmet II was strong enough to launch a full scale offensive against 
the Venetian foothold in Romania. The war started from the refusal of Venice to give 
back a slave, who converted to the Christian religion, to the Ottomans. It is clear that 
this was only Mehmet II’s pretext to declare war against Venice.567 On 6 September 
1463, the Ottoman governor of Morea, Isa Beg, successfully captured the important 
city of Argos from the Venetians. Unsurprisingly, Venice’s approach towards the 
crusade proposed by the papacy changed after this attack. After its reluctant 
approach at Mantua, the Serenissima began to press Pope Pius II. A first, an 
agreement was made between Venice, the duke of Burgundy and the kingdom of 
Hungary. Venice and Hungary were interested in an alliance against the Ottomans, 
especially since Mehmet II had invaded and conquered Bosnia in 1463, and 
consequently exposed Hungarian territories to the Ottoman threat.  
Venice’s diplomacy was aimed at involving Florence in the crusade. On 18 
January 1463, Doge Cristoforo Mauro sent a long letter to Florence inviting the 
Commune to take part in the upcoming crusade. The letter again presents some 
common rhetorical themes, such as the idea that Christian powers should stand 
together against the common enemy of the faith.568 In addition, this letter contains 
invitations to contribute financially to the crusade and to obey the pope’s requests. 
Furthermore, Pius II, sent a letter to Florence on 1 October 1463, inquiring about the 
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will of the Florentine Commune to send galleys to Constantinople, and secondly, to 
invite Florence to contribute to the Venetian war effort.569 The pope asked Florence 
not to send commercial galleys to Constantinople in order to avoid a scandal.570 As I 
have shown in the previous chapter, these Florentine galleys travelled to 
Constantinople and returned safely to Porto Pisano. Moreover, Florence no longer 
had problems over its contribution to the crusade because Pius II died just one year 
later.  
Cosimo the Elder’s death left Piero di Cosimo de’ Medici, Cosimo’s son, heir 
of the Florentine Commune. There were several political consequences to Cosimo’s 
death. As mentioned numerous times in the previous chapter, Medici rule in Florence 
was the result of a series of alliances with various members of the Florentine 
aristocracy. Cosimo the Elder ensured that these families had their share of Signoria 
offices. Therefore, Florence was not an absolutist state, but something more akin to 
the Augustan period of the principatus. As such, Piero de Medici’s succession was 
contested and even led to an assassination attempt. The families behind this plot were 
among the most famous in Florence, such as the Acciaiuoli, the Pitti and the 
Soderini. However, not every single family member joined the plot against the 
Medici. There are cases of brothers taking opposite sides – one for the Medici and 
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one for the plotters. In the Soderini family for example Niccolò supported the Medici 
and Tommaso was part of the plot against Piero de’ Medici.571  
This political turmoil had an impact on Florence’s internal and external 
policies, especially as it confirmed the Medici weaknesses in their rule of Florence. I 
particularly refer once more to the ennobling privileges granted to Florence by John 
VIII, which appear not to have been enough to stop the challenge to the Medici 
authority.572 Furthermore, in Rome the political affairs were no better. After Pope 
Pius II’s death the Conclave elected Paulus II as pope. The new pope was a Venetian 
of the noble family of Barbo. Florence soon realised that their hope that the idea of 
crusading would fade away would not come to pass. The new pope wrote in 1465 to 
request that Florence arm and dispatch the three galleys that Florence had repaired in 
Porto Pisano during the time of Pope Pius II.573 The Commune effectively carried out 
Pius II’s request as stated by the 1464 provision directed to the Florentine Sea 
consuls.574 The request made by Paul II makes me doubt that Florence in the end sent 
these galleys to Pius II, despite the promises made by the Signoria to the latter. 
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574 ASF, Provvisioni, Protocolli 11 r 16. informati magnifici et potenti domini priores libertatis et 
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maris et ipsi domni quilibet dicta requisitio facta fuit habito prius super hoc consilio multorum 
sapientum civium ipsum ex consilium penitus sequentes intellecto a dicto oratore quod ipse hec 
suprasede per aliquis opus neuiebat et pp responsium ad posita sibi fieri absque numia mora 
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Moreover, lack of sources seems to suggest that Florence did not even send these 
three galleys to Paul II.  
Pope Paul II carried on other initiatives. He decided to summon all Italian 
powers to discuss their contributions to the crusade and asked for still more in 
another letter sent to Florence.575 Florence replied to this letter on 7 June 1465, 
promising a contribution of 16.000 ducats.576 However, the Florentine Commune 
also reminded the pope of some of the difficulties the city was enduring. For 
example, Florence was afraid of a possible outbreak of bubonic plague.577  
The papal request was discussed in the pratiche. Francesco Neroni stated the 
necessity of dealing carefully with the request in order to keep the pope satisfied. 
The ambassador in Rome, Aloisio Guicciardini, was ordered to be wary and not to 
take any action without a specific order from the Commune.578 In a successive 
meeting, Mannio Temperano suggested that the issue should be discussed in the 
assemblies so that every important citizen could understand the situation.579 Mannio 
Temperano’s suggestion was only a pretext since in this meeting a fracture among 
the oligarchs in the pratiche on the issue of the crusade emerged.  
In the past, members of the Acciaiuoli family, such as Angelo, did not hide 
his unhappiness due to Cosimo the Elder’s prudential diplomatic line with regard to 
the crusade. One of Acciaiuoli’s reasons might have been the destruction of 
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Acciaiuoli domination in Athens which had probably an impact on the Acciaiuoli 
family in Florence. The lack of sources about eventual connections between the 
Greek and the Italian branch of the Acciaiuoli’s family, does not exclude the 
existence of a communication channel between the Italian and the Greek branches of 
the Acciaiuoli’s family. Therefore, the Medici’s disinterest concerning the Greek 
branch of the Acciaiuoli might have impressed negatively the Florentine Acciaiuoli.  
The Ottoman sultan, despite the preference given to Florence in 
Constantinople, did not have the same policy toward the Athenian/Florentine family 
of the Acciaiuoli. Francesco II, the last member and duke of the Acciaiuoli, was 
forced to abandon Athens for Thebes in 1458. Two years later, Mehmet II 
“suspected” a plot to reinstate the duke in Athens and ordered Zaganos Pasha, 
general and vizier of the sultan, to murder the last Florentine duke.580 Despite the 
lack of sources indicating any Florentine reaction whatsoever to events in Athens, 
one gets the impression that the Acciaiuoli were not quite “happy” with Mehmet II’s 
decision. Moreover, in the preceding years, Angelo Acciaiuoli had shown that he 
was less than enthusiastic about Cosimo’s plan to avoid the crusade, and in this case 
there might be a connection with the Acciaiuoli house in Athens.  
The Acciaiuoli hostility emerged clearly in the pratiche on 27 May 1465. 
This pratica discussed the papal request for contributions and Angelo Acciaiuoli 
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used strong words in its favour.581 Not only did Angelo Acciaiuoli suggest that 
Florence should pay the subsidies to the pope, he went on to urge an alliance with 
Venice and the kingdom of Hungary. The Acciaiuoli’s proposal was evidently 
unacceptable for the Medici, since it would put Florence decisively on the crusading 
side and risk a war against the Ottomans. The likely consequence of this war would 
have been the loss of all privileges enjoyed by Florentines in Constantinople and 
probably even the opportunity to have these privileges again in the future. 
Needless to say, this course of action would have been catastrophic for 
Florentine businesses flourishing in Constantinople. Angelo Acciaiuoli most likely 
thought that the death of Cosimo the Elder opened new opportunities and that Piero 
de’ Medici’s power was far from being absolute. Carlo Pandolfini, someone close to 
the Medici position, suggested instead the usual Florentine tactic, that is, to 
contribute only when the other Italian powers would have done the same.582 In the 
end, the meeting decided to delegate the decision to the Consiglio dei Cento.583 This 
decision should not come as a surprise, as clear divergences emerged within the core 
of the Medici’s power for the first time. The Consiglio dei Cento was an ancient 
public office which had powers of control and supervision over the finances, but was 
later suppressed. However, in 1458 Cosimo the Elder decided to reform this ancient 
institution, and furthermore gave it more powers than in the past, especially in the 
ratification of legislative acts. The Consiglio dei Cento was of course Cosimo’s 
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stratagem to reinforce Medici power in Florence. The Consiglio dei Cento was also 
in charge of the Monte supervision, the main economic institute of the Commune, 
and even had the power to elect important offices.584 The elected offices included 
Florentine galleys roles, such as the conductor.  
This decision to bring the matter to the Consiglio dei Cento was a victory for 
the Medici faction. The Medici were predominant in the Consiglio dei Cento, and 
therefore were able to suppress all the legislative acts that they did not like. The 
Medici proposal to bring the matter to the Consiglio dei Cento passed, since further 
letters from the pope confirm that Florence did not give the subsidies and again used 
dilatory tactics. The final confirmations come from another pratica on 16 October 
1465. The reason for this meeting was a report by Jacopo Guicciardini, Florentine 
ambassador, who had left Naples for Rome to meet with the pope. He discovered that 
the pope had forbidden both Venice and Hungary from making peace with the 
Ottoman sultan. Moreover, the ambassador informed Florence that the pope was 
aware of the difficulties of Venice and Hungary, and therefore made clear that Rome 
was expecting subsidies from all Christian powers. This papal expectation confirms 
that the Commune delayed their crusade contributions.585 Giannozzo Pitti affirmed 
that the war between the Turks and Venice was very useful for Florence. Moreover, 
Pitti proposed to write to the pope that Florence was ready to back up the crusade.  
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This proposal was likely a deception to avoid any peace negotiations between 
Venice and the sultan, which the Serenissima had begun to consider. Angelo 
Acciaiuoli suggested that if a peace was to be settled, it should not come about as a 
result of a lack of subsidies, especially from Florence.586 The latter opinion confirms 
once again the Acciaiuoli criticism of Medici policies and the presence of a 
disagreement within the Florentine elite as to its foreign policy.  I believe it is clear 
that Florence was indeed aware of the good opportunities coming out of the 
Venetian-Ottoman war, but at the same time knew it needed to be cautious with the 
pope. Despite the Venetian-Ottoman war, Florentine galleys were still using the 
Levantine routes.587  
On 26 January 1465 three galleys safely returned to Porto Pisano from 
Constantinople, and with large cargoes. The commerce between the sultan and 
Florence was still active despite the threat made by the Venetian ambassador in 
1463. It appears that Florence did not even evacuate the Florentine community in 
Constantinople.588 As shown in the previous chapter, Florence relied on its 
connections in Milan and with the pope in order to rebuff Venice’s unfavourable 
actions. In addition, Florence managed to achieve a diplomatic consensus with the 
Neapolitan kingdom. The relations between Florence and Naples, despite the initial 
quarrel with Ferrante I and the attack on the Florentine state galleys, began to 
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improve.589 Florence established a bond with Ferrante I by once again taking 
advantage of its careful diplomatic policy. At the beginning of Ferrante I’s rule in 
Naples, erupted the first conflict between him and a vast faction of his barons. The 
cause was the lack of legitimacy for Ferrante I and the strong centralism imposed by 
Alphonse V. The barons decided to call to their aid Jean of Anjou. Venice did not 
assist Ferrante in this conflict. The alliance between Venice and Naples signed 
before the peace of Lodi, which was aimed at forcing Florence to capitulate, had 
apparently come to an end.590   
The reasons for the rupture between Naples and Venice lay in their 
competition over the Balkans. Both powers were interested in expanding their sphere 
of influence into the Balkans by using Skanderbeg’s resistance against the Ottoman 
Turks. Florence took advantage of this struggle between Venice and Naples. When 
the Neapolitan barons decided to revolt, Florence and Milan offered support to 
Ferrante I. The duke of Milan, Francesco Sforza, actively contributed in the war 
against the Neapolitan barons, and the Milanese duke even suggested to Ferrante I to 
attack Genoa in order to prevent an eventual use of the seaport for the Angevins, if 
called on by the rebels.591 The Milanese suggestion was not wrong since the 
offensive lead by Jean of Anjou, son of Rene I, took place with the support of Genoa. 
The Angevin initiative, however, met with failure. An important help came from the 
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Albanian leader, Skanderbeg, who first sent some men in Apulia and later joined the 
war himself.592   
The revolt was crushed thanks to Ferrante I’s victory over the rebels near 
Troia’s plains, a locality in Apulia, on 18 August 1462. Afterwards, Giovanni 
Antonio del Balzo Orsini, prince of Taranto and leader of the rebels, died in 
November 1463.593 Florence was thus able to form a league with Milan and Naples 
in 1467. This league was a great success for the Medici since the kingdom of Naples 
was a key player, both for the balance of power in Italy, and Florence’s interests in 
the Levant. For example, since the formation of the league, Florentine galleys no 
longer experienced particular problems from Ferrante I’s corsairs or his admiral 
Bernat de Villamarí. Moreover, Florence was even able to give a condotta to Bernat 
de’ Villamarí and rely on the admiral for defensive and escort purposes as a 
stipendiato of the Florentine Signoria.594 Meanwhile, the Constantinopolitan business 
was so active that in May 1466 another two galleys were sent to the Levant and 
returned on 12 September.595  
Another objective fulfilled by Florence’s diplomacy, was the successful 
isolation of Venice in Italy. The reason why Florence wanted to isolate Venice was 
due to events in 1466. After Cosimo’s death, some of the most important families in 
Florence began to openly criticize Medici rule over the Commune, especially the 
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Medici’s influence over the accoppiatori, the core of Medici power in Florence. The 
crucial moment for the plotters was the election of Tommaso Soderini as Standard-
bearer of Justice. He was supposed to carry on reforms that would demolish Medici 
power, but failed completely in his attempt.596 As a consequence, the plotters decided 
to organise a coup in 1468, which failed as well. The internal Florentine struggle 
eventually led to the Pitti-Soderini-Neroni plot. The attempted coup, which also 
included the plan to kill Piero de’ Medici, was prevented and most of the rebels were 
exiled. Unsurprisingly, the exiled plotters went to Venice to ask for military support. 
Venice did not turn down their ambitions. Indeed, Venice entrusted its most 
renowned Venetian condottiere, Bernardo Colleoni, with a war against Florence.597 
Venice’s goal, as stated by the same Venetian Senate, was the removal of Piero de’ 
Medici, and most likely the entire Medici family, from Florence.598 
Clearly, the league established in 1467 with Naples put Florence in a safer 
position and prevented further Venetian attempts to undermine Medici power in 
Florence. At the same time, the Florentine Signoria instructed its ambassador in 
Rome, Guicciardini, to reassure the pope of Florence’s goodwill towards the crusade. 
The significance of this specific order might have been a Florentine plan to force 
Venice to carry on the war against the Ottomans. In fact, Venice had used this to 
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justify to the pope its decision to open negotiations with the sultan, stating that the 
Serenissima was the only Italian power waging war against the Ottomans.599 
Florence, therefore, willingly showed an interest in making contributions to Venice 
because, in this way, Venice was forced to continue the war against the Ottoman. 
Florence’s diplomacy, therefore, provided the pope with a necessary weapon to press 
Venice in carrying on with the war. At the same time, the league between Naples, 
Florence and Milan granted to Florence the necessary security in Italy to pursue its 
Levantine goals. In fact, Florentine galleys sailed almost regularly throughout the 
1460s.  
The Venetian threat to block Florence’s state-galleys proved ineffective, at 
least for the moment. Moreover, Venice’s war against the Turks in these years had 
settled into a stalemate. In the beginning, the war seemed to go favourably for 
Venice. The Serenissima and the king of Hungary managed to recover lands from the 
Ottomans both in the Morea and in Bosnia. However, the sultan’s reaction was 
immediate. Mehmet II quickly recovered the lost territories and, with Zaganos Pasha 
and Turhanoglu Omer Bey, went on the counter-offensive.600 Venice’s diplomacy 
was evidentially aware that if Venice was alone with the king of Hungary, then 
defeat was unavoidable. At this point contacts were being made between Naples and 
Venice, despite the former’s alliance with Florence and Milan. Most likely, Ferrante 
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I viewed Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, ever closer to his kingdom, with a 
measure of concern.601 
However, new events would again alter the political balance in Italy and lead 
to a rapprochement between Naples and Venice. The first was the siege and fall of 
Negroponte in 1470. Negroponte was strategically important for the Serenissima’s 
actions in the Levant. From there a Venetian fleet could directly threaten 
Constantinople. Mehmet II’s victory was immediately known in Italy and put the 
diplomatic balance maintained by the Florentine Signoria at risk. In 1470, Pope Paul 
II sent a letter to the Florentine Commune arguing that the fall of Negroponte 
signalled that it was time for all Christian powers to unite in a universal league 
against the Ottoman power.602  Yet another event would mark the shifting alliance of 
Naples from Florence to Venice. Only one year earlier, in 1469, the important 
Albanian leader Skanderbeg died. The death of Skanderbeg partly settled the Balkan 
struggles between Venice and Naples. Yet, the definitive push to a joint combination 
Naples and Venice came from the Ottoman occupation of most of Albania just after 
Skanderbeg’s death.603 
If the news of the fall of Negroponte was probably welcomed in Florence, the 
fall of Albania was not. In fact, with the fall of Albania, the Ottoman Turks now 
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possessed, for the first time, a strategic location from which to directly threaten not 
only Venice but also the same kingdom of Naples, in particular Apulia.  




Ferrante I was clearly concerned about the fall of Albania to the Ottomans. The 
Ottoman shadow was so close to Ferrante I’s kingdom that he wrote on 8 August 
1470 a letter to the Florentine Commune in which he clearly urges the Signoria to 
unite with the efforts against the Ottoman threat. In this letter to Florence, Ferrante I 
states that “the closeness of the danger”, along with Mehmet II’s possession of the 
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Aegean and Ionian islands, could lead to closure of the Adriatic Sea and an invasion 
of Italy.605 Of course, the Neapolitan king was more concerned about the possible 
invasion of the kingdom of Naples rather than Italy in general as the letter sent to the 
Florentine Signoria remarked the “pro vicinitate periculi” after the Ottoman conquest 
of Albania.606 At the time of the Neapolitan letter to Florence, the Venetian colony of 
Negroponte had already fallen. Soon, Florence discovered that the Ottoman sultan 
sometimes was not a good indirect ally. Here, the words ‘indirect ally’ is meant to 
define a specific situation in which Florence was simply taking advantage of the 
situation presented by the war between the Ottomans and Venice, but without any 
formal agreement between the Florentine Signoria and the Ottoman sultan. The fall 
of Albania and Negroponte pushed Naples and Venice to form an alliance which was 
dangerous news for the Florentine Signoria.607 In 1471 Venice and Naples, later to be 
joined by the duke of Burgundy, officially joined in a league against the Turks. In the 
agreement was also present the Grandmaster of Rhodes ad Turci offensionem.608  
The Venetian ambassador in Naples, Zaccaria Barbaro, sent a letter to Venice 
on 1 November 1471, which confirms the proclamation of the league between 
Naples and Burgundy. Here, the Florentine envoy is described as uneasy at the news 
of the signed league.609 Florence had strong reasons to be worried about this 
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rapprochement between Naples and Venice. Naples and Venice represented a new 
axis of power that could become a danger to the Florentine trade routes in the 
Levant. An interesting example is provided by another report sent by Zaccaria 
Barbaro from Naples to Venice.610 The Venetian ambassador states that, while he 
was meeting with the king of Naples, he reminded Ferrante I of his terrible mistake 
with regard to Florentine cloth. He explicitly stated that: 
 
Your Lordship had done things that at the beginning seemed useful to your Lordship but 
in the end they produced damages, since the Florentine cloths were after the ban 
diverted to Constantinople and this diversion in the end resulted in economic damage to 
your Lordship.611  
 
 
Zaccaria Barbaro seems to indicate that the trade of panni Fiorentini between 
Florence and Constantinople was flourishing, to the detriment of the Neapolitan 
economy. It might be that Barbaro was only trying to put pressure on Ferrante I 
about Florentine trade in the Levant.  
The addition of the kingdom of Naples to the crusade alliance was a victory for 
Pope Paul II, since the latter could use Neapolitan participation to pressure other 
Italian states, such as Florence and Milan. Unsurprisingly, the pope sent another 
letter with apocalyptic tones on 23 August, describing the threat represented by the 
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Turks.612 Moreover, Ferrante I sent a letter to Florence on 17 October 1470, which 
gives some hints about the diplomatic background in Italy and enhances the dangers 
represented from the Ottoman’s advance.613 This time it was the king of Naples who 
stressed the danger represented by the Ottoman threat for all of Italy and the entire 
Christian religion. However, the real purpose of this letter was to ask Florence for an 
intermediation with the new duke of Milan, Galeazzo Maria Sforza, who came to 
power after Francesco Sforza had died in 1466. The Neapolitan king was afraid of 
pursuing the expedition against the Turks without being certain of the neutrality of 
the Milanese duke, which is why he wanted to renew the league of Lodi. Most likely, 
Ferrante I wanted to win the favour of Florence because he needed the Medici to 
persuade Galeazzo Maria Sforza to join the league. Thus he probably restrained 
Venice from attacking Florentine galleys, as the same Zaccaria Barbaro states to 
Venice in a letter sent on 8 November 1471, in which he reports that the king of 
Naples ‘caresses the Florentines only because not all of them are of the opinion of 
the duke of Milan’.614  
Sforza’s opinion about the crusade at that time, just as his opinion about 
renewing the league of Lodi, was not favourable. He wanted the league to be 
renewed without including any additional clauses from the previous treaty signed in 
1454. Sforza repeated this request at least two more times in the letter, and added a 
particularly enlightening sentence, which reads, “and if the pope or Venetians will 
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not accept this” the duke would not have changed his mind and would have 
preserved the original content of the treaty.615 The reason why this sentence is 
enlightening is because it identifies the fears of the duke of Milan. One of the reasons 
why Milan did not want to renew the league was Galeazzo Maria’s personal aims, 
especially in regards to Piedmont, such as Vercelli, Asti and other locations.616  
Another element which may have contributed to Milanese uncertainty was the 
willingness expressed by the duke of Burgundy to contribute to the Crusade. The 
axis formed by Naples, Venice and Burgundy caused Milan to move closer towards 
the king of France, to whom Galeazzo Maria Sforza had been a condottiere. In fact, 
Ferrante I feared the Angevins’ ambitions towards Italy. The duke of Milan, if 
encouraged to do so by circumstances, could have called the Angevins into Italy 
without hesitation. The French could have used the Genoese seaport since at the time 
the duke of Milan controlled it and Milan had cordial relations with the Angevins.617  
Not surprisingly, there was the same Venice behind the papal initiative for the 
league.618 However, unlike Florence, the duke of Milan was in the position to oppose 
a refusal in case of other papal requests for the crusade. The ties between Milan and 
the French were even stronger than they had been in the past, and especially after 
1464, the year of the conquest of Genoa by the Milanese. Not surprisingly, Florence 
supported the Milanese attack against Genoa with supplies sent by sea.619  The same 
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Louis XI king of France granted Genoa as a fiefdom to Milan after the duke’s 
request.620 Ferrante I was surely aware, therefore, of the double menaces which 
threatened the Neapolitan kingdom, and thus valued the safety of the double alliance 
with Venice and Burgundy. However, Florence did not enjoy the same protection 
such as Milan. Therefore, the Florentine Commune pressured Milan to allow the 
collections of tithes in its territory as the Florentines did not want to upset Naples, 
Ferrante I or the pope.621 
 In fact, at the beginning of the 1470s, Florence seemed to change its position 
on the crusade. In 1470, Florence wrote a very favourable letter to the Neapolitan 
king, in which the Signoria defined the Turks as a “lethal plague”.622 Why did 
Florence appear so willing to support a renewal of the Italic league and to do so 
much against the Ottoman threat? The reason lies in Florence’s continued aim to 
maintain the political balance in Italy. New events once again threatened this 
balance. In 1466, as stated above, Piero de’ Medici thwarted the Acciaiuoli-Pitti-
Soderini plot and the Venetian attempt to remove him from power. This local war 
was far from becoming a real threat, especially since Florence enjoyed the protection 
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of Milan. In the same years, further problems arose in Romagna due to the struggle 
between the Malatesta, the local ruling family and the pope.  
To summarise these events, Sigismund Malatesta, lord of Rimini, had an 
agreement with the pope. This agreement stated that after Sigismund’s death the 
pope would assume possession of Rimini and other small cities in Romagna. 
Sigismund Pandolfo Malatesta (1417–1468) died in 1468, and subsequently Pope 
Paul II claimed Rimini and the other cities for the Patrimony of St. Peter. Roberto 
Malatesta (1441-1482), condottiere and one of Sigismund’s sons, first offered his 
services occupying the cities on behalf of the pope. However, after recovering the 
cities, Roberto Malatesta declared himself the new sovereign.623  
The risk of creating a conflict in Romagna was too great a danger for the 
Medici. The Signoria had always tried to keep the popes out of the affairs of 
Romagna due to the risk of larger papal territories near to Florence’s borders. As 
Florence’s diplomatic priority was to preserve the balance of power, the only 
solution was to resume the negotiations for the league. The best occasion to do so 
was in the aftermath of the Ottoman conquest of Negroponte in 1470, because this 
situation put new pressures on Venice and the pope. The fact that Florence was 
among the proposers of this league played in favour of the Florentine-papal relations. 
One ought to understand that Florence, still, had many interests in Rome, such as the 
alum concession in Tolfa, the apostolic depository and, in general, a good influence 
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due to the banks.624 This diplomatic tactic could also explain the positive answer 
given to the Venetian ambassador who came to Florence on 12 October 1470. The 
ambassador, Antonio Priuli, described to the Florentine Signoria the fall of 
Negroponte, and again stressed the common threat represented by the Turks to the 
Christian world. The official answer of the Florentine Commune was supportive and 
stated the necessity of facing this issue and promised without any doubt to send 
emissaries to Rome.625 The Florentine Signoria also officially discussed the Turkish 
threat in the pratiche on 28 February 1471. The pratiche had to discuss the request 
for help against the Turks received from the king of Naples. Giovanni Canigiani 
argued that relations between Florence and Naples must not be endangered due to the 
business of Florentine merchants in the Levant. Luigi Guicciardini shared 
Canigiani’s proposal of giving 20.000 florins to Ferrante I, but specifically asked to 
remind the Neapolitan king that the Florentine Commune had sustained a number of 
expenses in the previous years due to Colleoni’s attack.  
From the same pratiche also emerges the Florentine fear of what Mehmet II 
might do in response to such an act. Several voices inside the council raised worries 
about the safety of the Florentine merchants who operated in Constantinople.626 The 
fears of an Ottoman reaction were so great that Jacopo Pazzi even proposed calling 
Florentine merchants back from Constantinople.627 This discussion was carried out in 
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several other meetings and in the end, on 20 April 1471, Florence decided to give to 
the Neapolitan king the promised subsidies. Tommaso Soderini remarked that it was 
important for Florence to keep its good relations with the kingdom of Naples by 
means of these contributions.628 From a Neapolitan source we learn that Florence 
even gifted six galleys to the Neapolitan king in 1472 in the first three months of this 
year.629 This powerful contribution from Florence, rather than attributing to the 
Commune characteristics of crusading fervour, has to be seen as a result of the 
importance held by Naples in Florence’s diplomacy.  
Again, the Ottoman Turks became instrumental for determining the aims of 
the Florentine Commune, especially in regard to its diplomatic goals. The 
contribution, in this case, was an instrument used by Florence to achieve the peace in 
Italy, seen as ever more necessary due to the axis of Venice-Naples; the papal aims 
in Romagna and the Florentine exiles armed by Venice and led by Colleoni.  
This interpretation excludes any possibilities of speaking of philo-
Ottomanism or philo-papalism, as these two categories cannot and should not be 
applied to the Florentine policies of the period. Florence decided to contribute 
willingly to the Neapolitan military expenses, even if this went against the Ottomans. 
One ought to recall that Florence was still actively trading with the sultan, therefore 
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one must exclude any crusading interpretation, but rather underline again both the 
importance of Naples and Constantinople for the Florentine Signoria.                                                                             
 However, the renovation of Lodi’s league, beyond helping to pacify Italy and 
reassure Florence amidst diplomatic tensions, did not stop papal appeals for the 
crusade. On 17 December 1471, the pope sent a new letter to Florence, questioning 
the city about the crusade. The pope expected Florence to provide 25 galleys, a 
considerable fleet if one considers the capacity of the Florentine sea-power.630 The 
papal request was considerable. This letter came not from Pope Paul II who had died 
in 1471 but from the new pope, Sixtus IV. With Sixtus IV, Florence’s goal to 
maintain the political balance in Italy started to crumble and at the same time, the 
Medici were hard pressed to survive the challenges posed by the pope’s family, 
Riario-Della Rovere and the armies of the kingdom of Naples.  
 
Sixtus IV, Florence and the Levant in the period of Lorenzo the Magnificent 
until the Pazzi plot (1471-1478) 
 
The election of Sixtus IV, previously known as Francesco Riario-della Rovere, took 
place on 9 August 1471. Despite the previous pope’s death, the crusade project did 
not stop. On the contrary, the new pope vigorously followed his predecessor’s plan. 
The letter delivered on 17 December 1471, sent by Sixtus IV to Florence, was quite 
straightforward in what it requested. Contrary to the past demands made by Paul II, 
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this time the new pope asked not only for contributions, but for military support in 
the form of 25 war galleys.  
Piero de’ Medici did not survive much longer after the Acciaiuoli-Soderini-
Pitti coup against him in 1466, dying only three years later in 1469 from the gout he 
had been suffering from all his life. Lorenzo de’ Medici, Piero’s son and later known 
as the Magnificent, took command in Florence.  
In the 1470s, the simplest solution to find allies against the Ottomans was for 
Venice to establish a league with Naples and Burgundy. This league should have 
provided, in the Venetian hopes, additional naval power, through Naples, and the 
necessary land power, through the duke of Burgundy, to fight the Ottomans. The 
Serenissima was not only waging war against the Ottomans in the Levant. In Italy, 
Venice’s diplomacy was again focused on impeding non-Venetian trade, especially 
that of Florence, Ancona and Genoa with Constantinople. Zaccaria Barbaro reported 
to Venice that “the duke (of Milan) and the Florentines work with the Turk, their 
galleys go to Constantinople and in general everyone does whatever they want”.631 
The relationship between Florence and Naples, despite the contribution of 20.000 
florins and the six galleys given in the same year, did not protect Florentine interests. 
Several events brought about this result. Surely, the fall of Albania to the Turks and 
the concerns expressed by Ferrante I must be considered. The Ottoman conquests, as 
we have seen in the previous paragraph, put the kingdom of Naples dangerously 
exposed to a possible Ottoman attack.  
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In the past, Ferrante I might have welcomed Venetian defeats because the 
Serenissima was still a matter of concern in Italy due to the vast power it held. The 
second reason was the mistrust between the duke of Milan and the king of Naples, 
since Galeazzo Maria Sforza was connected to France and Florence was an ally of 
Milan. Besides, Galeazzo Maria Sforza had married Bona of Savoy, who was the 
sister-in-law of Louis XI, king of France.632 Third, Florence, after the subsidy of 
20.000 florins and the six galleys sent around 1471-1472, believed that Ferrante I 
would be satisfied. However, Venice and the king of Naples agreed in 1472 that 
Florentine trade with the Ottomans was indeed damaging their war effort, and 
therefore decided to block it. In fact, the king of Naples supported Venice’s proposal 
to combine his ambassador with the Venetian emissary in a united embassy in order 
to push the pope in forbidding any Florentine or Genoese commercial expedition to 
Constantinople. Since Genoa was part of the Milanese dominion, the joint Venice-
Naples embassy can be interpreted as a hostile act against the Milanese-Florentine 
coalition.633 The tactic adopted by Venice and Naples showed how important 
Constantinople was for the Florentine market. For Naples had even banned 
Florentine cloth in the kingdom. However, as we have seen from Zaccaria Barbaro’s 
report, this Neapolitan policy met with complete failure.634 The shift towards the 
Levantine market damaged the Neapolitan economy, as the Venetian ambassador 
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states in the aforementioned letter to the king Ferrante I. Naples and Venice therefore 
decided to strike directly at the source of Florentine wealth. 635 
The Neapolitan tactic is once again confirmed in another letter written around 
4 or 5 October 1472. Barbaro received a confirmation from Ferrante I that the 
Neapolitan king had written to Anello, ambassador of Naples in Rome, who together 
with the Venetian emissary was ready to ask to the pope the interruption of all 
commercial expeditions to the Levant. This measure was especially addressed 
against the Florentine and Genoese ships.636 However, by the end of 1472, Venice 
had realised that the alliance with Naples was not useful for its goals. Naples and 
Burgundy did not really support the Venetian war. In fact, from 1472 Venice began 
to approach Florence.  
The reason for this diplomatic initiative was probably the mutual interest to 
keep the peace in Italy. Florence and Venice were not interested in on-going wars in 
Italy. Florence, for the usual reasons connected to commerce, while Venice, because 
it was already in an exhausting war against the Ottomans. Moreover, the duke of 
Milan was more interested in keeping the duke of Burgundy out of Italy and 
expanding Milanese influence to the Savoy, especially Asti and Vercelli in 
Piedmont. This Milanese necessity is also one of the reasons why Milan did not want 
the universal league, as the treaty would have stopped its plan.637 Naples, despite the 
alliance signed with Burgundy and Venice, apparently did not contribute enough to 
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the war against the Ottoman. The Venetian ambassador in Naples reported to Venice 
that Ferrante I had recalled from the Levant the Neapolitan admiral.638 Venice’s 
interest in the league with Florence can be summarised in two important points: the 
first was that by maintaining the peace in Italy the Serenissima could have focused 
on the war against the Turks. The second reason was that within the league it was 
easier to obtain contributions for the war against the Ottoman empire.  
The league between Florence, Venice and a reluctant Milan was officially 
signed on 2 November 1474.639 The alliance with Venice was made necessary for 
Florence by the papal siege of Città del Castello. The city itself was not an important 
town, but it was in a very important geographical position on the border between the 
Holy See and the Florentine Signoria. The pope ordered the siege in opposition to 
Niccoló Vitelli. The Medici were supporters of the Vitelli. Their wish to help in the 
siege led Lorenzo to seek stronger allies to replace Naples. On this occasion, for the 
first time in their relationship, the duke of Milan refused to help the Florentines.   
Lorenzo de’ Medici feared that Milan was no longer reliable. Moreover, the 
departure of Naples from the league in the early 1470s pushed the Medici to find 
another ally. Venice was the perfect option to counterbalance the loss of Naples, as 
Venice was the only power in Italy with the military strength to contest the kingdom 
of Naples. Finally, with Venice as an ally, the Florentine state-galleys would no 
longer have to worry about Venetian attacks. 
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However, the alliance between Florence and Venice concerned Sforza. 
Galeazzo Maria Sforza tried to persuade Lorenzo that this alliance with Venice was 
going to be a problem for the Medici in the future.640 The duke at this point used the 
usual Florentine tactic and tried to use the war against the Turks as a way to pressure 
the pope into once again promoting the Italic league, and therefore avoid an alliance 
between Florence and Venice. However, the Milanese plan faltered in the face of 
Florentine opposition. The duke of Milan had no choice but to enter the league, even 
demanding to be part of it. Clearly, a Florence-Venice alliance would entirely isolate 
the duke of Milan in northern Italy. Sforza even threatened the Medici with the 
possibility of a Milanese deal with the king of Naples. The Medici understood that 
Milan would have no need of the Medici if Sforza was to ally with Ferrante I, and at 
the same time Rome and Naples were sending alarming signals.641 The pope, aware 
of the disagreement between Milan and Florence over Venice, was trying to 
conciliate Milan and Naples. The danger of a possible understanding between Milan 
and Naples gave the final push to the Florentine Signoria in its alliance with Venice. 
Consequently, the duke of Milan was forced to agree in this alliance, failure to do so 
would have risked isolating the duke in Italy. Sforza even threatened Lorenzo to 
allow Milan into the alliance.642  
The league between Florence, Milan and Venice, which became official in 
1474, represented a failure of the papal attempt to break the axis of Milan and 
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Florence. Soon, Lorenzo de’ Medici faced several situations which brought serious 
risks to Medici power. Four were the key events: the competition over the possession 
of the city of Imola against the pope, the resistance made by Lorenzo de’ Medici to 
the appointment in 1475 by the pope of Francesco Salviati Riario as archbishop of 
Pisa, the assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza in 1476 and the famous Pazzi plot 
in 1478.   
In 1474, Pope Sixtux IV decided to appoint Francesco Salviati-Riario, a 
blood relative of his, to the archbishopric of Pisa. Lorenzo de’ Medici was against 
this appointment and refused to accept the pope’s choice. This unwanted 
appointment by the pope indicates that the political influence of the Medici in Rome 
was starting to fade. Since the acquisition of Pisa by the Florentines in 1409, the 
control of the archbishopric was a matter of capital importance for the Signoria. 
Unsurprisingly, the predecessor of Riario-Salviati was Filippo de’ Medici, of the 
cadet branch of the Medici.643 Moreover, Filippo de’ Medici was not the only case 
since Cosimo de’ Medici had always tried to influence the election of favourable 
bishops in the cities subjected to the Florentine Signoria’s rule.644 However, 
Francesco Riario-Salviati was a declared enemy of the Medici house, and he was to 
become one of the main conspirators in the Pazzi Plot. This papal attack was only the 
beginning in a series of attacks directed not against Florence, but specifically the 
Medici. This can be seen in July 1474, in the same year, when Sixtus IV decided to 
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replace the Medici bank from the Depositary General with the Genoese Meliaduce 
Cigala.645 Furthermore, the next year, in 1476, Sixtus IV granted to the banks of the 
Pazzi family, now second in Florence only to the Medici, the alum monopolies in 
Tolfa and the Crusade Depository. Therefore, Roman businesses, although still in 
Florentine hands, were lost to the Medici.646  
It is quite surprising that the Medici did not foresee the incoming Pazzi plot 
or the potential danger posed by a hostile papacy. The Medici, for the first time since 
Cosimo the Elder took power in 1434, witnessed the collapse of the relationship with 
the pope. Even with Pius II, Florence had managed to maintain normal relations, 
otherwise the pope would have never granted the alum mines of Tolfa to Cosimo de’ 
Medici.  
Despite the prudent policies enacted by both Cosimo and Piero, who had 
always made it their policy to appease the popes, Lorenzo de’ Medici had to face the 
aggressiveness of Sixtus IV. A perfect example is the city of Imola. Pope Sixtus IV 
had always tried to expand in Romagna, considering it the domain of the Patrimony 
of St. Peter. Romagna was divided between small, local signori, and an ideal aim of 
a territorial expansion.647 The city of Imola was under the control of Galeazzo Maria 
Sforza, but in a very important strategic position very close to Florence. The papal 
acquisition of the city represented a nearby threat to Florence in the form of papal 
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power, or more specifically the Riario-Della Rovere. One must remember that 
Francesco Salviati was also related to the Riario. Potentially, Florence would have a 
Riario in Rome, another one in Pisa and one in Imola (Sixtus IV, Francesco Riario-
Salviati and Girolamo Riario respectively). Therefore, rather than a fight between the 
pope and Florence, the ensuing war was between the Medici and the Riario-Della 
Rovere. The marriage in 1473 between Caterina Sforza, illegitimate daughter of 
Galeazzo Maria Sforza, and Girolamo Riario, nephew of the pope, opened the doors 
to Imola. The Pazzi, moreover, lent the necessary money for the purchase of Imola 
from the duke of Milan to the pope, despite the fact that Lorenzo de’ Medici refused 
a loan to the pope and gave similar recommendations to all Florentine banks.648 The 
relationship between Sixtus IV and the Florentine Commune, and specifically the 
Medici family, was therefore officially broken. The subsequent plot, which took the 
name of the Pazzi conspiracy, was probably the natural conclusion of a struggle 
between the Riario and the Pazzi against the Medici.  
Before the Pazzi plot, another event shook the foundation of Florentine power 
in Italy, that is, the 1476 assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, the duke of Milan, 
by Lampugnani, Visconti and Olgiati.649  While is not clear if there was a connection 
between the Riario and Sforza’s death, it is certain that the death of the duke of 
Milan represented another hit to Florence’s power. Despite the imperfect relations at 
the time between the Medici and the Sforza, Florence still relied heavily on its 
Milanese ally for its military defence, and Milan was still a part of the 1474 league 
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with Venice and Florence.650 Another reason for the Medici to worry was the fact 
that Sforza’s heir, Gian Galeazzo Sforza, was a minor, only seven years old. Lorenzo 
de’ Medici most likely witnessed these events with concern. Following Sforza’s 
assassination, the pope asked the regent Duchess of Milan Bona of Savoy to remove 
the 400 soldiers in Imola that Galeazzo Sforza was using to maintain control of the 
city against Girolamo Riario.651 After a papal embassy had arrived in Florence, 
Lorenzo de’ Medici seemed to accept the papal request for Imola. Most likely, 
Lorenzo had to accept that the Pazzi were gaining an influential position in Rome, 
and since the takeover of Imola was already complete, there was no need to create 
further problems with the Riario-Della Rovere. In later years, the pope would try 
again to impose contributions on the Italian states of 16.000 ducats, to be sent to the 
Hungarian king. Florence, along with Bona Sforza, duchess of Milan and acting 
regent, decided to decline the requested subsidies, enumerating the present 
difficulties after the assassination of the duke of Milan.652 The Florentine Signoria 
gave the same answer to the Venetian ambassador Piero Molin on 8 July 1477. After 
the king of Hungary made peace with Mehmet II in the beginning of 1477, Venice 
began to suffer heavily in their war with the Ottomans.653 Therefore, the original 
contributions planned since September 1476 ended, as had often happened, in 
complete failure. It stands to a reason that Florence considered the subsidies as an 
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unnecessary favour to Venice. Despite the lega particolare enacted in 1474 between 
Florence, Milan and Venice, Lorenzo de’ Medici and Milan did not want to give 
more money to Venice. Perhaps Florence since it had already obtained the league 
with Venice thought it was unnecessary to provide Venice with more money. 
The Pazzi coup occurred in Florence on 26 April 1478. Lorenzo de’ Medici 
and Giuliano de’ Medici were attacked by Bernardo Bandini Baroncelli and Jacopo 
de’ Pazzi while they were attending mass in the Florentine cathedral. Giuliano fell 
under the assault, but Lorenzo managed to escape the church and reach his home. 
Meanwhile, Francesco Salviati-Riario, the archbishop of Pisa, directly attacked the 
palace of the Signoria but was repulsed, captured and hanged by Medici loyalists. 
The same cardinal Raffaele Riario was eventually captured and imprisoned in 
Florence.  
The plot completely failed as Florence refused to rise against Medici power 
and even fought back against the attempted coup.654 That same day, Lorenzo de’ 
Medici wrote a letter to Bona Sforza, asking for urgent military help in order to 
secure the Medici position in Florence. The Milanese answer was positive, but 
Lorenzo de’ Medici did not know that the coup had already failed. With the arrest of 
Raffaele Riario and the execution of Jacopo, Renato de’ Pazzi and Francesco 
Salviati, the crisis passed. The consequences of this coup would be the collapse of 
relations between the papacy and Florence into a state of war. Pope Sixtus IV 
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excommunicated Lorenzo de’ Medici and placed Florence under papal interdiction. 
Finally, the kingdom of Naples, instigated by Sixtus IV, invaded Florentine territory 
just after the ecclesiastical provisions were launched against Florence and the 
Medici. The war ended in 1479 after Lorenzo’s personal travel and negotiations 
conducted with Ferrante I. However, the negotiations did not prevent the presence of 





In the case of the Ottoman-Venetian war, scholars have generally considered 
Lorenzo de’ Medici an ally of the Ottomans and directly involved with the sultan. In 
my opinion, this interpretation is distorted. Past scholars have naturally interpreted 
the events from the Florentine perspective. As we will see in the following chapter, 
this methodology is not the most correct since the Ottoman empire had the leading 
role in relations with Florence. From the Ottoman point of view the analysis of the 
events becomes quite different.   
 Florence was clearly a power in between two superpowers such as Venice 
and the Ottomans. The surprising element here is how Florence despite the complete 
lack of any military power managed to obtain from the Ottoman-Venetian war 
benefits from both Venice and the Ottoman empire. In the first part of the war 
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obviously Florence tended to the neutrality with respect to Venice thus the league 
with Naples and Milan in 1464. When the alliance with Naples started to crumble 
around 1470s, Florence reversed its alliance with Venice and signed the league with 
the Serenissima and Milan in 1474. This diplomatic acumen allowed Florence to 
keep its trade with the Ottomans despite the fact that the Signoria actually 
contributed to the crusade in order to favour its political aims in Italy.  
The last obstacle Florence faced during the Ottoman-Venetian war was the 
pope. In this case, thanks to the Medici, the Florentine Commune possessed 
influential instruments, such as the banks and the control of the apostolic depository. 
The same Venetian ambassador in Naples, Zaccaria Barbaro, stated, already by 1471, 
that Florence was paying all the debts of the pope and the cardinals.656 This influence 
must have been of a certain magnitude. As a result, Pope Paul II at first refused 
communion for Florentine merchants in Constantinople, but was later forced to 
withdraw this provision, which shown the influence held by the Medici in Rome 
thanks to their banks.657  
Even if Florence was militarily not powerful, the Medici could rely on an 
extensive network of information and the political influence thanks to their banks. 
The network helped Florence and the Medici in choosing the best policies. The only 
moment this network did not work efficiently was the Pazzi plot. The Medici did not 
see this event coming and Lorenzo de’ Medici did pay the price. Not only did he 
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almost lose control of Florence itself, but he did lose his brother Giuliano. The 
failure of the Pazzi plot definitively reinforced Lorenzo’s power and the Medici 
regime in Florence.  
In conclusion, I think that the Florentine attitude during the Ottoman-
Venetian war was mainly oriented to maintaining both the status quo in Italy and the 
good relations with the sultan. Florence, as we will see, did collect intelligence for 
the sultan, but also gave subsidies to be used against the Ottomans. These behaviours 
are not contradictory with each other, but rather are coherent within the Florentine 
political agenda. Just as Florence, similar is the case of Ragusa. However, there is a 
certain degree of difference. Ragusa was a city obliged by the position to maintain 
good relations with both the West and the Ottoman empire, while Florence enjoyed 
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Florence and the Ottomans (1468-1481) 
Introduction 
 
Florence managed to obtain a great deal from Mehmet II in Constantinople in the 
beginning of the 1460s following the ahd-nāme presumably granted by the sultan to 
the Commune in 1458-60. Mehmet II appears to have preferred Florence among the 
Western powers because it posed no real danger using a low military power and the 
near absence of a war fleet. In this way, Florence became a privileged partner of the 
Ottoman sultan, but was in no position to influence Ottoman policies. Mehmet II 
might have considered several other elements which made him to choose Florence 
rather than, for example, Ancona. Ancona’s political power in Italy was lesser 
compared to Florence. Unlike Ancona, Florence thanks to its banks was able to have 
an influencing power and an extensive network especially with regard the papacy.  
This political weight might have been considered by the sultan since Mehmet II was 
always looking for ways to have information as much as possible up-to-date. I am 
not persuaded that an eventual cultural admiration had its part. Surely, Mehmet II 
had always attempted to bring to Constantinople individuals of renowned cultural 
fame. Gentile Bellini is one of the most famous cases. However, intensive cultural 








relations with Venice, for example, failed in preventing the Ottoman from attacking 
the Venetian empire in the Levant. Again, political and economic reasons were more 
determinant than cultural elements. What is certain is that from 1458 to 1469 the 
Florentine galleys in the Levant became an annual sight.659 Especially when 
compared to the Byzantine period, it is clear that Florence enjoyed a major 
improvement in trade conditions in the Levant. 
This section will focus on the relationship between Florence and the 
Ottomans from the death of Piero de’ Medici in 1468 until 1478. The analysis of the 
diplomatic contacts between Florence and the Ottoman empire will be presented 
from the Ottoman point of view. In a correct diplomatic analysis, I think that the 
most accurate approach is to use the perspective of the leading power in the 
relationship. Moreover, I will also highlight the difficulties for Florence in 
maintaining good diplomatic relations with both the pope and the Ottomans. Finally, 
I will contest Babinger’s definition of philo-Ottomanism attributed to Florence’s 
diplomacy.  
I will stress the idea that it is impossible to define the Florentine-Ottoman 
relation as balanced due to the much more powerful state of the Ottoman empire. 
Florence’s diplomacy was mainly reactive in its relation with the Ottoman empire. 
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Moreover, I will take into consideration the considerably different power held by 
Florence and the Ottoman empire. 
Unfortunately, the direct correspondence between the Commune and the 
sultan in this period (1464-1481) is quite rare and usually refers to episodes of low 
importance or petition made to the sultan in favour of single individuals or the 
Florentine community. The chronological gap between the letters is also significant. 
Some letters are even separated by three years, despite the “optimal relations” 
between Florence and the Ottomans. The pratiche are once again a crucial source to 
understand the significance for Florence of the Ottoman understanding. Thanks to 
these discussions among the most prominent citizen of the Florentine Signoria we are 
aware of details, previously unknown, which shed an interesting light on the real 
state of this relationship between Florence and the Ottomans. Another valuable 
source for this analysis is the chronicle of Benedetto Dei since it is the main evidence 
of the sultan’s interactions with the Florentine community in Constantinople. 
The last issue tackled here is the conquest of Otranto by the Ottomans. 
Scholars have sometimes doubted the good will of the Florentine Commune and 
even accused the Florentine Signoria of active collaboration with Mehmet II. To 
undertake this, I will examine the medal made by Bertoldo di Giovanni (1480-1481) 
and some unpublished sources describing this critical event for the diplomatic history 
in the fifteenth century. This chapter will end with the death of Mehmet II when the 
Ottomans were weakened due to the civil war between Bayezid II and Djem Sultan.  
 








Florence and the Ottomans: an unequal relationship (1468-1478) 
 
I shall begin by introducing the official correspondence between the Florentine 
Commune and Constantinople. One of the first letters, after the grants of the 
privileges in 1464, simply petitioned the sultan to help the Florentine Signoria to get 
back the wares stolen by the Catalan pirate Suordinave.660 Despite the crusade 
decreed by Pope Pius II, the argument of this letter has nothing to do with the 
impending war. The letter contains nothing further of interesting detail, but confirms 
the presence of Catalan corsairs, which were quite common in the Mediterranean.661   
The second letter comes three years later in 1467. The Signoria wrote to the 
sultan and petitioned him to provide protection for the Florentine merchants and 
safeguard the belongings of those who had died in Constantinople. The Signoria sent 
a similar letter to the Florentine consul in Pera, Mainardo Ubaldini, urging him to 
obtain the protection of the sultan over the properties of dead Florentine 
merchants.662 One of the most interesting elements of this letter is the use of the term 
“natio” by the Florentine Signoria when referring to the Florentine merchants in 
Constantinople. The term “natio” made this document the first letter in which the 
Florentine Signoria finally acknowledged the Florentine community in 
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Constantinople as institutional. The organisation of the colony in Pera had most 
likely reached a noteworthy number of elements.  
The next letter to Mehmet II was two years later, in 1469. The letter is rather 
formal in its contents. The Signoria thanked Mehmet II for the favours he had 
granted to the Florentine community. This document refers to the possible extension 
of the capitula. It is plausible that Mehmet II agreed to protect the wares of the dead 
Florentine merchants in Constantinople in compliance with the previous request.  
At the time of this letter, Venice and the Ottoman empire had been at war for 
more than five years. Venice, moreover, was already threatening to block the trade 
route to Constantinople, specifically in the Aegean Sea. This Venetian policy 
particularly affected the Florentine, Genoese and Anconitan galleys.663 This period 
was relatively difficult for the Signoria, as Florence’s sea capabilities were nothing 
in respect to the long maritime expertise and tradition possessed by the Venetians.664 
The terminology of “benivolentia” can mean literally anything from being a simple 
protection to a favour, indicating a rather preferential position or even material 
grants. Therefore, this letter might also contain an indirect suggestion about a 
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possible military support given by the sultan to the Florentine galleys dispatched to 
Constantinople. 
 In fact, Mehmet II expected at least an annual expedition from Florence, as 
evidenced by the letter sent from the consul of Pera to Florence, in which the sultan 
enquired with the consul about the galleys that Florence was supposed to send.665 
The contents of the Florentine letters to the sultan seem to be more about ordinary 
administration rather than political matters. As such, the letters seemed to lack any 
elements regarding possible Florentine espionage in favour of the sultan. There are 
some exceptions, such as the letter sent in 1472 to Mehmet II regarding Lorenzo 
Davanzati. Despite the formal writing in the letter, there are some noteworthy details. 
The first detail is that Davanzati, at the time of the letter, was travelling to 
Constantinople with two galleys.666 The second detail is that Florence seemed to 
apologise for not having sent galleys in recent years due to the plague which affected 
Constantinople since 1466-1467.667 This plague had to be a serious event for the 
Florentine community in Constantinople since several Florentine merchants died in 
the outbreak.668 Yet, the fact that it was necessary to justify the lack of galleys to the 
sultan seems more a consequence of the blockade enacted by the Venetians on the 
Aegean Sea. The reason why the Signoria never mentioned the Venetian blockade to 
the Florentine galleys to the sultan is doubtless of political nature. Florence most 
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likely feared that Mehmet II would choose another more reliable commercial partner. 
The consequences of losing this trade arrangement would mean Florence would be 
cut off from all commercial improvements made in the Ottoman empire.  
There are two additional letters that give notable information and provide some 
suggestion on both the organisation of the Florentine colony in Constantinople and 
the content of the capitula granted by the sultan. The Florentine Commune sent these 
letters in 1474, to the consul Mainardo degli Ubaldini and to the sultan. The 
Florentine Commune petitioned Mehmet II to grant their consul the legal 
jurisdiction, along with enough coercive power, to restore and maintain order in the 
Florentine Community. The other letter, sent to Mainardo, contains elements that 
concerned the Florentine community in Constantinople. The tone used is quite 
explicit in acknowledging the problems in the Florentine colony. The Florentine 
Commune reprimanded Mainardo degli Ubaldini, as he was unable to maintain the 
control of some Florentines in Constantinople.669  
The Ottomans and Florence might have used other means of communication. In 
Babinger’s article on relations between Italy and Mehmet II, Florence appears to rely 
more on merchants or particular agents of the Medici house rather than official 
messengers.670 The aforementioned Benedetto Dei was one of these possible agents. 
Another possible Medici agent is the practically unknown Pagolo da’ Colle, who 
appears in a few Medici documents. These special missions were mostly connected 
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to the Ottomans. For example, on the occasion of Bayezid II’s ambassador, 
Ibrahim’s visit in 1484, Pagolo was the person whom Lorenzo de’ Medici appointed 
to escort the ambassador to Savoy due to Pagolo’s knowledge of the Ottoman 
world.671 Unfortunately, the purpose of these special missions is not revealed by any 
official sources, and no specific details can be found in the private Medici archive. 
The reason for this absence of information might be due to the customary use of 
giving oral instruction for the most important missions. By doing so, Florence could 
avoid the dangerous risk of interceptions of documents by potential enemies and 
maintain an excellent diplomatic profile with regard to the other Italian powers, and 
especially the pope.672 
However, the Medici were not using often these special agents but only on 
selected occasions.  Pagolo was not a spy in a strict sense but rather a trusted Medici 
agent for special missions. Babinger’s “Lorenzo de’ Medici e la Corte Ottomana” 
does say someting about Pagolo da’ Colle.673 Unfortunately, the lack of sources 
about the Medici agents precludes any broader investigation. The only certainty is 
that Pagolo da’ Colle was a merchant directly connected to the Medici with 
particular expertise in the Levant. Every time the Medici needed a mediator they 
always relied on Pagolo da’ Colle.674 
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 I will not here repeat word for word the article of Babinger, which seems to me 
particularly accurate and impossible to develop further due to the lack of primary 
sources. However, one consideration is important. The Medici always sent Pagolo 
da’ Colle for specific missions, such as the delivery of Bandini Baroncelli from the 
sultan, or when he travelled together with Bayezid II’s ambassador, Ibrahim, to 
Savoy when the problem of Djem sultan, Bayezid II’s rebel brother, was at stake.675 
Therefore, between the official correspondence and the private actions of citizens 
such as Benedetto Dei and Pagolo da’ Colle, the general idea which emerges is that 
Florence kept the contacts with Mehmet II to the bare minimum. Only in the case of 
events of a paramount importance the Medici used these special agents. 
In conclusion, when Florence wrote to the sultan or to the consul, the Signoria 
consistently avoided political content. Besides, Florence always steered clear of any 
mention of the trade problems caused by Venice. These exclusions are probably due 
to two reasons. First, the Medici used unofficial communication channels between 
the sultan and Florence through agents such as Pagolo da’ Colle and this explains the 
lack of a consistent official correspondence. Second, Florence did not want to expose 
eventual weaknesses to the sultan for the fear that Mehmet II would replace the 
Signoria with another commercial partner. 
The letters between the Signoria and the consul Mainardo expound on the 
organisation of the Florentine colony in Constantinople, which seems similar to the 
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organisation of other Florentine colonies, such as the one in Naples.676 The 
Florentine Signoria seemed unable to impose any centralisation and only maintained, 
with some efforts, the right to appoint the consul in the city. As a result, the 
Florentine consul dealt with a number of complications regarding the local 
merchants. This struggle between the central power and the local Florentine 
merchants was not exclusively in Constantinople. For example, in Naples there had 
been a quarrel between the Signoria and the local merchants’ colony due to the 
presence of two consuls in 1462: one elected in Florence and the other in Naples. 
Always in Naples, once the local community elected a Florentine exile which caused 
the Signoria to intervene.677  This weakness was possibly a result of the lack of 
resources and commercial experience of the Florentine Signoria. Therefore, it makes 
sense that Florence petitioned the sultan to grant more power to the Florentine 
consul.  
In conclusion, the official letters sent to the sultan by the Florentine Signoria 
reveal only a part of the relations between Florence and the Ottomans. Florence did 
enjoy a privileged situation in Constantinople, but the lack of a centralised 
organisation and of notable sea power prevented Florence from maximising this 
advantage. The sultan seemed to satisfy the Florentine requests for reasons that went 
beyond the commercial volume transported to Constantinople by the Florentine 
merchants. Florence, despite these privileges, never matched the volume of Venetian 
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trade in Constantinople during the Byzantine empire, both in terms of organisation 
and in quantity of the wares.  
The Cronica of Benedetto Dei, or the correspondence between the Medici and 
Pagolo da’ Colle, among other sources, provide a better understanding of the 
political relations between Florence and the Ottomans. 678 I will begin by introducing 
the character of Benedetto Dei. He was a Florentine merchant (1418-1492) and a 
Medici agent.679 He wrote a chronicle named La cronica dall’anno 1400 all’anno 
1500, a chronological annal which contains some digressions. To define Benedetto 
Dei only as a curious adventurer is to undermine the volcanic Florentine he was. By 
following the tales of the chronicle someone may have the impression that Benedetto 
Dei, rather than a normal spy, was probably a Renaissance James Bond. However, 
Dei is far from accurate in his writings as his chronology describes events out of 
order. For example, he dated the fall of Trebizond in 1455 rather than 1461.680 
Therefore, I focused my attention on the general image that Dei presents about the 
relationship between Florence and the Ottomans, especially with regard to possible 
Florentine spying on the Venetians for the sultan during the period of his war against 
Venice. In 1461, Dei moved to Constantinople to be employed by Girolamo Michiel, 
a Venetian who was one of the main contractors of alum production in the Ottoman 
empire. Dei’s employment in Michiel’s business happened in the same period when 
the Medici had obtained the contract from the pope for the alum from Tolfa. The 
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680 Dei 1985:156-157. Literature on Trebizond and its last years see Bryer 1980, Miller 1926. 








coincidence of time between the two events is remarkable; however it is impossible 
to understand whether this was a coincidence or a specific order from the Medici. 
Certainly, if this was not a coincidence it could explain why Dei spied on Girolamo 
Michiel and not, for example, other Venetian merchants in Constantinople. Moreover 
there is still something unclear. For example: why Michiel, a Venetian, should have 
employed a Florentine considering the political condition in Italy?681 
Other interesting elements appear. Benedetto Dei seemed to confirm the 
existence of the Ottoman privileges in the same period I hypothesised, that is, in 
1458-1459, although he set the exact date in 1461, which cannot be true because in 
the same period Florence had already dispatched other galleys to the Levant.682 
Furthermore, Dei accused himself and Florence of actively spying on the Venetians 
on behalf of the Sultan.683 The Serenissima never explicitly accused Florence of 
being in league with Mehmet II, but rather targeted Ancona.684 The more interesting 
                                                          
681 On Dei and Michiel, see Babinger 1978:183.  
682 Babinger 1963:312 Il gran Signore nel 1461 fece grazie e privilege ai Fiorentini in pregiudizio de’ 
Veneziani e nelle guerre del 1462 al 1466 intercettarono fino le lettere de’ Veneziani e le portarono al 
Gran Signore e diedero ad esso consigli. 
683 Pisani 1963:15 E notate bene ciaschuno che Firenze dall’anno 1460 all’anno 1472 a senpre tenuto 
e tiene pratiche e intelligene col gran turcho e co’ Maumett Bascia, chapitano de’ chapitani e senpre 
sono fiorentini colloro in canpo. 
684 Here the accusation was about selling weapons to the Turks. Even if the blame went to Ancona, 
one must remember that Florence used to transport wares through the Anconitan galleys. ASV, Senato 
Secreti 271-273 Die XIIII Februarii 1467 … impedire et providere quo introitus utilitates et 
emolumenta que percipit a christianis sutrahabantur sibi quam nulli dubium est nations christianas 
ita navigare cum mercatoribus omnis fortis munitionibus armis et aliis rebus per viam chii et aliter 
constantinopolum sicut nulli bellum … cum hoste ipso. ASV, Reg. Senato Secreti 20 67 
MCCCCLXVII die xxx Marci Sicut omnium notum esse post hac implicit simus in hoc ardenti bello 
cum turco tamen anconitani nunquam cessant cum naviores et aliis navigiis suis continue navigare 
instrictum et constantinopolim et nunc inter alias expediri student unam navium suam butarum vii et 
non solum agunt mercatura cum Turcis in grave damnum nostrum verum etiam deferent arma. On 
Ancona see in general Leonhard 1992. On the city’s commercial network with the Levant see Ashtor 
1978, Id. 1986 and Id. 1997(2). An interesting account of the Anconitan consul in Constantinople 
during the siege in 1453 is in Pertusi 1980. 








letter was the one sent from Venice to Florence in which the Serenissima accused 
again the Anconitans of selling weapons to the Turks. Venice informed the city of 
Florence that it was ready to arm four galleys for “taking care of the problem”. Why 
Venice informed Florence with such threatening words? In the end Florence was not 
Ancona. Most likely, Venice knew that Florentine merchants used to transport wares 
on the Anconitan galleys. Another reason might have been that Venice made clear to 
Florence that the Serenissima would have fiercely opposed any attempt to sell 
weapons to the Ottomans. To this Venetian letter, Florence apparently replied 
without giving much weight to the Venetian threats.685 Yet, all the Venetian 
accusations specifically against Florence came from chronicles or private reports, but 
never from public documents.686 Malipiero, in the Annali Veneti dall’anno 1457 al 
1500, gives an interesting account of Florence’s espionage activity. The Venetian 
states that the Florentine consul received information pertaining to Venice from 
Florentine merchants who had arrived from Italy in Constantinople. Afterwards, the 
consul usually transmitted the information received to the sultan.687 
                                                          
685 ASF, Responsive Copiari I, Ab Venetis 167v-168r. In Appendix II n. 165. The Florentine 
Signoria’s answer is in ASF, Missive I Cancelleria 45 343-344, in Appendix II n. 166. 
686 See the Venetian statement on Florence made by Zaccaria Barbaro in Naples in Corazzol 1994:380 
el ducha et fiorentini lavoreriano cum el turcho, le galeace sue vano a Constantinopoli et ognuno 
faceva quello I volevano. 
687 Malipiero 1845:41. E se intende che Fiorentini e Genovesi ne son in bona parte causa, perchè ‘l 
Consolo de Fiorentini, avanti che giungesse Zuane Capello, affermava al Bassa’ che la Signoria no 
manderia Ambassadore per la pase, e l’esshortava a metterse a ordene; e da poi fatta la domanda del 
salvo conduto, ghe ha ditto piu’ volte, che la Terra è in stretta, perchè l Papa, la Comunita’ de 
Fiorenza e altri Signori d’ Italia ne muove guerra, e che la Signoria manda a trattar de pace, perchè 
la è in besogno e in pericolo tal che ‘l Bassa’ è fatto piu’ anemoso. Ghe è anche alguni che va de qua 
a Constantinopoli su e giu’, che informa el Consolo de Fiorentini delle cose della terra; e lui fa saver 
el tutto al Bassa’, e ghe dise anche de piu’ per tuor la reputazion a la Signoria.  








What is interesting is that Dei described an activity based on letters intercepted 
while Malipiero referred instead to reports given by the Florentine merchants who 
travelled between Italy and the Levant. It is clear that the two elements are not 
exactly the same. Dei provides other details and even mentions some of the 
Florentines who acted as probable intermediaries between the Florentine community 
in Constantinople and the Ottoman sultan. These people were Jacopo Tedaldi, 
Mainardo degli Ubaldini (the consul), Niccolò Ardinghelli and Carlo Martelli.688 I 
have already covered Tedaldi and Mainardo, the Florentine consul in Constantinople, 
in the previous chapters.689 About Niccolò Ardinghelli we do not possess consistent 
information. He was a merchant who had some trouble with the Medici since he was 
exiled. In 1466 he received the pardon and finally was allowed to return to 
Florence.690 Carlo Martelli was probably a merchant with long experience in the 
Levant. He emerges in the letter sent to him by Dei in 1462 and he sent a letter to 
Cosimo the Elder in 1463 about the galleys.691 The fact that Martelli was in direct 
communication with Cosimo the Elder cannot but imply that he was person of a 
certain importance. 
Yet Florence, despite all the sources examined so far, seemed not to be directly 
involved. Of course, the Florentine Signoria was informed about the events that had 
occurred in Constantinople and in the Levant, but there is no definitive proof of 
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689 About Tedaldi see fn. 397. 
690 On Ardinghelli see Walter 2005:67-72. Ardinghelli also emerges in some private letters of 
Alessandra Strozzi. See Gregory 1997:133-134 (See also the prosopography in Appendix III).  
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espionage by the Signoria. In my interpretation, it was only a matter between 
Mehmet II and the Florentine community in Constantinople. Mehmet II presumably 
approached and pressured the Florentine consul without addressing the Signoria.  
The sultan did not have any reason to inform Florence since he had all the coercive 
power needed to force the cooperation of the Florentine community. First of all, 
Mehmet II could have harmed the Florentine community in loco which was 
extremely vulnerable to any kind of physical threat; or simply Mehmet II could have 
withdrawn the commercial concessions made to the Florentines. The latter option 
would have been, if enacted, an immense catastrophe for the Florentine merchants in 
Constantinople.   
Dei’s description of the meeting between the aforementioned Florentine 
merchants and Mehmet II was probably only one of many episodes. The sultan met 
with the most important members of the Florentine community to learn about the 
reports received by them from the Florentine merchants. Dei’s description of this 
meeting with Mehmet II seems to match Malipiero’s information about Mainardo’s 
cooperation with the sultan. The fact that a Venetian and a Florentine source agree 
with each other improves the reliability of the information. The merchants were the 
first element involved in the espionage. The information given by Dei about 
Venice’s letters, which were intercepted by Florentine merchants (and also Dei) and 
later delivered though him to the sultan, confirm evidently what has been argued 
before. In the end, I think that the Florentine community in Constantinople spied for 
Mehmet II. Yet, this activity happened and continued because the Florentines in 








Constantinople did not have a choice. In addition, this activity was part of a specific 
request of Mehmet II only to the Florentine community in Constantinople. The 
government in Florence must have been aware of this, but most likely was not 
involved in order to avoid political consequences. In this way, Florence would not 
have been taken as responsible for the actions done by the Florentine merchants in 
Constantinople. Most likely, the espionage activity was directed by the Florentine 
consul in Constantinople and not by the Florentine Signoria, as the Venetian 
Malipiero confirmed in his Annali.692 This espionage is only a small picture of the 
conditions in which the Florentine colony lived in Constantinople. Dei’s chronicle is 
useful in revealing more details about these conditions. Dei describes the 
celebrations of the Florentine colony over the successful conquest of Mytilene and 
Bosnia by the sultan in 1462 and 1463 respectively. On this occasion, the Florentine 
celebrated Mehmet II in the Florentine galleys which, at the moment, were in 
Constantinople. Dei used this episode to exhibit the importance and respect enjoyed 
by the Florentine community in Constantinople. The Florentine author did not spare 
words to describe the sultan’s love towards the Florentine community compared to 
the fear of the Venetian and Genoese’s merchants in Pera.693   
It is necessary to clarify the historical context in which these events took place. 
The Ottoman empire at the time of the first Venetian-Ottoman war was a powerful 
                                                          
692 See fn. 681. 
693 Dei’s account on the celebration after the conquest of Mytilene is in Dei 1985:161. The words of 
Dei on the love and the fear are the following: laonde I gienovesi e I viniziani, li qual’erono in Pera e 
per la Romania, n’ebbono ischoppio e tremore, visto che’l turcho portava tanto amore e tanta 
benivolenza e tanto chredito a la nazione fiorentina. On Bosnia’s account see always Dei 1985:163. 








and expanding power, stretching from Asia to the Balkans. The armies of the sultan 
were the most technologically advanced ones thanks to the artillery weapons. 
Moreover, the humanist literature of the time depicts a picture quite fearful of the 
sultan, owing to a recognition of the military power at his disposal. Unlike the 
Ottomans, Florence did not possess a proper military capacity on either land or sea. 
Their commerce, although rising, was not yet comparable to the Venetian trade in the 
Byzantine period.694 Florence suffered from Venetian predominance in the sea.695 
The Medici banks were the jewel of the city, granting to the Medici the possibility of 
moving capital and generating revenue. In addition, the banks could be used as a 
network of agents or diplomats, not for the Signoria, but for the Medici themselves. 
Besides that, Florence was quite a minor power compared to Venice, France, Naples 
or the Ottoman empire. Babinger, Pastor and most scholars commonly relate 
Florence as “using” or “influencing” the Ottomans.696 All scholars’ works, except 
İnalcik, interpreted Florence as the main actor in its relationship with the Ottoman 
empire. Therefore, Florence often appeared as “suggesting” or “influencing”, while 
in my opinion is wrong due to the uneven relation between Florence and the sultan. 
However, I agree more with the position of İnalcik, who assessed the Ottoman point 
of view in his works. This perspective seems to me the most accurate since the 
Ottoman empire was a superpower in this period, especially in comparison to 
Florence. 
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  It is absurd that a power like Florence could have used or even influenced 
Ottoman policies while the opposite is far more probable. Besides, Mehmet II had 
never been in position to depend on an Italian city and the Ottomans had all the 
coercive power necessary to enforce their superiority in Constantinople. For 
example, Mehmet II could have simply expelled the Florentines and privileged 
another community, such as Ancona.697 Also, Mehmet II was interested in using the 
Florentine colony for his objectives, since the sultan in this period was waging a war 
against a dangerous opponent, such as Venice. The sultan was not going to ignore the 
chance to have fresh reports from a closer source to Venice such as Florence. In 
particular, Mehmet II keenly observed the espionage activity and financed spies all 
over Europe.698 
For these reasons Dei’s entire attempt to depict the Florentine community in 
Constantinople as honoured to have the sultan as a guest paints only one side of the 
picture. In fact, Dei’s description tries to hide the fact that the Florentine community 
in Constantinople was powerless in the face of Mehmet II. It was not the Florentine 
community that was to be honoured by the sultan, but they who honoured Mehmet II, 
mostly because there was no alternative. Mehmet II attended celebrations and 
honours organised by a Christian power (Florence) to celebrate the victories of an 
                                                          
697 Information about the Anconitans in Constantinople during the Ottoman empire is very scarce. 
However, they were probably selling weapons to the Turks (see fn. 678). Moreover, Ancona, like 
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Islamic ruler against other Christian powers.699 In fact, during the celebrations for the 
conquest of Mytilene the sultan went to the boat of Giuliano Ridolfi and was 
honoured by him and the crew. For the celebration after the conquest of Bosnia the 
sultan this time went into the house of Carlo Martelli, a prominent Florentine banker. 
Again, it was the sultan to be honoured by the Florentines and not the opposite. In 
view of that, these celebrations appear not have been spontaneous, but more an 
“unwilling tribute” to the power of the sultan.700  
The Florentine community in Constantinople offered this tribute because it 
wanted to keep its privileges and good relations with the Sublime Porta. In case of 
refusal, Florence would lose all its privileges and most likely suffer a heavy 
retaliation from the sultan. These events resembled the unequal condition of a vassal 
in front of his lord, such as the humiliation suffered by Manuel II when, as a vassal, 
he had to congratulate Bayezid I for his victory in Nicopolis. Another episode which 
confirms this interpretation is the execution of 456 Venetians in the presence of the 
Florentines, including the consul, at the moment in Pera. This episode enhances more 
the real balance of power between the sultan and Florence where the latter is reduced 
as simple and forced spectator of Mehmet II’s glory.701 
Additionally, Constantinople was Florence’s first market for wool and later silk 
cloth. Florence needed this market especially from the moment that Naples was not 
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any more a reliable trade partner.702 The fact that Florence managed to ignore the 
Neapolitan ban on Florentine cloth and replace Naples with Constantinople is a sure 
evidence of the power at the disposal of the Ottoman sultan in respect to Florence. 
This is yet additional proof of why the celebrations reported by Dei must be 
contextualised as triumphal festivities for the sultan in which the Florentines, 
willingly or not, were only part of the background. The same Dei in the chronicle 
seems to admit that Florence had to honour the Ottoman sultan. For Benedetto writes 
that the sultan “asked and ordered” this celebrations to the Florentine community.703 
Nobody celebrate willingly if it had not been ordered. Therefore, one ought to 
assume that the Florentine are not the “honoured ones” which Dei had attributed to 
the Florentine community for this event. 
Mehmet II was doing a favour for Florence by waging war against Venice, 
because Venice was still a potential threat to the balance of power in Italy. Yet, no 
source suggests a military agreement between the Ottomans and Florence. For 
example, the conquest of Albania in 1469, rather than being a favour to Florence, 
was a troublesome event, since it was among the causes of Naples’ rapprochement to 
Venice. Furthermore, the same Venetian-Ottoman war also brought trouble for 
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Florence since the Venetian galleys did not intend to leave Florence free to trade 
with the sultan. 
 I think it is also unjustified to believe that Mehmet II told Florence any of his 
plans with regard to the war against Venice. First, because there are no sources and 
Florence did not seem aware of anything aside from reports from its merchants.704 
Secondly, there was no reason why Mehmet II should have revealed the Ottoman 
plans to a minor power like Florence. The Florentine sources on their community in 
Constantinople confirm that the relations between Mehmet II and Florence were 
neither even nor smooth. The aforementioned fears, which emerge from the 
Florentine pratiche, are clear symptoms of the inferiority of Florence and the 
precariousness of its relationship with the sultan. Clearly, Florence was exposed to 
the sultan’s decisions and orders. 
If that would not have been the case, one would have difficulties explaining why 
the Florentines would have risked their Italian neighbours, especially the pope, by 
siding so extremely and openly with the sultan. There were still negotiations and 
pressure from the pope for contributions in favour of Venice or Hungary. What is 
more, if Florence was so openly friendly with the sultan, it made no sense to send six 
galleys and 20.000 florins to Ferrante I in 1472, and then later to join a league in 
1474 with Venice, which was still at war against the Ottoman empire.705  
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The Medici did not use permanent spies in the Ottoman empire, and the little 
information they received from the Levant came as reports mainly from trusted 
merchants, or sometimes from the Florentine consul of Pera.706 Therefore, the 
probability that some kind of deal or pact existed between Constantinople and 
Florence is quite low. Clearly, the Medici wanted to be informed about what was 
happening in the Levant, thus the existence of the reports sent to Florence by Medici 
agents. However, these reports were first of all directed to Lorenzo or Piero de’ 
Medici, not the Signoria, which means they were unofficial. Moreover, the contents 
mostly related to big events such as the fall of Caffa in 1475.707 Most likely, the 
Medici had their own agents operating under their direct orders. These agents were 
not official representatives of the Florentine Signoria in Constantinople, but rather 
individuals at the Medici’s service such as Pagolo da’ Colle. 
To conclude, Florence could not have obtained commercial privileges by 
applying political pressure on the Ottoman empire. It stands to a reason that the 
grants were a specific decision of the Ottoman sultan. Therefore, the whole chronicle 
of Benedetto Dei must be interpreted under the perspective of a minor power dealing 
with a superpower. The aforementioned espionage activity may have been part of a 
specific “request” of the Ottoman sultan, just as in the case of the celebrations in 
Mehmet II’s honour after the conquest of Bosnia and Mytilene. The “trusted 
Florentine advisors” were probably only the “trusted informers” of the sultan. The 
meeting described by Dei was only due to Mehmet II’s will to have first-hand 
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information from an Italian power quite expert on Venetian issues such as Florence. 
Dei aimed to defend the marginality of Florence by transforming the city into the 
most important friend of the sultan. This theory makes even more sense when one 
analyses the chronicle as a whole, for the writer clearly wanted to celebrate Florence 
and the Medici at the same time, besides, of course, promoting his valuable support 
to the Medici’s cause. Besides, of course, celebrating himself. Unfortunately, it is not 
clear to whom this chronicle was addressed. What likely happened is a clever sultan 
granting commercial privileges to an insignificant military power, and consequently 
binding that city to the sultan’s goodwill.  
The Signoria never connected itself with the espionage activity of the 
Florentine consul in Constantinople. All the actions and the reports came from the 
Florentine consul and the merchants in Constantinople. Whether that was the will of 
the Florentine Signoria is not known. Most likely, Mehmet II never addressed the 
Signoria on this matter since he had no reason to do so. It is possible that the sultan 
directly approached the Florentine consul, at the time Mainardo degli Ubaldini, and 
“kindly” requested Florentine services in the matter. Just as the celebrations in 
honour of the sultan, I find it hard to believe that Mainardo could have said no to 
Mehmet II.  
Yet, Florence was able to take advantage of the political events even in this 
situation of manifest inferiority. This ability was also due to Florence’s balanced 
diplomacy which therefore explained why Florence never sided decisively with any 
power. The main interest for the city was to be able to prosper in Constantinople 








without getting too much involved in the conflict between the Ottoman empire and 
Venice, and to benefit from both political powers whenever there was the possibility. 
For example, the league formed in 1474 including Venice, Florence and Milan 
enabled the Florentines to have a strong ally in order to counter papal ambitions in 
Tuscany and Romagna. This alliance was also possible due to the strong pressure 
Mehmet II put on Venice, which pushed the Serenissima to look for a treaty in Italy. 
Venice feared Neapolitan expansionism both in Italy and in the Balkans, and the 
impossibility of sustaining two fronts – one in Italy, and the other in the Levant. The 
Neapolitan attempt to expand its influence in Cyprus probably represented the last 
straw that broke the camel’s back.708  
Also in the case of the Pazzi plot, the good connections of Florence with the 
sultan worked in their favour. One of the conspirators, Bernardo Bandini Baroncelli, 
fled to Constantinople. Bernardo’s hopes to be safe soon faded as someone in the 
Florentine colony must have recognised him and warned Mehmet II. The sultan 
immediately ordered Bandini to be imprisoned, while a merchant, Bernardo Peruzzi 
wrote to Florence about the capture. The assassin was afterwards delivered to the 
Florentine ambassador, Andrea di Bernardo de’ Medici, sent to what was probably 
the only official mission of the Florentine Commune to Mehmet II. The sultan's 
willingness to hand over Bandini Baroncelli to the Medici cannot prove a direct 
involvement of the Florentine Signoria with Mehmet II. In fact, it only proves that 
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Mehmet II had no reasons in keeping Bandini Baroncelli as instrument of political 
pressure against Florence and the Medici. On a marginal note, it is interesting that 
the Florentine Commune was not informed by the Florentine consul in 
Constantinople about Baroncelli's capture but by one of the Florentine merchants 
who was there.709   
There is no doubt that Florence was able to seize the best opportunity at the 
perfect time. I do not think this is only a random case. The Medici, thanks to their 
banks, had at their disposal an excellent diplomatic network all around Europe which 
allowed Florence to always be well informed about events. Therefore, Florence was 
able to enact policies more convenient for the moment with the ultimate goal dictated 
by Florence’s political agenda. This was the goal of Florentine policy since Cosimo 
took control of the Signoria in 1434. Florence after it lost the war against Lucca 
under the Albizzi, would never start another war.710 The advantages of these policies 
are clear. Florence had the opportunity to increase Levantine commerce at the 
disadvantage of the Venetians and enjoy the benevolence of the sultan.  
 
Otranto, Naples, the Ottomans and the role of the Medici: guilty or not guilty? 
 
I have decided to reserve a special paragraph to discuss the political events around 
the Ottoman invasion of Otranto in 1480, carried out by the governor of Bosnia 
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Sanjak, Gedik Ahmet Pasha. The decision to focus on this event is due to the 
complicated debate over the role played by the Medici, and especially by Lorenzo 
the Magnificent. The question is whether Lorenzo de’ Medici had an active role in 
the invasion or if the Medici did not have a direct part on the Otranto attack. Some 
scholars have suggested that the Florentine Signoria had a direct involvement in the 
attack on Otranto.711 This hypothesis rests on the events following the Pazzi Plot. 
The Florentine Signoria sentenced Cardinal Salviati-Riario, one of the plot leaders, 
to death by hanging. As a consequence, Pope Sixtus IV placed Florence under 
interdict and excommunicated the Medici. The plot, which the pope was aware of, 
indeed failed. Afterwards, the invasion of the king of Naples, Ferrante I, supported 
by the pope, ended with the Florentine loss of some territories. Lorenzo de’ Medici 
had to travel personally to Naples, in order to negotiate peace with Ferrante I. The 
terms of the peace gave to the king of Naples, and to the pope, the option of 
returning territories occupied during the war.712 This peace was unfavourable for 
Florence, further demonstrating Florentine difficulties in military matters. Scholars 
hypothesise a connection between these events and an alleged active role of the 
Medici behind the invasion of Otranto in 1480.713  
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The reason behind this Medici active role is that the conquest of Otranto put 
the king of Naples in desperate need of subsidies. Clearly, the invasion of Otranto 
was a great success for the Ottomans largely because at that moment all the majority 
of the Neapolitan army was still in Tuscany. The Medici offered large quantity of 
subsidies in exchange of the Florentine territories lost to Naples during the previous 
war. Moreover, scholars believed that the medal made by Bertoldo di Giovanni 
around 1480-1481 and presented as a gift to Mehmet II was the definitive proof of an 
agreement between Florence and Constantinople.714 The medal presents an 
inscription in which Mehmet II is called IMPERATOR ASIAE AC TRAPESVNZIS 
MAGNEQVE GRECIE. The term Magna Graecia has been interpreted as a clear 
reference to the South of Italy, and an invitation by Lorenzo de’ Medici to the 
Ottoman sultan to invade the kingdom of Naples. Babinger rejects this hypothesis 
and I tend to agree with the German scholar. The Florentine gains are to be 
connected once more with Florence’s ability to benefit from events, even if it did not 
have the power to influence them. 
There are some unpublished Florentine sources which shed light on the Medici 
role in the Otranto attack. Several letters sent by the Florentine ambassador in Rome, 
Filippo Pandolfi, seem to point to the fact that the invasion was not a surprise. What 
is certain is that Venice was well aware of the Ottomans plans. The role of Venice 
has been examined and has determined that the sultan asked for Venetian neutrality 
before the invasion. The Venetian Senate agreed to allow the Turkish fleet to pass 
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through the straits and attack Otranto.715 On 13 May 1479, the ambassador Pandolfi 
wrote to Florence: 
One letter came yesterday night from Benedetto Salutati and told us that he received 
information from Otranto from a ship which came from Constantinople. The Turks both 
by sea and by land seem to organise themselves in order to put Ragusa under siege. This 





This letter confirms that Mehmet II had already begun to plan the attack. 
Whether it was for the actual attack to Otranto or the contemporary attack 
against Rhodes is not certain. What is certain is the fact that, in Constantinople, 
preparation for an attack was on-going, and the Italian powers were not 
completely unaware. The subsequent letter, written by Pandolfi to Florence just 
fourteen days later, gives more information. 
Last night came here a letter from the governor of Fano which stated that in Fano and 
Ancona two Turkish boats had done severe damages. In these places, people are afraid 
and they had written to our lord (the pope) hoping that he (the pope) will do something 
about it, otherwise they would have to do whatever they can. This new letter scared the 
papal court and it is our impression that this event will accelerate the peace 





Already by 1479 the Turkish army had begun to test the Italian defence by 
hitting the seaports of Fano and Ancona. Fano and Ancona are in the so called Marca 
Anconetana, while Otranto is in Puglia. The distance between Ancona and Otranto is 
350 kilometres. The main goal of the Ottoman army was to test Italy’s defensive 
capacity and eventually mislead the Italian powers about their real targets. With the 
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attack on Fano and Ancona, the Ottomans showed an ability to hit the Italian coast 
regardless of distance. Another possible conclusion from the letter is about 
Florence’s diplomacy. The tension created by this Turkish attack was, in the 
ambassador’s words, “good for the peace”. In fact, in Rome negotiations were taking 
place for the conclusion of the war between Florence, Naples and Pope Sixtus IV. 
Again, this does not prove anything about the alleged involvement of Florence in the 
attack, but rather confirms the versatility of Florence’s diplomacy, which was ready 
to use any development for its own benefit, regardless if it was an Ottoman attack 
against a Christian city.  Another letter seems to confirm the fact that the pope was 
afraid of an Ottoman attack against Italy. However, when the pope asked for 
contributions from Venice, the Serenissima refused to oblige him. One must note that 
Venice had just made peace with Mehmet II, and were therefore not willing to risk 
another war, especially to defend Naples. Milan and Florence, after some 
consultations, decided to stay with the Venetians in a way confirming the league 
created in 1474.718  The Florentine Signoria was therefore aware of the movement of 
troops made by the sultan, just as were all Italian powers.  
Another reason why some scholars believe Florence was actively involved 
with the sultan’s plans is the medal of Bertoldo di Giovanni, made around 1480-1481 
and given to the sultan as a gift from Lorenzo de’ Medici. 
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Preserved in the Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York) 
 
The front the figure shows an image of the sultan with the inscription MAVMET 
ASIE AC TRAPESVNZIS MAGNEQUE GRETIE IMPERAT. On the reverse there 
is the figure of the sultan triumphantly standing in a chariot and carrying three 
women as prisoners. The three women represented symbolically Asia, Trebizond and 
“Greece”. The medal was officially granted to the sultan as a gift for the delivery of 
the assassin, Bernardo Bandini Baroncelli. Scholars have debated about the 
significance of the words MAGNEQUE GRETIE. Some assumed that this 
inscription was the definitive proof of the Medici’s active involvement in the Otranto 
invasion, while Babinger rejects this idea and argues that the inscription referred to 








Greece.719 Babinger’s main point was that Magna Graecia in the Quattrocento 
defined Greece, and not the South of Italy. Apart from one rare case in the poem 
Grecia Grande, attributed to Michele Racchele, there are no other cases of the phrase 
Magna Graecia referring to the south of Italy.720 I believe it is correct to 
contextualise the medal as a gift for Mehmet II, for the delivery of Bandini-
Baroncelli.  
Let us consider the theory of the secret plot as true for a moment. The 
production of a medal like Bertoldo’s could not have been a secret action. The 
commission, the production, and even the moment in which the medal was gifted, 
involved a considerable number of people. Whenever an action is undertaken 
secretly, reason dictates the involvement of as few people as possible. This is why 
the Signoria or the Medici usually assigned Pagolo da’ Colle for special missions to 
the Levant. The same production of a medal supposes the existence of a workshop 
with assistants doing parallel works, while the artist was taking care of the main 
concept. Not only the delivery, but the decision to make that medal would require the 
involvement of a certain number of people who would be aware of the true 
significance of the medal. Therefore, if the medal is to be considered an invitation by 
the Signoria for Mehmet to invade Otranto, one would expect to find Florentine 
sources attesting to the fact. Instead, we find only a later Neapolitan source making 
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the claim.721 Even Ferrante I asked Florence for help in the aftermath of the invasion. 
If the king had even a minimal suspicion about Florence, he surely would not have 
asked Florence for help. Unsurprisingly, Ferrante I did not ask for help from Venice. 
Most likely, the king of Naples was aware that the Serenissima, besides having 
knowledge of the Ottoman attack on Otranto, did not take any actions to prevent the 
Turkish army from disembarking at Otranto. Venice always patrolled the Adriatic, so 
Ferrante knew that Venice must have allowed the Ottoman army to cross the sea.   
Last but not least, other doubts arise regarding the possibility of Florentine 
involvement. The medal, according to the studies on the object, was made around 
1480-1481, and probably given to Mehmet II during the Ottoman embassy that went 
to Florence in 1480, asking for artists and wood carvers.722 The Turkish fleet 
attacked Otranto on 28 July 1480. The estimates of the size of the Turkish force 
range from 10.000 to 18.000 men and there is no doubt that the Ottoman army was of 
paramount quantity.723 Such large armies and fleets could not have been recruited in 
a few months. Yet, the best hypothesis, which denies completely any form of 
Florentine involvement, is that already on May 1479 the Ottomans were testing the 
Italian coastal defences with the aforementioned attacks at Fano and Ancona. The 
news of these attacks were known in Rome and, consequently, must have been 
known in the whole Italy. Only in that moment did Florence learn that the Ottomans 
were targeting the Italian powers. The sources clearly show that the Florentines had 
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no idea of the possible target of an Ottoman attack. Therefore, I believe that Mehmet 
II already had planned the attack on Otranto, considering it as a parallel to the 
Ottoman attack to Rhodes. In fact, to organise such complicated attacks at the time 
would have required a considerable amount of time, just only for recruiting or 
organising the necessary logistical support.  
 I cannot say whether one attack was a diversion for the other, but it is quite 
unrealistic to point to the Medici as an active and involved partner in the Ottoman 
attack against Otranto. What is plausible, however, is that once again Florence’s 
diplomacy was ready to gain whatever was possible from the fallout of the attack. At 
the moment Otranto fell into the hands of the Ottomans due to the “surprise” attack, 
Ferrante I immediately requested help and subsidies from Rome and from Florence. 
The dots between “surprise” are not random since it is difficult to think that Ferrante 
was caught completely off-guard. The previous signals (attacks on Fano and Ancona) 
and the threatening proximity of the Ottoman empire after the conquest of Albania 
were all known in Naples. Most likely, Ferrante I did not want to call back the troops 
from Tuscany at the command of the duke of Calabria, Alphonse, who, at the time, 
was trying to put under his influence the Commune of Siena.724 With regard to 
Florence, the letters from the Florentine ambassador in Rome seem to confirm a 
general unawareness in Florence about the Ottoman plans. Surely, the Florentine 
Signoria could have suspected something, but nothing points out to an agreement 
between Lorenzo de’ Medici and the Ottomans.   
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After the Ottoman conquest of Otranto, the Neapolitan ambassador sent 
letters to Florence on 4 July 1481 asking for the subsidies. The pratiche are quite 
straightforward in indicating what Florence requested in exchange. Domenico de 
Bartolo affirmed that Florence could have given the money, but required that the 
king of Naples return the territories lost in the recent war.725 The king of Naples, 
probably without much of an alternative, had to accept the Florentine conditions. 
One year later, a Florentine embassy carried out by Antonio de’ Medici was sent on 
5 July 1481.726 The Signoria ordered the Florentine ambassador to go to Naples and 
thereafter to Barletta (city in Puglia) where the Neapolitan king was at that time. The 
ambassador was to express the Commune’s gratitude to the king for the restitution of 
the lands and satisfaction at the death of Mehmet II. Furthermore, Antonio 
recommended a league and friendship between Naples and Florence, especially 
against the Venetians. Once again the Italian political situation had changed, and 
once more the kingdom of Naples had become instrumental for Florentine policies. 
The main reason for this was, once again, the balance of power. With the attack 
against Otranto, Naples was deeply hurt. Instead, the true winner was indeed the 
Serenissima which managed to weaken a direct rival in the struggle for the Italian 
supremacy. Not surprisingly, just after these events, Venice was going to intervene 
aggressively against Naples in the war of Ferrara (1482-1482). Again, alliances 
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changed in Italy. This time Venice joined the pope against Naples and Ferrara, the 




The aim of this chapter was to identify the state of relations between Florence and 
the Ottoman empire from 1464 to 1481. I believe that most of the diplomatic 
activities enacted by the Florentine Signoria with regard to the Ottoman empire were 
reactive rather than proactive. Florence needed the sultan to support its commerce in 
Constantinople, but the sultan did not need Florence. The Florentine interests in 
Constantinople were vital for the Signoria, especially for the Florentine panni. 
Therefore, Florence depended entirely on Mehmet II’s goodwill because the sultan 
could have revoked Florentine trading privileges at will.  
Benedetto Dei, in his chronicle, clearly wanted to glorify Florence. The secret 
information provided by Florence to the sultan, the advice given by members of the 
Florentine colony in Constantinople, and especially the celebrations made in honour 
of the sultan, are all clear evidence of the inferior position of Florence in their 
relationship with the sultan. The sultan understood, from the beginning of his rule in 
Constantinople, that privileging Florence over Venice or Genoa bought him a 
dependable ally to use any time it was necessary. The celebrations made in honour of 
the sultan were, in my opinion, only one of the clearest examples. Dei declared that 
the sultan honoured the Florentine Commune by attending the celebrations and being 








entertained in the Florentine galleys. However, I think that the only reason for the 
sultan to go to the celebration was to enhance his triumphant image as an Islamic 
ruler celebrated by Christians. It is implausible that the sultan wanted to honour the 
Florentines. The sultan would have removed the privileges in the event of Florence’s 
refusal to cooperate. 
As far as the Otranto invasion and the role of Florence are concerned, there is 
no proof of direct Medici participation in the matter, while the role of Venice as the 
power who granted “benevolent neutrality” to the Ottomans has been proven.727 
Florence did not take part in the invasion. The sultan probably did not even inform 
Florence of his plans, as Pandolfi, Florentine ambassador in Rome, appears to 
confirm. Besides, Mehmet II had no logical reason to inform the Medici, for there 
was nothing Lorenzo de’ Medici could have done in favour of the sultan. Moreover, 
Florence was still recovering after the Neapolitan invasion. Mehmet II had no 
interest in spreading this information as there was always the risk his plans might be 
discovered. The entire Ottoman operation in Otranto was a success because, at the 
time of attack, the sultan was also attacking Rhodes. The Neapolitan fleet was at that 
moment in Rhodes helping its defenders and therefore unable to defend the waters 
around Italy. Thanks in large part to Venetian neutrality, Gedik Pasha managed to 
cross from Valona to Otranto and conquered the city.  
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Another debate revolves around the medal made by Bertoldo di Giovanni, 
interpreted as an invitation from Lorenzo de’ Medici to invade the south of Italy. 
This theory is not convincing. The Italian powers were aware that the sultan was 
plotting something against Italy after the attacks in Fano and Ancona. Some other 
evidence emerges from Sforza’s archive.728 Yet somehow the Otranto invasion was a 
successful surprise attack. There was no point in presenting a medal during an 
Ottoman embassy to Florence in 1480 as an invitation to attack the South of Italy, as 
the entire operation had to rely on surprise. The Medici would have never risked of 
being closely associated with the Ottomans. Evidently, it was impossible to hide the 
Turkish embassy and the gift of the medal with so many people involved. Therefore, 
the medal must be interpreted as a Medici gift to the sultan for the delivery of 
Bandini Baroncelli. The three women in the chariot effectively represented Asia, 
Trebizond and Greece. It is true that the medal was celebrating the conquests of the 
Ottoman sultan, but not his future conquests. Of course, I will not deny the fact that 
the Medici received advantages from Mehmet II after his conquest of Otranto. 
Lorenzo de’ Medici gained the opportunity to reclaim territories lost to Naples after 
the war as an exchange for subsidies to Ferrante I. However, this event must be 
understood in the context of Florence’s diplomatic tradition, which took advantage of 
new developments.  Finally, the medal and the attack on Otranto are nearly in the 
same period of time. Mehmet II’s decision to take Otranto required some time, and if 
Florence invited the sultan then the city was most surely aware of the Ottoman plans. 
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So, why should Lorenzo de’ Medici have risked his position by inviting Mehmet II 
to do something that was already in motion? Again, this does not make any sense. 
Evidently, Florence’s diplomacy operated as in the past by taking the most 
advantage of events arising without being directly responsible for them. The same 
attitude can be seen when Florence offered its contribution for the crusade to Venice 
and even forced Milan to do the same. Finally, the primary source accusing the 
Medici of collaborating with the sultan is from Naples.729 It stands to reason that the 
Neapolitan historians of the time had an interest in accusing Florence because they 
needed to safeguard the character of Ferrante I, as well as a need to justify the 
tension between Florence and Naples.  The conquest of Otranto by the Ottomans and 
the consequent offer of contributions from Lorenzo the Magnificent to Ferrante I is 
yet another proof of Florentine pragmatic policy based solely on Florence’s political 
and economic goals. 
In the following year, Mehmet II died, and so did Ottoman interest in holding 
Otranto. Ferrante I conquered the city from the Turks in 1481 and gave back the 
territories he had captured from Florence. The Ottoman empire faced a civil war 
between Bayezid II and Djem sultan, both sons of Mehmet II. What truly mattered is 
that the Medici managed both to preserve the status quo in Italy, and at the same 
time to protect their commercial interest in Constantinople. Clearly, Florence had a 
certain degree of success in its own political agenda that was neither philo-papal nor 
philo-ottoman, but purely Florentine.  
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This PhD dissertation aimed to answer several questions ignored or 
superficially discussed in past scholarship. The first question concerns the relations 
between Florence and late Byzantium. Scholars have traditionally focused too much 
on the Ecumenical Council of 1439 rather than the political and especially 
commercial goals behind this meeting. One of the central aspects of the relations 
between Florence and Byzantium are the privileges granted by John VIII. These 
privileges have previously lacked a critical analysis and historical contextualisation. 
Scholars have simply accepted them as a fact and never questioned their authenticity.  
Moreover, past scholars have failed to investigate whether Florence made concrete 
use of the commercial chrysobull. For example, scholars have not considered 
whether Florence ever created a loggia in Constantinople.  
This dissertation has reversed the common perception in scholarship that 
Florence possessed a loggia after John VIII granted the commercial chrysobull to the 
city. It has made clear the complete lack of sources which identify the presence of a 
Florentine loggia in Constantinople during the Byzantine period.  Therefore, 
Florence never enacted the commercial privileges given by the emperor. The reasons 
for this were of political and economic in nature. Specifically, Florence was unable 








to overcome the predominance of Venice and Genoa in Constantinople, and therefore 
continued to use their intermediation, which was more profitable.  
Another central issue was the nature of Florence’s diplomacy. This is 
important since Florence was a minor a power compared to Venice, Naples and the 
Holy See. Therefore, the city had to rely heavily on diplomacy to preserve its 
interests and develop further commercial and political goals, making the 
investigation of its diplomacy crucial for the understanding of Florence’s relations 
with the Levant and the other Italian powers. This dissertation argued that Florence’s 
diplomacy maintained a remarkably flexible coherence based on pragmatism. This 
coherence can be seen in many episodes of Florence’s history.  For example, 
Florence had hoped to receive commercial privileges since the end of the fourteenth 
century. The Medici’s rise to power in 1434 did not change this goal, as shown from 
the letter sent in 1436 by the Signoria to John VIII.730 After Florence received the 
privileges in 1439, the city no longer had need of the Byzantine emperors. Therefore, 
Florence always refused to satisfy the requests sent by John VIII and Constantine XI 
and did not participate in the Varna crusade. This Florentine disinterest does not 
represent, in my opinion, a change of diplomacy towards Byzantium, but rather 
shows the coherence of the Signoria’s diplomacy.  
This dissertation investigated further the pragmatism at the base of Florence’s 
diplomatic coherence. Matters of faith were relatively unimportant for Florence. The 
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discussions in the pratiche and the letter to the ambassadors confirm this statement, 
since the basis of every decision taken by Florence followed political or economic 
reasons. The same pragmatism can be observed in the instructions given to the 
ambassadors, especially with regard to papal initiatives on the crusade. Most often, 
the Signoria sent ambassadors with little authority to negotiate the organisation for 
the crusade or any other papal initiative. In this way the Florentine ambassador could 
have postponed every answer to the pope since they had to consult the Florentine 
Signoria. Of course, this choice was a Florentine expedient in order to gain time. It 
was crucial to delay every action in order to reason on the best policy and perhaps 
await more favourable developments. Moreover, the ambassadors were prohibited 
from promising anything which would bind the Signoria to the pope, especially in 
the case of crusade contributions. The only two exceptions were in cases of secret 
promises, like those at Mantua (1459), or in the case of the use of the duke of Milan 
as a guarantor for Florence, as happened at the beginning of the Venetian war against 
the Ottoman empire (1463). This pragmatic diplomacy was one of the reasons why 
Florence was deaf to the Byzantine requests. There was simply nothing to gain from 
helping the Byzantine emperors who were completely under Genoese and Venetian 
influence. This was not because Florence had no commercial interests in 
Constantinople.  








On the contrary, the Constantinopolitan market was very important for 
Florence’s woollen and silk cloth production.731 Normally, Florence had in Naples 
one of the most important markets for its cloth production, but this trade stream 
diminished after Alphonse V took possession of the Neapolitan kingdom. Alphonse 
V and Ferrante I were not reliable commercial partners due to their political and 
commercial aggressiveness. Alphonse V twice enacted a trade embargo against 
Florence, while Ferrante I banned the Florentine panni. However, thanks to its 
commercial repositioning in Constantinople, Florence was finally able to divert its 
cloth trade to a stable and more profitable market, as the same Venetian ambassador 
in Naples, Zaccaria Barbaro, stated to Ferrante I.  
Florence’s pragmatism manifested itself in the ways the Signoria conducted 
its foreign policy. The primary Florentine goal was to maintain the balance of power 
in Italy, and thus defend Florence’s independence and peace. The rise of Francesco 
Sforza as duke of Milan and the conquest of Naples by Alphonse V caused new 
alliances between Florence and Milan against Naples and Venice. Consequently, 
Florence was not going to help Byzantium, since the Florentine Commune had no 
reason to give support to an important Venetian marketplace. The reason for the 
Florentine shift from Venice to Milan lay not only in Italian politics but also in the 
Levant. Florence could not remain an ally of Venice since the latter was the main 
obstacle to Florence’s commercial expansion in Constantinople. Therefore, 
                                                          
731 Tognetti 2002:36-39. If the woollen cloth production started to decrease, Florence had a recovery 
thanks to the silk cloth production; see in general Tognetti 2002.  








Constantinople was just another “battleground” where the conflicts and shifting 
alliances among Renaissance powers were played out. The shocked reaction of the 
Milanese ambassador as he witnessed the satisfaction expressed by someone in the 
Signoria to the news of the fall of Constantinople is the final proof of Florence’s 
pragmatism. Florence and the Medici were aware that the fall of Constantinople 
represented a huge loss for Venice’s power and the end of Venice’s monopoly in the 
city.  
Florence’s diplomatic shrewdness can be observed in the forgeries made by 
Florence. This dissertation has been the first modern work arguing that most of the 
surviving documents issued by the Byzantine emperor John VIII on behalf of 
Florence and the Florentines are forgeries. These forgeries themselves show the 
pragmatic, almost Machiavellian thinking of the Medici, who took advantage of the 
unprecedented presence of the Byzantine emperor and his huge delegation, to 
promote Florence’s narrowly Italian goals. The Medici needed these forgeries to 
reinforce their legitimacy at a moment in which their power was menaced by several 
enemies, such as the duke of Milan or the former ruling family in Florence, the 
Albizzi. Finally, another proof of Florence’s diplomatic pragmatism is in the 
understanding between Florence and the Ottoman power after 1453. This pact clearly 
shows that the Florentine city did not consider the religion of the partner to be an 
obstacle to trade and diplomacy. It is true that Venice and Genoa had also made 
commercial agreements with the sultan, but the case of Florence is different. 
Florence was chosen by the sultan for different reasons, above all the fact that the 








city did not at all represent a threat to Mehmet II. The Florentine-Ottoman 
relationship was unequal from the beginning and depended entirely on the sultan’s 
goodwill towards the city. The willingness of Florence to accept an alliance with a 
more proactive and unequal partner, such as the Ottomans, shows again their very 
pragmatic approach. 
This dissertation has also argued for a different understanding of the 
interrelation among Venice, Florence, the popes and the Ottomans.  Florence has 
either been interpreted as philo-ottoman or philo-papal. I think that both the 
aforementioned interpretations are unsuitable in describing the specificity of 
Florence’s diplomacy. Florence had its own political agenda that followed mainly 
political and economic reasons. As such, Florence had to maintain good relations 
with all the major political powers of the time, such as Venice, Naples, the popes and 
the Ottoman empire. Accordingly, Florence could not have been rigid in its 
diplomatic line, such as always being contrary to the crusade or always in 
competition with either Naples or Venice.  
This flexibility did not undermine Florence’s coherence since the city always 
pursued its political and economic interests, such as attempting to maintain the 
balance of power in Italy and at the same time improving its commercial presence in 
the Levant. Surely, the Florentine position in between Islamic and Christian powers 
made it harder for Florence to pursue its goals. For example, I do not think that 
Florence was so eager to provide intelligence to the Ottomans, but clearly had no 








choice.  Florence feared an eventual reaction by the sultan against the Florentine 
community in Constantinople as the pratiche clearly had stated. At the same time the 
Florentine and Ottoman relationship was not always a positive one for Florence. For 
example, following the Ottoman conquest of Albania in 1469, Ferrante I, afraid of 
the Ottoman advance, abandoned the alliance with Florence and Milan for Venice.732 
For Florence, having a friendly Neapolitan kingdom was crucial. For instance, a 
friendly Naples guaranteed the travel of the Florentine galleys to the Levant. The 
Ottoman attack against Albania, and the death of Skanderbeg, pushed the Neapolitan 
king toward the main enemy of the Florentine Signoria, Venice. Therefore, it makes 
sense that Florence granted six galleys and 20.000 florins to Ferrante I in 1472, as 
the Signoria probably wanted to restore the friendship with Naples and separate 
Ferrante I from Venice. Florence presented the gift even thought it was perfectly 
aware that this was an action against the Ottomans, and therefore carried fearful 
consequences if discovered.  
Yet, Naples was not the only power with which Florence wanted to keep on 
friendly terms. Florence also tried to maintain a friendly relation with the Holy See. 
The popes had an important role since the time of the great Florentine commercial 
companies Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli. The first Florentine Levantine expansion 
took place thanks to the good relations with Rome, as the pope granted to the 
Florentine companies the collection of tithes in the Levantine dioceses since the 
fourteenth century. Florence had several economic interests in Rome, above all, the 
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apostolic depository which was in Medici hands since 1427.733 Moreover, the favour 
of the popes was necessary for carrying out trade with the Levant. Only the pope 
could grant the special permission needed to trade with the heathens. The pope could 
have undermined Florence’s interests in the Levant. For example, Pope Paul II 
denied Holy Communion to the Florentine merchants in Constantinople, even if that 
measure did not last.734 The reason why this papal provision was ineffective is again 
due to the Medici’s political acumen. Cosimo the Elder and, later, Lorenzo de’ 
Medici, often paid the papal debts and sustained expenses of the Roman curia.  This 
monetary influence of Florence in Rome was so invasive that even the Venetian 
ambassador, Zaccaria Barbaro admitted that “I heard … that Lorenzo de’ Medici’s 
bank does everything in the court and has from the pope and the cardinal every 
favour and more reputation…”.735  
Florence had a similar attitude toward the crusade – flexible but coherent. All 
the popes from the second half of the Quattrocento tried to organise a crusade which 
aimed to at least to bring to a halt the Ottomans’ aggressive expansion. Florence 
consistently employed temporising tactics to avoid paying contributions to papal 
requests for aid to the crusade. Scholars have hypothesised that Florence attempted 
to boycott the crusade in which Venice was the only power that might profit from it. 
However, the discussions in the pratiche give evidence of the fear the Commune 
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held for the Florentine community in Constantinople if the sultan would find out 
about a Florentine contribution to the crusade. Besides, Florence effectively gave 
crusade contributions when it suited the Commune’s political goals. For example, 
Florence once offered contributions to prevent Venice making peace with the sultan, 
thus negating Venice’s argument that peace was necessary because the Venetians 
were the only power actively fighting Mehmet II. In 1474, however, Florence offered 
a contribution to Venice in exchange for joining the league in that same year.  
Relations with Venice followed the aforementioned scheme. It is clear that, 
after 1453, hostility between the two powers could not have been avoided as a result 
of the will of Florence to increase its power in Constantinople. The Medici’s will 
was not to see Venice destroyed, but only contained especially in Italy. Venice, just 
as Naples, was crucial for the balance of power in Italy. Nothing stopped Florence 
from joining a league in 1474 with Venice in the period of the Ottoman-Venetian 
war. In this period of time, Ferrante I of Naples seemed to acquire too much power 
and began to erode Florence’s influence in Rome, especially after Pope Sixtus IV’s 
election. Besides, the league between Florence and Venice prevented the Florentine 
state-galleys from being attacked in their voyages to the Levant.  
To sum up, Florence’s diplomacy was flexible but coherent in its 
pragmatism. Florence sometimes gave crusade contributions, even if they did so in 
secret and at the same time passed information to the sultan through the Florentine 
consul in Constantinople. Florence’s diplomatic tactic was to maintain the balance in 








Italy in order to facilitate its commercial activities, including those in the Levant. 
Florence’s diplomatic view was global, and it took into account political and 
commercial matters that included the entire Mediterranean. For example, the league 
with Venice in 1474, or Florence’s league with Naples in 1464, were not only made 
from an Italian political perspective, but had consequences in the Levant as well, 
such as stopping Venetian or Neapolitan attacks against the Florentine state-galleys.  
It is no surprise that, at this moment, the balance of power began to crumble. 
Florence was faced with one of the gravest dangers in Medici history. The election of 
Pope Sixtus IV, the alliance made with the king of Naples, and the assassination of 
Galeazzo Maria Sforza (1476) destroyed the Italian balance of power. Sixtus IV and 
Florence entered into a conflict over the pope’s policy in Romagna, which ran 
counter to Florentine policy. The Pazzi plot in 1478 was the last event of a conflict 
which escalated quickly. Fortunately for the Medici, Lorenzo survived and managed 
to overcome his enemies only to receive interdict and excommunication. Naples, 
incited by Sixtus IV, entered the war and managed to conquer some territories. It was 
mainly thanks to Lorenzo de’ Medici’s visit to Naples that peace was signed between 
Florence and Naples.  Similarly, this peace saved Medici rule in Florence.  
The subsequent conquest of Otranto made by the Ottomans clearly played in 
favour of Florentine interests. However, there is no evidence of Florentine 
involvement in the Ottoman decision to attack Otranto. First of all, I doubt that the 
sultan would have ever been influenced by a city, such as Florence, which was 








militarily insignificant. Most probably, Mehmet II had this plan in mind after the 
truce with Venice in 1478, since the sultan always avoided fighting on different 
fronts at the same time. The unpublished reports sent from Rome by Pandolfini seem 
to confirm the Florentine Signoria’s ignorance of the impending Ottoman attack. 
What was certain was that Florence, as usual, reacted to this event with great 
diplomatic acumen. The Medici negotiated with Ferrante I and promised a 
contribution in exchange for the territories lost in the war against Naples (1478-
1479). Once again, Florence benefited from the attack of Mehmet II, and afterwards 
obtained other benefits by helping Ferrante I to conquer back Otranto from the 
Ottomans.  
This PhD dissertation on the Levant has shown the importance and great 
potential based on material from the Italian state archives. It reversed the common 
perception of Florence as a power that was relatively uninvolved or disinterested in 
the Levant, since Florence’s interests in the region are traceable from the fourteenth 
century. This work has also demonstrated that Florence had no inhibitions when 
dealing or negotiating with powers of different faith, as long as the outcome could 
strengthen Florentine interests. Matters of faith, so important in the Middle Ages, 
surrendered to the logic of the general welfare of the state and the wealth of its 
commercial elite. Florence’s diplomacy was coherent in its actions towards the 
Byzantine empire. If Florence did not help Byzantium, it was simply due to 
pragmatic reasons. Florence cooperated with the sultan simply out of fear of an 
eventual angry reaction from Mehmet II, and to protect its interests in 








Constantinople. At the same time, to protect its independence and the balance of 
power in Italy, Florence made a deal with Venice and Naples and contributed to both 
for the crusade when these contributions went in favour of Florence’s political 
agenda.  
To conclude, the history of the relationship between Florence and the Levant 
represents the successful attempt of a minor power to compete against much stronger 
neighbours like Venice or Naples. Florence, despite its military weaknesses, 
managed to achieve a privileged status in Constantinople with the favourable ahd-
nāme granted to it by the sultan in 1458-1460. Moreover, Florence also managed to 
defend these privileges from the threats of the popes, the Venetians, and Naples. 
Diplomacy was the key to Florentine success, allowing Florence to maintain the 
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APPENDIX I/A  
THE UNUSUAL LONG REPETITION IN THE 
FLORENTINE CHRYSOBULLS AND THEIR 




John VIII’s commercial chrysobull to Florence 
 
Müller, 122, pp. 174-177; Lampros, pp. 338-344 
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John VIII’s chrysobull dealing with domestic matters to Florence 
Müller 172-174, 121; Lampros pp. 335-338 
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John VIII’s chrysobull to Plethon  
 
Lampros 331-333 




☩ Ὁ οἰκεῖος τῆς βασιλείας μου κῦρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς ἐνεφάνισεν εἰς αὐτὴν 
ἀργυρόβουλον τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου πανευτυχεστάτου 
δεσπότου τοῦ Πορφυρογεννήτου κῦρ Θεοδώρου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου, διαλαμβάνον ἵνα 
ἔχῃ τὸ περὶ τὸ Καστρίον χωρίον τὴν Βρύσιν μετὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ νομῆς καὶ περιοχῆς, καὶ 
τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν ἀποφέρηται καὶ ἀποκερδαίνῃ πρόσοδον, τήν τε ὑπὲρ τοῦ 
κεφαλατικίου δηλονότι καὶ τὰς δύο μείζας τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ ἐξαλειμματικὰ στασία καὶ 
πᾶν ἄλλο δημοσιακὸν δίκαιον, ἄνευ μέντοι τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἑξαμιλίου ἀποταχθέντων ἢ 
ἀποταχθησομένων κεφαλαίων, ἔχων ἄδειαν αὔξειν καὶ βελτιοῦν αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸν 
ἐνόντα τρόπον· ὁμοίως καὶ ὅσους ἂν προσφέρηται ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ οἱ διάδοχοι αὐτοῦ 
ξένους καὶ τοῦ δημοσίου ἀνεπιγνώστους, καὶ προσκαθήσωσιν ἐκεῖσε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ 
χωρίῳ, ἵνα ἔχωσι καὶ αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Μετὰ δὲ τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ 
καθέξῃ καὶ νεμηθήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ χωρίον μετὰ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ γενησομένης ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ 
αὐξήσεως εἷς τῶν γνησίων παίδων καὶ κληρονόμων αὐτοῦ, ὁ προτιμότερος, καὶ 
τοῦτο γίνηται κατὰ διαδοχὴν εἰς τὸν ἑξῆς ἅπαντα χρόνον, ὀφείλοντος τοῦ 
κατέχοντος αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν. [Ὁμοίως] 
ἐνεφάνισε καὶ ἕτερον ἀργυρόβουλον τοῦ εἰρημένου περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς 
βασιλείας μου, διαλαμβάνον, ὡς ἂν κρατῇ καὶ κεφαλατικεύῃ ὁ εἰρημένος κῦρ 
Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς τὸ κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου μετὰ πάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ 
νομῆς καὶ συνηθείας καὶ περιοχῆς, λαμβάνων κατ’ ἔτος ἐντὸς τοῦ προσοδίου αὐτοῦ 
πάντα τὰ δίκαια τοῦ κεφαλατικίου τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας, τάς τε μείζας καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο 
ὀφείλουσιν οἱ ἔποικοι τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας βασιλικὸν δίκαιον χωρὶς μόνης τῆς τοῦ 
φλωριατικοῦ δόσεως· μετὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ τελευτὴν ἵνα κρατῶσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύωσι 
τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν αὐτοῦ τελευτὴν ἵνα κρατῶσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύωσι τὸ τοιοῦτον 
κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου καὶ οἱ γνήσιοι υἱοὶ αὐτοῦ παρ’ ὅλην αὐτῶν 
τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀναγεγραμμένον τρόπον, ὀφείλοντες ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν 
ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν· καὶ ἐὰν προτελευτήσῃ ὁ ἕτερος αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὁ ζῶν κατέχῃ καὶ 
τὴν τοῦ τεθνεῶτος μερίδα παρ’ ὅλην αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωήν. Ταῦτα δὴ οὖν τὰ ἀργυρόβουλα 
ἐμφανίσας τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου ὁ εἰρημένος κῦρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς παρεκάλεσεν, ἵνα 
πορίσηται καὶ χρυσόβουλον τῆς βασιλείας μου εἰς πλείονα τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀσφάλειαν. Ἡ 
βασιλεία μου οὖν εὐμενῶς τὴν αὐτοῦ παράκλησιν προσδεξαμένη, τὸν 
παρόντα χρυσόβουλλον λόγον ἐπιχωρηγεῖ καὶ ἐπιβραβεύει αὐτῷ, δι’ οὗ εὐδοκεῖ, 
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θεσπίζει πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ διορίζεται, ἵνα τὰ εἰρημένα ἀργυρόβουλλα τοῦ 
περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου ἔχωσι τὸ κύρος, τὸ στέργον καὶ τὸ 
βέβαιον, καὶ κατέχῃ ὁ εἰρημένος οἰκεῖος τῆς βασιλείας μου κῦρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς 
τὸ περὶ τὸ Καστρίον χωρίον τὴν Βρύσιν μετὰ πάντων τῶν εἰσοδημάτων 
αὐτοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἑξαμιλίου δόσεως, ὡς προείρηται, ἔχων ἄδειαν αὔξειν καὶ 
βελτιοῦν αὐτὸ καὶ παραπέμπειν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γνησίους παῖδας ἐπὶ τῷ 
παραπέμπεσθαι καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνων τὸν ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον τρόπον πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν 
κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀδιάκοπον εἰς τὸν ἑξῆς ἅπαντα χρόνον, ὀφειλόντων τῶν ἀεὶ 
κατεχόντων αὐτὸ ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν. Ὁμοίως ἵνα ἔχῃ 
ὁ εἰρημένος κῦρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς τὸ κάστρον 
καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου, λαμβάνων ἐντὸς τοῦ προσοδίου αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ δίκαια 
τοῦ κεφαλατικίου τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας καὶ τὰς μείζας καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ὀφείλουσιν οἱ 
ἔποικοι τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας βασιλικὸν δίκαιον χωρὶς μόνης τῆς τοῦ φλωριατικοῦ 
δόσεως. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ τελευτὴν ἵνα κρατῶσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύωσι τὸ τοιοῦτον 
κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου καὶ οἱ γνήσιοι υἱοὶ αὐτοῦ παρ’ ὅλην αὐτῶν 
τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀναγεγραμμένον τρόπον, ὀφείλοντες ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν 
ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν. τρόπον, ὀφείλοντες ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνήκουσαν 
δουλείαν. Καὶ ὅταν προτελευτήσῃ ὁ ἕτερος αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὁ ζῶν καθέξῃ καὶ τὴν τοῦ 
τεθνεῶτος μερίδα παρ’ ὅλην αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ 
δύναμιν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀργυροβούλλων 
τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου, τοῦ 
πορφυρογεννήτου.  
Τῇ γοῦν ἰσχύι καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγου 
τῆς βασιλείας μου καθέξῃ  
ὁ εἰρημένος κῦρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς τὸ περὶ τὸ Καστρίον χωρίον τὴν Βρύσιν μετὰ 
πάντων τῶν εἰσοδημάτων αὐτοῦ, ἄνευ τῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἑξαμιλίου μόνης δόσεως, ὡς 
προείρηται· ἔχων ἄδειαν αὔξειν καὶ βελτιοῦν αὐτὸ καὶ παραπέμπειν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ 
αὐτοῦ γνησίους παῖδας ἐπὶ τῷ παραπέμπεσθαι καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνων τὸν ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον 
τρόπον πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀδιάκοπον εἰς τὸν ἑξῆς ἅπαντα χρόνον, 
ὀφειλόντων τῶν ἀεὶ κατεχόντων αὐτὸ ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνήκουσαν 
δουλείαν. Ἔτι ἵνα ἔχῃ ὁ εἰρημένος κῦρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς τὸ κάστρον καὶ τὴν 
χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου, λαμβάνων ἐντὸς τοῦ προσοδίου αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τοῦ 
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κεφαλατικίου τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας καὶ τὰς μείζας καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ὀφείλουσιν οἱ ἔποικοι 
τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας βασιλικὸν δίκαιον· χωρὶς μόνης τῆς τοῦ φλωριατικοῦ δόσεως. 
Μετὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ τελευτὴν κρατήσωσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύσωσι τὸ τοιοῦτον κάστρον 
καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου καὶ οἱ γνήσιοι δύο υἱοὶ αὐτοῦ παρ’ ὅλην αὐτῶν τὴν 
ζωὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀναγεγραμμένον τρόπον, ὀφείλοντες ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν 
ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν. Καὶ ὅταν τελευτήσῃ ὁ ἕτερος αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὁ ζῶν κατέχῃ καὶ τὴν 
τοῦ τεθνεῶτος μερίδα παρ’ ὅλην αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ 
δύναμιν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀργυροβούλλων τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας 
μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου. Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων 
δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας 
μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ φλωριατικοῦ δόσεως. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ τελευτὴν 
κρατήσωσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύσωσι τὸ τοιοῦτον κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου 
καὶ οἱ γνήσιοι δύο υἱοὶ αὐτοῦ παρ’ ὅλην αὐτῶν τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀναγεγραμμένον 
τρόπον, ὀφείλοντες ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν. Καὶ ὅταν 
τελευτήσῃ ὁ ἕτερος αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὁ ζῶν κατέχῃ καὶ τὴν τοῦ τεθνεῶτος μερίδα παρ’ 
ὅλην αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ δύναμιν τῶν εἰρημένων 
ἀργυροβούλλων τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου 
δεσπότου τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου. Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν 
ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μῆνα 
Ὀκτώβριον τῆς νῦν ἑβδόμης ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ ἐννακοσιοστοῦ 
τριακοστοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔτους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον 
ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος. 
    ☩ Ἰωάννης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ 
Παλαιολόγος.  
 
Constantine XI’s chrysobull to Ragusa  
 
Zepos 5.603-5.605; Miklosich-Müller 1865:3.228 
 
☩ Ἐπεὶ τὸ εὐγενὲς καὶ περιφανὲς κομούνιον τοῦ Ῥαγουσίου ἐπεδείξατο εὔνοιαν καὶ 
φιλίαν εἰς τοὺς ἡμετέρους ἄρχοντας καὶ ἀνθρώπους κατὰ τοὺς παρελθόντας καιρούς, 
τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν αὐτῶν διερχομένους, δεχόμενον αὐτοὺς μετὰ ἀγάπης καὶ τιμῆς 
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καὶ διαθέσεως καλῆς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα κινηθεῖσα καὶ ἡ βασιλεία μου ὥρισεν, ἵνα, ἐὰν 
ἔλθωσι καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν ἐπὶ τῷ χρῆσθαι ταῖς πραγματείαις αὐτῶν, 
εὐεργετήσωμέν τινα εὐεργεσίαν εἰς τὰ κομμέρκια αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο ἀκουσθὲν εἰς 
αὐτὸ ἀπέστειλεν ἀποκρισιάριον τὸν εὐγενῆ ἄνδρα κῦρ Βόλτζιον ντὲ Μπαλπάλιω, καὶ 
ἐλθὼν ἐζήτησεν, ἵνα δώσωμεν αὐτῷ τόπον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνοικοδομῆσαι λόντζαν καὶ ἔχωσι 
καὶ κόνσουλον ἐν αὐτῇ, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησίαν, ἐὰν θέλωσι, καὶ ἐμμένωσι καὶ ἐξ 
αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα, ὅσοι βούλλονται, καὶ ἔχωσιν ἀφ’ ἡμῶν περίθαλψιν καὶ θεραπείαν 
καὶ συγκατάβασιν εἰς τὰ κομμέρκια αὐτῶν, ἡ βασιλεία μου, καὶ δι’ ἣν πρότερον 
εἶχεν ἀγάπην εἰς τὸ εὐγενὲς καὶ περιφανὲς (κομούνιον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ 
ἀξίωσιν τὴν μετὰ τοῦ ἀποκρισιαρίου αὐτοῦ τὸν παρόντα χρυσόβουλλον λόγον 
ἐπιχορηγεῖ καὶ ἐπιβραβεύει αὐτῷ, δι’ οὗ εὐδοκεῖ, προστάσσει, θεσπίζει καὶ 
διορίζεται, ὅτι εἰς τὸν τόπον, ὅντινα μέλλομεν δοῦναι αὐτῷ, ἀνοιδιορίζεται, ὅτι εἰς 
τὸν τόπον, ὅντινα μέλλομεν δοῦναι αὐτῷ, ἀνοικοδομήσῃ λόντζαν, ἐν ᾗ κόνσουλον 
ἴδιον ἕξει ἐν αὐτῇ, ὃν ἂν ἐκλέγηται, ὥστε κρίνειν τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ πάντας πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους· καὶ ἐὰν ἐγκλητεύσῃ Ῥωμαῖος Ῥαγουζαίῳ χρεωστοῦντι, ὀφείλει 
ἀπέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν φόρον τοῦ ἐγκλητευομένου Ῥαγουζαίου, δηλονότι εἰς τὸν 
Κόνσουλον αὐτοῦ· ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ὁ Ῥαγουζαῖος ὀφείλει ἐνάγων τῷ 
χρεωστοῦντι Ῥωμαίῳ ἀπιέναι εἰς τὸν φόρον αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ῥωμαίου. Ἔτι δὲ 
ἀνοικοδομήσῃ καὶ ἐκκλησίαν, ἐὰν θέλῃ. 
Καὶ διδῶσι καὶ πάντες οἱ πραγματευταὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων κομμερκίων δύο εἰς τὰ 
ἑκατόν, ἐμβάλλοντες καὶ ἐκβάλλοντες πάντες οἱ Ῥαγουζαῖοι πάντα τὰ ἑαυτῶν 
ἐλευθέρως ἄνευ τινὸς ἐμποδισμοῦ, καταβάλλοντες μόνον περὶ τῶν εἰσερχομένων 
αὐτῶν πραγματειῶν, ὅταν ἔρχωνται, δύο εἰς τὰ ἑκατόν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐννοῶνται εἰς 
ἐμβολὴν καὶ ἐκβολήν, καὶ πλέον μὴ ἀπαιτεῖσθαι περὶ ὧν καταβέβληται οὕτω, ὡς 
ἔφημεν, ὀφείλοντες καὶ οἱ κατὰ καιροὺς ἡμέτεροι κομμερκιάριοι λαμβάνειν τὰ 
δύο εἰς τὰ ἑκατόν, εἴτε ἐπ’ ἀγορᾷ ἔχωσι τὴν τοιαύτην δουλείαν τοῦ κομμερκίου, 
εἴτε ἐπὶ τῷ πιστῷ, ὁπόταν ἔρχωνται μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων πραγματειῶν. Καὶ 
κατοικοῦσι καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὅσοι ἐξ αὐτῶν βούλλονται. Ἂν δέ γε συμβῇ Ῥαγουζαῖόν 
τινα χρεωστήσαντα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τῆς πόλεως ἐξιέναι, μήπω τὰ κεχρεωστημένα 
καταβάλλοντα, ἄλλος δὴ διὰ τοῦτo Ῥαγουζαῖος ἀντ’ αὐτοῦ μὴ ἐνεχέσθω, μήτ’ 
ἐνοχλείσθω, σωζομένου δηλαδὴ τούτου, ὡς, ἐὰν ἀπέλθῃ ὁ χρεωστήσας εἰς τὸ 
Ῥαγούζιον ἢ εἰς τοὺς τόπους αὐτοῦ, ἵνα ἐκεῖσε ἀναγκάζηται ὑπὸ τῆς αὐθεντίας 
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αὐτοῦ ἱκανῶσαι τῷ χρεωστουμένῳ Ῥωμαίῳ, ἡνίκα μηνυθῇ τὸ περὶ τούτου πρὸς αὐτὸ 
διὰ γραφῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀρχόντων, πρὸς οὓς ἂν τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβαῖεν ἀνήκειν, ἢ μὴ 
ἱκανώσας ἐμβάλληται εἰς φυλακήν, ἕως οὗ ἀποτίσῃ τὸ οἰκεῖον. χρέος· καὶ τοῦτο 
ἐνέχηται τὸ κομούνιον ποιεῖν, φανερούσης τῆς τοιαύτης γραφῆς τῶν ἡ ἑτέρων 
ἀρχόντων καὶ καθαιρούσης τὸ χρέος ἀληθῶς ἢ καὶ διὰ προσώπου ἐνάγοντος περὶ 
τούτου εἰς τὸ δικαστήθῶς ἢ καὶ διὰ προσώπου ἐνάγοντος περὶ τούτου εἰς τὸ 
δικαστήριον αὐτῶν τῶν Ῥαγουζαίων. 
 Τῇ ἰσχύι γοῦν καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγου τῆς βασιλείας 
μου νεμηθήσεται  
τὸ εἰρημένον εὐγενὲς καὶ περιφανὲς κομούνιον τοῦ Ῥαγουζίου τοῦ ἀνοικοδομῆσαι 
λόντζαν, εἰς ἥντινα ἴδιον κόνσουλον ἕξει, ὃν ἂν ἐκλέγηται, ὥστε κρίνειν 
τοὺς (ἑαυτοῦ πάντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Ἔτι δὲ ἀνοικομήσῃ καὶ ἐκκλησίαν, ἐὰν θέλῃ. 
Καὶ διδῶσι καὶ πάντες οἱ πραγματευταὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων κομμερκίων δύο εἰς τὰ 
ἑκατόν, ἐμβάλλοντες καὶ ἐκβάλλοντες πάντες οἱ Ῥαγουζαῖοι πάντα τὰ ἑαυτῶν 
ἐλευθέρως ἄνευ τινὸς ἐμποδισμοῦ, καταβάλλοντες μόνον περὶ τῶν εἰσερχομένων 
αὐτῶν πραγματειῶν, ὅταν ἔρχωνται, δύο εἰς τὰ ἑκατόν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐννοῶνται εἰς 
ἐμβολὴν καὶ ἐκβολήν, καὶ πλέον μὴ ἀπαιτείσθω περὶ ὧν καταβέβληται οὕτως, 
ὡς ἔφημεν, ὀφείλοντες καὶ οἱ κατὰ καιροὺς ἡμέτεροι κομμερκιάριοι λαμβάνειν 
τὰ δύο εἰς τὰ ἑκατόν, εἴτε ἐπ’ ἀγορᾷ ἔχωσι τὴν τοιαύτην δουλείαν τοῦ 
κουμμερκίου, εἴτε ἐπὶ τῷ πιστῷ, ὁπόταν ἔρχωνται μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων πραγματειῶν. 
Καὶ κατοικοῦσι καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὅσοι ἐξ αὐτῶν βούλονται. Ὁμοίως τὲ ἕξει καὶ τὰ 
λοιπά, ὡς ἀνωτέρω πλατύτερον διαλαμβάνεται. Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτου δήλωσιν καὶ 
ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, 
ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μῆνα Ἰούνιον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης ἰνδικτιῶνος τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτης 
τοῦ ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ ἐννακοσιοστοῦ πεντηκοστοῦ ἐννάτου ἔτους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ 
ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος ☩. 
Κωνσταντῖνος ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ 
Παλαιολόγος 
 
Manuel II’s Chrysobull to Monemvasia 
 
Lampros 122-123 




Ἡ βασιλεία μου ἀποδεχομένη καὶ ἔχουσα θέλημα, ἵνα ἡ ἁγιω-  τάτη μητρόπολις 
Μονεμβασίας κατέχῃ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Ἑλικοβουνοῦ ὁλοτελῶς καὶ ὁλοκλήρως εἰς τὸ 
ποιεῖν τοὺς κατὰ καιρὸν ταύτης ἀρχιερατικῶς προστατεύοντας λειτουργίας δύο καθ’ 
ἑκάστην ἑβδομάδα, ἐν ταῖς τῆς Τετράδος καὶ τοῦ Σαββάτου ἡμέραις, ὑπὲρ 
τῶν  ψυχῶν τῶν ἐκεῖσε ταφέντων παίδων τῆς βασιλείας μου, ὡς καὶ ὁ νῦν ἱερώτατος 
μητροπολίτης Μονεμβασίας ὑπέρτιμος καὶ ἔξαρχος πάσης Πελοποννήσου κύριος 
Ἀκάκιος ἔταξε κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν τοῦ 
ἐπὶ τούτῳ προβάντος ἀργυροβούλλου τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας 
μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου, τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου κυροῦ Θεοδώρου τοῦ 
Παλαιολόγου, ἐπιχορηγεῖ αὐτῇ ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπιβραβεύει τὸν παρόντα 
χρυσόβουλλον λόγον αὑτῆς, δι’ οὗ 
εὐδοκεῖ, προστάσσει, θεσπίζει καὶ διορίζεται, ἵνα τὸ εἰρημένον ἀργυρόβουλλον τοῦ 
περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου τοῦ 
Πορφυρογεννήτου, ἔχῃ τὸ στέργον,  τὸ κῦρος καὶ βέβαιον, καὶ κατέχῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν 
καὶ εἰς τὸ ἑξῆς ἡ ἁγιωτάτη μητρόπολις Μονεμβασίας τὴν εἰρημένην χώραν τοῦ 
Ἑλικοβουνοῦ μετὰ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ πύργου καὶ πάσης τῆς περιοχῆς αὐτῆς ἀναφαιρέτως 
καὶ ἀναποσπάστως κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ  ἰσχὺν καὶ δύναμιν τοῦ εἰρημένου 
ἀργυροβούλλου καὶ καθὼς εὐλόγως δικαιοῦται ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, μὴ εὑρίσκουσα χάριν 
τούτου τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἐπήρειαν, ὀφειλόντων τῶν κατὰ καιροὺς ἀρχιερατικῶς 
προϊσταμένων τῆς τοιαύτης μητροπόλεως ἐκτελεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν καθ’ ἑκάστην 
ἑβδομάδα δι’ ὅλου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐν ταῖς τῆς Τετράδος καὶ τοῦ Σαββάτου ἡμέραις 
λειτουργίας δύο διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀνελλιπῶς ὑπὲρ  τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἐκεῖσε ταφέντων 
παίδων τῆς βασιλείας μου, καθὼς καὶ ὁ νῦν ἱερώτατος μητροπολίτης τῆς αὐτῆς 
ἐκκλησίας, ὑπέρτιμος καὶ ἔξαρχος πάσης Πελοποννήσου κύριος Ἀκάκιος ἔταξε 
τοῦτο ἀπαύστως ποιεῖν. 
 Τῇ γοῦν ἰσχύι καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγου  τῆς βασιλείας 
μου ἕξει ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἑξῆς τὸ εἰρημένον ἀργυρόβουλλον τοῦ περιποθήτου 
αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου 
κυροῦ Θεοδώρου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου τὸ στέργον, τὸ κῦρος καὶ βέβαιον, καὶ καθέξει ἡ 
δηλωθεῖσα ἁγιωτάτη μητρόπολις Μονεμβασίας τὴν εἰρημένην  χώραν τοῦ 
Ἑλικοβουνοῦ μετὰ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ πύργου καὶ πάσης τῆς περιοχῆς αὐτῆς ἀναφαιρέτως 
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καὶ ἀναποσπάστως κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ δύναμιν τοῦ εἰρημένου 
ἀργυροβούλλου καὶ καθὼς εὐλόγως δικαιοῦται ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, μὴ εὑρίσκουσα χάριν 
τούτου τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἐπήρειαν, ὀφειλόντων τῶν κατὰ καιροὺς ἀρχιερατι-  
κῶς προϊσταμένων τῆς τοιαύτης μητροπόλεως ἐκτελεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν καθ’ ἑκάστην 
ἑβδομάδα δι’ ὅλου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐν ταῖς τῆς Τετράδος καὶ τοῦ Σαββάτου ἡμέραις 
λειτουργίας δύο διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀνελλιπῶς ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἐκεῖσε ταφέντων 
παίδων τῆς βασιλείας μου, καθὼς καὶ ὁ νῦν ἱερώτατος μητροπολίτης τῆς αὐτῆς 
ἐκκλησίας,  ὑπέρτιμος καὶ ἔξαρχος πάσης Πελοποννήσου κύριος Ἀκάκιος ἔταξε 
τοῦτο ἀπαύστως ποιεῖν. Τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος 
τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μῆνα Σεπτέμβριον τῆς ἐνισταμένης 
τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτης ἰδικτιῶνος τοῦ ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ ἐννακοσιοστοῦ 
τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτου ἔτους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον 
ὑπεσημάνατο κράτος. 
 
Μανουὴλ ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ 














THE UNUSUAL MENOLOGEM IN THE FLORENTINE 
PROSTAGMATA AND THEIR COMPARISON WITH 




Joannes VIII’s Commercial chrysobull to Florence 
 Müller 174-177; Lampros. 338-344 
Εἰς οὖν τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τοὺς προρρηθέντας ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρας, 
τόν τε ἐσόμενον κατὰ διαδοχὴν τῆς δικαιοσύνης σημαιοφόρον καὶ τοὺς πρώτους τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ὁ 
παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς αὐτοῖς κατὰ μῆνα Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν 
τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ ἐννακοσιοστοῦ τεσσαρακοστοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔτους, 
ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος. ☩ 
☩ Ἰωάννης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος. ☩ 
 
Joannes VIII’s Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters to Florence 
Müller 172-174, 121; Lampros 335-338 
Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τοὺς περιφανεῖς καὶ προειρημένους 
ἄρχοντας, τόν τε σημαιοφόρον τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοὺς πρώτους τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν πρὸς 
πᾶσαν τὴν μεγαλοπρεπῆ πόλιν καὶ κοινότητα τῆς Φλωρεντίας καὶ ὁ παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς 
βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μῆνα Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης βʹ ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ 
ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ ἐννακοσιοστοῦ τεσσαρακοστοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔτους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ 
θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος. ☩ 
☩ Ἰωάννης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος. ☩ 
 
Joannes VIII’s Prostagma to Giacomo de’ Morelli 
Lampros 345-352  
Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν εἰρημένον εὐγενῆ ἄνδρα Ἰάκωβον 
Ἰωάννου Παύλου Ντεμορέλης, τὸ παρὸν τῆς βασιλείας μου πρόσταγμα, ἀπολυθὲν κατὰ μῆνα 
Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ ἐννακοσιοστοῦ 
τεσσαρακοστοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔτους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο 
κράτος· ἐπιτεθείσης καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας συνήθους καὶ βασιλικῆς βούλλης.  
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☩ Μηνὶ Αὐγούστου ἰνδικτιῶνος βʹ ☩ 
 
John VIII’s prostagma to Michele Fedini 
Lampros 345-352  
Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσινκαὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν εἰρημένον εὐγενῆ ἄνδρα 
Βρακάντιον Μιχαὴλ Φεηδίνης τὸ παρὸν τῆς βασιλείας μου πρόσταγμα, ἀπολυθὲν κατὰ μῆνα 
Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ ἐννακοσιοστοῦ 
τεσσαρακοστοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔτους, ἐν ᾦ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο 
κράτος, ἐπιτεθείσης καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας συνήθους καὶ βασιλικῆς βούλλης  
☩ Μηνὶ Αὐγούστου ἰνδικτιῶνος βʹ ☩ 
 
John VIII’s Chrysobull to Plethon 
Lampros 331-333 
Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς 
βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μῆνα Ὀκτώβριον τῆς νῦν ἑβδόμης ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ 
ἐννακοσιοστοῦ τριακοστοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔτους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον 
ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος. 
☩ Ἰωάννης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος. 
 
John VIII’s prostagma to Lavra monastery 
A. Guillou, P. Lemerle, D. Papachryssanthou, and N. Svoronos, Actes de Lavra. III. De 1329 à 
1500 [Archives de l'Athos VIII. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1979]: 187 
Εἰς γὰρ ἀσφάλειαν αὐτῆς ἐγένετο καὶ τὸ παρὸν πρόσταγμα τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἐν ἔτει 
͵ϛῶ ϡῶ πεντηκοστῶ τετάρτω 
ΜΗ(ΝΙ) ὈΚΤΩΒ(ΡΙ)ΟΥ (ἸΝΔΙΚΤΙΩΝΟΣ) Θʹ ☩ 
 
John VIII’s prostagma to Lavra monastery  
A. Guillou, P. Lemerle, D. Papachryssanthou, and N. Svoronos, Actes de Lavra. III. De 1329 à 
1500 [Archives de l'Athos VIII. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1979]: 178-179 
Τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἐγένετο αὐτ(οῖς) (καὶ) τὸ παρ(ὸν) τ(ῆς) βασιλ(είας) μου πρόσταγμα, ἀπολυθ(ὲν) τῆ 
τετάρτη  
☩ ΜΗ(ΝΙ) ΔΕΚΕ(ΜΒ)Ρ(ΙΩ) (ἸΝΔΙΚΤΙΩΝΟΣ) Ζʹ ☩ 
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Manuel II’s prostagma to Lavra monastery  
A. Guillou, P. Lemerle, D. Papachryssanthou, and N. Svoronos, Actes de Lavra. III. De 1329 à 
1500 [Archives de l'Athos VIII. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1979]: 142 
Τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἐγένετο καὶ τὸ παρὸν τῆς βασιλεί(ας) μου πρόσταγμα ἐν ἔτει ἑξακισχιλιοστῶ 
ἐνακοσιοστῶ τρισκαιδεκάτω, ἀπολυθ(ὲν) τῆ κεʹ (30) 
ΜΗΝΙ ΜΑΙΩ (ΙΝΔΙΚΤΙΩΝΟΣ) ΙΓʹ ☩ 
 
Manuel II’s prostagma to Iviron monastery  
V. Kravari, J. Lefort, H. Métrévéli, N. Oikonomidès, and D. Papachryssanthou, Actes d'Iviron III. De 
1328 au début du XVIe siècle [Archives de l'Athos XVIII. Paris: Édition du CNRS P. Lethielleux, 
1995]: 164 
Ποίησον δὲ κ(αὶ) σὺ ἕτερον γράμμα τῆ τοιαύτη μονῆ εἰς δήλωσιν τῆς τοιαύτης ὑποθέσε(ως), ὅπως 
παρηκολούθησ(εν) ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς μέχρ(ι) τέλους. Ἀπελύθη τῆ (π̣ρ̣ώ̣)τ̣η. 
ΜΗΝ(Ὶ) ἸΟΥΝ(ΊΩ) (ἸΝΔΙΚΤΙΩ̃ΝΟΣ) ΙΔʹ 
 
Manuel II’s prostagma to Dyonisos monastery  
N. Oikonomidès, Actes de Dionysiou [Archives de l'Athos IV. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1968]: 91 
Τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἐγένετο καὶ τὸ παρὸν πρόσταγμα τῆς βασιλεί(ας) μου ἐν ἔτει ἑξακισχιλιοστῶ 
ἐννακοσιοστῶ εἰκοστῶ τρίτω ἀπολυθ(ὲν) τῆ κῆ 
















Unpublished primary sources 
from 1450 to 1481 
 
 
Symbols only used in this appendix.  
Omissis = impossible to read/damaged 
Italics = texts in Italics are summaries of longer texts  
Ind. = Indictio/Indiction. 
 
Brief description of the sources used 
 
ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 
Letters sent from the Florentine Signoria to foreign powers. The documents are all 
preserved in microfilms and ordered in progressive numbers. Therefore, no recto or 
verso is necessary. 
ASF, Legazioni e Comissarie 
The instructions sent by the Signoria to the ambassadors and the reports written by 
them to Florence. 
ASF, Responsive Copiari I/II 
The letters received by the Florentine Signoria from foreign powers or private 
individuals. The division between I and II is strictly chronological.  
ASF, Consulte e Pratiche 
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The discussions among the most prominent citizens of the Florentine Signoria on 
matters of paramount importance such as the relations with the Ottomans, the pope, 
the policies to enact with regard to internal and external events. 
ASF, Signori, Dieci di balìa, Otto di pratica, Missive 
Miscellanea of documents which include letters sent, received, reports of 
ambassadors etc. 
ASF, Manoscritti 117 
This manuscript was written by an anonymous Priorista and describes events year 
per year. 
ASF, Mercanzia 
Documents about commerce such as accomandita, dispute etc. 
ASF, Signori, Risposte verbali di oratori 
These registers contain the responses given by the Florentine Signoria to embassies 
coming from foreign powers. 
ASF, Signori, Minutari 
First draft of a letter than later was copied into the official register of “Signori 
Missive I or II Cancelleria”. 
ASF, Provvisioni 
These registers contain the provisions of the Florentine Commune in the moment 












Legazioni e Commissarie 13  
8-10 
Commissione a Giannozzo di Bernardo Manetti 
Ad Aragona 
Giannozzo Manetti needs to preserve the peace with the king of Aragon and to obtain 
the return of the wares stolen from Florentine merchants who are Giannozzo 




Manoscritti 117  
18v-19r 
1451: Prese in quell’anno il Gonf. Bernardo di Uguccione Lippi. Ed in quel tempo 
passarono in Firenze ambasciatori di Costantino Paleologo Imperatore di 
Costantinopoli e quelli andavano a Roma e fecero reverenza alla Signoria in quel che 
potesse aiutare l’Imperio Costantinopolitano contro la potenza dei Turchi e riferirono 
come l’Imperatore suo Signore era stato richiesto da Veneziani a licenziare le … nel 
imperio suo, i mercatanti Fiorentini ma che egli capendo le cortesie usate dalla 
Repubblica all’Imperatore Giovanni suo fratello quando si trovò in Firenze al tempo 
di Eugenio IV e l’Unione delle Chiese non gli l’ha voluto in alcun modo 
acconsentire. I medesimi sentii che i Veneziani avevano fatto in Ragugia e che 
avevano avuto la medesima risposta. 
3 
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Noi abbiamo avuto notizia come addi del presente mese fu deliberata licenza a tutti i 
Fiorentini come debbino levare ogni loro cosa di ciascuno loro terra. Giacomo 
Manetti should impede the above from happening.  
 
4 
Legazioni e Commissarie 13  
36 
Giannozzo Manetti 
Iunii s. a. (1451?) 
Ti abbiamo raccomandato la causa delli mercatanti e così omissis che nuove è avviso 
della remata di Levante della maestà del Re omissis. 
 
5 





Safe conduct valid for two years to all Florentine merchants termine non di meno e 





Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
160 
A Leandro omissis 
Florence sends a courier who carries letters for the pope. The letters contain the 
Signoria’s request for the safe conduct in full form to Bernardo di Masi and 
Dietisalvi Neroni who currently are travelling to Rome. Poi a Napoli che 
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desideriamo che questo fate che rechi velocemente qua quindi si rapido ad ottenere il 
salvacondotto e quando ce l’hai spediscilo con tutta fretta per la via che ti diranno 
Bernardo de Medici e Dietisalvi di Nerone. Gli ambasciatori Veneziani arrivano piú 
presto che speravamo. Sicche sollecitare il salvacondotto. Hora bisogna con 
prestezza sabbia et pertanto sollecitelo e mandalo come diciamo.  
Florentia Octobri 1454 die 14. 
7 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
183-184 
Ai Veneti 
The Venetian galleys captured some boats in their route to Chios. In these ships 
there are wares which belong to Florentine merchants. The Florentine Commune 
decided to send Giovanni de Pillis to recover the stolen wares. 
Firenze 






Prese il Gonf. Bernadetto de Medici ed il Papa mandò a Firenze magnifico Giovanni 
da Napoli e con Principi Cristiani acciochè pigliassero l’armi contro il Turco. 
 
9 
Responsive e Copiari  1  
15v-16r 
10 Februarii 1455  
Florentine datation: 10 Februarii 1454 
Re d’Aragona 
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Gherardi Gambacorta Battista Arnolfi Jacopi de omissis Ormanni de Albizzi erga 
nos omissis statum gravem et amplissima extisimte cupimus eas omnes in tanto et 
tam … (the above names are all Florentines exiled who are currently living in the 
Aragonese court). 
10 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40 
234-235 
Provvisoribus gabellarum civitatis Pisarum 
Per i capitoli della pace bisogna levare le gabelle alle navi Catalane abbiamo inteso 
che il re di Aragona farà lo stesso nel suo reame. omissis  
Aprile 1455 
11 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
237 
Re d’Aragona   
The letter relates to the sign of the peace (Lodi’s peace). 
10 aprile 1455 
12 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
257 
Ianua  
Retulerunt nobis gabelle salis que eum quedam novis omissis sole ad earum 
requisitionem veniret in Portus Pisanum de mandato dominis actianis nostre dicta 
navis Ianua deducta est cum nulla iusta at honesta causa sive ea retinere debiant 
omissis licentiam omissis dicte navis ut in Portum Pisanum per ut omissis cum dicto 
sale venire possint ut nostrorum in ea mercatarum  satisfactio omissis. 
13 Maii s.a. (1455)  
13 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
259 
Ianua 
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The pope sent some galleys to Porto Pisano for an expedition against the Turks. 
Florence communicated to Genoa that “velit vestri onem honestum virorum illi 
imparturi”. 
16 Maii (1455) s. a.  
14 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40 
267 
Ianua  
Florence asks Genoa to stop every attack against the Catalans due to the collateral 
damage produced in Porto Pisano. 
Iunii 1455 Firenze 
15 
Responsive Copiari 1  
21-22 
1 Iulii 1455 ind. II  
Re d’Aragona 
A certain Giovanni Navarro, Catalan merchant, “protectior vestris portu requies 
fecerunt res ob suis componeret ac cum quadam barca multa bona fatis ardue suma in 
caricatarum pisanes transferret venuti sibi omissis”. The letter carries on about some 
episodes of the naval war between Naples and Genoa that produced some troubles in 
Porto Pisano.  
16 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
280-281 
Ianuensibus 
Sed regi Aragone galere non nulla danno ferrant Januensibus in portu nostro Pisano 
non id moleste ferantur. Florence wrote to Alphonse V ut quia portum nostrorum 
tuctum eiusdem in eunde et redeunde. Digneretur mandare suis et aliquis in portu 
nostro Ianuensem capere auto spoliare vellem. Quod sua omissis novis liberalitatem 
concessi  mandaris suis classi que cuncta Portum Pisanum nec omissis ut naves et res 
Januensium. 
3 Iulii 1455. 
17 
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Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
290-291 
Re d’Aragona  
Bernardo di Ugucciano owned a boat which was assaulted near Corefice (Corfu). 
The boat carried a cargo of wheat. 
21 Iulii 1455  
18 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40 
311-12 
Ianua  
Luca de Caponibus et sociorum mercatorum ad civium nostrorum dum partente ad 
portum nostrorum dum gerentur eris hic fuisse et esse omissis qua re non possumus 
non mirari et visti nobis nec simile omissis et preterea comperitum quo omnibus que 
navigia vestra que navi quod applicant portui nostro vigore humane et fama com 
gratia recipiuntur nec leduntur nec retuntur a nobis quisquam aliquis omissis et causa 
sit facendi sub re omissis vidicentur omissis ut respicientes ab officio omissis 
caritatis vestra pervidere ac mandere velint ut barcas omissis mercaturum nostrorum 
et quem illus vehementer libere ac celeriter expeditisse quo nec suum ad portum 
nostrum facere possint et suscipient mercatores nostrum fructum habemus populus 
nostro frumento uti possit omissis. 
Octobri 1455. 
19 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
312 
Genoa  
Antonius Januense omissis et civitate vestri omissis Simonis dal Campo Pisani civis 
et Synon in Portu Pisanus venturum expectebat ut costitutum erant pertinens per 
Januam eam divertur omissis. 
Sine data. 
20 
Responsive Copiari  I  
23-24 
1455 Octobri 10 




The Turks are a problem and Florence must contribute to the solution... The pope 






Prese il Gonfalone Daniele Canigiani e in quel tempo venne una d’una lettera scritta 
al Pontefice dal Cardinale di S. Angelo, suo legato in Ungheria sulla vittoria avuta 
dagli Ungari contro Maometto Imperatore de’ Turchi. 
22 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40  
358 
Arcivescovo Ragusa 
The letter mentions a possible business concerning wheat. The pope gave is 
agreement. 
15 Februarii 1456 
Florentine datation: 15 Februarii 1455. 
23 
Consulte e Pratiche 54 
1v-3v  
Marcii 1456 
Inteso le lettere da Roma e da Napoli prima si dice intero alla richiesta che fa la 
maestà del re del fatto di Batista (Cerchi) che la si abbi prima notitia commetta 
questo caso a 6 della Mercatantia che vogliano la Signoria contenta che si dice un 
favore di quelli del Vigna et anchora il caso del omissis Come quelli di Biliotto et 
che per loro s’intenda quello che ne vole ragione et che omissis et di loro pareri et 
giudizio fanno rapporto alla Signoria. Come dissi ambasciatori che appresso la 
maestà del re dell aver dato favore allo accordo del omissis nostro ambasciatore da 
Napoli il quale è bene informato del danno che fu fatto nel tempo della pace a nostri 
mercatanti si scriva che ci parli alla maestà del re et che ci possi consegnare quello 
che la sua maestà permise ad altri mercatanti omissis. 




Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
397-399 
Provvisori gabellarum  
I nostri mercatanti dovevano godere di un  beneficio per la rimozione di certe gabelle 
del re di Aragona se noi avremmo rimosso la gabella di 4 per lira ai mercanti 
Catalani. La maestà del re afferma non solamente avere cavate le gabelle poste per i 
suoi regni ma ancora ha provveduto et così dice che la gabella di denari 4 per lira si 
riscuote insino che a nostri mercatanti che già furono danneggiati da sue navi sia 
interamente satisfatto come per dette lettere scripte a Pozzuoli omissis passato 
chiaramente omissis e considerando ancora che le lettere che decta gabella non si 
riscuotessi fu falsa e fine che ne recavi delle omissis non fussino aggravati di dette 
gabelle e restante la cagiona debba cessare l’effetto omissis et che nostri mercatanti 
danneggiati siano restituiti nel primo stato omissis che decta gabella si riscuota 
havendo ad notizia che si riscuota nei luoghi della maestà del re et per loro cose che 
fussono condotte nella nostra iurisdictione e non per que che si trovano omissis. 
21 Maii 1456 
25 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
417 
Principi Tarentino  
Giannozzo Salviati was captured and robbed by the Prince of Taranto’s men nearby 
Cyprus. The boat was owned by Bernardo Salviati. The letter also mentioned that 
Bernardo Salviati had certain business in Rhodes but does not mention which ones. 
16 Iulii 1456 
26 
Responsive e Copiari 1 
39v-41v 
A rege Aragonum  
2 Septembrii1456 
Cum littere vestre adventum ambasciatori super satisfaciendo debito magnifici atque 
dilecti filii nostri Johannis Antonii de Foxa consiliari et degnum civis nostri dilecti 
per vestram excelsam communitate serenitate nostra destinandi significarent hoc 
equitate quadam extulumus et expectavamus donec vidivimus eam aliter subscripse 
litteras quas vestras ab asperibus discrepassa ita ut cum istius debiti satisfactio 
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quemadmodum experimento comprobamus in longum protrahatur nullius quadam 
versus ordo ad eadem satisfactionem probeatur compulsi quidem non mediocritatem 
affidavis eiusdem Johannes Antonii querimoniis efficere non possumus quin eidem 
Johanni Antonio rectam itaque equitatem in se continentem petenti sui huiusmodi 
debiti satisfactio vestre denegari possit presentiam cum nobis ipsis consideramus 
illum sub fide vestri salvoconductus omissis Quo id capitula inter nos set vestram 
huiusmodi comitatem in omissis habito respectu captum fuisse atque depredatum sed 
omissis qui semper in rebus istis vestras procedere consuevimus habeantes omissis 
respectum ad conservandi amicitia nostra que ad iustitie rigorem scribendum quam 
ut omissis fortissime percepimus posset atque deberet ad executionem et 
satisfactionem istius debiti per nos procedi volumus equitate quadem iterato nobis 
rescribere ut morem vos conosceturus. Rogantes requirentes et exhortantes omissis ut 
omni opere finem querimoniis istis imponat eo modo quo prefatus Johannes Antonio 
dedisto suo debito a nobis habeat satisfactionem. Alioquin vos reddimus certiores 
procedemus et procedi faciemus super huiusmodi satisfactione eas remediis debiti set 
giuridici et in similibus introductis fatis quidem moleste facente ferentes si eo modo 
fieri habeat et defide vestre et etiam illustrissime duce Mediolani publice disputari 
quem novimus egredisse fidem atuqe promissionem suam eidem Johanni Antonio 
pollicitam fuisse per omissis sita rerum zelatum et custoditum et ne negotium 
huiusmodi ulterioribus dilationibus involveratur etiam viginti quinque dues suo 
silentio et novitate aliqua pretexerebimus ut infra huia satisfactioni provvideatis. 
Quibus elapses nihil aliud quandam ereditionem per nos modo predicto omissis in re 
iste speretis. 
27 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria  40 
446 
Venetis  
A Florentine ship while it was travelling toward Chios was captured by Venetians 
galleys. The Signoria asked the Venetians to return the wares. 
30 Octobrii 1456  
1457 
28 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
13 
Fratri Puccio  
Sed hec pauca noluimus siluisse quondam mercatores illi nostri domini ex tunc facti 
sunt mercatanti Et rerum quando securitatem super illis illis imposuerunt. Et si 
potuissent suspiceri quandam “Aragona and Genova” dissidie tunc essent, numquam 
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se in villa securitate implicuissent. Summa nos est omissis dictatum in quibus 
securitas interposita est et de quia indictio nostre deberrent confermari. Committimus 
igitur e vestra rem et negotia mercatorum nostrorum erogamus et creavimus 
plurimam ut ipse fervor velut eorum quod indemnitati perspicere 
7 Ianuarii 1457 
Florentine datation : 7 Ianuarii 1456 
29 
Responsive e Copiari 1 
44v-45r 
A Rege Aragone  
18 Ianuarii 1457 
Florentine calendar: 18 Ianuarii 1456 
On the matter of Giovanni Antonio da Fossa (alias Fuscia) Giuliano de Ridolfis 
orator vester ad nos venit publica auctoritate et facultate cognitionem e decisionem 
cause et queralum eiusdem Ioannes Antonii in nostro nomibus commitens omissis 
decervimus declaramur et sententiamus eandem vestram communitatem debitrice 
esse eidem Ioanni Antonii in ducatis milletrecentis et ambo mille trecentis vide lice 
pro conductione et exactione. Reliquis vero pro centum quinquaginta ducatis otto 
equi set alius rebus quo plurimi eidem Ioanni Antonii tempore captionis abbatio 
quam quidem pecuniarum summam integram et absque diminutione vestrem 
comunitatem omissis mensem februaro proximo venturo solvere et satisfecere 
teneatur. 
30 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
32-35 
Duci e officiali di Balia Ianua 
Quod ut regno triremes in porto nostro omissis trireme ille quidem molestissime 
fuere impedirunt eunim omissis ponitum omissis spoliaverunt navigia, que onusta 
mercaturus ut pertebant omissis nostro omissis Que cum ita sint, pro comperto 
debente quidem sic occupantibus portum nostroum necque favores nec sbdusidie 
auto opportunitate illes accondissevimus presertim quando fiere illa intelligeremus 
quietem et statum. 
12 Marcii 1457 
Florentine calendar: 12 Marcii 1456 
31 
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Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
37-38 
Genova  
A certain Giustino Barbarossa stopped a boat owned by Filippo di Rainiero and 
Pietro de Nerettis full of wheat which were supposed to come to Porto Pisano. 
Florence asked for the restitution of the wheat.  
24 Marcii 1457  
Florentine calendar: 24 Marcii 1456. 
32 
Responsive Copiari 1  
47r-48v 
1457 27 Marcii 
Alfonso d’Aragona 
The pope had ordered that Florence needs to return the possessions which belongs 
to Gambacorta e Antonio de Pisaurus consiliaris nostri  
33 
Legazioni e Commissarie 14 
77-81 
Florence insisted on the wares robbed from Salviati. Paolo Orsini, captain of the 
Prince of Taranto’s galleys is the responsible of the robbery. 
Marcii s.d. 1457 
34 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
41-42 
Regi Aragone  
Perfecture omissis sint nuper triremes civitatis ac mercatoribus nostros ad partes 
Orientales omissis ad insulas Sicilie et omissis Nam ipsa nos et mea ut presente 
perspicit et humanitate sua tuetur tenenti ut qui cum suis essent triremibus illis 
vehescentur tum homines tum mercatorem et res manere secentibus tenantur 
Maiestatem vestram rogatam e omissis per ob secretum facimus ut triremibus ipsis et 
hominibus ac mercatores et bonis omnibus que in illis veherentur pubblica fides et 
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salvoconducto in forma liberi et ampla conceditur. Quod singularis hec gratie 
omissis. 
1 Aprilii 1457 
35 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
41-45 
Regi Aragona  
Nonnulli e mercatoribus subiectis maiestas vestra qui suis negotiantur omissis quibus 
requirimur et renoveamus illud vectigalia 100 per libra quod imposueramus 
mercatores que ad nos de regno afferentur per satisfactione mercatorem nostre 
omissis bona et res a navi omissis vestre fuerant discepte et expudentes igitur huius 
ipsis debita sempre cum omissis ac devotione omissis dictam quod vectigalia ipsum 
omissis a nobis impositam fuisset nisi maiestam vestram eis consensum habuissemus 
omissis quem non putavamus subiectos illos maiestatis vestri longe fore refragantur 
omissis perfectum eum notum si illus etiam omissis vestre celsitudine annuisse idem 
per vectigalia certa die id cause omissis de integro poneretur et exigeretur post 
omissis et impetramente a dignis tale maiestate vestre spectabile Bernardo de 
Medicis oratore quia stimamus in hac quidem tamquam in re iuste et in principi 
iustissime ac cessa erit dedimus operam omissis quantitas pecunia que omissis 
intentiamus maiestatis vestri omissis causis et omissis quod efferetur spoliatis 
insuper aliqui et e damno illo per ipsis quare supplicemus humiliter maiestatem 
vestram. Si quod semel et integra de sua begnignitate ac iustitia adresse ut ferme et 
ad effecturum per dicti peniteret iubere nam sic ad modo in alia parte per mercatores 
reficiuntur ad modum per vidimus maiestatem vestram que iustitia semper coluit nec 
mirare effectu complere et mercatores nostres omissis.  
10 Aprilii 1457 
36 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
Giovanni Filippo da Fusta 
The Signoria wrote that the corsair Antonio de Montealto should not attack the 
Florentines. However, an attack apparently occurred on 21 of this month. The 
corsair entered in Pisa and assaulted a boat while the latter was unloading wines 
and clothes. This attack damaged Florence and the Signoria asked to stop these 
attacks.  
25 Aprilii 1457 
 
37 
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Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
47-48 
Domino Bosnie et Serbie  
We have received your ambassador postulata sunt de vectigalibus tollendus per 
nonnullus mercator et illu conducentis omissis illustrissimus princips non plene 
potuessemus nam nimium libenter fecissemus quando more gerere vestre omissis sed 
constitutiones rei aliquo pacto permittunt ut ab ordinationem sua vectigalia illa 
queant demovere. 
28 Aprilii 1457 
38 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
68-69 
Principi Tarentino  
Albertazzi di Neri del Bene and “partners” were robbed. Moreover, their ships were 
captured by Pietro Pendere from Brindisi. Florence asks for a monetary 
compensation. 
2 Maii 1457. 
39 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
59 
Ragusa  
The Signoria reported that due to the decision of Cosimo the Elder, Florence had 
sent Gerardo de Pillis, counsellor of Bartolomeo son of Paolo, for certain 
negotiations. Florence recommends this Bartolomeo to the sovereigns of Ragusa.  
14 Maii 1457 
40 
Responsive Copiari 1  
49v-50r 
Aragona 
Alphonse V complained about the tax on the wares. Pacis ductum ius tolli fecerunt 
provideam quo pro capitula pace servare facere antedictis subdictis nostros et 
salvoconductus omnes per vos eos concessos. Et si ob id lesi sunt in pristinum statum 
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reducentur indemnes quod ubi fecentis iustitie primum: deinceps per voluntati nostre 
satisfactio quod vestro satisfactio sicut eam nobis pollicemur. Nos cadent et rerum 
ferum subdicti vestri experare volentes que iustitiam omnium reperabarunt. 
14 maii 1457  
41 
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76-77 
Venetis  
Andrea Nicola de Alleis is the owner of a ship which was returning from the Levant 
on November. The ship was intercepted and captured towards Lesina in Sclavonia by 
your [Venetian] galleys which were coming from Candia. They captured wares 
whom belong to Pietro and Giacomo de’ Pazzi. Ut autem cives recuperent et vendent 
et constituerem huic negocii Filippo in Ghiandam exhibituram. Florence asked back 
the wares. 
21 Maii 1457. 
42 
Legazioni e commissarie 14 
89-101 
Diplomatic instruction given to Antonio di Bartolomeo Masi. He has to go to 
Bernardo da Villa (Bernat Villamari) supreme commander of Alphonse V’s galleys. 
The ambassador has to ask for a safe conduct. Moreover, Antonio has to demand 
compensation for the damages produced by the Aragonese to the Florentine galleys 
which were bringing wheat and food.  
Maii 1457  
43 
Legazioni e commissarie 14 
89-101  
Commissione ad Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi ambasciatore presso il Santo Padre e 
alla maestà del re d’Aragona 
Supplicherai ancora alla Santità sua che si degni di concedere salvacondotto a nostre 
fuste et mercanti che anderanno in Levante et a Costantinopoli et a loro viaggi in 
forma piena e non dubiti la Santità sua che nostre fuste non hanno a aspotare arma e 
come che diano subsidio da combattere a Turchi che prima vorremo morire.  
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82-83 
Regi Aragone 
Florence requested from the Aragonese king [Alphonse V] to provide for the 
damages made by the Aragonese Galleys to the Leghorn seaport. Furthermore, the 
Signoria asks for the safe conduct since “ancora non se ne avuto risposta”. The letter 
also contains another complaint for the wares lost by Salviati in Cyprus.  
Maii 1457. 
45 
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83-84 
Regi Aragone 
Pro triremibus nostris intere advente facentibus petivimus fidem publicam nam quia 
illa esse orbita omissis sed ut cum viderunt ceteri homines teneamus vestram 
salvaconducti regio liberum ad securis omissis cum igitur triremes ille nostre sint in 
duo quo destinata sunt perfectura oramus maiestatem vestram ut salvaconductum 
concedere dignetus pro triremibus et personis omissis. 
14 Iulii 1457. 
46 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
102-103 
Duci Janue  
Corsairs who were disguised as fishermen arrived in Porto Pisano. Adduxerunt 
enim ex faucibus armi and took wares of the Catalans. Florence asks compensation 
from Genoa. 
13 Iulii 1457. 
47 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
105 
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Regi Aragonum  
Safe-conduct granted for the Western part of the Mediterranean Sea.  Florence 
promised that its merchants will not carry wares which belong to Alphonse V’s 
enemies. 
27 Iulii 1457. 
48 
Responsive Copiari 1  
59v-60v 
Aragona 
This response from Alphonse V confirms the agreement of the letter written on 27 
July 1457.  
1457 26 Iulii. 
49 
 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
107-108 
Regi Aragonoum  
In reditu oratores nostrum intelleximus ob quas rationes et causas maiestas vester 
salvaconductus nobis concessum poteri remeturi ad partes Orientale profectur non 
expediri perseverit. Et plure et retulint que nos ante eius reditum latebant cum 
maiestas vester nobis concessit fidem publicam per trirerem et bonis que in ea 
veherentur ex captione dumtaxat omissis et illa non veheret non inimicarum per 
maiestam vestram. Et cum vestras dictam triremi non veheremus ut Janue per se 
deventur gentis. Sperabamus ut de gratia maiestà vestre ille exceptione tolleretur aut 
saltem decoravetur qui nam essent inimici maiestatem vestram ut nos cum illis 
negotia non haberemus et multo pacto suaderi nobis poteras ut gratia ille primum et 
cessa revocaretur. Utinam maiestas vester oratori ea litteris dum erat penes nuntiasset 
que retulit viam quedam rationabiliter fuisset ea omissis. Nec existenent observamus 
vestre serenitas et maximis de cetus ne dum per presentem turbationem aut 
offensionem aliquem fieri velimus. Supplicamus igitur serenitate vestre ut 
salvaconductum ipsum in forma plena concedere dignetur per eunde et redeunde. 
Mittemus oratorem nostrum quo ita conferentur et componentur omissis. 
17 Augusti 1457. 
50 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 




Duci Janue  
The ship owned by Filippo di Nicola di Pisa, who is a Florentine merchant, was intercepted 
and captured by Scervonucci, a Genoese corsair. 
20 Augusti 1457. 
51 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
113 
Calisto III  
Giacomo Guicciardini was sailing with one trireme ut Cypro Rhodium frumentibus 
veheret. Accipit tandem iter Jacobus tum vestre Sanctitatis tum patriarchi tunc 
civitate gratie non Rhodi frumenti penuria laburabatum omissis the boat was 
captured omissis spem et fidem publicam vestre.  Guicciardini had a cargo valued to 
350 ducats. 
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173-174 
Angelo Acciaiuoli  
S’è scritto il novembre passato che pregassi il duca di Calabria affinchè il re 
d’Aragona ci concedesse il salvacondotto per le nostre galere di Levante. Facesti 
buona operatione. Inpero che abbiamo aviso da Napoli che la maestà del re era felice 
di concederlo et rimettere nelle fare del duca il fatto del Gambacorta. Ringrazierete la 
sua grazia di questo che ha fatto sino a qua e pregherete sempre sua grazia di mettere 
e suoi ambasciatori che insieme col nostro Nicola Giugni il quale mandano a Napoli 
facino tutto per avere il predetto salvacondotto et che s’acconci questo fatto del 
Gambacorta sicchè questa cosa abbia conclusione. In modo che noi possino navigare 
et fare le nostre mercantie et bisogni. Giugni prende la via di Sigismondo e a lui 
diviene che avviseremo delle risposte sia sul salvacondotto che sul Gambacorta.  
Scriviamo a Pigello Portinari inoltre. 
16 Ianuarii 1458.  
Florentine calendar: 16 Ianuarii 1457. 
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174 
Pigello Solchi de Portinari  
Se Agnolo non è partito presentagli la detta lettera. Ma se è partito per tornare a 
Firenze tu terrai le due lettere e presenterai al duca quelle solamente per il duca, 
solleciterai che nabbiamo risposte d’ogni celerità possibile. 
 21 Ianuarii 1458. 
Florentine calendar: 21 Ianuarii 1457. 
54 
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41 
173-175 
Duci Mediolani  
Noi abbiamo  avviso di quanto gli ambasciatori della vostra illustrissima Signoria 
hanno parlato colla maestà del re di Raona in favore che la sua maestà ci conceda 
salvocondotto per le nostre galee di Levante il quale parlare è proceduto per lo 
scrivere della vostra illustrissima Signoria della quale sommamente ringraziamo la 
vostra Signoria et abbiamo sincero aviso della risposta facta per la maestà del re della 
quale siamo certissimi che essa Signoria illustrissima de prefati suoi ambasciatori è 
pienamente informata. Et per ragione che noi desideriamo che omissis ogni standolo 
e confermi la benevolenza et che noi possiamo fare la nostre mercatantie col 
navigare et col trafficare però omissis preghiamo la vostra illustrissima Signoria che 
di nuovo commetta a suoi ambasciatori che insieme col nostro facciano ogni oratione 
et dicano favore che noi abbiamo predetto salvacondotto et che faccianci questo facto 
del Gambacorta omissis attendiamo risposta con prestanza per poter dare notitia a 
Nicola Giugni il quale vi mandiamo al presente et per lo salvacondotto si ancora per 
dare favore omissis si ancora che concordia nasca in tra la maestà del re e il 
magnifico signor Sigismondo.  
21 Ianuarii 1458. 
Florentine calendar: 21 Ianuarii 1457. 
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Priores libertatis omissis a Antonio de Lorenzo Ridolfi in Roma 
 




Abbiamo letue de giorni 10 (e) 21 del presente et per quella intendiamo quanto è 
occorso et seguito costi. comendiamo della diligentia tua intenere bene avisata questa 
Signoria et che così perseveri ti confortiamo in quanto scrivi delaverti solecitato el 
Sancto Padre circa l’impresa del Turcho et di quanto rispondessi giudichiamo te non 
avere potuto megliori rispondere et eperche come tu sai nella tua commissione si 
dice che avendo noi delle maggiori potentie innanzi non dobbiamo essere e primi a 
rispondere et per tanto quella seguirai in tutto intendendoti collo ambasciatore dello 
illustrissimo duca di milano et ingegnandoti ritrovare a che camino vanno gli altri e 
di tutto darai aviso che siamo certi che omissis tutto governerai come ai fatto insino a 
qui. 
 
23 Februarii 1458. 
 
Florentine calendar: 23 Februarii 1457. 
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24-25 
Domino Bernardo di Villamarina, Capitano classis regie Aragone 
Siamo nuovamente informati da consoli del mare di Pisa come la maestà vestra dice 
essere parata a fare rilasciare certi nostri uomini di Livorno che padroni di certe 
vostre galee già presi per le quale già altra volta omissis in caso che voi siate chiaro 
essersi dato sufficiente sodamento intorno ai fatti della fusta di Nicola et che a voi sia 
noto è che alla maestà vostra possa a ragione domandare per li sopradetti vostri 
padroni et per omissis abbiamo dato ordine e operato in modo che il sodamento è 
fatto in modo piú e fermo del quale apparisca per meno del pubblico omissis.  
7 Maii 1458. 
57 




Die 26 Juniii 1458 in saletta de sero 
 
 
Auditis patronis illis qui preterito anno duas galeas conduxerunt qui omissis sunt se 
magno in periculo fortunarum suarum esse ex eo quia propter impediunta que 
accideant et suspicionem de rege Aragonum iussi sit navigationem inter mittere cum 
maximo eorum danno et incommodo et omissis postulabant ut aliquis modis ad 
liberetur per quem navigatio tuto fieri posset delecti sunt incliti cives ut superiore 
ipsa consultarent qui paucis exceptis omnes consenserunt que cives pauci et egregi 
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deputarentur qui re diligenter examinata quod eis videretur in eiusmodi negotio 
statuerent omnes quidem assumantes que quia ex navigatione ipsa non solum omissis 
et honor augetur civitati sed etiam utilitas maxima mercatoribus et artificibus melius 
sua negotio obeuntibus ex quorum operibus magnam civitate pecunia cumulari solet 
cumqua semper civitatis libertas defensata est omnes illi modi caperentur precipue 








1458 6 Luglio in saletta de seco 
 
raporto facto per gli incliti citadini soprascripti de navigare 
 
Che inteso di quanta utilità universalmente a tutta la città et contentamento di tutto il 
popolo che si navighi et maximamente commodo et sicuro che ne segue oltre a lutile 
lonore et reputatione della città et però raportarono che questo anno ne tempi usitati 
et debiti le  galee che sono date per Fiandra in ogni maniera si mandino co patti e 
capitoli che sono stati tolte et etiandio che per Levante si mandi due galee in 
conserva come era stato ordinato perché sintende per la morte del re et etiandio per 
galere della cruciata il mare essere cresciuto in pericoli di persone di male a fare et 
per potere mandare dette galee è necessario che consoli del  mare abbino auctorità 
potersi concordare co condottieri della galera per Levante a utile di comune et che 
per lavenire si mandi ogni anno in Levante due galere a tempi usitati le quali e 
consoli del mare che pe tempi saranno abbino a dare a lo incanto co capitoli et patti 
usitati et che la condotta sia fatta per certo tempo per una galea per detto viaggio di 
Levante sintenda essere finita et a detti conduttori sia fatto il dovere del danno 
ricevessino come parrá a consoli del mare pe tempi che saranno. item che si 
perveggha che la galea di Barberia vada a tempi co patti et condutturi omissis. 
 
59 
Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42 
91 
Principe Tarantini  
Nuper triremes duas omissis nostri civis versus Orientis partes navigarent non alium 
ob causis nisi ut mercibus vehendis omissis et per eiusmodi exercitum civitas vestre 
locu plectior fieret omissis rogamus atque observamus ut si qua erunt quibus illi per 
navigium tutela per itinerens comoda vel per iis rebus quos adverturi sint illi indigere 
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videantur vestra est nostro respectu omni benivolentia et favore persequatur 
recepturi. 
5 Septembrii 1458. 
60 
Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42 
92 
Regi Ferdinando  
Florence requests to King Ferrante I of Naples the security in the seaports and 
possession of his kingdom in favour of the Florentine galleys. 
5 Septembrii 1458 
61 
Legazioni Commissarie 15  
13-14 
Oratoribus ad Summus Pontefice 
Abbiamo deliberato di nuovo con nostri collegi dovrete anche dire al Santo Padre 
che gli piaccia volere dare buona licentia che le galee nostre le quali sono mosse per 
noi in Costantinopoli e nelle parti del Levante tra gli infedeli et in Barbaria vi 
possino lecitamente andare et vendere e comperare mercatantie come è usanza da 
fare. 
28 Septembrii 1458. 
62 
Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42 
112-113 
Regi Sicilia 
Florence sends a letter recommending the Florentine galleys which are going to 
travel towards his possessions. 
12 Octobrii 1458. 
63 
Legazioni Commissarie 15  
15-19 
Commissione ad Angelo Acciaiuoli e Luigi Guicciardini a Napoli 
   
 
 388 
14 Ottobre 1458  
Et perché di nuovo omissis abbiamo quelle galee le quali armate di Gaeta et sono al 
servigio della maestà del re avere assalito le nostre galere di Levante con gravissimo 
pericolo di quelle le quali apena scampare poterono dicete alla maestà del re che 
intorno a questa materia voglia in modo provvedere per tutte quelle che necessarie 
faranno, che le nostre galee che sono partite sicure tornar possino e quello che 
aveano andare non siano in alcun modo molestate perché le galere predette cioè che 
possino liberamente tornare et così andare et perché stando le galere di quella armata 
per esse al porto nostro di Livorno danno grave sospetto a chi a quello con latro 
legno venire volesse. Lo pregherete gli piaccia dare opera che quella armata sia assai 
piú discosta da porto nostro et in luogo che sospetto generare non possa et 
reccomenderete pregandolo che tenga modo che al porto nostro ciascuna sicuramente 
possa navigare. 
64 
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118-119 
Benedicto de Giugni consuli Florentini Neapoli et Filippo de Strozzis  
Nuovamente abbiamo inteso non sanza grande admiratione come le galere le quali 
omissis di Gaeta assaltare le nostre galee che andavano in Levane con le mercatantie 
de nostri cittadini et furono in pericolo di non essere presa se l’aiuto di dio non si 
fosse intervenuto. Il perché molto dubitiamo che l’altre nostre galere le quali partire 
debbono et ancora quali quelle che tenevamo non sicure siano molestate . Il perché vi 
comandiamo che uno di voi sentiate alla maestà del re e a lui intendete le intentioni 
sua intorno a questa materia dolendovi della cosa gravissimamente e speriamo 
labbiano fatto a sua insaputa e fare nel modo che le nostre galere e fuste non siano 
molestate. Fatelo con grande diligenza perché il pericolo è gravissimo.  
Octobri 1458. 
65 
Legazioni Commissarie 15  
19-20 
Oratoribus Rome  
Angelo Acciaiuoli e Luigi Guicciardini rimangano a Roma i quali abbiamo eletto 
ambasciatori al nuovo re di Sicilia. Andrete a Napoli per andare con 
quell’ambasciata poi tornerete a Roma e quivi se possiate quando l’altre ambasciate 
si faranno et maximamente quelle de Vinitiani a quivi ingegnerete a fare. Insuper 
nuovamente omissis in caso al quale a noi pare gravidamente dovere essere stimato 
in però che siano avvisati che quelle galee le quali uscirono armata da Gaeta et sono 
al soldo del re di Sicilia assaltarono le galee nostre di Levante con grave pericolo di 
quelle et se non fusse la subita fortuna del vento l’arebbono prese et dubitassi questo 
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non fusse azione di messer Bernardo di Villamarina capitano di quell’armata. Il 
perché scrivano al consolo de Fiorentini et a Filippo degli Strozzi i quali appresso la 
maestà del re si omissis che di questo caso facciano cerimonia con lui per Agnolo 
voglia a questa materia rimediare e così a voi e a Pagolo et Luigi diciamo in 
commissione, dobbiate fare come in omissis ella piú la gravitate si contiene e parci 
considerato il pericolo che voi prestamente faciate le visitazioni debite et poi di 
subite di così vi portiate accioché colla maestà del re essere possiate et queste lettere 
la quale va a sidetto console et Filippo. 
14 Octobri 1458. 
66 
Legazioni Commissarie 15  
23-25 
Cenni a Pietro di Bartolomeo Bardi presso Bernardo di Villamarina  
17 ottobre 1458   
Gli dirai come abbiamo avuto notizia nei giorni passati come le sue galere uscite da 
Gaeta hanno rotto il corso alle galere nostre le quali cariche di mercatantie andavano 
verso Levante e aveano assaltato e forse preso le nostre se non ci fosse stato il vento 
di fortuna la quale cosa noi è data non poca admiratione considerando noi avere colla 
maestà del re singulare amicizia omissis il quale umanissime parole noi regni suoi de 
cose nostre volere ricevere et conservare come le sue omissis et non solamente le 
nostre galere volere essere sicure ma che sento quanto si può favorire et honorare et 
qui a noi navi o galere mancassino volerci delle sue concedere per gli usi et bisogni 
di questa repubblica. Il perché essendo queste galere le quali le nostre assalire 
vollano insieme con tutta l’armata vestra omissis et obbedientia del prefato re di 
Sicilia ci meravigliamo come simili cose ebbino voluto tentare delle quali omissis 
fusse sito bisogno non offesa o molestia alcuna ma subsidio et aiuto speravano et 
siano certi che alla maestà del re questa cosa da lui saputa giovissino nuova gli sia 
molesta per l’amore et la benivolentia che è riposta. Intendendo maximamente in 
quanto pericolo le galere siano state e quanto danno per avvenire abbiamo a tenere 
considerando che essendo già questa cosa nelle galee nostre che ancora in altri viaggi 
omissis a muovere pochi di vorranno che robe e mercatantie vogliano carichare et 
similmente in quelle che sono andata et pochi siano che ella tornata messe alcuna 
cosa mettere si fa danno le quali cose non solamente risultano a danno grandissimo 
ma in vergogna ancora di noi e della città nostra. Ricordando alla sua maestà come il 
omissis re di Raona et Valenza fece per le omissis mandera un bando la copia de 
quale è presso di noi abbiano nel quale specialmente e Fiorentini tutti et loro 
mercatantie e robe sono pienamente sicure omissis per rispetto di questo dobbiamo in 
tucta die lui e sue galere essere sicuri. Et poco lo pregherai che la giustizia et fede la 
quale nel re di Sicilia abbiamo per quella benivolentia omissis voglia per l’avvenire 
et omissis dimostrare a tutti quello che credono cioè lui essere a noi amicissimo etc. e 
che alle galere nostre ogni favore et subsidio darebbe et non violenza alcuna omissis 
et che voglia per maggiore sicurtà concederci sicurtà e salvacondotto per omissis 
galere che sono ite et per quelle anderemo ovunque. Per tutte le mercanzie e cose che 
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mese sono e faranno non perché ne abbiamo bisogno di lui lo bisogno ma per dare 
piú reputazione alle galere predette. Et se in questo lui rispondesse volere 
salvacondotto concedere per le robe nostre e d’altri salvo che per quelle de Genovesi 
si omissis risultasse pericolo et danno. In però che come si sentisse questo ciascuno 
altro dubitare omissis tenendo che come robe di Genovesi non si omissis ritenuto 
perché in simili casi et sospetto facilmente omissis si che voglia suo conto di dare 
questa sicurtà a noi e non a Genovesi etc. in caso che così fare non volessi finalmente 
ritiri il salvacondotto per le robe nostre ed di tutte le galere excepti e Genovesi 
dicendo a llui questo salvocondotto non si demandare per alcuno sospetto che di lui 
sabbia ne perché essendo la pena di questo fatto per via del salvacondotto ogni 
sospetto da ciascuno omissis et nessuno si guardera in decte galie arrivare come si 
guarderebbe el salvacondotto non leggendo. 
67 
Legazioni Commissarie 15  
25-27 
Angelo Acciaiouli e Ludovico Guicciardini 
Oratoribus Rome  
Andrete in questi luoghi in cui potrete trovare la maestà del re di Sicilia. Non 
afferirete alcun subsidio o aiuto intorno alle armate de Turchi. Essenco ancora per le 
passate guerre afflitti. 
27 Octobri 1458. 
68 
Legazioni Commissarie 15  
27 
Angelo Acciaouli e Ludovico Guicciardini  
Roma 
Nuova impresa de Turchi. Ricevere subsidio per su curia delle potenze Italiche 
specialmente dalla nostra. Quello che intorno a fatti del Turcho per voi facesse a 
seguitare unde perché veduta da voi quella rimarrete a pieno della nostra intentione 
informati 
4 Novembrii 1458. 
69 
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154-155 
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Ducatis nobilis civitatis Messane 
Florence recommends the Florentine galleys que ab Orientis partes vehebantur 
onustas mercibus et per eiusdem frequentis apud Sicilie regias presides 
prestantissimos viros. 
9 Decembrii 1458. 
70 
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156-158 
Duci Calabrie  
Perditus naviculem quedem mercibus nostre, capitani illem bonifeceant Corefice 
insule oppidum adduxit. The Florentine Signoria asks for the ship and wares 
captured by the duke of Calabria. 
18 Decembrii 1458. 
71 
Legazioni Commissarie 15  
31-34 
Angelo Acciaiuoli e Ludovico Guicciardini 
Roma 
Et quanto a quello l’impresa dei Turchi rispondesse altra volta essere si imposta le 
decime qui ne terreni omissis e quelle pagata ne ancora da le altre potentie di Italia 
eccetto il duca di Milano alcuna quantità di denari se pagata e d’altra parte omissis ci 
pare ragionevole essere ferma con gli altri omissis che da nuovo subsidio si dimandi 
ne questo si dice perché a noi questa imposta non piace e che non vogliamo al Santo 
Padre prestare in quella ogni possibile favore. In però che sempre come sapete siano 
stati fedeli omissis per le guerre passate abbiamo gravissime spese sostenute non 
dimeno offerendo che quando le altre potentie in questa impresa faranno tanto per la 
rata nostra etc. 













Prese in quell’anno il Gonfalone Niccolò degli Alessandri nel medesimo tempo 
passò di Livorno il Duca Giovanni con un armata di 20 galere, dove fu ricevuto da 
ministri della Repubblica con onori grandissimi. 
73 
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186-187 
Venetis  
Bernardo Romano from Valencia had been captured by Giovanni from Venice. The 
wax belonged to the Florentine merchants and the Florentine Signoria asks Venice 
to return the wax. 
16 Februarii 1459. 
Florentine calendar: 16 Februarii 1458. 
74 
Legazioni Commissarie 15  
62-64 
Leonardo (Leandro) degli Alessandri e Otto Nicolini per le galera del duca di 
Calabria che deve arrivare nel nostro porto 
25 februarii 1459 
Andrete a Pisa e aspetterete il passaggio di detta armata. Che avendo noi per le nostre 
galere et fuste et robe et mercatanti salvocondotto dalla sua Signoria omissis che non 
scriviamo esse necessario per la amicizia nostra meriti di nuovo é sia come impegno 
et in testimonio e tutte le omissis di nostra ob sicurtà ci farà gratissimo lo concedere 
in piú piena forma et per piú tempo che potrà raccomandarai alla sua Signoria tutte le 
nostre fuste omissis che passano neli luoghi della sua Signoria. 
75 
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Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42 
197 
Ragusa  
Per quiemus e modi solet non plus pelagii omissis septimum omissis Didicimus 
quoque vestre omissis ut pro mercibus eductis in modo advenire posset expecti 
quantum cives nostrum in eorum inebilis aut oppidus solvere cogerentur. Cum que 
sicut accepientes nuper Martinus Clavendis apud vos degens per Jacopo omissis 
cives vestre instituere pecunias omissis alio mitte instituisset eum omissis pendatur 
vectigalia solvere equum omissis 
5 Marcii 1458. 
76 
Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42 
218-19 
Raguseis  
The Florentine Signoria recommends Giannozzo Biliotti, who is a Florentine 
merchant coming to Ragusa with some wares. 
77 
Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42 
226-227 
Regi Aragonum  
Cum priore anno triremes nostre cives mercibus plenes ad Orientem missimus Sicilie 
portus tenuisset ex ea insula hodies per omissis prede spe illeciti quam infutem fare 
esperabantus eas a docti omissis capere illas ac diripere conati sunt. Que ut eas 
regrebant celeriter omissis versi interamultis navalibus socius amissa etiam una in 
humanissime cum civibus e gentis nostris que captas aliques, litteres anno volunt nec 
sane referri potest que pie que egregiis omissis messene cives omissis sint volumus 
ut publicas siquie aliqui ad vestras triremes nostros molestatentur que vestras in regni 
venture sint. 
78 
Consulte e pratiche 55  
117v 
8 Maii 1459  
Maximus duper navigandi ordinem multo rum opinionem esse talem quia magnam 
auctoritatem et utilitatem civitati et mercatoribus efferet ob causas eam amplium a 
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civibus et consilium super eiusmodi re petituturi sit semper cives omissis dominus 
exhortatos esse et navigationationem et omissis augerent omissis vereri se ne si alius 
ordo non copiat finem . Ut navigationem non possit consequiri si mercatores 
cernerent ob in ordinationem navigandi sucis reperire aut in periculo esse omni re se 
ad hoc exercitio extraherent cum detrimento civitatis quo esse iustum formam et 
regulam ex qua tandem omnes intelligant cum minimo periculo navigantium futurem 
esse et ut ad particularia proposita  deveniat duper se intellegire quemadmodum 
Bartholomeus de Lauri in primus statuendum esse ut presenti necessitati et cum 
pecuniis si curratur et ob navibus qui iter facient providendum esse et 
quemadmodum ipse ex eius verbis intelligit pecunias petitus illis non suppeditatures 
tertio loco etiam providendum esse ut naves que ad huc reverse non sint tucto et que 
celeriter redire possint et quem hec difficultatem hanc videri sibi sexantocto 
capiendos esse qui dissensionibus aliqum nostre instituent presentibus civibus 
ardendam et in Pisis esse civiam industrie intendum esse ut aliunde si fieri potest que 
ex Marsupiis civis pecunie omissis quemadomodum fieri posse a omnia dupertur si 
diligant ex que cercatisse ita omissis futurum esse ut omnia prudenter et cum solet 
civium omnium provideretur. 
Giannozzo Pitti. Utilitas navigationem fieri. 
79 
Consulte e pratiche 55  
22v-23r 
26 Iunii 1459 in saletta 
Florentine calendar: 26 Iunii 1458 
Auditis patronis illis qui preterito anno duas galeas conducerant qui quedi sint se 
magno periculo fortunarum sua esse ex eo quia perpetua impediunta que accideant et 
suspicionem de rege Aragonum iussi super navigationem intermittere cum magno 
eorum danno et incomodo et omnio postulabant ut aliquis modis adhibetur per quem 
navigatio tucto fieri posset delecti sint nostri cives ut super re ipsa consultarent qui 
paucis exceptis cives conserserunt quod times pauci et egregi deputaretur qui re 
diligentorum examinata quod eis videretur in eiusmodi negotio statuerent cives 
quidem assumentes quod quia ex navigatione ipsa non solum omissis et habere 
augetur civitatis etiam utilitas maxime mercatantis et artificibus melius sua negotia 
obeuntibus ex quorum operibus magnem civitate pecunia cumulari solet. Cum qua 
semper civitatis libertatis defensata est cives illi modi caperentur precipue cum ipso 
rege Aragonum quibus modiis navigatio ipsa secura futura erit. Follows the 
signatures C. Pandolfo, G. Machiavelli, A. Acciaiuoli, Luigi Guicciardini, Loisio de 
Ridolfi, Angelo Della Stufa, Jacopo de Pazzi. 
80 
Consulte e pratiche 55  
134-137v 
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Die 7 Iulii 1459  
Que plurimi mercatores ex nobiliaribus totius civitatis venerunt ad damnos graviter 
quidem querentes qui Petrum Ramandi de manuali cum quidem trireme que dicte 
esse Bernardi de Castiglioncello agressus est lembos quasdam ad catalanos nomine 
pertinente set illos tandem eam capisse una preda omnia retinuit esse viro rem hanc 
per eximi et vero civitati et mercatoribus periculosem quam Florentine naves 
diviniter faciunt semper portus Aragonum regis tenere compelluntur sive Occidentis 
tradiciant sive in Orientis partes quas naves si ob damnum a Florentinis receptem 
Catalani ceperunt calamitas in gens multis sequerentur esse omissis vehementer 
aubitendum re ita quinque accedunt quantum illos omni offensi vel aliud cogitabant 
nisi que ad mode inuriam acceptam omissis feruntur convocasse igitur domnines 
illos cives ut abes consilium caperent quam omissis super hac re provederatur eum 
omissis. 
81 
Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42 
261-262 
Magno Magistri Rodi 
Antonio Frescobaldi omissis suscepitis religionem ut una cum adus que bona fidem 
adversos barbaros hostes tueretur per qua saepe deceritamus non cuisque nullum 
periculum aut latore recusans tale denique omissis per gloriosem militiam expetere 
omissis. 
30 Iunii 1459. 
82 
Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42 
Domino Bernardo da Villamarina 
287 
Antonio di Simone Ambrogio son of Bernardo and Stefano di Ambrogio has been 
robbed by a catalan ship. 
27 Iulii 1459. 
83 
Consulte e pratiche 55  
49v 
21 Iulii 1459 
Rapporto fatto per gli nostri cittadini sopra i fatti del navigare. 
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omissis si mandi due galee di conserva come era stato ordinato perché s’intende per 
la morte del re et etiandio per galere della crociata il mare essere cresciuto in pericoli 
di persone di male affare et per potere mandare delle galere è necessario che i consoli 
del mare abbiano auctorità potersi concordare co conduttori delle gare per Levante a 
utile del comune et che per l’avenir si mandi ogni anno in Levante due galere omissis 
le quali e consoli del mare che pe i tempi saranno abbino a dare allo incanto con 
capitoli e patti usitati et che la condotta sia fatta per certo tempo per una galere per 
detto viaggio di Levante omissis. 
84 
 
Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42 
302-303 
Principi Tarentino  
Bernardo Salviati que ab hunc triremio elapso an paulus quadens vicesimus per 
omissis nostre due quarumdam triremium que omissis ut cum barbari hostes 
prenerentur ut omissis per ipse Cyprum insulem facere omissis quadam iniquo 
merces plurime Bernardi et socio rum eius vehebatur quem hostili omissis a vestris 
omissis Illi diripiunt omissis rogamus et observemus ut huus qui per Bernardo 
omissis benigne feci omissis et omni favere atque omissis intelligent 
commendatitiam nostram apud vos non omissis eum incoluma qua mercatoribus 
accendunt vestri haud dubie nostre omissis. 
9 Augusti s.a. 
85 
Signori Missive I Cancelleria 42 
346-347 
Ianuensibus 
Adversum ac re medium quaerere que infamiam graviam nostre reipublice omissis 
quibus ut parve erat commoti per omissis predones aliqui in portu nostri versati sint 
que nave Liburno rese ac praedas actas vendere consueta erunt.  
26 Maii 1459. 
86 
Consulte e Pratiche 56  
1v 
6 Novembrii 1459 
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Esse preterae duper cives creatos officiales quinque Pisarum verbis quibus 
quemadmodum ipsi affirmant pecunie desiunt plurime per hedificandi navibus certis 






Gonfaloniere Francesco Orlandi. Il Papa vedendolo essere ancora la guerra omissis il 
re Ferdinando e il duca Giovanni e il non poter fare quella impresa contro i Turchi si 
risolse di ritornare a Roma. Giunse a Firenze il 25 di Gennaio e si fermò due giorni. 
Gonfaloniere Francesco Figliandri. Vennero in Firenze ambasciatori d’alcune parti di 
Persia, Armenia e Impero di Trebisonda. Andarono dal Papa a chiedere aiuto contro 
la potenza de Turchi. Uno degli ambasciatori era de descendenti del poeta Dante 
Alighieri. 
88 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
1-2  
Ragusa  
The Florentine Signoria reccomends  Giacomo and Pietro Pazzi. 
15 Februarii 1460. 
Florentine calendar: 15 Februarii 1459. 
89 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
6-7  
Ragusa 
General mentions of Francesco and Carlo Cambi and the juridical quarrel they have 
with Nicola di Francesco da Cortola in Ragusa. 
14 Februarii 1459. 
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Legazioni Commissarie 15  
80-81 
A Guglielmo Oricellario oratore presso Piombino  
Pregherai così sua Signoria a dare tutti i favori e aiuti che a lui sono possibili a le 
nostre galere et che mandi qualche legno suo a significare al capitano et padroni 
come di dette galere la venuta di questa armata et che riceva le dette galere nel porto 
suo sine che cessi ogni pericolo et suspetto et tu hai commissione di significare a 
prefati capitani et padroni questa cosa in que modo ti parva migliore e generalmente 
di potere fare et dire intorno a questa materia tutto quello che stimerai essere utile 
alla nostra città et non parrebbi et così vogliano che tu ti ingegni subitamente avisare 
decti capitani et padroni prefati delle notre galere et di fare in modo se sia possibile 
che loro ritorno colle galere a Palermo e Sicilia perché in questo modo ci pare 
doverebbero essere piú salve e piú sicure 
7 Iunii1460. 
91 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
84  
Piombino 
Poiché noi speriamo le galie nostre di Levante dovere in su pochi giorni venire nel 
porto nostro di Pisa e di nuovo abbiamo inteso come l’armata dell’illustre duca di 
Calabria et de Genovesi è arrivata nel prefato porto et non sappiamo quanto tempo 
quivi abbino a soprastare benché noi ci rendiamo certi che da quello le galee nostre 
non ci verrebbono detrimento alcuno per la amicitia la quale col prefato duca e co 
Genovesi abbiamo non di meno per torre ogni cagione di inconveniente e di pericolo 
che potesse intervenire pieglieranno sicurtà grande dalle città vostra la quale 
abbiamo sempre trovata in ogni caso amica e benivole singularmente della 
repubblica nostra pregandovi Sua Signoria massimamente quella gli sia di piacere 
dare alle prefate nostre galere ogni favore et comodità che gli sia possibile 
massimamente di mandare qualche vostro legno subitamente con quella celerità che 
sia possibile et che si rechi e de in simile caso a significare a quelli delle nostre galee 
come l’armata sopradetta si trova nel porto nostro et quando saranno arrivate a 
Piombino a tenerle colle galee insieme nel porto vostro in luogho sicuro et a buona 
guardia insino che l’armata sia partita et così facendosi per le spettabile Signoria 
vestra come sanza dubbio alcuno speriamo ci riputeremo a quella singularmente 
obbligati che mai simile beneficio dimenticheremo anzi terremo quelle insieme cogli 
altri vestri a perpetuo nella memoria a mente nostra. 
3 Iunii 1460. 
92 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  




A Filippo de Tornabuoni capitano galearum Orientalium  
Perché nuovamente è venuto in Porto Pisano l’armata del duca di Calabria et de 
Genovesi et crediamo che quella nel porto predicto al quanto di sopra stia per levare 
via ogni materia distandolo abbiamo scripto al magnifico signore di Piombino et 
provveduto colla Signoria sua che quando sarete a Piombino arrivati vi ritengha nel 
porto suo a buona garanzia insino che avrete notitita l’armata predicta essere partita. 
Et però ti commendiamo che tu riduca le galere nel dicto porto di Piombino in 
luogho sicuro tenendo bene in punto et in ordine come si richiede et di quindi non ti 
partire insino che sentirai certamente l’armata sopra detta essere partita et non 
dubitiamo avrete ogni favore et comodità gli sia possibile. 
3 Iunii 1460 
93 
Legazioni Commissarie 15  
81 
A Guglielmo Oricellario oratore presso Piombino  
Abbiamo ricevuto la lettera del presente mese per la quale intendiamo la diligenza et 
industria tua nel mandare ad effetto quanto per noi ti fu commesso della qualcosa ti 
siamo essere commendati et confortanti a seguire con omissis cominciato et non 
lasciare indietro cosa alcuna la quale tu intenda essere utile e necessario per la 
ragione per la quale si fa manifesti et quanto tu vedi avere fatto tanto quanto vedi 
essere di bisogno intorno a quella ti diano licenza che tu possa ritornare. 
10 Giugno 1460 
94 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
106-107 
Papa 
The letter mentions Bernardo Castiglione navali milite Fiorentino che con la sua 
flotta combatte i barbari nemici di Romana Chiesa. Florence asks the Pope to pay 
the condotta. 
30 Iunii 1460 
95 
Provvisioni Registri 5 
151 
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31 Marcii 1460 
Florentine calendar: 31 Marcii 1459 
Ut opera navigandi quia cum provisionem est quod singulis omnis mittantur octo 
galeis grosse cum quatuor capitaneis ad quatuor viaggia principalia et similiter 
inceptus est pro videre de bono assignamento per dicto opere navigandi plurime quod 
nam edite sunt provisiones ad idem opus utilissime omissis. 
96 
Provvisioni Registri 5  
166 
8 Iulii 1460  
Primo: provisionem omissis in consilio de cento per finali conclusione provisio fare 
quando presentis quinque gubernatores Pisarum possint se vulere de incanti galea 
cum que de presenti anno profecture sunt addit partis Orienti set Occidenti set 
incantare ille barbere ad presens di cotanti viri omissis ad hoc vis galee rectores que 
reparatione indigent possent reparari hic et fieri de novis prout in previsione super id 
edicto latino continetur. Et considerantes quod id minime fieri potest absque damno 
comuni set incomendo conducturam galearum predictorum prout per eos assertur. Et 
cognosce res ad eundam emertim facili set absque ullius damno vel incomodo 
permecturi modum proveniri posse habita primo super victus omnibus et consilio 
dicta die octavo mense Julii omissis ab incarnatione 1460 indictione octava 
infrascriptos dominos priorers et vexillifer in su facente ne omnio congregatos in 
palatio populi Florentini deliberate. 
96 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
137 
Duci Calabrie 
Cum erint classes dictes triremes vestras in eo portu offendissent mercibus plenas ad 
Orientis iter percutas atque instructas ne dum eas. omissis 
4 Septembrii 1460. 
97 
Miscellanea 1/18  
Anno 1460 114r/117r 
8 Ottobri in consiglio de’ cento patroni galeras omissis conducentis pro partibus 
orientis teneantur et obbligati essenti omissis reditu afferre et consegnare provideri 
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capitano armo rum unum tappettum pro omnibus galeis quas pro dicto viatico 
concessus aut um pro qual iter ipso rum volentes potentes domini omissis dubium 
omissis ac simile sue lege renovare provideri et declari qui tam pro “suis” galeis”  
viatica orienti qui prio omissis et consignari provisor predicti ut supra dicti debeat ut 
omissis de omnibus galeis predictis clare et aperte quod conductores seu patronum 
galeis pro partibus Romania seu cruentis tam omissis teneantur et obbligati sunt infra 
unum mensem e due reditus sui in portum pisanum omissis dari et consignari 
provisori unum tappetum pro quali ber galea omissis quod tappetum sit valori set 




Legazioni Commissarie 15  
A Pietro de Pazzi 
Per la via di Pisa abbiamo omissis attendono a ogni ora quelle abbi seguito et 
ristretto de loro che non pensiamo credere decto aviso non giungha et per cagione 
che questo caso e dall’importanza che tu conosci ti comandiamo che sanza nostra 
licentia tu non debba partire da decta armata et opererai tutto che ti fu commesso con 
ogni sollecitudine e  per sicurtà e salute delle nostre galere e di tutte quelle che ogni 
di occurre omissis et potendo dare aviso omissis. 
11 Ianuarii 1461 
Florentine calendar: 11 Ianuarii 1460 
99 
Provvigione Registri 5 
237  
21 Gennaio 1461 ind. 9 
Florentine calendar: 21 Gennaio 1460 
omissis quanto sia l’utilità che risulta e in factori e in reputazione e quest’anno puote 
dal navichare delle vostre galee gli effecti lo dimostrano si chiaro che pure che 
ogniuno conforta che per una cosa non si possa fare la piú utile che quello mantenere 
omissis Et perché a fare questo si cognosce due cose intralaltre sono a recte 
necessarie che l’una è dare tanta comodità quanto honesta omissis dare si possono 
tempo per tempo a conductori et padroni delle  nostre galee sicché per tali comodità 
riesca loro ogni di piú l’aviso omissis De omissis l’altra è dare modo ora eziandio e 
mercatanti per modo che possino e voglino charicare le robe  loro su dette galee, 
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pertanto sperando che alcuna parte et allalatra si darebbe gran comodità se 
provedesse alle cose in che si dice che e conductori et padroni di tutte le galee che 
anderanno per provisione al viaggio di Fiandra et Inghilterra sia loro libertà omissis 
et si da il permesso di fare scala a Palermo omissis quelle di Barberia pagano la metà 
(pagano per la metà del detto secondo viaggio la metà di quello che dovesse pagare) 
omissis che i  mercatanti possino avere certezza di quelle che abbino a pagare di noli 
et eziandio omissis capitani della parte guelfa deliberino sul “pregio dei noli” su 
qualunque cosa si scarischi su dette galee per qualunque viaggio e anche scaricare. 
The Sea Consul must ensure the presence of enough wood in Porto Pisano to build a 
galley. 
100 
Missive I Cancelleria 43 
 229-230 
Bernardo da Villamarina 
Florence complains about the capture of men and boats made by Fiscetto who is at 
Bernardo’s orders. Florence is confident that Bernardo will fix this problem. 
9 Februarii 1461 
Florentine calendar: 9 Februarii 1460 
101 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
285  
Nationi Florentina Neapoli  
Florence is surprised by the election of Francesco di Mariotto Baldovinetti who is a 
Florentine exiled to the office of Florentine consul in Naples.  
18 Iunii 1461. 
102 
Provvigione Registri 5 
166-167  
15 Luglio 1461 
Che i capitani di parte guelfa omissis deliberare e dichiarare il pregio denoli di 
qualunche mercatantia robe et cose che si caricassino sulle galere Fiorentine di per 
qualunche viaggio dallora innazi l’incantare et similmente circa l’avere levare et 
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caricare le mercatantie et cose degli altri mercatanti con questo che non potessino 
rescere alcun nolo che fusse stato ordinato omissis. 
103 
 Missive I Cancelleria 43  
338-339 
Regi Renato 
Cum ab hinc anno elapso cives nostri cum duabus triremibus officium peterent ut ibi 
ex more negotiarentur et pro petimo appulissent naves da carnicus quidam vestre ut 
perdurat miles vestra ferens insignia hostiliter illas aggressus non prius de scitia qui 
vestri novo novium impares pecunica omissis redimerent posset quo verrectione 
factus nostros civi navibus in omissis Bizantium versis cursum idenoeum tempos ac 
locum eos invaderet tandem nostris padroni egressi portum ob huius sint armi quod 
vidisse presenti spem omissis cum duabus trirembis inectibus plenus omissis amice 
virus atque armis institutem et re dum se illas accipere posse sed vicibus impareri 
arbitraretur ex hosti confesteri amicus factus dissimulans nil ab eo temendum esse 
multa que vestrum illi cepisse ne quid hostile in nos omissis noliretur qui licet 
suspectum essent omissis fidem utpote imperbi pro darsi continuo agere soluti cum 
quia verso Sicilia diceret censeret que ipsis nefas esse amicissimi regis prefactum 
aggredi qui ab iniuria temperaret begnige omissis dimisso quel ille arbitrerunt qui ubi 
cestiunt triremes alterum inectibus vacuem relictis alis ad cives omissis itere si 
cepisse natus facili hanc expugnari posse letat que dari sibi occasionem cives 
opprimende omissis illi videre e maribus perdant abstulisses omissis faciunt omissis 
ac adortus navibus suis omissis dedit nostri aut de nova perterrit cernentes nullam in 
arcus ne illos in meritos contumelia damno que afficeret qui omissis. 
21 Octobri 1461. 
104 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
340-341 
Ragusa 
Florence asks Ragusa to pay back the debt own by the Florentine merchant Ginori 
who sold some clothes. 
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A Renato Sicilie Rege  
 
Magnifici viri amici nostri carissimi. nuper litteras vestras accepimus quibus 
Scarinam sub nostris insignis ac de mandato nostros vestris triremes non mediocri 
damno affecisse intelleximus omissis quod ex his centum et 30 navales socios ex illis 
triremibus accepisse et in usum convertisset sinam omissis eisi summa opere fuit 
ingrata nobis quodam subditos vestros nostros amicissimos contumelia danno iniuria 
ac convitio affecerit tamen vehementer et multo plures quod agimur audire sub titulo 
consensus quisque voluntatis nostre Scarincium ipsum ea omnia adversus homines 
inos egisse. Non minus vos latere debet nos sedulo vestram rem publicam in 
Summum pretiorum et tanquam amicam huisse nec ab lege veteris amicitie nostre 
impresentiarum abhorrere constituimus uno et continue mantenere et gratissimam 
here decretimus. quod si ad vestre rei publice utilitatem honorem et statum aliquid 
addere possumus libenter agemus ut cognosciatis nos amicitiam vestram continue 
maxime fecisse quorsum heo viri magnifici ut intelligatis Scarincium ipsum sub 
preceptionis nostre lege ea que contra amicissimos nostros fecit minime operasse. et 
enim quando a nobis ipse discessit et iter versus regnum nostrum accipit ei expresse 
omissis ut vos et vestrates inter alios amicos nostros plurimi facere et tanquam 
amicam nostra istam vestram rem publicam favoribus quibus possa prosequeretur. 
quo sit ut admirationi non mediocri officiamus Scarincium ipsum de nostro mandato 
ea egisse que adversos triremes nostra fecit asservare quam voluntas nostra secus sit. 
reliquium est ut amicitiam vestram nobis maxime gratam fuisse ac semper fore 
intelligatis. scribimus ad eum ut dictos vestros subditos non secus ac amicissimos 
nostros optime trahere neque deinceps apud contra eos aliquam iniuriam seu 
dannorum facere presimat. coeterum quam apud nos fuit dabimus operas ut qui 
primum vestri homines una cum rebus suis omnibus restituat. valete ut optaris datum 
in civitate nostra a questo die 5 Novembrii 1461. 
 
106 




Capitano galere Orientalium 
E siccome sentiamo in questi mari dal canto di qua tra Napoli e Genova al presente 
piú galee e navi di malo affare et corsali et in fra gli altri Scarinci con circa 16 galee 
il quale insino a qua a danneggiato e nostri mercatanti et così sono certissimi farebbe 
in caso potesse e in piú nuovamente intendiamo a mole lavico a coteste galee che 
sapete ne fa e per pertinentia nell’andare vostro e però noi intendiamo fare ogni cosa 
per honore e per utile in salvezza di quello et mandiamo questo et ancora noi di qua 
facciamo il peroramento che di fatto vi si dice. Sicche stimiamo questo fante vi 
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troverà a Modone e gli abbiamo detto stia quivi insino alla giunta vostra et perché et 
consigliamo et comandiamo che costi a Modone leviate quei compagnoni potete per 
galee sopracello. Accioche per ogni caso siate meglio in ordine a potervi defendere la 
spesa de quali faremo mettere per avaria. Et quando di costi partito per fare il 
puleggio abbiate locho di non entrare ne a Spartiviento ne a Monte Ascagnolo et quei 
lugohi sogliono essere stanze di corsali a venga per rispetto del golfo di e di rivolte 
ve ne stia in caleta a Messina e di quivi non vi partite insino non sono due galere 
grossa della nostre le quali abbiamo ordinato di fare armamenti molto bene et forte di 
buoni uomini et facciamo conto partiranno di Porto Pisano innanzi Natale il piú 
lungho et omissis adddirittura a Messina senza tochare in altri luoghi dove nella 
giunta loco intendendo quelle nel paese fussano fusti di mali affarte a presente a 
potervi offendere vi si faranno incaute insino anno dove accioché di compagnia nepo 
ssiate venire piú sicuramente si che se dette galee di nuovo mandiamo fussore partite 
da messina per venirvi incontro vavessino trovate necessiamo e così vogliamo 
laspettiate a Messina insino a loro ritorno et in caso nel paese non fussero fuste di 
mali affari le dette due galere che di nuovo mandiamo vi aspetteremo a Messina per 
non perdervi pe cammino che stamani faremo prima di voi et di poi insieme e le 4 le 
galee di buona compagnia vi rechiare adiritura in Porto Pisano senza tuchare altre 
luogho eccioche di voi sabbia meno lingua si può et ancora perché non gittiate il 
ferro in alcuno porto dove potesse essere giunti che sapete il pericolo grande portano 
le galere come sono fuste alle quali la maxima dell arneta non corrano niuno dessere 
offese dellaltri legni ma soprattutto bisogna abbiate grande avertenza alentrare in 
Porto Pisano ventriate in tempo che secondo omissis possiate offendere et non 
oessere offesi et ancora sapendo che di Calabria vi potesse dare lingua di vostra 
venuta vogliano la facciate et per uno per pro aquello sendo avvisati prima di vostra 
tornata possiamo a Livorno fare quei procedimenti si intendessero essere validi per la 
vostra salvezza et benché noi siamo certissimi non bisogni niente di omissis vi 
ricordiamo e vogliamo che voi vegnate con tutti quei procedimenti e avertele chiaro 
vi conducanno a salvamento. 
18 Novembrii 1461. 
107 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
351 
Mainardo Ubaldini consoli Florentini civitas Pere 
Questa Signoria a per piú vie intesto quanto tu porti bene a honore et utile de nostro 
mercatanti che somamente ti comendiamo. Et benché questo sia il debito tuo niente 
di mancho ti avisiamo che anoi e a tutta la nostra città è gratissimo et niun bene fu 
mai immeritato per salvezza delle nostre galee che così al presente si trovano 
abbiamo fatti alcuni provedimenti et alcune notitia a Modone accioché nel loro 
passare di tutto siano avvisati et crediamo che alla venuta di questa di così saranno 
partite niente di mancho abundare in cautela ti mandiamo in questa una lettera al 
capitano delle galere al quale diamo aviso quello abbiano a fare et come sabbia a 
governare. Sicche non sendo partito da li et essendo partito appresso dite fai con 
ufficio.  
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18 Novembre 1461. 
108 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
350-351 
Pippo Cerchi habitante alla Vallona 
Questo fante che recha lettera di mercatanti che anno andare in Pera vogliamo che la 
vanno così vada insino a modone con latre lettere le quali gli abbiamo dato et però 
vogliamo che alla giunta sua tu toglia le dette lettere vanno in Pera et mentirale pel 
fante che della omissis et detto omissis con presenza spatierá che ne vada a Modone 
di modo di tutti quei favori che ti saranno possibile che la siconduca a salvamento et 
questo fa con effetto.  
18 Novembrii 1461. 
109 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
350 
Martino Dossi (rigatterio a Modone)  
Noi ti mandiamo questo fante con una lettera diretta al nostro apitano delle galere di 
Ghostantinopoli la quale dimportanza è come necessita dicto capitano l’abbia et però 
abbiamo detto fante stia così insino alla passata di decte nostre galee et te 
confortiamo et comandianti che tu metta ogni sollecitudine et diligenza che nel 
passare di decte galere decto capitano abbia decte lettere. Facendone notitia come a 
te parrá omissis ad lui solo et altri luoghi circostanti accioché se dette galere vi 
capitassono su loro fatto nostra di decte nostre lettere: accioché non manchi nulla ne 
cambi che passino così abbiamo fatto con ufficio. 
s.d. 
110 
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
369-370 
Regi Ferdinando 
Cum instiore omissis pro clarissimo cives nostro Luca Pitti cum certis mercis 
convergere petens vellonem insidia in tempstans coachis ad insulam omissis  pene 
desertium  navem appulit. Cui casu quodam triremis perfectus que ad consalvium de 
rege Siciliam pertinet ob huius factis hostilem in modium nostri hominis navem 
omissis 
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Cum erant continuo navigare mercatores Orientis aprtes quas infidelis tenent per 
distrahendis mercibus sicut multi ex Italia consueverint atque liceant permittetibus 
barbaris tutum ad illos aditum neque illius opere efferent adversus aliqau quo soiunt 
accedant ut livorem honestium sibi omissis. Florence requests to Ferrante I to 
mediate with the king of Aragon and Sicily. 








Piero Acciaiuoli Roma deliberata 1462 s.m s.d. 
 
È stato di nuovo alla presentia nostra un mandatario della Signoria di Vinegia decto 
Febo Capella il quale narrando con molte parole la potenza del Turco e che le galee 
nostre si debbano partire d Augusti o di Settembre et agiugnere a Ghostantinopoli al 
tempo che il Turcho ará fatto colla sua armata tanto quanto a in proposito per 
questo  sia possibile che colle galere nostre gli posa offendere in alcun modo et che 
essendo la città nostra mantentuasi di continuo per lo esercitio de mercatanti il quale 
in Italia é grandemente mancato et essendo per la qualità de tempi chiusi mercatanti 
nostri quasi tutti gli altri luoghi nei quali omissis. 
 
112  
Missive I Cancelleria 43  
383 
Nationi Florentinorum (Napoli)  
Noi habbiamo con consiglio di nostri prudentissimi cittadini deliberato per buoni 
rispetti e honesti del chonsolo della natione vestra in cotesto regno sia per l’avenire 
diputato da nostri spectabili et honorevoli capitani di parte guelfa. omissis é loro 
informati di nostra intentione almeno al presente electo per vostro console lo 
spectabile cittadino Zanobi Lottieri la cui electione vi significhiamo a voi tutti e per 
honorato e in qualunche cosa trattato come consolo della nostra natione et così 
vogliamo et comandiamo che con ufficio facciate senza qualunque scusa o cagione 
che collegare si potesse. Et perché intendiamo che di nuovo avete creato un altro 
console a lui comandiamo che rinunci al detto magistrato vedute le presente e a voi 
che lo consigniate e così fare in caso che volontariamente non concorresse et che in 
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alcun modo non lo trattiate per lavenire per vestro console et se altrimenti per voi si 
facesse ne pigliamo dispiacere grande negli animi nostri.  
6 Februarii 1462. 
Florentine calendar: 6 Februarii 1461. 
113 
Missive I Cancelleria 44  
15 
Re di Aragona  
Florence officially requests to the king of Aragon for the return of the Florentine 
wares which had been taken by his men. There is the interesting mention that 
“mercatores nostri per consuetudine sua super navi cuiusdam Genuensis merces 
poni”.  
114 
Proviggioni Protocolli  
381-382 
13/14/15 Februarii ind. 10  
Per ricordo fatto per parte de Capitani della parte Guelfa della città di Firenze si dice 
come può essere noto a ciascuno così altra volta deliberato e ordinato che si dovesse 
mandare ogni anno tre galere pel viaggio di Romania e tre per quello di Ponente per 
piú sicurtà delle galee per rispetto de corsali che vi sono in questi mari. Et che per 
questo tale ordine per parti di decti capitani sono stati incantati già due volte cioé di 
Septembre e di Gennaio per piú passati tre galee per Romania per questo anno però 
non davenire et non si sono potute allogare e niuno va fatto una superproferta di dare 
alcuna cosa al comune ma ogniuno chiederebbe et tanto che farebbe troppa spersa al 
comune et intendendesi che seguitando questo modo ogni anno si farebbono mai 
richieste et multiplicarebbero la spesa al comune per modo che in brieve tempo il 
navichare sarebbe abandonata in tutto per la città nostra. La qual cosa quando 
adivenisse il nostro comune ne perderebbe assai di riptuatione et molto ne 
mancherebbe delle sue intrate, le nostre mercatantie et le Arti farebbono assai meno 
che non fanno et universalmente tuto il nostro popolo ne riceverebbe grandissimo 
disagio et danno! Et che essi capitani considerando questi tanti et tali inconvenienti 
et desiderando a quegli obiviare anno avuto ne di passati piú volte sopra questo 
buone nuove de nostri savi cittadini piú esperti nell’opera del navicare. Et con loro 
insieme avendo examinato bene e così sopradetti tutti unitamente s’accordano et 
consigliano et confortano che si tenga ogni modo et via per la quale sinitenda potersi 
meglio mantenere il navicare come cosa che tutti afferiscano essere utilissima sopra 
tutte laltre alla nostra città et a tutto il nostro popolo. Et finalmente concludo di dare 
le 3 galee per ciascuno detti viaggi ordinato insino a qui omissis che allora pare che 
si debba provvedere nel modo infrascripto cioè che per questo anno per piú davenire 
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si possa et debba mandare tre galee grosse in Romania et tre in Ponente come é 
ordinato et che alle schale per l’andare et tornare et co capitoli conductioni et modi 
parti e effecti nel mandare delle due ordinate omissis di detti viaggi quelle che 
appartiene a lui salve nondimendo le cose in decisione. 
Che delle tre galee l’una per ciascuno di detti viaggi si debba armare pe consoli del 
mare di Pisa che pe tempi saranno a chiesto et spesa del Comune di Firenze. Et così 
armati consegnarle a conductori di quella a tempi debiti et sotto le pene ordinate per 
le decte. Et che sulla detta galea che così si armerà per a chosto del comune il 
Capitano di dette tre galere sanza altro perdurare o rassegna per quella tal galea 
andare il capitano però che la persona al capitano supplisce et così supplire possa in 
quella del luogo del padrone della rassegna. Et le altre due galee per ciascuno di detti 
viaggi si debbino armare pe conduttori di quelle et pongano il capitano come é stato 
ordinato per le tre galee e fare tutte le altre spese che et come é ordinato per le due. 
Potendo et dovendo sulle dette tre galee charicherà parimente dando a ciascuna la 
rada dogni mercatantia et robe come parrá al capitano et padroni di quelle che sia piú 
utile per conservatione di esse galee et delle robe che su quelle si charicheranno.  
Item che in compensatione della spesa che si farà pel comune di Firenze in armare 
detta una galea delle tre per ciascuna di detti viaggi considerando dell’altra parte il 
vantaggio ne pigliano i conductori per landata di tre galee per la sicurtà desse galee 
et per la comodità e utilità che hanno di levare piú robe che omissis piú noli et della 
aptitutdine che harano a potersi spanare piú omissis senza haver a soprastera in 
Inghilterra per tutti questi rispetti il septo che piglierà o dovarà pigliare pe noli delle 
dette tre galee per ciascun di detti viaggi sia et apartenga al comune di Firenze. Et 
poiche si possa et debbi a tempo debito a consoli del mare di Pisa per l’opera del 
navigare et gli altri cinque septi di detti noli appartengasi a conductori di quelle. Et 
che lo scrivano che sará diputato a ricevere detti noli sia tenuto et debba pagare al 
capitano alla schiuse quella che rata che tornava allora al comune di tutti in noli che 
dovesse recare per le galee di Ponente. Et per le galee di Romania paga debba al 
capitano in Pera la decta rata de noli et noli che si pagano poi per intorno sia tenuto 
et debba detto scrivano pagarli poi a consoli del mare di Pisa tenendone diligente 
chonto per modo che nel comune di Firenze non ne sia difraudato. Et che il detto 
Capitano tutto quello che così vorra alle sue navi di detti noli possa e alui sia lecito 
convertire et pagare nel soldo et spese di decta galea così armata pel comune di 
Firenze tenendo di tutto buon chonto. Et avertendoli alcuna cosa sia tenuto et debba 
tutto quello che così gli avanzasse rimette a consoli del mare di Pisa alla sua tornata 
non delle galee et di tutto rendere a detti consoli buona ragione. 
Item che capitani della parte che pe’ tempi saranno sieno tenuti et debbino infra dieci 
di dopo le finale conclusione di questa aver incantato le tre galere di Romania 
facendo detti incanti secondo gli ordini et infra il detto tempo debbino aver 
concedute non a chi meno ne che ne desse ma a chi piú profferre dare al comune. Et 
di poi immediatamente siano tenute et debbino incantare passati detti dieci di siano 
tenuti et debbino  incantare le 3 galee per Ponente et quelle concedere nel medesimo 
modo facendo luno et laltro di detti incanti ne tempi e luoghi per gli altri incanti di 
galee ordinanti et fatti sotto le medesime pene. Et co capitoli conditioni modi parti et 
effetti et salvi et bisogni sopradetti. Intendendosi detti capitani di parte liberi et 
absoluti da ogni et qualunche spesa nella quale fussino o dicessi loro essere incorsi 
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per non lavere incantato a tempi ordinati le dette tre galere che per questo anno 
mandare si debbono alle parti di Ponente maxime considerato che tutto hanno fatto 
con buon consiglio di piú nostri cittadini perché sintende che quando non si fa 
profferta sugli inchanti delle galee ne segue vergogna al comune et gran 
manchamento al nostro navichare. Item che quello che di sopra nella presente 
provisione s’intende havere et habbia luogo solamente pe detti due viaggi et per 
questo anno presenti rimando per primo davenire. Rimanendo salve et ferme tutte le 
latre cose così pe’ detti due viaggi omissis come per già altra ordinate. 
15 Februarii 1462. 
Florentine calendar: 15 Februarii 1462. 
115 
Missive I Cancelleria 44  
89-90 
Natione Florentinorum in Neapoli 
Zanobi Lottieri is the consul chosen by Florence. Therefore the consul chosen by the 
Florentine community in Naples is not legitimated.  
25 Septembrii 1462 
116 
Missive I Cancelleria 44  
90 
Consuli natione Florentinorum Neapoli 
The letter concerns some problems between the local Florentine community and the 
designated Florentine consul. 
25 Septembrii1462. 
117 
Legazioni e Commissarie 15 
141 
20 Octobri 1462 
Florence orders to Francesco di Nerone to finalise the agreement with the 
Neapolitan admiral Bernat Villamarí. The agreement concerns the protection of the 
Florentine galleys. Specifically, the text states: 
1) To defend the Florentine galleys 
2) Full safe conduct for the Florentine in the galleys. 
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3) The seaport of Porto Pisano must not be theatre of fights between the 
Neapolitans and their enemies.  
4) The admiral must stay XXX miles away from Porto Pisano. 
5) Eventual supplies will come from the Florentine seaport; no negotiations will 
take place. 
6) The admiral must dispatch for the protection of the Florentine galleys at least 
5 galleys.  




Legazione e Commissarie 15  
A Luigi di Buonaccorso Pitti a Genova 
153 
The Florentine Signoria instructs Luigi di Buonaccorso Pitti at the moment in Genoa 
to negotiate a safe conduct for the Florentines. In the case of a Genoeses’ refusal, 
the Florentine Signoria will continue to seize the Genoese goods in Porto Pisano.  
24 Novembre 1462. 
119 
Missive I Cancelleria 44  
114-115 
Duci Genua  
Per Bernardo Crappellum omissis navi capta missa sunt origine cive nostrarum. The 
letter mentions two corsairs. One of them is Bernardo Barchenus (qui nobis 
molestum es). Florence promises retaliation against the Genoese wares in Porto 
Pisano. 
17 Decembrii 1462 
1463 
119 
Missive I Cancelleria 44  
128 
Bernardo da Villamarina 
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Perché di qua a pochi giorni debba partire da Porto Pisano una galea delle nostre per 
il viaggio di Barbaria padroneggiata per lo spectabile nostro cittadino Piero di 
omissis Vespucci preghiamo e confortiamo la Signoria vostra che essendo richiesta 
da lui fare compagnia a decta galera e prestagli favore oportuno servo al tenore che 
capitoli con essa fatti accompagnare decta galee e rimasugli quel subsidio che 
bisognasse. 
25 Ianuarii 1463 
Florentine calendar: 25 Ianuarii 1462 
120 
Missive I Cancelleria 44  
144 
Duci e Consolibus Antiani Genoa 
Florence asks to the Genoese to give back the boat which was captured by the 
Genoese. Moreover, Florence also wants a monetary compensation.  
5 Marcii 1463. 
Florentine calendar: 5 Marcii 1462. 
121 
Missive I Cancelleria 44  
155-156 
Bernardo da Villamarina 
Abbiamo notitia per lettere de nostri consoli del mare de la città di Pisa come presso 
al porto nostro sono venute piú galee condotte da huomini di malo affare et ancora 
presso a Piombino ne sono alcuni altro di simili e quelli e scriviamo essere nostro 
dovere darne notitia alla Signoria vestra accioché improvvisamente et perché la galea 
nostra la quale andata in Barberia debba in pocho tempo tornare dubitamente ancora 
che da queste genti omissis la magnificenza vostra gli piaccia dare lingua a quelli 
della galera nostra la quale debba porre scale in pocho tempo a Gaeta delle galere 
che sono tenute a Piombino e al porto nostro e da poi prestare a quelle dicto subsidio 
e favore tale quale stimate essere bisogno per salvamento di quella che non 
dubitiamo mediante la virtú vostra ella ritornare salva come desideriamo e delle 
opere vestre vi rimarremo sempre obbligati e ci rimarrà singulare piacere. 
16 Aprilii 1463 
Florentine calendar: 16 Aprilii 1462 
122 
Missive I Cancelleria 44  





A boat owned by Pietro and Gugliemo Pacti was captured. Florence asks to Genoa 
the return of the boat.  
16 Aprilii 1463 
Florentine calendar: 16 Aprilii 1462 
123 
Missive I Cancelleria 44  
159 
Domino Bernardo da Villamarina 
Benché a noi sarebbe stato gratissimo che secondo e capitoli facti colla magnificenza 
vostra quella fusse venuta in questi mari al tempo debito e per la absentia vostra si 
siano seguiti assai detrimenti e damni et però quelli ci sia alquanto molesta non di 
meno avuto rispetto alla virtú vestra et fede verso questa republica che le galee vestra 
abbiano quella di nuovo ricondotta in quella medesima piú presto che gli sia 
possibile venire colle sue galere in questi mari vicini sperando che la venuta vostra 
abbia a essere senza dubbio alcuno salvamento delle galere che presto debbano 
tornare et ancora stimiamo che alla magnificenza vestra ne seguira havere e bene 
però gli piaccia mostrare possibile perché conosce il pericolo nostro et il danno che 
ciascuno abbiamo se non venisse ne ad altro effetto che per sichurtà delle nostre 
galere e delle robe de nostri mercanti et similmente del nostro porto la conduremo et 
non dubitiamo malanimo che a noi ne seguirete quel fructo il quale sommamente 
desideriamo et a quello grandissimo honore et singulare benivolentia et perpetua di 
questa Repubblica. 
29 Aprile 1463 
Florentine calendar: 29 Aprile 1462 
124 
Legazioni e Commissarie 15  
162-163 
A Piero Acciaiuoli 
An ambassador sent from Venice mentioned that the Turk had at his disposal at least 
36 galleys. Moreover, the Venetian ambassador stated that the Ottomans would have 
taken the 2 Florentine galleys going to the Levant. Venice demands that Florence 
abandon the travel to the Levant. Florence refuses since its galleys are due to depart 
in August or September and to arrive in Constantinople around June or August. 
Florence also mentions that most of the markets are closed to Florence (because of 
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the war) and that the Turks always respected the safe conduct. Therefore Florence 
asks its ambassador in Rome to persuade the pope not to support the Venetians’ 
demands. 
19 Marcii 1463. 
Florentine calendar: 19 Marcii 1462. 
125 
Legazioni e Commissarie 15  
164 
Piero Acciaiuoli 
The Florentine Signoria advises Piero Acciaiuoli to avoid any more request of tithes 
from the pope. 
26 Marcii 1463. 
Florentine calendar: 26 Marcii 1462. 
126 
Legazioni e Commissarie 15  
177 
Francesco di Neroni presso il Villamarina 
You can give to the admiral the biscotto for July and even August. The admiral can 




Missive I Cancelleria 44  
145 
Regi Renato 
Giovanni Villaggio captured a Catalan boat which had a cargo of wheat owned by 
Florentine merchants. Florence asks back the wheat.  
12 Maii 1463. 
Florentine calendar: 12 Maii 1462. 
128 
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 77 
 
consuli Florentinorum Mainardo de Ubaldinis in Constantinopoli 
 
Noi mossi principalmente per honore et bene di questa città e di tutti e nostri 
mercatanti et per salvamento delle cose loro che costi sono vogliamo in ogni modo et 
così ti imponiamo che veduta la presente con quella celerità ti sia possibile tu vadi 
alla presentia del signore Turcho et per nostra parte gli dirai che la sublimità sua non 
pigli admiratione se noi abbiamo alquanto differito del viaggio delle galee nostre le 
quali siamo usati mandare ogni anno a Ghostantinopoli et se quelle piú tardi quivi si 
condurranno però che essendo ne mari de qua grandissime armate abbiamo avuto 
sospetto chelviaggio delevante non cifusse da quelle impedito ma che la nostra 
intentione è ferma et così sempre sará perlavenire dicontinuare il decto viaggio et 
mandare nelle terre sue le nostre galee non solamente in questo anno ma in perpetuo 
piacendo così alla sua illustrissima ancora con maggiore numero di galee et molto 
maggiore quantita di mercatantie come avremo la commodità et il modo di così 
potervi fare et sperando che i capitoli fatti colla maestà sua sempre interamente ci 
saranno osservati et riceveremo da quella ogni favore intorno alla pesentia de nostri 
mercatanti sicome insino al presente cuesto con somma fede observato et fatto et che 
noi similmente  non obstante questa lungha novità o molestia che allui si facessi da 
qualunche altra natione sempre la fede allui data come ne capitoli sicontiene 
indubitamente observeremo et quando alla maestà sua paresse avendo rispecto a 
capitoli nostri che al presente occorrono che noi dirigessimo le galee nostre ad altro 
luogho che a Ghostantinopoli ne terreni et porti suoi ecio e alle foglie o ad altro 
luogho che piú sicuro o commodo fuisse dirai noi essere aparichiati seguire in tutto la 
sua intentione et rispondendo lui parergli che si vada ad altro luogho et nominando 
quello agiugnerai gli piaccia fare levare e commerchi a decto luogo alle nostre galee 
come furono levati a Ghostantinopoli et come arai avuto risposta da quello 
subitamente sanza indugio alcuno per tue lettere di tutto ci aviserai et così ancora el 
capitano et padroni delle galere nostre le quali per aventura fanno per cammino.  
28 Junii 1463 
129 
 




A Ottone oratore ad Ponteficem 1463 Augusti 24 
 
Voi andrete con quella diligentia che siete usato nelle altre vestre legationi e 
trovandovi finalmente a Roma nella presentia del Sommo Ponteficie fatte prima le 
debite salutationi et offerte direte che noi essendo richiesta per lettere et ambasciatori 
della Santità sua mandare a quella nostro ambasciatore perché lo illustrissimo signor 
duca di Borgogna doveva mandare a Roma in questo tempo suoi oratori come avrà 
significato per lettere per conferire et conchiudere intorno alla difesa et salute della 
Christiana religione contro a nimici di quella. Richiese la sua Santità che convocasse 
gli oratori de laltre potenti per omissis di Italia accioché insieme co quelli questa 
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materia grave et degna nuovamente si considerasse et trattasse noi desiderosi fare 
qualunche cosa grata et accepta alla Sancticà sua subitamente aver fatto proposito 
omissis al suo desiderio degno di persona comune atione. in però che nessuna cosa 
può essere piú a quella conveniente di maggior merito et gloria piú grata omissis. 
 
130 




ab Pio II Summo Pontifice  
 
Rettulit nobis orator Venetus qui apud nos agit esse intentionis nostre mittere 
nonnullas triremes Constantinopolim et quam Veneti aperte bellum gerunt contra 
Turchum Christiani nominis hostem timent plurimum detrimenti inde afferri posse. 
primum quia hostes qui Italorum vires formidant existimantes omnes concordes esse 
in gerendo bello poterint ex eo coniectari non concordiam intra Italos ser magnam 
vigere discordiam quin alii in aperto sint bello cum Turcis alii cum his commerciunt 
quasi amicorum palam habeant. videbunt falso predicari Italo imitis viribus 
defensioni Christiane religionis intendere. sue crescent animi hostium amicorum 
diminuent et qui coacti Turchis serviunt cupientes ad Christianos redire tepescens. 
timent a quia Turchis ubi oportunitatem habit triremium Florentinarum eas contra 
Christianorum classes cum suis parare poterit. nec confidendum est eius fidei: qui 
fidem non novit. supplicavit igitur nobis devotiones vestra hortaremur ne triremes 
illas mitteretis neque ex huiusmodi scandali subsequi possit afferens demum 
Venetorum ad nos missum hanc ob eam oratorem suum. nos hec intelligentes 
accersuimus oratorem vestrum cui omnia communicavimus qui excusationes 
quasdam in medium afferatat que ab verisimile non abhorret tam non videt ex his 
satisfactum Venetis verum scandalum se qui non parum si mittantur. Per ea hortamur 
omissis ut omnibus posthabitis consulatis Christiane religioni et in mittendis 
triremibus superfedeatis ne ex huiusmudi missione cum magna Christiani popouli 
tacitura et non sive honoris nostri diminutere aliquid sinistri eveniat. Data Rome 








a Pio II Pontefice Maximo   
 
Latere nos non debet quanta dilecti fili Ragusini cives postque iniquitatis spectator ex 
Christiane religionis impugnator Maumethus Turchorum rex Europas invasit damna 
et incomoda pertulerint et quod hoc anno post captum Bosne regnum et misere sed 
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cum dolore referimus in predam calamitorum distractum fuerent in timore constituti 
ne ipsius voracitate absorberentur et ut ipsio feritatem et insolentiam evitarent ac in 
fide Orthodoxa constater persistent incredibilia ex Persarum onera passi sunt et non 
modo ea que ipsi pro eorum tuitione iam diu hinc timentes eventum preparaverant 
sed quod nos et subminiscravimus et dedimus penitus consumpserint. fecimus nos eis 
omne subsidius et pro debito a honore nostro ac applice fedis semper pro posse 
facturi fuimus neque ipsos inique deferemus sed ut peculiares et devotos filios totis 
viribus protegemus nunc vero cum decreverint dilectum filium Matheum 
archidiaconum et oratorum ipsorum pretium ostensorem ad vos mittere quod etiam 
auxilium implorare nostri offici esse duximus devotionibus nostris comendare eas 
hortantes ut denotorum et fidelium Sancte Matris Ecclesie munere fungantur ex quo 
certe praeter eterne retributionis premium laudem et comendationem maximam 
comperabias et nobis magnopere complacebitis. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum 








Rapporto facto per dietisalvi di nerone de dietisalvi oratore allo illustrissimo signore 
duca di milano il quale ritorna in firenze questo di octo di dicembre 1463 
 
circa alla praticha della dieta facta a Roma contea del Turcho che fu la parte 
principale della mia commissione chome di per di per mie lettere ho advisato se 
ridotto la cosa che unitamente a queollo illustrissimo signore et la nostra comunità 
 sono stati in unione et duno medesimo parere et così insieme sono stati a Roma 
tractati cioe di dovere contorcere alle x xx et xxxx al pagamento quando unitamente 
si faccia per gli altri et le altre potentie Italiane et altro impedimento non fusse dato 
alle nostre galere di Levante et per ragioni che tale impresa debbe da ciaschuno 
essere commendata et favoreggiata et troppo caricho sarebbe a chi facesse il 
contrario così ad presso a Iddio chome agli huomini el mondo però pare a quello 
illustrissimo et dicta che è si debba fare dimostratione di volere prestare ogni favore 
et di poi seghuirne secondo che i tempi ne mostreranno et dare i favori quando 
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a Paulo II Pontefice Maximo 
 
Dilectis filis salutis et apostolicam benedictionem. requisiti fuimus superioribus 
diebus ab oratoribus vestris ut triremem quam olim vestra civita inpersectam in Portu 
Pisano. Fere Pio predecessori nostro in usum hoc expeditionis et classis in Turcos 
armande concesserat nobis reddere vellemus quinquidem expeditio ipsa 
prosecutionem non habuit. superveniente dicti Pii obitur a vos ipsa trireme apprime 
indigere videamini. nos autem in civibus que cum Deo possumus comodis vestri 
cupimus benignos nos exhibere et petitionibus vestris ammirere. scire nos volumus in 
persuadenda instruendaque et armanda navilla a dicto nostro predecessore qui ut 
nostris corpus illius dumtaxat at imperfectum accepit magis sumptus factus fuisse 
quarum computa dilectio filio Thome Soderino militi oratori vestro apud nos agenti 
ostendi fecimus omissis sit pro caritate qua nostre rei publicam affiamur contenti 
famus triremem ipsam cum corredis suis nobis consignari faceret volumus ait qui si 
pro hoc sancto opere fidei defendende voluerimus ea uti nos requirentibus nobis eam 
consestim exhibeatis sperantes qui ita nostre ipsa fidei vos geretis ita fervor noster in 
causa Dei non imminutus sed magis quod autos se videat. datum Rome apud 
Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatori die omissis 1465. 
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a Paulo II Pontefice Maximo  
 
Superioribus diebus ut comperetum habetis advertentes nos fuissemus impiissimi 
Turchorum regis communis hostis ex calamitatis Christianorum convocavimus 
omnes potentatus Italie et presertim Florentinos. cumque horum omnium oratores 
apud nos convenissent habuto communi consilio cum veneralibus fratribus nostris 
Sancte Romane ecclesie cardinalibus una cum his oratoribus ac negotio 
diligentissime agitato denique devetum est ut iam multo oportuno presidia 
Christianis his qui in faucibus vigientis hostis constitunt omnio mitterentur et 
maligna illa crudelis que fera e finibus europe traderetur itaque obtulerunt quisque 
presidium inter alios orator vestri duo milia ducatorum singulo mense in huiusmodi 
semper opus vestro nomine solvere obtulit que omnibus parva res hec quid visa est 
ac longe minore quod florentissima vestra res publica prestare procul dubio debuisse. 
cum vestro casum in Christo filii nostri Mathie regis Hungarie illustris et 
propugnatoris ac defensoris acerrimi Christianorum nunc ad nos missi oratores 
exposuerint ipsum Turchum validiorem in dictis surgere atque trattari adversus 
Christianos omni genere crudelitatis ut nisi presto occurat valde formidandum fit 
omnibus nobis eo potissimimum quam Hungari per se ad resistendum non sufficiunt 
ac omissis unde subsidia efflagitat. id a nostro considerationem adeos hndam esse 
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duximus verem ne si negligant turbulentissimus ille exercitus atque urget omneque 
unius armi summam iam contribuatis et mittatis in Hungarorum subventionem neque 
usque dum voluat armus differatis quam nunc egestas minet neque hiemem 
expectetis in qua milites ociosi sunt neque cunctandum putetis ut cum post hac 
accurere voluitis sero id agatis. aiunt ne bis dediti quo cito dedit item omnia oportune 
bona sint non enim satis erint quod neglectum fuit dolere si quidem nullo studio 
corrigi poterit quod sero fie. Si vestro totius sine difficultatem obiiceretis quod 
minime credimus oramus ut saltem dimidam partem nunc detis vos in qui Dei gratia 
divites et semper prompti pre omnibus aliis esse soletis ut boni cristiani in prestanda 
huiusmodi  subsidia cum feceritis ut spes nostra est profecto retributo bonarum 
omnium operum deus acceptam habebit hanc oblatorem neque in quo erit immemor 
ad rependendas vobis amplissimas vites. ipse enim largus est retributor insuper et nos 
quibus Christiane salutis omnis cura commissa est et qui totis viribus huic sancto 
operi incumbimus hanc ipsam oportunam largitionem pro magno beneficio 
deputabimus. placerit vobis immediate his litteris responsium dare. datum Rome 
apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatori die 16 maii 1465 pont. nostri anno primo. 
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Die 24 Maii  1465  
 
Laurentius Nicolinus vexillifer ab infrascriptis civibus petiit in his rebus consilia. 
quid agendum sit de navibus mercatoriis applicent ne barzalone quod orator regis 
Aragonie ne fieret rogaverat. quid respondendum esse summo Pontifici qui xxiiii 
florenorum in animum promissorum sub conditionibus emolumenti cruciate 
recipiendi impresentia petat saltem xii nulla habita condutionum intentione omissis 
Postremo quid mandandum sit dominus aloisio orator apud Summum Pontificem 
iusso a Neapoli Romam proficisci illique expectare quid sibi in mandatis detur.  
 
Franciscus Neronis Ad litteras summi Pontificis quibus preter conventum 
impresentia pecunie xxiiii florenorum referendum sibi videre ad maiorem civium 
numerum ut et materius et cautius agitare possit renderi ut quantum fieri possit non 
offendatur animus Pontificis et utilitati publice consulatur omissis Quod intelligatur 
interea dominus Aloisius orator Rome debeat illic supersedere nec ne et sedem meam 
deliberationem mandata adentur.  
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Die 27 Maii 1465  




Laurentius Nicolinus vexillifer iustitie proposuit litteris summi Pontificis quia nihil 
adhuc deliberatus sit tandem quid sit respondendum. Presertim cum dominus Antoni 
de Ridolfis qui expectabatur adsit et qui poterit omni de re ut gesta cum summo fit 
Pontifice exponere omissis Dicunt omissis velle id quod hactenus cum Venetis 
fecerunt cum Florentinis pro antiqua benivolentia conservanda atque augenda 
contrahere et mercari et res eorum populo necessarias ex nostro portu et civitate pise 
urbi sue subministrare.  
 
D. Antoninus de Ridolfis rem omnem exposuit ut cum summo egerat Pontifice sed 
secundum eius mandata obiligasse Florentinum populum cum ceteri quoque oratores 
Italie idem unusquisque pro mandato suo facerent ut contribueret ipse quoque in hoc 
inceptum in Turchos Christianorum hostes uno anno tantum xxiiii florenorum idest 
singulo quoque mense florenorum duomilia receptis in compensationem decimis 
vigesimis et trigesimis et predicationibus et indulgentiis et quicquid aliquid afferre 
eomlumenti posset. in calce autem fere reditus ipsius Summum Pontificem ab eo 
quesissse existimaret ne Florentinos quod voluto anno promissum fuerat inpresentia 
essent cum periculum et egestas impendeat soluturos et cum id fieri posse orator 
denegasse rationesque attulisset tantum scribere se et id petere velle respondit. Atque 
ita fecit ego vero abii et huc tandem ad nos Dei gratia incolumis proveni. Vos quid 
agendum deliberandumque fit melius considerabitis.  
 
D. Mannius Temperanus: laudavit dominus Antonium de Ridolfis qui in legatione 
sua omnibus mandatus suis diligentissime satisfecerit. deinde omissis si deliberaretur 
ut pecunie omissis postulata Pontificis solvantur ut contra ab eo petatur ut ea que in 
compensationem per eius sua promissa sint de quibus in eius litteris nulla fit mentio 
omissis nobis. Ceterum rem ut magni ponderis mature deliberandas esse omissis 
 
D. Carolus de Pandolfinis omissis: ad postulata Pape sibi videri necessarium futurum 
si ceteri potentatis Italie contribuent quod sint policiti Florentinum quo populum 
idem facere et pp promissa legati nostri et ut infamia apud ceteros Italie populos 
evitetur qua notaretur Florentinus populos si concurrentibus ad solutionem 
promissorunm in hoc Sanctum opus et communem Christianorum ausam ceteris nos 
soli immunes et expertes otiosi essse specatores conspiceremur.  
 
D. Angelus Acciarolus omissis: ad postulata pape multis rationibus asseveravit 
assentiendum esse summo Pontifici id (non) debitum esse omnium Christianorum ut 
hostibus religionis nostre et pecunia et omnibus viribus repugnetur id esse e dignitati 
populo Florentini. se a multifacere pro in subventionem Hungarorum mittende sint 
pecunie ut id fieret promptis animis ut promptitudinem Hungari anima divertentes de 
animis et benivolentia nostra certitudinem haberent neque Venetos proponerent 
quorum amicitiam ut audio ungari complectuntur. et cum formidanda sit potentia per 
se Venetorum additis viribus benivolentie ungaroum magna fiet accessio. et quam a 
populo decernendum est si pecunie solvende sint notarum rem fieri populo oportere 
non solum deligendos esse de sapientioribus qui rem agitent et maturee sapientierque 
consulant ut qui an dixerunt consulerint. 
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Johannocti de Pittis: summi Pontifici obtemperandum esse si qua fieri possit. 
presertim uom un ea re sidetur compensatio lucrum magis qui damnum inesse 
videatur.  
 
D. Antonio de Ridolfi: omissis de postulatis vero summi Pontificis multis relatis de 
his que Rome intellexerat tandem conlusit deligendos esse nonnullos cives qui rem 
tractent et mature consulant. et in eam inclinavit verbis omnibus suis sententiam ut 
summo Pontifici quantum fieri possit gratificetur testimonium faciens de optimo 
animo et voluntate ipsius erga Florentini populum quam conservandam et augendam 
esse multis de causis et optimis rationibus conservavit.  
 
D. Otho Nicolinus: postulata pape eiusmodi esse ut melius tractentur cum 
paucioribus civibus presertim cum his quo ob impedimentum nequiverunt adesse 
omissis 
 
D. Angelus Stufa: quamquam existemet inceptum contra Turchos non habiturum 
esse nunc alium successum qui hactenus habuerit nihilominus rem mature 
discutiendam 
 
Die XXX Maii 9 r Laurentius Nicolinus omissis petiti quid videatur respondendum 
Pape qui petiti omissis 
 
 
Otho de Nicolinus dixit: ex consensum eorum omnium qui ad eas res tractandas 
fuerant delecti et ex sententia eorum qui ob impedimentum nequeunt adesse summo 
Pontifici in eius postulatis omnino esse obtemperandum. ceterum considerandum ut 
id qui minimo populi incommodo fiat. Et id fieri posse si quinque viri per consilium 
centum deligantur quibus auctoritas ex potestas detur mutuo accipiendarum 
pecuniarum quibus voluntati summi Pontificis satisfiat.  
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Paulo Pape II  
 
Superioribus diebus Sanctissime ac beatissime pater cum intellexissemus tuis litteris 
que esse tua voluntas ut impresentia a nobis in ungarorum auxiliuorum dimidium 
saltem solvere eius quod voluto anno et perfecto ex per comissione nostra debebatur 
statim oratori nostro quem a Neapoli pridem venire ad serenissima tuam iusseramus 
in mandatus dedimus ut de eo negocio ita tecum agendi quemadmodum alterus 
apostolicis litteris per oratores ungaros nobis redditis hactenus ut videmus non est 
actum. quia ut existimamus legatus nostros istus nondum pervenerit cum ungari 
abierunt. alterius igitur litteris beatissime pater vis ut eadem xvi ducatorum idest 
dimidium totius quod pollicitis toto anno sumus in cruciate sanctissimum opus certis 
quibusdam modis ac donationibus quibus solvere promisimus posthabitis tamen ob 
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instantem necessitatem ob pericula nisi succurratur ungaris sapientissime a te 
elegantissimeque narrata inpresentia solvantur eorum oratoribus. movent nos cum 
verissime rationes que divine sane scribimetur a te tum vel multo magis auctorias tua 
beatissime pater se oborintur plurime et maxime difficultates que rem nobis adeo 
reddunt difficilem ut omnino videre non que armis quomodo possit et voluntati tue et 
nostro desiderio quod semper voluntatem sequitur Pontificis fieri satis. multa nos 
incommoda circumsederunt. annone caritas in qua et benignitatem tuam sepius 
excepti sumus. et sensit nostre populus et pro singulari beneficio et plane divino 
dono in animis reposuit. pestis timore que omnem civitatem suspectam et inertem et 
ociosam temuit. atque alias multo maiores difficultates perspessa est nostra civitas 
que pro divina tua sapientia cognoveris necesse est. qua pp minime vere omissis 
supplicare Sanctitate tue ut hanc excusationem nostram ita ut verissima est 
clementissimis auribus excipias. ac nos pro devotissimis Romane ecclesie filii pro 
deditissimis tibi pro his qui semper ad morem summo Pontifici gerendum 
obsequendumque sint promptussimi nisi contra inogeat necessitas cui reductari 
homines non posse aiunt in gremio teneas tue beatissimo vii Iunii mcccclxv. 
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Paulo Pape II  
 
Accepimus litteras tuas Sanctissime ac beatissime pater quibus humanissime ac 
clementissime cohortaris ut xvi ducatorum quemadomodum aliis quoque apostolicis 
litteris cohortati simus inpresentia persolvamino. hulla causa est beatissime pater 
neque esse potest cive non observit? Sanctitate tue non debeamus ac in primis 
cupiamitis. id si tibi erit persuasum cetera facillima relinquentur nobis. in presentia 
autem ob maximas occupatiantes nostra pape illustrissimos hospitos qui recipiendi 
sunt a nobis et propter dies sestos Sancti Iohannis que omnem civitatet et occupatam 
et negociosam habent nihil certi respondere possumus. paucos post dies cum erit 
nobis copia nostrorum civium de verum sententia solum consuetudinem nostre 
civitatis aliquid tertius respondebimus hoc semper humiliime supplicantes beatissime 
pater ut quemadmodum re vera est semperque fuit Florentinis populis ita 
obsequentissimum deditissimumque et beatitudinis tue et ipsi fedi in qua ex divina 
gratia tua os meritissime collcate existimare digneris nos que et populum omnem 
nostrum clementissime beatissime tue etiam atque ad comendare. te die bene valere 
et foelicem esse cupimus. xxii iunii mcccclxv. 
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Paulo Pape II  




Nihil est Sanctissime ac beatissime pater quod magis cupiamus que voluntati et 
preceptis tuis facere satis. quod ad cause sunt ut litteris apostolicis nuper nobis 
redditis paulum differemus. conantibus enim nobis responsium atque omnia per 
omissis sergantibus plurime oboriunt nunc difficultates de quibus aliis et litteris 
scripsimus ad serenitatem tuam que et conatu faciunt veritas ac desideria nostra 
intercipiunt. sed illud est in primis que persuasit sibi pro re certa populus cum 
primum de xxiii ducatorum millibus mentio facta est in expeditionem Sanctissimam 
contra immanissimos Turchos ex obligatione et converitus fuis contribuendum 
fuisset cum ceteri quoque Italie popouli et principes ad auxilia huiusmodi 
convenerent,. id quia penitus in hoste difficilimam nobis cum populo reddit ad 
omnem innovatio rem ut puta qui promissis se stare sue et ex obbligatione sua 
solvere velle et quidem libenter affirmet. hoc id molestissime et tulimus et continuo 
secondis qui morem beatissime tue gerere non queamus. quod ex causa fiat ut per 
oratorem nostrum Loysium Guicciardinum clarissimum equitem tibi signicaremus id 
quod existimavimus fortasse populum facilius esse adimissurum. est enim sapientie 
tue natura nota populorum qui dispendia et sumptus non libenter faciunt et cum 
semel quid imbeberunt non facile moventur e sententia presertim ad incommoditatem 
nisi urgeat magna quedam causa. hec nos impediunt beatissime pater atque votis 
adversaquitur nostris qualiter pro divina clementia tua excoramus ut feras equo 
animo si id non fit quod fieri non potest veramque causa nostram placidis auribus 
excipias nosque et per populumque nostrum ut semper fuimus erimus qui devotissimi 
apostolice sedis et filii. xxviii iunii mccclxv. 
 
140 






The Florentine Signoria complains to Genoa  about the robbery made by Nicola 
Doria to the detriment of Paolo degli Albizzi cui octingenti ducati sunt credit cum 
maxima damna ex navitione recepisse xvii iulii mccclxv. 
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Domino Johanni de Villamarina  
 
Ob benivolentiam Bernardi Villamarine patrui tui et perpetua eius in nostra 
rempublicam fidem et merita amplectumur te et proseguimus eadem caritate et 
benivolentia eademque de te speramus ad que a bernerdo suscepimus sine 
dubitatione aliqua polliceremur. necque dubitare debes nos quecumque tibi grata 
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futura putaremus volentissimis animis esse facturos. sed que in presentia  patris tuis 
litteris ut iacobus zamzo carcere liberetur per leges nostras fieri non potest invictis 
creditoribus quibus ipse sua sponte se obligavit et integre satisfacturum solemnibus 
stipulationibus promisit dabimus tamen operam ut rem tibi gratam faciamus ut omnia 
que fieri possunt in sua commoditatem per creditores ipsos ea fiant tua causa cui 
parati sumus in omnibus que peterentur et que fieri possent gratificare. v 
augusti  mcccclxv. 
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Consoli del Mare 7 Giornali 65v-66v 
Ricordo della vagia delle 3 galere di Levante tornarono addi’ omissis 1465 Capitano 
Bernardo Corsi Padroni Piero di Francesco Corsi, Francesco di Giovanni Benci e 
Niccolo’ d’Ugolino Martelli la quale fu gittata 9 Luglio 1466 per Bernardo Cambi e 
Bongiovanni Gianfigliazzi e Piero di Neretti eletti da Chonsoli del Mare di Firenze a 
detto di 9 fecere raporto che ne e appresso e spese fatte per detti schali. 
Paghati a Rodi per ancoraggio ..di quel porto 12 
Pagati a un porto ancoraggio 3 
Pagati Livorno ancoraggio 3 
Salvocondotto ai maonesi 12 
Per uno fante mandato da Rodi a Pera 27 
Presenti fatti al maestro di Rodi e altri presenti fatti al podesta’ e a maonesi 20 
Messina ancoraggio 7 
Messina e 3 piloti 9 
Ancoraggio Napoli 31, 6 B 
omissis Gaeta 6 anchoraggio etc. 13 B 15 
Pagati per vantaggio facessero a uno fante mandato a Firenze 9 
3 piloti 60 
Pagati per elezione del capitano Bernardo Corsi donati a Firenze secondo la legge 30 
Donati ai consoli del Mare di Pisa 25 
Totale: 274, B 146 
Appresso faremo nota delle robe venute sulle dette ghalee qui al diripetto della loro 
firma fatta per detti compartatori 
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Aghostino di Toti 1195 
Antonio di Rabatta e Bernardo Chambi e compari di Pisa 462.10. 
Sdracella per mattei? 100 
Rosso Cerretani che dimora a Pisa 1324.15 
Lucha Capponi che dimora a Pisa 431.10 
Giovanni di Filippo Villa con compari di Pisa 379 
Francesco Berti? 2021 
Bartolomeo e Nicola Benci co compari aPisa 3040 
Piero Doviso di Bernardo 42 
Ugholino e Antonio Martelli co compari di Pisa 1345 
Giovanni da Piacenza Schrabanello 192 
Giovanni e Pietro Salviati di Pisa 237.10 
Niccolo’ di Ugolino Martelli 6229 
Giovannni Giustiniano di Ambrogio 240 
Monaldo e Luigi Grimaldi 475 
Filippo e Federigo Centurioni di Genova 60 
Giorgio de Marmi 75 
Jacopo di Francesco e Manfredi suo fratello 75 
Gabriello da Privanta 77.10 
Battista e Bartolomeo Castigliane da Genova 172.10 
Simone di Negrone? da Genova 1433 
Giorgio Guisse? Di Genova 165 
Marchio?Maurchio?Mauro Buondina 146 
Chalvano Adorno 9 
Bernardo de Micho de Genova 250 
Marchello Chappa da Genova 100 
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Paolo Grimaldi  da Genova 91 
Francesco Maruffo di Genova 475 
Giuliano Maruffo da Genova 312 
Baldassarre Adorno da Genova 390 
Gherardo di Vivaldi 48 
Ghirigoro Larchiaro 450 
Pungiballa Paliuvi? 200 
Attaviano Adorno 84 
Omissis 50 
Giovanni Sobieti di Genova 20.12. 
Raffaello delle Torri 31.10 
Giovanni Battista di Grimaldi da Genova 25 
Benedetto di Valdia 18 
Somma 23436.7 Ci. Ro largho. 
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Die XVII Augusti mccclxv  
 
Vexillifer ad infrascriptos senatores loquens consilium petivit omissis ad extremum 
utrum quod consules artis lane petiit utile sit vectigalia lanarum reduci ad antiquum 
modum presertum ob nonnullas lanas que ea spe in portum nostrum duxerunt iter. et 
de navigatione etiamque futura est. 
 
D. Mannus Temperari: ad ultimam partem prius respondit et de re navigatoria dixit 
sibi videri quod fieri in re tali consuevit ut id referatur ad consules maris et 
mercatores. De lanis sibi videri quod de re navigatoria.  
 
D. Carolus: de lanis videri sibi quo fit in populus pasci possit providendum et 
prorogandam legem de vectigalibus mitioribus in annum alterum.  
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D. Jannotius: in omnibus que per eos qui ante dixerunt assensus est de re navigatoria 
solum quedam verba fecit et ea quidem omnia lege navigandi constituta esse. 
 
D. Loysius Guicciardinus: de lanis id quod superiores. Rem navigatoriam existimare 
se gubernari oportere ut leges et consuetudines navigandi constituit. 
 








die xxii Augusti mcccclxv  
 
Bernardus Bartholi de Corsis: electus sint secundum ordinamenta legatus ad magnum 
Sultanum ad regem Cipri et magnum Magistrum Rhodi cum litteris credentis et 
commissione per dominos et collegia deliberandis sine aliqua communis expensa 
 
die omissis Augusti 
 
magnifici domini collegis deliberaverunt mandata ipsius ea que infra scribentur et 
litteras credenti omissis esse. mandata huiusmodi fuere 
 
Se arrivassi in luogho dove fusse la persona del Soldano padre et benefactore nostro 
singularissimo presenterati dinanzi a sua excellentissima maestà parendo a padroni et 
mercatanti di decte galee. et prima salutatolo come è di consuetudine racchomanderai 
noi et tutto il nostro popolo alla sua sublimità dimostrando con efficaci parole quanto 
sia grande la fede et la devotione del nostro popolo inverso la sua celsitudine. 
Et ultimamente dirai che habbiamo mandato nel suo amplissimo regno le nostre 
ghalee perché così habbiamo stimato far cosa grata alla sua humanissima maestà 
perchè sempre mai ha veduto et laltre che vi sono navichate et qualunche nostro 
cittadino et mercatante con letissimo et humanissimo volto et facto sempre a tutti i 
nostri benefici et gratie assai piú che non è futo chieste a sua humanissima et 
gloriosissima maestà. et con quelle parole et modi che crederai gli sieno acceptissime 
pregherai di gratia che sia contento che e merchtatanti nostri paghino e commerchi 
con piú commodita di loro che si può e di quelle robe solamente et merchatantie che 
resteranno nel porto del suo amplissimo regno. et parendo a merchatanti di fare 
alchuno presente ad avaria lo fa in nome di questa Signoria con quelle parole che atte 
e alloro parranno convenienti.  
 
Quando anchora dove fussi la persona della maestà del re di Cypri parendo a 
mercatanti come di sopra si dire ti presenterai anchora dinanzi a sua maestà et 
salutatolo et rachomandatoci e la città e merchatanti lo pregherai come di sopra per 
utile e commodita delle ghalee et merchatantie desse. 




A Rhodi anchora visiterai el gran maestro reverendissimo in Christo padre et 
benefactore nostro et salutatolo et racchomandato il popolo nostro e merchatanti et 
chiesto quelle medesime gratie che di sopra. racchomanderai a sua revertendissima 
Signoria Bernardo di Marco Salviati e compagni nostro dilectissimo cittadino et 
merchatante che si degni di volerli far fare dovere di ducati 771 7/8 debbe havere 
della ragione della sua nomea per rigore di sententia havuta qui da sei della 
merchatantia come piú pienamente di questa materia sarai informato da esso 








Regi Cipri  
 
Propter eam que semper fuit humanissime maiestatis tue in nos et populum et 
mercatores nostros ad mirabilis quedam et prope divina beneficentia tua nihil omnino 
est quod petere a te non audeamus et speremus consequi. cur enim non esse hoc 
animo debeamus que infinita pene documenta manifestissima nobis dederis. cariorem 
nulli patri filium esse quenquem posse que sit tibi Florentinus populus ex quo etiam 
habemus et agimus tibi immortales gratias et quondam assuefecisti nos tuis beneficiis 
non dubitamus continuo aliquem a te petere ut ea in dies cumulatiora faciamus. nos 
autem tibi continuo magis obnoxios tuis divinis in nos meritis reddamus. navigant 
igitur nostri cives mercatorem gratia per amplissima loca gloriosissimi regni tui. 
certo scimus eassidem qua semper incredibili humanitate tua eos te esse benficiis 
affecturum et omni mansuetudine et clementia prosequuturum sed id precipue a te 
petimus et oramus ut ea tantum mercimonia Florentine. huic navigationis 
vectigalibus obnoxia sint in portibus tue iurisdictionis quocumque appulerint que in 
his ipsis locis vendita et tu adita relinquentur. que ex his exportabuntur ut sint ab 
omni onere navigatorio et ab omni portorio immunia erit ea magnificentia vel 
benigitas tue maiestatis mercatoribus nostrus magno emolumento et commoditati 
nobis autem ita gratum fiat ut gratuus fieri nihil possit nec quod nos per maiori 
benificio accipere in presentia a tua maiestate valeamus. nos filios tuos et populum 
nostrum devotissimum ac deditissimum tibi magno opere commendamus. diu et 
salute vale xxiii Augusti mccclxv. 
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Die XVI Octobris mcccclxv 
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Iacobus Guicciardinis rediens a legatione Neapolitana Romam venit et apud 
Summum Pontificem cum fuisset non nbihil habuit ab eo in mandatis. Itaque inssuo 
assingere in senatu omnia recitavit. Se fuisse ad Pontificem maximum et post 
consuetas commendationes captata prius attentione legati sic accepit Pontificem 
tertiorem esse factum et quidem inscio rege ungarie regem ipsum etiamsi vehementer 
erat contra immanissimos Turchos. eritatus tamen restunctum esse omnem ardorem 
legatis Venetis dissuaderibus net ad pacem chortantibus. et quamvis scripseruit ad 
regem et ad Venetos pontifex et pacem cum hoste nois Christiani prohibuerit. tamen 
vereri Summum Pontificem ne coacti necessitatibus que soli tantum bellum non 
possint sustinere pacem feriant. itaque hortari ut communi consensu omnes 
potentatus in publicam Christianorum causam auxilia conferant. et tandem hortatum 
finisse Pontificem ut id refere et ad senatum Florentinum et expectare super ea re 
responsium. ad sese respondisse legatus dixit urbem Florentie numquam fuisse in 
postremis in quacumque laude presertim Christiana. et idem se putare nunc quo eam 
facturum. et id relaturum et cuncaturum pro mandato suo ut responderetur post 
reversionem suam. His dictus in consultationem venit senatus. 
 
Bernardus de Giugnis: videri sibi inquit ex re nostra esse bellum Turchorum que 
maxime prorogari ut et Veneti et summus pontifex hoc intricati bello de novis rebus 
non excogiterit. Se censerent denit ad Pontificem littere ut hortetur sua Sanctitas 
eique supplicetur ut velut aggredi hoc sanctus opus belli contra Turcos et velit 
suscipere onus connocandorum populorum ut coi consensu bellum geratur. 
 
Carolus Pandolfinus: rem tractari veterem et dui consiliis agitatam non tamen 
provisam id se habere animi hoc pacto non posse dictus perdurare quoniam ob 
potentiam Turchi Veneti non poterun dum repugnare. videri sibi Summum 
Pontificem agere ex officio suo et pastorali. Poplum nostrum Florentinum semper 
promptum fuisse ad hoc inceptum ut etiam pius pontifex testis ubi est esse potest. 
Itaque scribendum ad Pontificem ut D. Bernardus quo dixit et ostendendum nos 
futuros semper paratos cum ceteri quoque potenatatus convenire volent.  
 
Angelo Acciaiolus: quia audisse se inquit sepe numero de ea re agi semperque 
eodem animo conclusum subveniendum esse pro virili non esse opus ut que acta sunt 
inpresentia reritent id tantum curare ut deinceps itares tractetur ut nihil scribatur qui 
levitatis maculam rei p possit incutere. Prius intelligendam esse rem mature. Postea 
scribendum videri hoc curandum ne si pax fiat cum Turco dicatur pax facta esse qui 
non voluerint Christiani et nostra civitas auxilium conferre. 
 
Joannoctius de Pictis: bellum Venetorum cum Turcis utilem nobis dixit et putare 
verum ee Venetos esse hortatos ungares ad pacem. et si denegabunt ungari Veneti 
ipsi pacem feriet. Et Pontificem ita qua est affectus patrie et sue civitati que ritare 
honestam causam Venetus huius paci si deneget auxilium. Censere itaque se 
scribendum esse ad Pontificem ostendam voluntatem et naturam Florentini populi 
qui per se non posse tantam rem sustinere sed esse ita animatos sit cum aliis simul 
aggredi omnia velint 
 
Loisius Guicciardinis: necessitate aginmur inquit ad scribendum summo ponteficie 
ex renuntiatione legati nostri in eam fere sententiam quam coeteri.  




Otho Nicolinus: commendavit Iacobum legatum de renuntiatione sua et responsio ad 
Summum Pontificem. Mercatoribus esse favendum nam de ea quoque re renuntiavit 
omissis Iacobus. Rescribendus summo Pontifici ut omissis qui ante dixerunt et si quo 
frequentiorem senatum agi res oportet ut quorum agatur et certi aliquid 
responderatur. 
 
Bartholomeus: laudavit et ipse legatum ob responsium ad Pontefice prudentia 
gravitateque plenissimum. In reliquis rebus idem quod coeteri censuit ut scribatur ad 
pontiuficem ut favent mercatoribus nam in eorum favore contineri non mediocrem 
rei per utilitatem et cense se ut intellectis his ad qua pertinet id prestetur id auxilii 
quod petierint. 
 
Francis de Sachettis: mercatoribus omnem auxilium prestandum in re Turchi placere 
sibi sententiam D. Angeli de Acciarolis. Prius rem intelligendam eodem modo 
sententiis concordibus deinde id scribendum qui fit ratum postea futurum. Et 
frequentiorem senatum de eadem re censuit. 
 
Joahnnes Canisianus: de mercatoribus dixit mercatanti laudibus extollens et utilem 
esse in civitatem affirmand et omnia censuit in eorum auxilium facienda que honest 
petent. deinde bellum protrahi Turchi cum Venetis utile videri et caute agendum 
nequid persentiscant. Respondendum censuit litteris ad Pontificem et frequentiorem 
senatum primo censuit. 
 
Mariottus Benvenuti: de mercatoribus idem censuit cum ceteri que in suo ordine 








Summo Pontifice Paulo II  
 
Narravit nobis Roma reversis Sanctissime ac Beatissime Pater Jacobus Guicciardinis 
quem nos a Neapoli venire ad Sanctitate tua enim omissis quantum moleste ferres 
qui Veneti auxilio defertur coeteros Christianitatem de pace cum immanissimo 
Turcho nomine Christiani hoste cogitare cogantur atque ad eandem ungarie regem 
amichae ardentissimo spict insuregentem choortari ad eo ut iam refrigenascere 
incipiat atque ipse quaque de pace cogitare. nos beatissime pater atque omnis 
Florentinus populus hanc Pontificalem molestiam non minore molestia accepimus. 
adeo ut nihil in presentis tanto opere desidereet a nobis qui his esse viribus ut tanto 
oneri sufficere queas. ostenderemus enim et dilucidum faceremus nos coeteris 
omnibus circis hanc sanctissimam atque adeo necessariam anteposuisse sempre atque 
impresentia anteponere. sed tante rei minime suffocturos nos esse putamus. et si 
enim numquam nos animi deficiunt tamen veremur ut nunc res nostre sunt ne 
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suppetat facultas. quanquam pro excellentissimo quodam beneficio datum a summo 
et omnipotenti Deo putaremus si quid tale quod beautus tue curam an tollere ponitus 
aut levare saltem posset valeremus. id tamen polliceri audaciter possumus nos pro 
facultatibus nostris nullo in quam loco esse defuturos quin hi sumus veri apostolice 
sedis et devotissimi et obsequentissimi filii qui semper fuimus et qui esse cupimus 
presertim te Pontifice Maximo clementissimo et cuius in nos et civitatem nostram 
infinita pene exectare diminuissime humanitatis et benignitatis Pontifice non observa 
documenta. xviiii octobris mccclxv. 
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Mercatoribus Florentinis Neapoli negotiantibus  
 
Per nostra lettera habbiamo inteso degli ordini ac privilegi i nostri consueti costi nel 
provedere davere il consule. il perché non volendo noi contra fare ad alcuno honore 
publico o alcuna utilita nostra vogliamo che come dite essere consuetudine nostra 
costi perseverare et eleggiate consule senza salario perché la ragione che dite del 
salario come dite ci pare pericolosa. et alla maiestà del re scriviamo ringratiandolo 
della clementia della sua maestà che di questo medesimo ne scrive et raccomandando 
noi et la natione alla maestà sua nella electione o diputazione farete del consule vi 
ricordiamo eleggiere tal persona che chi volesse calumniarvi meritatamente non 
possa havuti il rispetto allo honore principalmente della città e della natione et utilita 
et conservatione de mercatanti et cittadini et huomini Fiorentini che sotto suo 














Dietisalvi Neroni: et vicinarum nationum turbationes cum quibus mercatura exerneri 
non utilita potest itaque existimam sit vale augeret res domi et facere navigationi pp 
multa et moxa emolumenta qui his est. Et canalis omissis et securitatem portus nostri 
et dignitatem populi probavit.  
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Thomasus de Soderinis : et re navigatoria ad postremum berna sint et ea nullo pacto 
defenda est pp auctoritatem et utilitatem populi.  
 
Loisius Guicciardinis: et navigationi facende est non si neglecta honorem attulis 
nostri rem publicam curata multo ad facere magis. 
 
Francescus Beninus: de navigatione nostra dixit eam omnio ample ostendam esse pp 
utilitatem et nomen recuperandam.  
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Die IIII Januarii 1465 (1466) 
 
Congregatis super rebus omissis de duabus aut tribus navibus mittendis 
 
Mannus Temperanus: navigatio autem quo secunbdo loco tractanda veniebat non in 
comode fortasse per consules mari ut consuevit omissis ut ipsis totam hanc rem 
navigationem per trahant qui his omissis et mercaturibus qui eius rei notitia habent.  
 
Carolus Pandolfinus: rei navigatione omissis et tractandam omnem hanc rem sui per 
consules sint per mercatores et recte . 
 
Angelo Acciariolus: et differre tam qua mittati legatus na pro mercatoribus alisa 
persona causa requiris si alia de causa mitteret. Si enim pp nos omissis qui apud 
Pontificem tractarent utilius videri non adesse legati ut sit nobis maris omissis 
inprovisi aut in rem Turchi aha qui occurent posset traherem itaque pro mercaturi 




Generally, everybody agreed on the res navigatoria. Times and modalities are, 
however, not known. 
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Mirati sumus et nos magnifici domni fratres et amici nostri carissimi Bernardum 
Salviatum non dedisse operam ut esset domni qui rem suam et causas ex illustrissimi 
ducis mandato cum Gabriele Recane procurare posset. Sue re causant affert ut 
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videtur nobis que admitti debeat. quoniam is cui rem mandarent precipiter necessaria 
quedam impedimenta proficisci non potuerit. sed polliceretur nobis ita facturum non 
dubitamus brevi curaturum ut ad sit chii eius procuratore. et si antea id non fiet 
saltem non deerit quin navibus nostris mercatoriiis illuc profecturis legitimum 
procuratorem chium mittati. velimus ut gabrielem ipsum ad exoectandum 
cohortemini neque molesta sit hec tantula mora quoniam futurum est ut tandem 
omnis causa et iure et quiete componatur. die xiii Martii mccclxv (i). 
 
Florentine calendar: die xiii Martii mcclxv. 
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Mahoensibus Chii  
 
Habbiamo la vostra lettera. ringratiandovi della humanita facta alle nostre galeaze 
benché non è nuova cosa la benivolentia vostra grandissima colla città nostra. 
Bernardo Salviati adimonstra per necessaria cagione che haveva mandato costi per la 
causa ha con Gabriello Rectane non essere potuto venire. ma che non presteza vi fare 
suo legittimo procuratore almeno colle nostre galeazze che questo anno debbono 
venire. paris iustiniano el quale modestissimamente nelle cose ragionevole et honeste 
ne raccomandate non dubitate che gli faria facta ragione et giustizia et nelle cose 
giuste ci sará raccomandatissimo. ex Florentia die xiii Martii mcccclx (sexto). 
 








die xxvi Martii mcccclxvi  
 
Aepiscopus Legionensis legatus summi Pontificis de more ad auditorii ostium 
exceptis esse a magistratu ex ductus in sedilia cum omnes consedissent. dixit 
Summum Pontificem commotum fuisse et dolore affectum pp obitum francisci 
sfortie ducis Mediolani illustrissimi. qui tamen et si ecclesiam ali quando vexaverit 
tamen tot tantasque fuisse eius virtutes tot facta egregia ut merito facturam fecisse 
nos maximam existimandum fuit. fuisse Summum Pontifice bene affectum eius 
virtutibus et mirifice eum dilexisse. habereque in animo certum eandem que 
dilectione filios et heredes prosequi. atque ob eam causam mitti se oratorem 
Mediolanum habereque in mandatis ut inter transeundum inter summi pontefici 
Florentinis domnis aperiat eam esse ut Italia pax et societas retineat. pertinere id ad 
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Summum Pontificem tum qui pater et custos est totius Christiani gregio tum que 
princeps est societatis Italicorum potentatum et quid multo maioris existimandum 
esse maximo in vigilare oportet ne alique discordie Italie animos faciant 
immanissimis teucris et quid antea ob concordiam Italie attentare non sint ausi orta 
discordia invadant. Sacre Summum pontefici Florentinum populum pacis esse 
studiosissimum. tam pro officio pastori et parris chortari et monere ut nihil 
pretermittant quid ad eam conservandam facere videatur omnia factura esse 
Summum Pontificem sponte sua propter eam causam. tamen cupere eum si quid 
preterea Florentini intelligant quod habeat in se utilitatem et conservationem pacis 
considenter admoneant nullos consilia negligentur nihil preterni iter ut pax 
tranquillitaque Italia conservet in ea preserveret societate Italicorum popoulos que 
divi nicolai quinti Pontificato imita est et ad hoc usque tempus summa cum utilitate 
et salute Christiani nominis conservata.  
Respondit Bartholomeus lentius vexillifer iustitie nihil intelligere potuisse populum 
Florentinum gratius qui eam rotum mentem pontiicio maximi ut nulla insecat 
inimicia Mediolansibus principibus quam ad Italie pacem retinendam nihil videatur 
esse accomodatius. procurasse populum Florentinum pro sua vie ut id fieret preterea 
siquid opus erit promptissime omnia esse facturos orare Summum Pontefice pro sua 
sapientia et probitate ut sanctissimo pacis proposito perseveret. nihil facere tum 
posse quod aut parere posset maiorem utilitatem Christiano nomini aut quo possit 
summus pontifex maioram sibi gloriam comparare. 
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Calzarando de Requesens capitano classis regis Ferdinandi  
 
Da Livorno habbiamo una humanissima lettera vostra et benché non cie nuovo 
lamente della maestà del re inverso di noi nientedimeno habiamo molto caro et 
accepto le promesse vostre. et havendo alcuno bisogno di voi o delle galee vostre 
arditamente ne richiederemo et viseremo la benignita della maiestà del vostro re et 
padre nostro. le cose nostre siamo certi riguarderete et honorerete per humanita 
vostra perché riguardando et honorando quelle riguarderete et honorate le cose 
proprie della maiestà del re. se possiamo fare cosa che sia grata a voi volentieri lo 
faremo se naremo notitia. die ultimo martiii mccclxvi. 
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Capitaneo classis regis Neapolis ad Ianuas  
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A questi di havemo vostre humanissime lettere di Porto Pisano et a quello 
respondemo. crediamo larete havute. et perché intendiate noi fare conto delle nostre 
proferte comincieremo a richiedervi con quella sicurtà ci date per la vostra lettera. a 
questi di sono stati presi uomini nostri presso al porto baratto da uno corsale 
gienovese  prendibene da levanto et facto ricattare come nimici. il che molto cie 
doluto et crediamo ancora a noi perlamicitia habbiamo colla maestà del re ancora a 
despiacere perché chi offende noi et gli uomini nostri perla strectissima amicitia 
nostra offende ancora voi. saravvi agevole col grande senno vostro et riputatione 
dimonstrare a costui il suo errore et quanto noi siamo cari figiluoli della maestà del 
nostro re padre vestro. quando con vostra comodità lo potrete fare haremo caro 
intendere qualche cosa. et se noi possiamo fare cosa vi piaccia lo faremo volentieri 








Domino Plumbini  
 
Habbiamo notitia che una fusta di male affare conducta da uno prendibene  da 
levanto huomo Genovese è capitata costi et ha preso nostri uomini et factogli 
riscattare che molto cie dispiaciuto et crediamo ancora a voi doverrà dispiacere 
quando lontenderete. però venediamo notitia e confortiamovi a fare quello per noi et 
honore nostro et utile degli huomini subditi nostri che richiede lantica et buona 
amicitia nostra. non vi manca prudentia ne buona volontà inverso di nuoi. la quale 
siamo certi che havete come habbiamo noi et havemo sempre inverso la vs. die vero 
Aprilis (1 Aprilii 1466). 
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Rem per molestam nobis intelleximus magnifici domini fratres et amici nostri 
carissimi et que non minus gravis esse debeat nobis propter amicitiam et 
coniunctionem nostram cantalusium hominem januensem apud amatunta navem 
quandam mercimoniiis onustam Florentinorum mercatorum nullo iure neque ulla 
quidem iustitie omissis intercepisse. itaque magno  affecti detrimento nostri 
mercatores magistratum nostrum circumsistant opem atque auxilium implorant ut 
non permittamus sine aliqua causa prede esse vestris hominibus quibus cum non pax 
solum est sed eadem eo coniunctissima amicitia iit addi nihil possit. velimus igitur ut 
aliquid remedii circumspiciatis. nos de prudentia vestra et de potestate tamen nobis 
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Legazioni e Commissarie 15 
55-62 
die xxxi Mai 1466  
 
Matteus Palmerius a consilio centum legatus creatus est ad Summum Pontificem pro 
uno mese prorogando per domino et collegia quotiens utile iudicabitur cum octo 
equis et uno cancellario cum mandatis et litteris credentie per dominos ipsos et 
collegia deliberandis et cum salario consueto. 
 
mandata Mathei de Palmeriis oratio ad Summum Pontifices deliberata die vi Junii 




preterea quod non te fugit ob habita cum Turcis commercia multi mercatores cives 
nostri eucharistie communione prohibiti fuerunt. exortus enim rumor quidam ea 
inbibita fuisse per dies omissis sancte sacerdotes et pastores deterruit ut omnes qui 
aliquo modo orientali navigationi ob mercaturas facerit prohiberent. ceterum que ea 
inhibitio fuerit aut quando quat quomodo fuerit inhibitum numquam notu fuit neque 
nobis neque cuisque ex his qui mercaturam Orientis exerciti erint. itaque supplicabis 
summo Pontifici clementissimo indulgentissimo ut mercatoribus nostris siquid 
inprudenter est erratum condonet communionique restituat presertim si nihil unquam 
quod antiquis canonibus ventitum sit importatus constet. lucri tantum et 
negotiationum gratia exercita mercatura quoniam ea maxime alatur Florentina civitas 
et plebes egestasque opificium sustentetur. si autem videbitur aut impetrandi occasio 
aliqua prestabitur tibi dabis operam ut inficitmeum quo negotiari liceat. sed quoniam 
de responsio Pontificis subveremunt ne petenti tibi deneget et atque et videas oportet 
ut misi spe certa impetrandi nihil aggrediare. quod a tibi facile erit pro prudentia tua 
et tempus et sermones interea aliqua affermit que etsi vir sapiens non pretermittit 
tamen quomodo fieri possint que occasio prestat facilius re ipsa percipiuntur quin 




Legazioni e Commissarie 15 
67-68 
 
(This is related to the above mission carried by Palmieri in Rome) 
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Postremas litteras tuas accepimus datas Rome vii quintilio die ex his cognoscimus 
Christiane communionis mandatam fuisse, quod ad mercatorum attinet causa quam 
vehementer est cordi nobis velimus ut quantum potes omni studio et diligentia tua 
acceleres ut ex licet aliquid. in sapientia et iustitia Pontificis magna spes est presenti 
cum palam profiteat ex iure se cum mercatoribus velle agere delegaveruitque causam 
quatuor ex sapientissimis et iustissimis cardinalibus et rei publice nostre ob eorum 
insignem humanitatem optime affertis. sedulo itaque cum his ages ut de iure 
renuntiet Pontifici super delegata mercatorum nostrorum causa. seorsum et 
reverendissimo patri nostro cardinali Sancti angeli et atque et causam istas 
commendabis. is enim non solum quia urbi nostre semper facit ut mirifica in 
populum nostrum extent eius beneficia sed qua ecellensis est probutatis et amicis 
peritissimus vehemti favere nobis opem implorantibus suam debebit.  
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Federico Ferdinandi secundogenito Neapoli  
 
omissis Impii magni teucri res quas in Albaniam egerit agitque ad presens eiusque et 
maritimos et terrestres apparatus dicere non curamus cum eas paternam maiestas 
D.V. significasse et in dies significare que a nobis aut aliis sibi scribiunt certo 
sciamus . dicimus tamen illos esse formidabiles atque Christiane religione et toti 
Italie periculum non parum minantes qui nisi aqstu providentum illisque obivetur res 
Christianas haud tutas iudemus. valeat D.V. datum in arce civitatis Raenti die 2 










regi Ferdinando  
 
Continuo gloriossisime rex pater urbis nostres accumulas benefitia tua quesint iam 
pene innumerabilia in populum et civitatem nostram. mercatores enim nostri qui 
negotiantur in tuo amplissimo regno continuo scribunt nobis ita tractari abs te ut ne 
humanius neque amicabilius in patria sua versari posse confirment. nihil peti atque 
quin concedatur. liberimam omnino atque utilem satis mercaturam esse. non 
conservari solum antiqua privilegia nostre nationis a divus regibus progenitoribus tui 
benignissime concessa. sed in dies magis ac magis ornatiora fieri. nihil habemus quo 
satis pro meritis tuis referre tibi gratiam possumus. facimus tamen et omnis populus 
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ardentissime id approbat quod possumus omissis colimus scilicet et observamus te 
regem gloriosissimum ac beneficentissimum patrem urbis et populi nostri totis animo 








Pro legatus ad Pontefice et regem Ferdinandus  
 
Nota et informatione a voi spectabili cittadini nostri messer Antonio di messere 
Loreno Ridolfi et Giovanni d Antonio Canigiani et deliberata adì XXX di septembre 
mccccxvi. 
omissis 
il perchè non abbiamo dubitato come per lettera scrivemo et per sua lettera fu 
confirmato la sua clementissima beatitudine havere havuto molestia de nostri 
pericoli. i quali siamo certi la fama et le lettere gi aranno portati grandi come 
certamente sono stati. Peroche per malignita et perversita dalquanti cittadini nostri 
ambitiosi et crudeli la nostra libertà è sita presso alla sua ruina et distenderete qui nel 
narrare alcuna delle particularita piú necessaria. dicendo che è già molto che 
comincio fra noi queste discordie che hora hanno facto questo movimento. essi 
havendosi messo nellanimo volere piú liberamente imperare et empire le sue meno 
che honeste et civili voglie hanno continuamento atteso con ogni industria seminare 
zizanie fra e viri principali cittadini buoni et giusti uomini fautori della giustitia et 
dogni bene et optimamente meriti della nostra republica. et havevamo tanto potuto 
con loro diaboliche astutie che havano condottola città nostra negli affanni diche la 
sua beautitudine et tutta Italia ha notitia. et che dio per la sua sommabonta et 
nostra  non per merito alchuno nostro se non forse in qualche parte per la nostra fede 
perpetua et constantissima et continua et fervente devotione in verso la sua 
sacrosancta chiesa et pontificale omissis è sita grata nel divino conspecto con 
piccolissimo standolo et somma compassione in verso e capi dello errare perché a 
molti altri complici et coadherenti al tutto è stato perdonato e spenda al tutto ogni 
discordia a summa pace et tranquillita ridotta la città el populo nostro et levate via el 
mal sono che conduceva el campo della città nostra a sterilita omissis per la qualcosa 
noi siamo molto allegri del successo nostro si perché la nostra libertà molto ce piú 
cara che alcuna altra cosa et che la cita nostra a si perché nella conservatione dessa si 
vedono rimediati et omissis una esopradecti gravissimi et abominevoli pericoli. fra 
queli e questo che ancora tucta la fede Christiana nondebilita et davasi ardire et forza 
allo immanissimo Turcho et universale hoste della fede di Christo e della chiesa di 
pietro il qula essendo tanto feroce et tanto insultando per le victorie havute et 
ricordandolo secondo si stima solo lamita et pace d Italia havendo quella havuto 
alteratione sintende facilmente quello che seguira che noi di tanti benefici ne 
rendiamo infinitissimamente gratie adio e alla optima volunta di sua beatitudine et 
sanctissime opere sue per la conservatione dessa pace universale. la quale senza 
dubio ha dato grandissimo favore a questi nostri pericoli i quali havendo avuto altro 
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fine manifestamente harebbono impedito la laudatissima et necessaria impresa sua in 
defensione della fede sancta della quale parlo comesso noi el reverendissimo padre 
cardinale di Sancto Angelo. alla quale ancora trovando ne di de nostri tumulti in 
questa città perché colla auctorità et desso Pontefice et della sua virtú ne porse 
grande aiuto molto ci sentiamo obbligati omissis  
 
Et perché la città nostra piglia piú grande utilita et ha necessita del navicare in 
Levante et ha dimonstrato sua beatitudine qualche volta noi gli essere grata riferite in 
questo come in ogni altra cosa landustria et prudentia nostra et se insulfacto 
giudicherete che supplicando della licentia a sua santitià senedovesse havere gratia 
nesupplicherete quando altrimenti giudichassi et dubitassi che esso non lo denegassi 
ci pare molto piú utile non tentare di tale materia cosa alchuna. 
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Domino Antonio Ridolfo et Johanni Canisiano oratoris ponteficialibus  
 
omissis facto mentione dalla sanctita del sommo Pontefice della rinnovatione della 
lega Italica spetialmanete perché la sua Santità già molto tempo et in piú a diversi 
modi se ingegnata a rinnovarla omissis per tanto larghissimi offerte alla sua Santità 
che saremo promptissimi aogni pensiero che farà la sua beatitudine per la 
conservatione della pace omissis ricordandone in questa parte della impresa contra 
limmanissimo Turco alla quale molto è necessaria lunita d Italia et comecapo e 
principe et conservatore et autore della lega sidegni procurare alleffecto sopradetto 
come sempre ha fatto omissis. 
 
164 




die xv Octobris mcccclxvi  
 
Orfeus Ricavis a ducibus Mediolani missis inter cetera materia data admonuit 
magistratum advenisse tempus accomodatissimum Italico federi renovando 
existimasse antem legatos nostros tam ad Summum Pontificem que ad Venetos 
nondum cum venisset ex urbe fuisse profectos eaque de causa multum acceleravisse 
iter videri enim dixit maxime essere ex utilitate utriusque status ut ad cetera mandata 
eorum hoc quoque adderet ut aperte tandem Venetorum animi patescerent qui multis 
ex causis susceptissimi esse debent. et in primis propter novos exiles qui apud eos 
convenerunt quod si fedus denegarent aut perplexitare et tergiversatione consueta 
uterentur nos rebus nostris circumspiceremus sanciremus que aliud foedus et cum 
Ferdinando rege Neapolitano et cum ducibus ipsis Mediolanensibus citaremusque 
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Summum Pontificem qui tum pp ea que vulgo disseminavit de proposito consilioque 
suo tum propter pontificale mimus pari favere turbatoribus autem eius adversus esse 
debet ut ipse princeps et caput foederis esse vellet. periculum enim esse ita 
terversantibus Venetis et se ad bellum occulte preparantibus nos interea otiosi simus 
expectemus que donec ipsi in apertam pugnam erumptam et mermes et mertis ut 
certia difficillimum bellum sit futuros magno cum discrimine communum 
fortunarum e bello eversivos.  
 
Responsium est placere id consilium ceterum necessariam esse ex consuetudine 
civitatis senatus consultationem. 
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Die xviiii Octobris mcccclvi  
 
Retulerunt ut scriberetur ad Paulum II in hunc modum habita prius super hac re 
consultatione 
(Carolus Pandolfinus, Angelus Acciariolus, Ioannoctius Pictis) 
 
Inteso quanto Jacopo Guicciardini ha riferito per parte della Santità di n. s. con 
monstrare che la beatitudine sua porti gravissimamente quello che egli intende del 
pensiero de Vinitiani  di fare pace col Turcho. la quale la Santità sua con ogni opera 
et forza è disposta reprimere per lo honore et conservatione della fede di Christo et 
della sedia apostolica. allegando che i Vinitiani sono mossi al cercare questa pace 
cognoscendo essere soli in questa guerra. hora il raporto della pratica di nostri 
cittadini et considerando quanto questa tale deliberatione de venitiani sarebbe contro 
alla opinione della nostra città et etiam quanto porterebbe allo honore della nostra re 
publica quando noi mostrassimo per la nostra risposta non non stimare questo caso et 
essere negligenti et nelle risposte et nelle opere. vogliamo che scriva alla sua Santità. 
alla nostra città non meno che alla sua Santità essere grave ogni affanno che noi 
intendiamo essere in quella et degli antri grandissimimamente non sentire le forze 
nostre pegli affanni successi come è noto alla sua beatitudine tali quali noi vorremo. 
Perché dimostreremo et alla Santità sua et a tutti e Christiani anteporre questo caso 
adogni altra nostra cura et riputeremoci dadio havere singolarissima gratia essere 
quelli  che lo potessimo fare. et benché noi non cognosciamo quali sieno leconditioni 
vestre nientedimeno noi vogliamo che la beatitudine sua sia certa che noi siamo 
quegli veri figliouli della sedia apostolica et della Santità sua che sempre siamo stati 
















Ferdinando regi Neapolitano et ducibus Mediolanensibus mutatis mutandis  
 
Nihil unquam longius fuit nobis rex gloriossime pater nostre urbis quam videre hunc 
opratissimum diem quo novos isto foedere quod Rome oratores tui nostrisque et 
illustrissimum principum Mediolanensium inierunt quo vel stabilita est Italie pax 
quod nos magnopere expectimus vel certe id effectum ut summo eam periculo eius 
qui adversare dicta omissis immoriande res veniant. sunt enim iam eo loco 
communes fortune ut videtur nobis ut nisi quis gratus volet esse temerarius contra 
quetudinem tranquillitatemque Italie qua fuimus multos iam annos ausuram 
existimamus neminem. approbavit foedus noster populos summo studio summaque 
concordia ut pubblicis scriptis nostris que erunt cum his litteris poteris cognoscere 
esse. rogam omnipotentem Deum qui ac pacis ac bonis omnium causa atque auctor 
est ut sit hec societas atque hec sanctissima foederis coniunctio et diuturna et 
perpetua vale die xxii Januarii mcccclxvii. 
 
Florentine calendar: xxii Januarii mccccclxvi. 
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Nominatis in foedere  
 
Foedus quod Rome nostri oratores cum rege Neapolitano et Mediolani ducibus 
inierunt pacis conservande gratia ac communes status et fortunas confirmandi inter 
coeteris conductiones hanc qui haberi in primis ut amici et soci nominationibus 
omissis qui percussimus foedus si ut amicis ipsis ac sociis nostris videatur veniant in 
societatem. itaque nos vetustam benivolentiam nostram semperque inviolatam animis 
nostris recensentes inter amicos et socios Florentini nominis in primis palam 
habuimus interservimusque publicis scriptus ut fieri oportuit ex foederis 
conductionibus existimamus autem rem nobis gratam fecisse ut nos certe ex amicitia 
et benivolentia vestra maximum fructum incaditatis accipimus. si id placuit ut 
placere existimamus nobis velimus itaque primum ita placuisse ad nos rescribatis. est 
enim in conditionibus terminus prescriptus misis unius posteaque has nostras litteras 
acceperitis. quo respondere debeatis. 
die xxx Januarii mccclxvii. 




Florentine calendar: die xxx Januarii mcclxvi.  
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Responsive Copiari I 
167v-168r 
 
Ab Venetis  
 
Christophorus Mauro Dei gratia dux Venetiarum etc. magnificus et excellentis 
dominis prioribus libertatis et vexillifer iustitie populi Florentini fratribus et amicis 
nostris carissimi. salute et sincere dilectionis affectum. accepimus litteras vestras 
datas duodecimo instantis super negotio navium Anconitanorum ex Constantinopoli 
in Italiam navigantium que ad prefecto navium nostraroum armatarum et intercepte 
sint. et quecumque dicitis et memoratis de mutua antiquaque benivolentia nostra nera 
sint. Numque enim fuit quim nos et cives omnes vestros singulari prosecuti simus 
benivolentia. quantum ad naves Anconitanorum a verum in eis caricatam pertinet 
perspicuum est nos cum immanissimo Turco quadriemnio iam exacto  bellum 
gravissimum et periculosissimum gessisse et gerere. quod ut impensis laboribis 
coeterisque malis incomodis que belli materia fecim afferre solei meminisse dici 
potest ita comuni periculo et comodis sique ex bello ipso ob nostras propugnationem 
suscipiunt commune omnium Christiani et dici potest et est. facti autem certiores 
cum navibus Anconitanis et alibus etiam  spreto Dei timore omni posthabita pietate 
et religione arma plures et omnifariam generis munitiones quibus hostes cavent ad 
eos deferri cum Anconitanis sceleris huismodi et literris et secretaris nostris 
plerimque expostulanimus petimus que abstinerent mittere instrictum naves eorum 
ne tante culpe ne tantiquer mali auctores apud Deum et homines haberentur et apud 
nos potissimum in quorum stragem et perniciem arma et munitiones connertebant. 
non negaverunt Anconitani rem hanc abominabilem et detestabilem esse et illis 
auctores acerrima dignos animadversione politique sint naves eorum in strictum 
amplius non missuros. Quod si qui inobedientes et contumaces eorum cives invita 
comunitate contrafare auderent nos quorum intenerat et qui poteramus providevemus 
ob quam rem non cessantibus navibus ipsique a navigatione consueta et sceleratis 
comertiis coacti fuimus ingenti impensa armare quatuor naves quarum prefecto 
comisimus ut anconitanorum naves instrictum navigantes et vemeantes retinere. quod 
comune prefectum ipsum fecisse nobis esse nuntiatum iussimus naves ipsas simul 
cum hominibus et rebus in illis existentibus huc conduci. ubi cum faciunt melius res 













Ex responso vestro sumus in sententia nostra confirmati qua semper fuimus etiam 
cum ad vos super ea re dedimus litteras antiqua benivolentia et convinctione nostra 
dignas hanc scilicet navium Anconitanarum interceptionem minime propter 
Florentinos cives et mercatores excitisse quos semper amice tractavistis ut vos 
amicissime scribitis. fuit et nobis et mercatoribus et civibus nostris huiusmodi 
omissis vestrum admodum gratum et antique benivolentie coniuncti omnie que 
nostre memoria tetigit animos letitiaque affecit duas in Italia tales respublica cetera 
marique vicinas his esse inter se animis oportet quale vos esse in cives et mercatores 
nostros asseveratis. maximo detrimento est mercatoribus nostris pecunia et 
mercimonia Florentinorum trahi istec et minime liberum esse sibi uti rebus fuis pro 
oportunitatitbus et utilitatibus mercatoriis tame siquid est ea res vobis allacura 
comodi ferent equiore animo et nos feremus. sed cum exunt adducte captive naves 
eri vestrae iustitie atque humanitatis et cives et civium nostros res libera facere et 
auferre monem occasionem omnibus vos non alio esse animo in nos qui esse debeatis 
pro vetere nostra benivolentia aut velle scribatis a persuasium esse omnibus velitis. 








die xiii Decembris mcccclxvii  
 
Bartholomeus Recanatus legatus Ferdinandi regis Neapoletani principio sue orationis 
amore et caritatem regiam in hac urbem et populum aplissimis verbis significavit. 
deind missum esse hortatorem ut quando tot tantisque subterfugiis pacem adversarii 
dediment ea preparamenta sint belli ut vel mutent hostes animos et consectendum 
pacem vel certe cum victoria geratur bellum ea autem non videri difficilia si enim 
paululum quid addatur virum ad preteritos conatus facile fore ut quibus improvisi 
restitumus preparati magis superemus et censere regem multum facere vel ad 
victoriam vel ad pacem si marique appareat bellum omissis autem in animo parare 
classem navium longarum omissis ita ad suadere Florentinis sociis armare in 
presentia classes quodfortasse sit difficilius per dare operam ut fabricatio aliquarum 
navium auctoritatem afferat rebus federis et terrorem hostibus quem possint 
vehementer augere ianuenses qui ob copiam navium fabricaturum spetiem subito 
facere possint maritimi belli que preparanta conferre potuerit ad maturandam pacem 
omissis sit nihilominus adversarii obstinatos afferrent animos certe faciliorem 
victoriam efficiant necesse est. admonuis preterea terra que instruendum esse bellum 
et duces et militis in fide reinendos que multo plurita ac meliores sit nobis que 
advarsariis si singulos virtutem expenderimus omissis Se preterea mandata huisset ad 
Summum Pontificem quibus pro sucepto labore ob pacem agere gratias et quantam 
plus valere ambitio adversarios significaret regem habere in aio existimare se idem 
sentire socios quale tales futuros belli apparatus in quod ante hac facile sue paret 
componere difficilius redda si expectet donec in aperte bellum descendat. preterea 
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hortatum fuisse senenses ut mirent societatem que pp pacem facta dicta ab hic 
nullium certum responsium retulisse.  
Bertholdus Corsinus vexillifer cum gratias regi egisset qui non solum sapienti per 
adeo amice non communem procurare responsione dificili donec ad signori et 







Missive I Cancelleria 45  
 
episcopo quinque ecclesiarum 
 
Qui audivimus legatos Venetorum acusare urbem nostram et incessere nos maledictis 
apud gloriosissimum istuum regem vestrum scribimus ad etiam maiestatem litteras 
quibus nos pro viribus purgamus et ostendimus omnia falsa esse que a Venetis 
obiicrentur nobis quemadmodum litteria ipsis nostris videre poteris. scimus autem 
apud eum ipsum regem valere te plurimum auctoritate et prudentia tua amare autem 
nos et civitatem nostram et habere odio iniquietatem et superbiam propter summam 
virtutem et probitatem tuam. itaque etsi certo scimus non fuisse opus his litteris 
nostris ad te ut cause nostre faveres tamen noluimus deesse officio nostro. rogamus 
igitur te in primis ut causam iustam et piam tuteris apud regem testimoniumque 
reddasde animis nostris religiose et piis affirmes quequod et verissimum est nos et 
omnem civitatem Florentinam observare eius maiestatem et habuisse semper 
maiestatem regum Hungarorum summo in honore. in presentia autem tantum 
affectos esse eius clementissime maiestati ut pro beneficentissimo patre et 
benefactore nostro perpetuo colamus. tibi quoque et virtutibus tuis affecti adeo 
sumus ut offerri nobis aliquam occasionem cupiamus qua animum tibi et voluntatem 
nostram ostendere possumus. vale ex palatio nostro die XIIII Januarii mcccclxviii. 
Florentine calendar: die XIIII Januarii mccclxvii. 
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The Florentine Signoria sends a letter to the Venetians and thanks their decision to 
return the wares previously stolen from the Florentines omissis. 
 
die xiii Februarii mcccclxviii. 
 
Florentine calendar: die xiii Februarii mccclxvii. 
 








a Paulo II  
 
Dilecti fili salutem et apostolicam benedictionem . plane perspecit devotio vestra 
quanto pere ex initio Pontificatus nostri omni studio ac diligentia conati sumus ne 
pax Italia turbaret pertubata non molestiam ingentem aio  cepreminis. itaque longe 
maiori conatu quescrivimus ut pax ipsa reingraretur atque fermaret. pastorale enim 
officium meum sic monuit et necessitas communis salutis Christianorum et 
conservande cum presertii palam fit rabidissimum illum cane immanissimum duce 
Turcorum qui nihil magis ardere videt qui excidium Christiane rei per biennio 
proximo bis albaniam cum validissimo exercitu personaliter petisse regionem Italie 
propinquam ac pene inconspectum appositam. previdentes igitur apertum periculum 
quod Italie immisere videbat si potentatus Italie discordes forent. cogitantes et 
composita pace servissimam illam bestiam reprimendam oportuna remedia adhiberi 
posse ac non immemores quantum ad nos pertineat eam cumsuscipere pacem hanc in 
qua maxime consultum credimus statui per uniuscuiusque potentatus Italie ut bene 
quietus et servare esse possit aduitore Deo confideamus et solemniter pubblicavimus 
quemadmodum et legere et nosse vestra devotio poterit. quamobrem cum videatus 
quanti res ipsa fit cumque et bonitate polleatis hortamur devotiones vestris et per 
viscera misericordie Dei nostri rogamus atque vobis ut catholicis virus iniungimus ut 
eam pacem quietas excellens et commune bonum allatura est ratam gratam 
acceptasque feratis et aplectamini sicuti certe confidamus vos esse factivos. et enim 
si secus quod absit fieri contingat veremini ne omnipotens deus irascatur et renitentes 
vindicta horribili et formida afficere velit multaque abominanda mala subsequanti et 
in universale detrimentum Christianorum. quod summopere precavendum et 
evitandum est. pace autem ut speramus permansura non solum Italia libertatum ab 
hoc pestilentissimo periculo verum etiam exinde comparari poteri validissima 
expeditio in retundendum ac prorsis delendum hunc truculentum inimicum ad 
gloriam magni Dei et amplitudinem Christiani nominis. que res cucumque catholico 
homini proviribus expectanda est et consuenda ut pro vestra prudentia illegitis. 
datum Rome apud Sanctum maarcum die II Februarii 1468 Pontificato nostro anno 4. 
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Paulo Secundo Pontifici Maximo  
 
Sisquis unquam pacis bona ignorare potuit Sanctissime ac beatissime pater summe 
pontifex necesse est ut superioris anni pericula totius a Italie vexatio et tumultus 
admonueant nihil esse in rebus humanis pace expetibiliis. nos certe cum redeunt in 
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mentem rapine, incendia, disreptiones, stupra sacrilegia omne nefas que bellum 
consequuuntur penitet cunctarus discordias et detestamur humanos errores et si nos 
ut tu pro tua summa sapientia noviste semper fuimus pacis cupidi ac ne minimam 
quidem aliquqam causam dedimus alicui turbande miscendeque Italie que iam tota 
bellorum incendio conflagratura fuit nisi tu divino auxilio fretus furori armori 
occurisses ex restituisses mediocrem mentem Italicis populis. ergo per te paule 
summe pontifex conservata Italia est que proculdubio dico quodam fato suo intestinis 
armis et quasi furiis quibusdam se ipsam domesticis viribus superatura fuit sunt 
profecto per omnem vitam tuam multa facta a te que ut pene divina sunt ita in 
admiratione sunt omnium humanum. sed hoc quod postremo fecisti qui servasti 
Italiam a calamitate bellorum et miseria servitutis tale est ut inter omnia benefacta 
tua clarius eluceat. nunc reliquum rest quieta Italia et redicta concordia nam antea 
omnis huismodi conatus fustra erat publicam et communem causam Christianam 
procures ut continuo procurare te audimus ut intelligati immantissimus hostis 
Turchus multum interesse cum pacata an cum perturbata Italia res sibi futura sit. 
favebis deus virtutem et deus noster ceeptis tuis et victoriam in manu tua ponet ut 
profligatis religionis nostre hostibus te duce et principe et auctoritas Christiano 
nomine redeas tandem in coelum unde missus fuist ad sanandas plagas nostras 
beatissumus et omnium omissis felicissimus. nos et populum omnem nostriunm 








ab Summo Pontefice Paulo Secundo  
 
Dilecti filii salute etc. erat quidem omnis hec Italia ut ad nos scribitis se ipsam 
intextinis odiis et armoris furiis brevi superatura et que semper virtute ac robore 
prestare ceteris nationibus consuevit in miserabilem conditionem collapsura. 
Previdebamus autem hec omnia et vehementer angebamur cum presertum omne 
potentatus Italie utrinque acies comtulissent ex nihil magir pro hoc dolor appetere qui 
excidium fuit viderentur. preterea inpiissimus rex Turchorum qui Christiani nominis 
potentissimus hostis est in die validiorem exercitum comparat et ad occupandam 
Italiam sestinat exstimans iam oportuna habere viam explendis consiliis suis 
scelestissimis. Itaque ad omni potentia Deum nostrum prem misericordias et Deum 
totus consolationis cives iures licet immeriti in terris gerimus confugiendum esse 
duximus. ac demum summa ope laboravimus ut etiam omnes pene insomnes noctes 
per egerimus ad frangendas Italitas nostras et anomos in mutua gratiam conciliandos 
tedebat enimanimam nostram tantorum an oculos malorum. miserabamur certe 
Florentissime urbi vestre que huic sancto solio devotissima esse sole. ubi 
adolescentiam stama consolatione ex benivolentia omnium bonorum civium egimus 
de demum cardinalatus honorem suscepimus cui proferto et nos non minus in omni 
cursu etatis nostre qui si nobis secundum qui carenem patria sit accetissimi semper 
fuimus que quo pare non armis gaudeat omissis in eam labem et bellorum rabiem 
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tracta esset non sine periculo impedentis cladis sue. gratias igitur domino Deo nostro 
agimusqui et nobis affinit et illuminavit horum omnium corda ad reireciendas 
tribulationes et ad commune consulatione suscipiendam vos non plurimum in 
domino collandamus et benedicimus qui et diligenter hanc pacem omnique studio 
querere unde bamini et eam ipsa quam letis animis ac omni genere exulationis 
amplexi estis eo maxime quia ut speramus et confidimus erga misericordissimum 
ipsum Deum nostrum tante eius in vos largitionis non ingrati excitis. ceterum placet 
ea excitatio quam in calce litterarum nobis contra immanissimum Turchorum ducem 
facere indemini proficisci enim illam scimus ex optimis vestris ad eam rem animis 
quippe qui semper ad euiusmodi Sanctum opus obeundum ut boni catholici opem 
ferre pro viribus paratissimi iusti estis. sed ut de nobis loquamur ex citatione aut 
cohortatione nequa qui indigemus quandoquidem ab initio Pontificatus nostri nihil 
magis ardemus qui et gregem commissum et rem publica Christiana a crudelissima 
illa bestia liberare nec solum hostem illum perditissimum reprimere nec etiam 
profugare hactenus enim ducenta milia florenorum in huiusmodi Christianorum 
subsidia erogavimus quorum centum et decem milia carissimo in Christo filius noster 
rex Hungarie illustris accepit. reliquos plerique ali qui a Turchis opprimerentur. non 
calcaribius igitur equis noster omissis curreret egebat neque in posterum egebit dum 
vos et ceteri potentatus Italie contribuatis quod facturos nonne dubitam. non enim 
eam tantam molem humeris nostris sufficimus substinere. quot quidem parum est 
evidens que ingratitudinis testimonium pace hanc recepisse pacem inter nos habere 
ac ferocissimum ipsum Christiano nominis inimicus non radicitus exstinguere ad 
gloria omnipotentes Dei et propagationem sancte fidei. datum Rome apud Sanctum 
marcum sub anulo piscatoris die xvi Mai 1468. 
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Mannus equitem: egressis tempestas bellorum et defatigatis civbibus porrigendam 
opem et subsidia pacis submnistranda navigationes et in primis  si quid mutari 
oportet dada operam ut inviter presertim dicti navigatione occidentali idem censuit 
de actis navigationibus 
 
Carolous Pandulfinus eques: laudavit navigationem tamque et utile et honestam 
censuit et experi omissis a omissis tempo exprobavit. itaque censuit reassimendam 
navigationem et siquid propterea providendi sit id statuendum. adomnuit tamen ita 
navigandum ut exeo non possit niunmodi alique ad rem publicam pervenire. si 
tempora navigatione servent id periculis posse omissis vitari omissis. 
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Super navigando die 16 Iulii 1468  
 
Mannus equitem: mirari rem tam valem tum negligi ut sepius in consilium est nihil 
unquam deliberare qua pp censuit eam rem diligentius providendam ut aliqua tandem 
via ad navigandum aperiat. id comodi fieri posse si mercatores qui eram artimu collet 
habeant consulori et ex eorum sententia stabat 
 
Iohannotius Pictus eques: varia habent in se rationes huismodi consultationem et in 
utramque partiter disputavit. concludens mercatori disfactionem et celeritatem 
eiusdam sententie dixit esse (idem Carlo Pandolfini Johanne Canisiani Antonio 
Ridolfini) 
 
Golinus Marcellus: comoditatem ostendi duorum navium qui pisis sint quibus 
navigare in presentia potest sint omni expensa dum valitatem ostend et conclusit 
prima sententia cum his qui in suo ordine adebant 
 
Leonardo Manellus: misi tardi sumus laudavit navigationem Constantinopolitana. 
atque eum celeriter apparandam et pp futuros annorum navigationem intelligendi quo 
mo magis utilitate navigari possit 
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die 18 (1468) 
 
Super navigando  
 
Mannius Temperanus eques: Constantinopolitana navigationem ita correpta est ac 
per eosdem et tamque acclarandam et omissis usque nullam causam obstacolari dicta 
navigari possit. interra dum illic perventum sit relinqui spatium ad cogitandis sit ne 
tuta navigatio ulterior. et per tempore id deliberandum de secunda navigatione 
Constantinopolitana considerandum quod utili sit rei publice.  
 
Aloisio Guicciardini: in presentia Constantinopolitanam censuit. et eam 
delibeationem acclarandam atque per prefactis navigationibus urgendis qui id 
duxarunt ut preparent navigationem. atque in Constantinopolim verendum aliquid 
non omissis a quo sunt fides publice sed a Venetis siquid in ea potest se exoffendere 
at ab eis in pace nihil timendi videri. quantum ad occidentalem navigationem et si 
non vidias consultati presentis temporis tamen venire in omissis eam quidem fuisse 
multos omissis 
 





Bernardo Bonieremimus iureconsulti: leg. omissis id cantum monuit navigationem 
Constantinopolim nullam dicte viri habere prohiberent per bellum cum Turchis nostri 
ab religionem sed ab ambitionem et inperium altrui 
 
Antonius Marcellus: referendam omnem disputationem et moras et per presentis 
intelligendum ab exeratoribus qui conduxerunt que na fiat eorum obligationes et qui 
de facere velint. si non sunt obbligati eam navigationem solita anchone se autem 
pollicereri se conduti nostro ubi nemo conducere ea per tucto augusti ab tirum. et 
ultra Chium non navigandi. 
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Paulo II Pontifice Maximo  
 
Perpetua ista tua constans que in nos urbemque nostram clementissima 
benignissimaque volunctas Sanctissimis ac beatissime pater qua omissis id luce 
omnes claruis cognivimus non alio esse te animo erga nos ac si patria ista esset tua ut 
et litteris et nuntiis sepe significasti nobis et nos re ipsa semper omnibus in rebus 
experti sumus et quotidie experimur facit ut nihil omnio iam quidem dari ab ista 
nobis sancta fede nec fine Deo possit confidentissime enim petam lovisti autem pro 
tua sapientia nulla re magis que mercatura omissis civitamtem nostram ea enim ab 
eius omissis primis fere incunabulis novam urbem et angustis positam locis aluit 
deinde per omnia tempora maxima conservavit ornavit auxit. multe id res declarant 
et in primis honores qui ei arti semper impensi sunt a nobis neque iniuria ut puta qui 
magno sepe et ornamento et adiumento fuerit nostre civitati sepenumero enim 
paceque ac bello ac domi et foris nostri mercatores de publica et libertate nostra 
benemeriti obnoxum fuis industrie populum reddiderunt. idem quo facile secure 
potes per tua ingenti cognitione rerum nostras atque omnium in alienis quoque 
urbibus a mercatura nostra factum et date amici preclare commoditates et non 
numquam cum urgerent magne necessitates liberalissime subventum nullo 
mercatorio commodo. sed benivolentie meritis impellentibus sed ea nunc multas 
variasque inoportunitates incommoditates que per omissis est a devoctionibus a 
seditione a bello verum cum iam parta pax per te ac stabilita sit quod et tibi pro tua 
benificentissima divinaque natura gratum esse remint restituere ei arti vires 
cogitamus ut tandem pacis huius quam tu et nobis imminet se Italie tanquam 
precipuum aliquod divinem que donum tradisti commoda populis que nost 
manifestias sentiat maiores que in dies gratias tibi auctori pacis bonorum que ipsius 
habeat. id autem maxime futurum est si quod als bonis de causis quasque tu minime 
ignoras intermissum est Constantinopolim mercatorias naves nostras ad verbi 
curemus non ut aliquam commoditatem subiministremus hostibus communibus sed 
ut nos datis mercimoniis et accepta pecunia factique ditiores mercatoria opera. cum 
tu meritissimum nominis Christiani  caput nos ad id muneris vocaveris ad quod 
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vocaturum una cum cetero robore Italico predixisti potentiores audentio res que 
venire possumus. non est autem currendum necquid inconcessimi ad hostes deportet 
a nostris gerunt enim nostri mercatores ab omni huiusmodi luchro alienissimos 
animos et nos summam adhibebimus diligentia ut nihil omnino super hac re 
pollicentibus procurantibus que id nobis sollicitus esse summus pontifex quique 
debeat. non sine causa omissis leges navigationes et comertia cum his hominibus qui 
Christiano non robunt non prohibuerunt sed quo modo navigandum et 
commerciandum esset statuierunt nos ex legibus illis hanc Constantinopolitanam 
navigationaem restituere nostris civibus cupimus tamen in suo Sanctissimo Pontifice 
sapientissimo iustissimo nobis autem et populo nostre beneficiosissimo ut faciamus 
non fint consilium. cum enim ad religionem id pertinere aliquo modo videatur ad 
Christi vicarium relligionis principem deferendum fuit ut eo conscio et probante ac 
benedictionibus divinis ea navigationem prosequerite magis prospera magis que 
lucrosa sit. quoque propter te summis quibusque precis oramus Sanctissime ac 
beatissime pater ut supplicantibus nunc nobis cupientibus ut bona pacis ista 
navigatione nostre populus magis sentiat quodque bellum abstulit a te auctore pace 
esse restutum votis nostris annuas et Constantinopolitane huic navigationi benedicas. 
nihil profecta feceris quod fecisse te inquam penitendum sit neque novam aut 
inusitatam in Italia rem dederis sunt enim preterea alie quoque urbes ac nobilissimi 
religiosissimi que populi qui omissis cum infedelibus comertiis ornant atque augent 
suas civitates. geruntque cum eis bellum et clades inferunt iis ipsis quas huiusmodi 
navigatio mihi comparaverunt divitiis quibus nos neque divino castu neque devotione 
in istam sacrosanctam sedem neque religionis aliqua observantia si vineri nos verbis 








Filippo Martello Rome  
 
Con questa stare una lettera al Sancto Padre perché pensando noi di rifare il viaggio 
in Levante non ce parso farlo che prima non se ne dia notitia alla sua Sanctita e 
richieggiassi della sua beneditione come vedrai per essa lettera di che ti mandiamo la 
copia. vogliamo che alla venuta desssa subito vadi apresentarla et attendere 
condiligentia la risposta e perché il tempo del partire delle ghalee per quel viaggio è 
venuto. vogliamo che metta ogni sollecitudine et ogni industria adoperando gli amici 
tuoi che sappiamo che ne hai che ne habbiamo prestissima risposta et tale risposta 
che sia il bisogno et desiderio nostro et lutile et lohonore della città. et mandianti uno 
de nostri cavallari con comandamento che aspecti et ritorni collla resposta. dati die 
















ab Paulo II Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. comperatum habet devotio 
ut  putamus progressum immanissimi regis Turcorum qui potentissimo exercitu mari 
ac terra nigropontum obsidet et ut Christiani nominis inimicus nihil alid molitanitur 
anhelat quo omni genere crudelitatis ipsum chrstianum nomen exstingue cum alias 
finitimas Christianis fidelii nationes debellare tum maxime hanc Italia ceterarum 
provinciarum nobilissima expugnare prosternere. hec tamen horrenda lues et 
internitio non unius potentatis esset sed primo omne Italie potetantum subinde 
onmnium Christianorum et principium. Angit nos super qui credibile sit res ipsa et 
cogitantibus diu nobis nihil accomodatus ad resistendum tanto malo imminenti ac 
instanti visum est quod qui robur omnis Italiae qui primum opponat tum deinceps 
subsequatur et ceteri potentatus fidelium. Id vero circa et oportunis et melius fieri 
non potest qui (sed) omnes consentiant. cum autem sciamus a omnios veros ad hanc 
sanctam rem comperandam conficiendamus que ut pote vere catholicos 
promptissimo verisimiliter fore. placuit in primis ad devotionem vestram scribere 
prout et ad reliquas Italas potentias scribere statuimus et in dominio eandem 
devotionem vestram hortamur ac per viscera misericordie Dei nostri rogamus ut 
mittati ad nos oratores vestros viros probos timentes Deum et conservande rei 
publice Christiane studis statum lectis presentibus litteres cum amplo mandato 
tractandi et concludendi universalem Italie unionem. nam sicut eidem Turchorum 
principi non bona consensio Italorum prestat audaciam ac spiritus magnos advetandi 
ita consternabit omnis eius animus intellecta Italorum potentia uno consensu 
coniuncta et ad oportunas provisiones facienda ex inde Italis facultas proveniet. non 
est cunctandum dilecti filii quoniam ob hostis ipse qui nihil magis sicure videtur quo 
internitionem et sanguinem totius Christianitatis iam in faucibus nostris est ac in dies 
viribus corroboratur ut quo omissis que vis mora occasionem excidi nostri communis 
ei prebeat. celeris autem opposita providentissima virtus Italorum illum retundere et 
profligare facillime possit ad laudeam et gloriam omnipotentis Dei  scelestissimi 
quod huius diacomis mahomet excitum sempiternium. datum Rome apud Sanctum 




Responsive copiari II 
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ab Ferdinando rege Neapoli  
 
Rex Sicilie etc. magnifici et excellentissimi domini amici nostri carissimi. certiores 
tade facti sumus litteris illustrissimi Venetorum dominatus quarum exemplum 
dedimus legato dominationis v qui apud nos agit urbem nigropontis vi expugnatam et 
in perfidissimi hostis nostre fidei potestatem venisse ipsum hostem urbe diripuisse et 
omne genus crudelitatis exercuisse in Christianos ac si nihil preclarius ducat quo 
Christiano sanguine saginari meret animus noster et non parvo dolore afficitur vel 
pro Venetorum ractura vel pro vicinitate periculi vel pro communi causa totius Italie 
e Christianitatis nobile omissis emporium europe amisimus. data est magna facultas 
Turcharum imperatori insulas ionii et egei occupandi claudendi ora adriatici maris 
invadendi Italiam et ut est imperandi avidus maiora audendi. deterrere nos debent 
exempla tot verbum tot gentuum tot populum quot ditioni eius post cladem 
Constantinopolitanam subegit. imminentem illum nam ceruit Italie videmus et prope 
sentimus hinc maria classibus infestat illinc terra claustris Italie propios factus ostia 
pulsat. undique minatur premit infestat. cavemus et ille veluti per scaligradum 
omnibus servile vigum imponere gestum erigant itaque D.V. eorum animi altum 
consilium neque huius periculi expertem esse sibit persuadeat. hostis enim 
potentissimus est quippe que maria classibus sternit. terras exercitibus complet et 
nihil eius viribus posse resistere animum induxit et iam finxit animo totius 
Christianitas. alioquin actum de nobis esse existimare possimus. si dum vicinorum 
periculum negligimus quo ad nos porro venita operimur. datum in castello novo 
Neapoli VIII Augusti 1470. 
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a Paulo II Pontefice Maximo.   
 
Dilecti filii et apostolicam benedictionem. placet littere vestre quas viii instantis 
mensis circa uniendam Italiam et rogendam eius virtutem contra dracone Turchorum 
tyrannum commune hostem nominis Christi ad nos dedistis. nam et unionem 
huismodi vehementer appetisse profitemini ac multo magis nunc appetere et oratores 
non solum ivi promptu habere sed et hortatoriis socios vestros litteris et ad ipsum per 
agendium executasse. utrumque admodum collaudamus verum ut vos sentire 
videmini ambo socii prompti ac parati erunt ut autem prospiciums serenissimis ipse 
regi Ferdinandis antecedit vos studio cum statum oratores in eam rem lectis litteris 
nostris designaverit viros graves et timentes Dei et secundum omissis nostrum cum 
facultate pro sequendi atque concludendi quantum censebimus ad rem pertinere. 
opusque de ex regni et vere catholicum et omni laude dignissimum.  at insignis ille 
dux sepe numero contestatus est ad commune salute sese semper affuturum. ex quo 
fit ut non dubitemus persertim accedente exhortatione vestra et urgenti evidentissima 
necessitate eum facturum omnia que res tanta postulat. vellemus maxime intelligere 
per vos uti rex effecit oratores designatos iam in via esse et advolere non qui reliquos 
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prestolent. sed qui prevenisse videri possint. preventio inedii exhortabitur et sed ex 
quidem impellet eos exortabit. tempus admonet tempus instat tempus urget. non 
autem eget prestolatione. Turchos enim hostis labes omnium Christianum exultans 
memoria ex revore nostro nigropontum urbem clara fidelium trucidatis oribus a 
decernio super Christianis et delevit et solo quavit. et iam ante portas Italie potentior 
in horas ex immanios adest. de Rhodo enim creta corcyra ceterisque orientalibus 
insulis per eum occupandis vel forte iam occupatis quod abioit certa sententia est 
erasurus pulcherrima et clarissima Italiam profinaturus religionem defloraturis 
virgines perempturus liberos omnes matronas ex quotiunque aut mares aut femellas 
apprehenderit in aciem gladii extuncturus nisi una potentatus omnes nulla intermissa 
mora ad restitendum omni conatu consurgamus. Consurgamus aut celeritate 
conficiendi non pretextu exopertandi ne ni voluerimus non virtute ex armis certare 
liceat sed lahrimabundi miserabile conditione ex servitute nostram tantumodo 
deplorare hebeamus ex per ignavia cum perpetua omnium nostrum ignominia 
contabescere. datum in Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris dies XXIII 
augusti 1470 Pontificato nostro anno sexto. 
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Die xxv Augusti 1470   
 
A rege Neapolitano Aniellus Archamonus legatus ad magistratum venit visitationis 
gratiam cum enim Venetias profiscisceret ex mandato regio non potutuit non visere 
magistratum ex legationis sue aperire causas. proficisci igitur se Venetia ideo dixit ut 
res ad ducandum in Turcho bello hortaret vereri enim regem ne amissa euboea insula 
succumbant. regem hortari ad Florentinos ut ad eam rem applicent aium et aliquid 
remediii dispiciant ne cum Venetis simul tota Italia et omnis Christiana republica 
depeat hortari id regem cum ob comunem causam tum ob suam sorsum qui primus 
ob vicinitate veniat in periculo. Respondit Iohannes Ridolfi vexillifer popoulum 
Florentinum tum rege causa que non aliter ac Florentinam libertatem salutem esse 
vult tum Christiane rei daturum operam ut nullo loro desit. 
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die xiii Octobris 1470  
 
Antonius Priolus Venetus legatus venit in urbem die xii acceptus est in ede suorum ut 
magistratus instituerat. postridie eius diei venit ad magistratum comitatus a nonnullis 
cuibus quos eum deducere magistratus ad se iusserat excepti eum ad cancellum 
auditorii. et cum consedissent post lectas legationis litteras. legatus humanissimis 
   
 
 454 
verbis atque honestissimis appelationibus salutavis magistratum et senatum atque 
omina ex vere amicitie officio que essent Venetos communia in Florentinis asserivit. 
deinde euboee insule amissionem deploravit et periculum ide est toti Italie et toti 
Christiano nomini magni impendere significavit per inde magratum ex senatum ad 
auxilium ferendum vehementer est rohotatus. quandoquidem et consilio et viribus 
plurimum in Italia valeremus.  
Respondit Ristoris vexillifer et quidem per breviter gratam esse salutatione Venetos 
et rerum Venetorum oblatione quod autem ad Turcham victoriam pertineret per 
molestum fuisse illud nuntium cum primum auditum est atque existimasse 
communem eam calamitatem fore nisi sunarraret. itaque missos esse Roma legatos ut 
agant de ea defensione apud Summum Pontifice omissis Christianis legatis qui 
vocant ipso summo Pontefice venuenerint. populum Florentinum neque amicitie 
Venetos neque Christianes cause dufuturum. missus deinde est et cives qui 
deduxerant reduxerunt domum et munera publica stati subserita sunt. 
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A rege Ferdinando 26v27v 
 
Rex Sicilie etc. magnifice et excellentissimi domini amici nostri carissimi. in magna 
fluctuatione animi nostri qua agitamur ob excitiale hanc pestem commune que 
periculum alluvionis Turchum que contra Italiam precipitem se ferre vide maxime 
spei nobiis fuit societatis vestre integerrime istuis que sapientissimi senctus 
recordatio. qua spem confermarunt auscerunt que littere vestre et Marini legati nostri 
quas nuper accepimus quibus satis super que nobis perspertum pro una actionum 
experientia pro excellenti vis ad omnia per sapiam incredibils vos cognosce 
impendentia mala cervitibus nostris omissis communi periculo succurrat. tum illus 
fuit voluptati maxime qui intelleximus nostra causa qui viciniores periculo sumus et 
in faucibus fere esse videmus non nos pace commoveri pubblico que decreto 
ordinum vestrum firmatum Italie rodei nobisque suppetias ferendas magna est 
amicorum eorum que in omni fortuna constantium in gravi et ancipiti periculo spes et 
recreatio. nihil est in secundis et in adversis rebus vel ad voluptates perfruendas vel 
ad tolleranda proterendas adversitate datum in societate humana commodius. fatemur 
nos tanti fecisse tantique fare turcarum contra Italie motus ut nihil contungere posse 
exstimemus quod eque nos comovere queat vel per labe et periculo Christiane 
relligionis vel pro Italie communi bono et dignitati vel propria pro re atque causa. 
non que imminere possent cetera pericula eo non unica habere remedia nec adeo 
atrocis videntur expertationis hec vero lues adeo dicta est adeo nefaria ut remedia 
habere moveamus nisi soactis viribus Italie pro adversari potentia ambitione furore et 
rei constituende commoditate cui iam assequi posse videtur quod libet vel ideo magis 
timemus qui non solum pro imperio belligerandum fit sed pro coingrebius liberis 
patria penatibus vita sanguine libertate dignitate relligioneque quod est in primis. 
verso fidelis nostra societas in periculis semper nobis addidit aios et ad omnia 
pericula magna constantia nos solatur et ut magni fecimus istius preclarissime rei 
publica integerrimam fidem que labe crimineque semper caruit que res nos ad ipsium 
societate allexit ita omissis potissima spem in arduo hoc negocio in vestra societate 
et amicitia collocavimus. et factum iri putamus Deo auspice et istius sapientissimi 
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senatus consilio ex gravitate quod Italia sedus percutiet relligionis dignitas Italie 
salus regnorum  que et urbium libertas tuta erit a tam atroci spectaculo. illud etiam in 
primis speramus qui illustrissime excellentissimi Mediolani dux qui hoc periculum 
non satis intelligere videtur ac multi facere vestris hortationibus veritate periculi 
patefacta cum sociis coibit. et pubblice privateque et utilitati Italie ex sociorum 
consentiet. quod non difficile puteamus cum sapientissimi fit et magna vi ingenii 
clareat fidei no relligionis amicitieque fit observantissimus. hoc idem nos sedulo 
curavimus et curaminis. in urbe iam stringit federis universalis conlusio ad quod 
percutiendi omnium animi aspirant et per bonitate atque sapientia prope divina 
beatissimi pauli II Pontefice maxime parvum difficultati videt in esse quo minus 
statim confletur. erit ut sapientor commemoratis postea facilior sedatis pacatisque 
animis ex seminario amoris amicitie federis que communi periculi provisio. hoc 
magnopere et petimus et rogamus ut in sententia stetio sanctissima duci Mediolani 
persuade nitamini que in commune re sunt. legato vestros qui Rome agunt 
moneatisque cum ceteris celerrime rem transfigant. non in hoc gravissimo negotio 
celeritatem plurimum utilitatis afferre iudicamus. agere autem vobis gratias pro 
tanto  erga nos studio tanto amore tanta benivolentia haud necessarium putamus 
quoniam istud integerrime sobrietatis officium non verba sed vicissitudine postulat. 
Datum in castello novo Neapoli die XVII mensio Octobris 1470 
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a Galeazzo Maria duce Mediolani  
 
Excellentes et potentes domini tam qua pres nostri. nui credemo che le S.V. habbiano 
assai potuto comprehendere per lo passato quanto lo animo et pensiero nostro sia 
desposto alla pace et tranquillità de Italia et de vicinare bene con ognuno. et questo 
haverlo demonstrato per multi effecti et argumenti et maxime nel facto de questa 
reunione. et redintegratione della liga cum la maiestà del S.re ferrando et quella sua 
comunita alla quale siamo venuti realmente ex con ogni sincerità et così alla 
executione et observatione de quella per el terzo capitolo nui tardassimo al tempo 
debito mandare nostri ambassatori insieme cum quelli de quella excellentissima 
republica primo alla maiestà del re ad honorarla et congratularsi cum essi de tale 
reunione et deinde ad Roma alla Santità del papa ad supplicarli et honestamente 
rechiedere che la sidignassi benedire la dicta liga nostra et redintegration et deinde 
venire alle altre particularità contenute in essa et intravarli cum capitoli et conditioni 
honeste et così piacendoli de rinnovare la liga universale contracta nel anno 1455 fra 
le potentie de Italia offerire ad sua sta per se et per la illustrissima Signoria de 
venegia lo intrare degno et honorevole volendola renovare pure et simpliciter come 
la sta nihil addito vel diminuito et per quelli proprii chi legitimamente furono 
compresi in dicta liga salvisa capitulis de questa reunione nostra come nel terzo 
capitolo se contene et circa tutte queste cose havimo dato pieni et larghissimi 
mandati et intstructione ad essi nostri ambassatori et scripto et replicato piú e piú 
volte de intervenire cum li altri ambasciatori regii e de quella excelsa comunita alla 
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executione et conclusione de quanto specta ad noli dal canto nostro non li mancano 
in cosa alcuna che habbiamo potuto cognoscere perché ne seguisse tale effecto. et 
essendo agitata bon pezo questa materia devanti al papa pare che piutosto habbi 
assentito de volere insieme con Venetiani attendere alla renovatione de questa liga 
universale del 1455 che ad benedire et intrare in questa et nui per adaptare ad ogni 
cosa gli siamo ancora condiscesi perché non havessero alcuna hopnesta ragione de 
partirsi dalla conclusione et a questo siamo rimasti et dio contenti che detta liga del 
LV se renovasse pure et simpliciter comere dicto per tutti quelli che legitime furono 
compresi in quella riservando la nostra particulare come secontene nel dicto II 
capitolo. studiandoce et sforzando de andare ad ogni verso per servare dicta versione 
et quanto in essa se contene. Nondostante tutte queste cose quando havemo creduto 
venire ad qualche effecto et conclusione di questa materia el pare che ogni di la cosa 
sia tracta in piú lunghezza et per alcuni lisii misso scrupolo et difficultate et cercato 
nove casone cum dare chavuto ad nostri collegati et in spetialita ad noi dicendo che 
per nui manca venire ad queste conclusione imputando li mancamenti loro ad altri et 
spargendo voce fra populi per favorire il fatto loro et seminando qualche zizanio per 
mettere discordia fra miei collegati il perché per satisfare ad noi medesimi et per 
defensione dello honore nostroe della verità havemo voluto communichare queste 
cose alle serenissime vestre. le quali sono prudentissime et intendono li portamenti et 
andamenti de questi tali meglio che nui amoche possino iustificare la causa insieme 
cum noi et chiarire ad ognuno la verità et quello che è infacto et le bone mente et 
despositione di vestre serenissime et nostra in questa materia perché nui come è 
decto non vedemo haverli mancato ne intendemo mancharli in cosa alcuna perché la 
pace et riposo de Italia habbi loro la quale nostra intentione è de venire alla liga del 
LV nihil addito vel diminuto stando ferma la nostra particolare et quando el papa et 
venitiani insieme o quale sia loro non acceptino questo haveveno satisfacto odio et al 
mundo et haveveno servato quello siamo obligati per la liga nostra particulare la 
quale deliberamo de servare et non fare cosa che habbia cum veruna persona et 
spetialmente con la maiestà del re et vestre exceli signori essere disputabile anzi 








ab Ferdinando rege  
 
Rex Sicilie etc. magnifice et excelsi domini amici nostri karissimi. quotiens isti 
sapientissimi senatus litteras accipimus mirifice animus noster reveat quidem est in 
epistula qua nuper ad nos dedistis in tanto vero pondere quod vel explicari elegantius 
vel perstringi acutis vel prudentis gravius que delibari potuisset suavissimum illud 
est nobis in primis qui sententia vestra minime a nostri animi sententia dissentat ii 
solem animis ii  sed studiis ad una rem per agendam contendimus optamus omnes 
expectumus magno studio ex quirimus que omnis Italia uno federe coeat illud novet 
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foedus quod Nicolao V Maximo curante istum est. omnes cognoscimus 
urgentissimas rationesque nos vel invito ad id feriendum robortari debent 
communem esse causa intelligunt omnes vident pericula sentiat vicina discrimina 
quid parere possit foedus atque concordia beneficii qui magnum exitum afferre 
discordia qui nesciat est nemo. movent nos exempla tot subactarum urbium tot 
populum tot gentium que servile vigum turpissime patiuntur.magnas esse Italos vires 
tot floride populis tot pibus beate tot armis clare tot bonis artibus ex disciplinis inbute 
tot principibus tot ducibus tot excellentibus rebus pubblicis exornare intelligunt 
omnes habemus annales et exempla maxima quibus a satis sperare liceret Italiam 
aptissima esse non ad tuendam solit dignitate propria sed ad illa qui maxime 
augendam. et tamen in re luce ipsa clariore in tot ambages unde tanta animorum 
dissensio quamobrem nodum in seirpo querimus. fatemur gravia tot imperiorum tot 
urbium tot populum negotia semper solere non parum habere difficultatis cum ita 
natura comparatum sit ut optimis admixta sint pexima. sed in tanto rerum discrimine 
ubi de salute libertate de fide imprimis agit sine ulla difficultate conciliandi sunt 
animi. timemimus ne subiratus Dei nobis sit. dederata que populi suum in reprobum 
sensum cum videntes serentes que precipites labimur. ad ipsem tamen Deum 
onnipotentem plenumque misericordiam confugendum est nec desperandum. imo ab 
eo nobis spes esse debet a quo huismodi gloria facinora prodeunt que miro ordine 
dispensat. rectenamque facimus opere nos sorii iam diu uni rei studemus illi operam 
impedimus. satis et omissis exploratum est que pro publica utilitate per epistolas et 
oratores egerimus. deus cui nihil ocultum est nobis sociis testis est non stetisse per 
nos quibus pluribus iam mensibus fedus ipsum percussum fuerit totaque Italia 
coverit. in communem ut forbitis hostem omissis animis omnes excitaremus et 
summeremus arma hactenus ut cernitis dilata res est non nostra non sociorum culpa 
qui nihil aliud in nova federe querimus nisi ut salvum illesumque esset foedus 
nostrum quod tam graviter tam sancte percussum est . neque aliter fieri posset cum 
ita legibus foederis cautum fit neque illud improbari a quo piam potest quando 
quidem preludium fuerit ad ipsum fedus universale neque illo quisuqe ledatur quod 
ad conservationem dignitatum nostras istum sit fine alterius iniuria et cum sucidatur 
discriminanti materia pacemque ac pubblicam quietem passi reddeat. verum per 
recentiores nostrum oratorum litteras intelleximus foederis universalis conclusione 
bene habere sperare iam salvo nostro transactum viri. nam Veneti cum oratoribus 
nostris ex sociorum de conditionibus convenerunt ut scilicet novando federi nihil 
addatur minuatum vel sed novetur salvo nostro salvoque illorum federe quod cum 
Pontefice ictum est. non est dubitandum ipsum Summum Pontifice accessum. nam 
quo pacto salva conscientia salvo honore dissentiret. si vero preter spem et 
expectationem nostram cederet diutius que differret denius operam ut hactenus 
fecimus ne nostra ex parte intelligatur que quis honctus que conditionibus nos 
tergiversari cum aperis que Venetis novandum esse foedus ipsum curremus. satis 
apud Dei trinbunal satis Deo reddemur innocentes puta animi conscientia cum rebus 
honestis non fuerimus reluctati. in omni autem rerum eventum hoc nos mirum in 
modi solat que ab hoc magnificentissimo populo excelsa que republica videmus 
nostram amicitiam magni fieri offerique nobis rem vestra pubblicam. quod enim esse 
iucundiis potest in omni fortuna amico et socio cui idem sit velle idem que 
volle.  non possumus brevi epistula perstringere quanta letitia persis fuerimus litteris 
ipsis vestris et iis que Marinus Thomacellus cumulatis per epistolas egit de ipsis 
dominatus erga nos benivolentia. Efficet hec spes et expectatio locuplex ut omnium 
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periculum quot contingere possent recordati e sit nobis multo minus molesta. fratris 
tanta amicitia tantoque federe. non sunt dissimilia erga vos studia nostra. quod enim 
est quod huic rei publice non dicaverimus quod est quod de nobis non possit sibi 
polliceri et speraret. id est sepe novo obtulerimus vimat tamen iterum iterumque 
repetere. nos scilicet regno filiis nobis que ipsis non percituros ut nostro pedriculo 










ab Galeazzo duci Mediolani  
 
Excellentes potentes domini tamquam pres. per lo cavallaro de la S.V. questa sera 
havimo ricevuto una sua lettera deli nove del presente. la quale secondo il costume 
nostro havemo molto bene lecta et intesa. et per rispondere a la substanzia di quella 
dicemo che non fu mai che non fussimo dispositissimi et inclinatissimi a tutte quelle 
cose che havemo congnosciuto credere in honore et beneficio della fede Christiana et 
poi ancora delli nostri collegati et de la loro canto sforzatone semper de mantegnire 
la fede nostra come se possuto vedere. et de presenti intendendo noi la instanza che 
fa fare la maiestà del re de sapere lanimo de nui collegati in questo subsidio che lo 
adomanda per defendersi dal Turco havemo facto dire alla prefata Signoria vestre el 
pensero nostro per Sagramoro nostro ambassatore quale cognoscemo per questa loro 
lettera esserli piaciuto et certamente oltre la affinita et mutua benivolentia et 
coniunctione  quale è tra la prefata maiestà et noi ne siamo ancora mossi ad fare tale 
ricordo per confermarsi con lo pensiero de la signorie vestre al quale semper in ogni 
cosa possibile deliberamo de ad servire come a quello che vedemo essere causato da 
ogni bono fondamento havemo adiuncha per omissis de quanto ve havimo facto dire 
per esso Sagramoro posto una decima al clero del dominio nostro quale ascende alla 
summa de XX milia ducati et così si dava principio ad fodere li denari et poi se 
consignavamo a quello deputera la prefata maiestà. et questa rinnovatione de liga 
universale fusse stata simpliciter secundo il terzo capitolo della nostra liga 
particulare lanimo novo staria piú riposato che non sta. ma essendo stata facta tale 
quale è a noi non parve de potere ne anche volimo fare altro che quanto è detto salvo 
quando tutti li altri principi Christiani gli converrano che allora pro ratu faremo 
semper el debito nostro et così semper faremo il debito per confermatione delli 
comuni stati secondo siamo obbligati per capitoli della nostra lega particulare. ed da 
qui inanzi non deliberiamo fare piú spesa in queste cose del Turco per veruna 
persona se non como è dicto. datum Vigevani XIII Februarii 1471. 
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Consulte e pratiche 60 
121rv  
 
die xxviii februarii 1471 
 
Florentine calendar: die xxviii Februarii 1470 
 
Super auxilio regi contra Turchum 
 
Tommaso Soderinus eques: respondendum legatio regi et subvenio dum regi de 
tuctis viginti millibus et persuadendum regis ut faveat apud Summum Pontificem per 
decimus ecclesiastis 
 
Johannes Canisiani eques: idem et precipue videndum nequid fiat qui inutile fit 
reipublice et saluti mercatorum nostrorum consulendum hac proprie una ut danni 
pecunie regi quibus ipse perlibito uti possit et deputandos omissis dixit et quodmodo 
et quante pare solui in parari pecunie debeant consultemus 
 
Loysius Guicciardinis: miseram olinonem civitatis deploravit qui superioribus anni 
tot clades passa sit et recitavit omissis et seditionis plure clades ex bellum quom cum 
coleoni gesti est obsidioni ariminensi afflicta esse rem publicam nunc autem parari 
bellum quod future sit diu omissis et dubiam esse consultationem dixit et qui omissis 
que pericula magni potendas. et tamen ob regis in re omissis meriti censuit et ipse xx 
millia ducatus porrigenda regi in auxilium ut superioris rege sententie facimur 
 
Antonio Ridolfi eques: omni ipso multi verbis et multis argumentationibus 
superiorem sententiam et tam cavendum ne qui palam fit nec novere id possit 
mercatoribus ob id presertim quod nuper acadit de regis hominibus et mercatoribus 
qui in turci ditione erant 
 
Boniovanne Ianfiliactus eques: quod agitetur Christiana que res censuit et ipse idem 
quid superiores sententiam monere tam se ut meminerit magistratus et que rem hanc 
examinaturi fuit tribus huius anni paratque ante oculos mercatores salute qui 
Constantinopoli negotiantur 
 
Iacobus Pactius eques: numquam putasse ut absque tributo ecclesiastico veniretur ad 
subvenendum robus Christianis et decti satus est qui lente predatur in eo tributo qui 
nisi fiat cum pro Christianis pugnandum est numquam sperandum esse in posterum 
futurum esset. et in subvenendum ut sed cauta subveniendum ut alias in consilio 
marrano omissis est nequid fiat quidem mercatoribus noveat qui Constantinopoli 
negotiant et confere se ut regi persuades ut an et cives et mercimonia qui in ditione 
turci sunt redeunti potestate nostram qui quicque deliberatos quod inutili fit rei 
publice et mercatoribus 
 
Dominus Marcellus iureconsultus: probavit et ipse primas sententias et liberaliter 
regi subveniendum et id caute faciendum ut relique sententia fuerunt. 
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Bernardo Bonieronimus iureconsultus: idem et eius sententia secutus est romulus 
honofrius qui vixta foederis. 
 
Andreas Crescius : cum iis qui in suo ordine Soderini idem. 
 
Nicolaus Berardus: duas esse causas dixit cur auxilum regi porrigere debeamus 
primus quod infedeli sit qui offendit secum dolore esse ingerit regno merita in urbem 
nostram et multes rationibus probavit suvenendum esse regi sed ob ingentur tributa 
curandum ut ecclesiasticis tributo fiant xx milli ducatorum ad imitationem maximo 
ducis Mediolani qui omissis dictissimums sit pollicitus tamen est xx millia 
ducatorum ex ecclesiasto tributo et quosdam ex his qui simul seretur senturi dixit in 
tomasio soderinus equites cum additione Jacobi Picti. 
 





Leonardus Mannellus: iis qui eran in sacello idem cum additionem iacobi pauli hoc 
est ut ecclesiastico tributo omissis regi si fieri possit. 
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die ii Martii 1471 
 
Florentine calendar: die II Martii 1470  
 
super re eadem consilium petitum a Gino Caponio vexillifere iustitie. 
 
Tomasus Soderinus eques: fuit eiusdem sententies qua fiant in superiore 
consultatione ut interest per oratorem videndum ut impereret tributi ecclesiastici a 
Summum Pontifice 
 
Iohannes Canisianus eques: post multa verba et multas argumentationes fuit in 
superiores sententia et deputandos cives adixit qui unde pecunie habende sint et 




Nicolaus Berardus: respondendum esse regi dixit per oratore atque illi persuandedum 
ut nolit nostro maximo periculo contra qui opus sit expereri nos fortune ob nostris 
mercatores et mercimoniam expollicendum regi cum eris opus omissis xx millia 
ducatorum ser omnes omissis vires et tanem qui omnes alios sententie fuit in ponere 
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subveniret incoveniens putare esse si solus ipse dissentiret. quoque in preservavit 
superiores sententias. 
 
die xxviiii Martii 1471 
 
admissus in senatu est Bartholomeus Recanatis regiis legatis qui gravis egit regis 
nomine vel id quod omissis sibi pollicet suas ob expeditionem in Turcos et petiit ut 
super pecuniis aliquid dedennat et ita legatis dimissus et super his consilium 
petitioni. 
 
Tommasus Soderinus: gravis habendas regis que ita humanitatem omissis et 
nihilominus permissi omissis memoris et aliquid decernendum ut impleant quod 




Angelus Stufa eques: ampie die causa quia res afferre in litteris difficultatis animo in 
pecuniis et modii inducendum ut tardius solvant nequid in deliberandis pecuniis quod 
omissis est finiret apparia possit quod regis molestie fit 
 
Iacobus Pactius: mittandum ligati ad regi qui de premissimus et aliis rebus nostra 
respondiant cautius enim agendum in ea re ne is qui in grecia negotiant nostra 
mercatores periculis obiicant 
 
Mariottus Benvenutis: mittendum ex ipse legatum censuit ne mercatores qui 
Constantinopoli negociant in periculo sint atque et ob qui nuper accidit de plumbino 
omissis et probavit prima sententia 
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Consulte e pratiche 60 
124rv 
 
Die VI Apriliis 1471  
 
Recitatio ab legato qui Rome est litteris quod respondendum sit  super promissis regi 
Ferdinando factis deferendo auxilio per defensione Christiani relligionis super 
prostulatis Roberti Sanseverinis. 
 
Tommasus Soderinus eques: in litteras id esse potuissimum ut relligiosa bona possint 
venire in tributi quidem et si dubius sit vestra Pontifice dadatur tanto urgente 
necessitant tanto magis instam dum quinto denegare magis atque materia bona 
describende et aliquid principii dandum ut aliquid tam de transfigatur. in premissis 
perseverandum et quanto res ipse comoditatem offerunt tempori ampie domini eam 
dixit servit ampiendam ut quo aliquam persolui possit iam nunc dispiaciatur omissis. 
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Consulte e pratiche 60 
124v-125 r 
 
Die xx Aprilis 1471  
 
super promissis regi factis de auxilio secondo florini summa viginti miliam quomodo 
perficenda sint 
 
Tommasus Soderinus eques: promissa servanda esse et regis benivolentiam multi 
facienda curandum que ut aliquandum per plura verba nostra aliquid rei intelligat. 
itaque tam curam demandata esse viribus paucis qui quo id fieri possit disquirant quo 




Ugolinus Martellus: idem et curandum dixit ne qui sint quod pericolosum fit 
mercatoribus qui Constantinopoli negotiantur atque id esse dixit 
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Consulte e pratiche 60 
128r-129r 
 
Super parandis pecuniis ut promissis stari possit xx millium Florentinorum regi 
Neapolitano et expensis solvendis que facta fit in adventum Mediolanensis ducis. 
 
Iohannes Pictis eques: suasit parationem pecuniam et promissa regi solvenda in 
sumptus omissis super navigando que multa dixit et quo plurimas utilitates publicas 
in eo esse demonstrator omissis 
 
Tommaso Soderinus: eques super paratione pecunias idem, super navigatio autem 
subveniendum dixit consulibus mari ut penitus non extinguat navigatoria que in 
honori rei publice fit et intelligendos cives dixit omissis 
 
Loysius Guicciardinis: eques merita certavit omissis regis in rem pubblica omissis 
que promissis perseverandum ut vestre regi referamus et que omnia pecuniis 
indigeant censere se ut tributo ecclesie omissis fieri possit. dissuasi omnem 
extraordinaria parandam cum pecuniam ea tandem deputatos cives dixit qui et quid 
oportunum sit examinatus et cum omissis pecunie possint pervenit. ab navigando 
nullo desistendum parte censuit quod honestissima res sit rei pubblice et eodem quo 




Jacobus Pactius eques: omissis et que triremis est Pisis qui navigare possit 
committendum consulibus maris ut qui corissime hanc rei expediant  
 








Thomasus Soderini eques orator 
 
Questa illustrissima Signoria per fare cosa grata a voi scrive al proveditor dell’ 
armata sua che allavuta della lettera mandi una galea a Ragusa che qui aspecti lo 
imbasciadore che deve essere di ritorno da Costantinopoli et che giunto che sia lo 
levi et conduchilo per quello modo che iudicheremo essere piú sicuro dove de 
omissis. 
 
Venetis die XXI Septembris 1471 
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A Ferdinando rege  
 
Magnifici et excellentissimi viri amici nostri carissimi. cum de Christiana republica 
omissis periculis inquibus versatur solicitaremur ac magis magisque solicitemur 
vidies semper sepe numero et per litteras et per oratorem nostrum exhortati fuimus 
illustrium ducem Burgundie ut maiorum suorum vestigiis incedes nobiscum pro 
tuenda Christiani republica adversus grassantes consentire Turco vellet. quibus 
auditis dux ipse ut est summa pietate et singulari in Deum cultu preditus incitatus et 
maiorum suorum exemplis nobiscum foedus percussit quod nuper ut moris est per 
urbes atque oppida regni nostri a preconibus pronuntiari missimus. quam rem ut par 
est d.v. per litteras nostras significare decrevimus quin et foederis ipsius exemplum 
atque copiam mittere ut que foedere continentur plane omnia intelligant. et quam pro 
iure amicitias atque coniunctionis nostre inter eos qui nobiscum foedere coniuncti 
essent rempublicam vestram noncupavimus d.v. summa opere rogamus ut 
noncupationem ac nominationem hanc nostram ratam acceptamque habere velint 
idque ut de more est per suas et litteras nobis declarare ut possimus ducem ipsum 
certo ac stato tempore de voluntate ac comprobatione vestra certiorem facere. quod 
ut dominationis vestre faciant vehementer et atque et hortamur. datum in 
Castellonovo Neapolis die X Novembris MCCCLXXI. 
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A Sixto IIII Pontifice Maximo  




Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. considerantes quot et quanta mala 
nefandissimus ille canis Turcorum princeps Christianis hactenis intulerit et quotidie 
inferre non desinat statuimos post que adhunc summi platus apicem meritis licet 
insufficientibus sumus evecti omnibus quibus possumus modis republice Christiane 
usque adeo laboranti sucurrere. in presentiarum nobis in Deo est dilecti filii hoc 
primo vere Deo dante triremes usque ad numerum vigintiquinque ad huiusmodi opus 
paratas habere. habemus iam quinque ex nostris in portu anchonetano que nisi 
promptu erunt. reliquas aut non habemus. neque tam brevi tempore est conficiendi 
comoditatem habere possimus. Promissum est eas aliunde procurare. A vobisque 
tanquam ab iis quos bonos catholicos esse facimus quinque que nunc vobis forte 
supersunt et validas tamen petere per vos ad semenstre commodandas nobis et nostris 
sunctibus inservendas atque armandas. exstimamus enim nos id libenter facturos 
esse. Qua praesente hortamur vos et ex mentis nostre affectu rogamus ut has quinque 
triremes nobis pro ipso semenstri commodare velitis. Etenim ipsi videtis periculum 
imminentissimum. expectamus autem a vobis celerem et votivam responsionem. Ut 










A Sixto quarto Pontefice Maximo  
 
Intelleximus esse proposita apud vos exortatis quibusdam premia interfactoribus 
vestrorum rebellium quod inhumanum est a Christiana caritate alienum videtus 
optamus et pro nostra in vos paterna dilectione consulimus et hoc tamen ut ab 
huiusmodi re penitis desistatis vel saltem quod negare certe non debetis decenartis 
non intelligi de rebellibus illi qui in alma urbe Roma et eius districtu aut alibi: ubi 








Ab rege Ferdinando  
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Affecit nos incredibili voluptate pecunia quam nobis ad expiditionem maritima nuper 
misistis que rei et si ut commoda rebus nostrus per oportuna per se iocunda nobis est 
longe tamen esto et iocundissimum dictum nos vestrorum perspicere. Intelligereque 
populum vestrum non modo non omissis nobis sed quod amicorum est proprium et 
pecunia qui belli necessis est et triremibus quibus navale bellum geritur nos innare. et 
enim ex viri ubi aut quo modo apertius declararis amoris societatisque vis potest que 
madiuvandris expedictionibus atque iis possimum expedictionibus quibus pericula 
iniuriesque propulsantur et ao eo presertium hoste qui fit qui potentissimus. Vos 
autem non solum pecunia ac triremibus nos vivatis? magno cum populo vestri atque 
omnium ordinum consensu sed in maxime gravi periculo atque adversus hostem 
superbissimum. Qui qq Christianum nomen eque odit atque infectatur eiusque 
inpotentia ommnium Christianorum capitibus imminet, tam Italie et nobis preserti 
qui vicinores sumus bellique calamitatis magis expositi omnis ire omnis que 
periculos vis ac rabies proprius minatur atque exproximo vehementius nos petit. quo 
circa vestri nobis auxilium eoest gratius quo periculo propriore sumus et quod aperta 
iam adversis turcum arma movimus qq voluntaria non tamen minus incessaria ut 
finibus nostris tutandis si et defensitande Christiane republica. pro hac igitur 
subsidiaria ac pecunia presidiariisque triremibus ac profato armoris ni nos vestri 
testimonio agimus nobis summas et singulare gratias. Vosque hortamur ut 
communem fidei orthodoxe causam suscipientes ea agatis de nobis popolusque 
Florentino ut Christianissimo sperarei iure debent. Et quam nostri armoris atque 
institituti est receptorem beneficionem ubique memores ac gratos esse velle sic 
habebote regem Ferdinandum ita quids recenti hoc vestre beneficio devinctum esse 
ut nulla unque incidere res possit que eius valeat abolere memoria. et qun acceptos 
meritos gratia pacis non minius quam belli muneribus referri potesi cuiusquid pacis 
quod cum bona dicti sit venia non minus studios nos esse quam quos vis aut opulos 
principes esse et nunc facemur et olim rebus ipsis declaramus pollicemur vobis tum 
pro nostro studio tum pro Florentina libertatis incolumitate omnia facturos nihil aut 
consilio aut opera unquam pretermis furos demum opere facultates copiasque nostras 
omnes expositum ut pacem omnium ut civilem tranquillitatem omnis undique Italia 
obtineat ut regnum hoc nostrum ut urbes oppiola atque agri vestri quorum non aliam 
quam regni nostricuram nobique suscepturi sumus pacis ocique muneribus tucto de 
tranquille frui valeant quod nostrum propositum vestrimque studium ut eventus 
sequatur et loquemur aut vobiscum liberaliter et nemine ex eludimus quind hostis 
loco habituri simus armisque nostris insecuturi quisquis fuerit modo aliquis fuerit qui 
vel pacem Italiam turbare vel Florentinam vexare libertatem audeat. quam nostram 
mentes vobis testatam esse cupimus ut sciatis quantum et olim ab experto et nunc ex 
professo de nobis nostraque opera sperare possitis ac debeatis. Die 28 Aprilii 1472. 
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A Sixto quarto Pontefice Maximo 
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Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. intelleximus sub ortas esse 
volaterris dissensions non leves quod nobis plurimum est molestum quippe enim ut 
iam manifestis signis intelligere potuistis omnes curas et cogiationes nostras 
riparandis Christianis et precipue Italis qui ad reprimendum et barbaricum impetum 
aptissimi esse videtur collocaverimus. que quid alicui dissenssionis exortur 
molestiam nobis affert et voluntati conficiende cordie adversature. quare per vestera 
misericordie Dei nostri et hortamur et monemus mono devotionem vestras ut ad 
sedandas penitusa tollendas dissensiones huismodi animum et secundium connertatis 
et in ipsis principiis Oriente ignem opprimatus ne ex parva scintilla quod absit et 
deus misericordis pietate sua avertat maius excitetur incendiumn et quietem Italie 
interturbet. vos ut intelligatis quam audi simus vestri et illos tranquillitatis studium 
auctoritatem opes et quicquid denique in nobis est ad hoc pollicemur et prestare 
parati sumus et ita quotiens iudentis necesse esse requiratis in nullo enim decerimus 
ob conservationem vestra. die ultima Aprilis 1472. 
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Ab Sixto Papa quarto  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. in direptione nobilis insule 
euboee e qua imatissimus Turchorum tyrannus superioribus annis Christianos eiecit 
compertum est hostes perfidos navigiis plurimis Christianorum que in eorum mari 
deprehenderenat visos et nostris nos potissimum expugnasse armis. quod non minus 
ignominio sum quam pernitiosum fuit. iactura suscepta cautiores nos redderi debet ut 
diligentius caveant quod semel damno et dedecori extiit. hac nos ratione dicti 
admonente officio pastorali ad nos et alios catholicos principes qui locus maritimus 
oris et scribendumn diximus ut quando quidem hostis subdolus mari incumbere ad 
bellum parat  in Italiam sibi transitum sciat omnis occasio potiendi navium 
Christianorum sibi principiatur ne rursis nostris nos armis impugnet. id autem facile 
cavebitur si navigatio Christianos ad terras Turchorum hec tempore conquiescat si 
nostri in eis locis non negociabuntur ubi possit in Turchorum potestate venire. quare 
per morte et passionem domini nostri Iesu Christi per resurrectionis et eterne spem 
per pietatem tua vos obtestamur dilectissimi filii ut omnibus vestre dictionissuio 
magnis et formi dabilibus poenis vihidetis ne hoc tempore ad loca Turchorum 
audeant navigare ut eos in officio contineatis nec eo ire permittatis ubi sibi ipsus et 
Christiane reipublice damnu afferant. hoc vos libenter facturos vestra nobis sapientia 
pollicetur sane a Deo premium et ab hac Sancta sede viderem omnem rationem et 















Ab Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo 
 
Quanto per semper desideravimus ut generalis liga inter Italie potentatus 
instauraretur cum omnis alii tum precipue devotio vestra per optime novit. nihil enim 
rebus Christiani utilius et salubrius inquam existimavimus intercapturus est hoc 
sanctissimum opus quibusdam impedimentio que pretor spem. et expertationem 
nostram arriderunt adeo ut necessario res hic cuisque prottacta sit. nunc vero rebus ad 
tranquillitatem redatis visum est nobis provinciam. eam prosequi quam pro officio 
nostro pastorali susceperamus ad quam quidem rem cum plures cause honeste et 
necessarie omnes debeant adhortariet impellet illa est precipua que comunem 
Christiani nominis hostem cervitibus nostris imminentem habemus. si quidem 
allatum est cum vere novo validissima classe et ingenti exercitu Italiam versus totis 
viribus esse erupturum cuius furori misi per Italos potentatus unamiter resistatur et 
crudelissima alius opprimantur consilia actum esse de summam rei publice 
Christiane. quare hortamur devotione vestram et publici boni studiosissima est ut 
oratore cum mandato in plena forma detraneo et concludendo huius omnio federe qui 
primum mittere veletis quidem aliis etiam significamus ut Deo auctore inceptum 
opus omissis perficere possumus. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo 
piscatoris die xxx Septembris 1474. 
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Ab Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo  
 
Quemadmodum magno adiumento rebus Italie et totius Christianitatis hactenus fuit 
et infuturum longe maiori esse potest motus insignis principis uxon cassan contra 
perfidum nostre religionis hostem Turchum ita nulli dubius esse  orbitanti quin eo 
cessante in aperto et maximo periculo Italia ipsa et Christiani relinquantur. cum ob 
causam ne dum expediens saluti Italie et Christianitatis sed omnino  necessarium 
esse censemus qui ipse uxoncassan in ea oppinione et proposito belli contra 
Turchorum gerendi retineat in quo ad presens est. quoniam nulla fortassis turci 
oprimendi occasio talis se omissis offeret qualis hec ipsa est sollicitat enim nos 
principis ille per oratorem suos in terrestri exercitu Turchum Christiani invadant. 
polliceque si id fiat se rursum potentissimo exercitu iterum descensire omissis nec 
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inter missirem bellum nisi cum intentione ipsius turci. his orator uxon cassam instat 
pro responso cum redire cupiat ad principem suom non contentus verbis sed certus 
de eo quodam Christianis sit faciendum. nos pro debito nostro et salute domini 
gregis  ac quia vetendum est nesi Christiani hanc rem negligant. ipse uxon cassam 
aliquod fedis cum Turcho ineat quod non essent absque discrimine et detrimento 
maximo Christianitatis. prompti simul ad faciendum quantum vires nostre valent 
possemus que utinam soli hoc pondus sustinere quanta neminem gravitatem veres 
facultates nostre non sufficiunt propterea necesse est ut devotione vestram et ceteros 
Italie potentatus reuqestamus hortam itaque nos filii dilectissimi quibus et privata et 
publica de ea hec res concordi esse debte ut oratores hic nostros cum pleno mandato 
mittatis ad concurrendum simul cum ceteris potentatibus et conferendum impense 
expeditionis terrestris hoc anno contra Turchum suscipiende sine medio carissimi in 
Christo filii nostri matthie regis ungarie illustribus sive alio modo pro ut melius 
videbutur. et hoc cito fiat ut sciamus predicto oratori et principi suo certum 











Ab Sixto Papa quarto  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem . super iustis et causis pro forma 
necessitate fidei catholice et propter apparatus maximos quos terra ac mari 
immanissimus Turchis inperniciem Christianitatis presertim hoc anno sicut plurimos 
testimonio accepimus molitur. cum nostre et ecclesie facultates nullo modo 
sufficierent. unam integram decimam omnium fructum redditum ac proventum esse 
descasticos imposuimus pro omissis nostris litteris de super confectis continentum 
hortamur itaque comunitatem vestra atque reuirimus ut collectoribus decimas 
huiusmodi per loca dominii reipublice vestra deputatis oportunos ac necessarios 
favore impendere velitis in huic Dei et fidei cause que maxima celeritate indiget 
vestris et aliorum catholicorum adiuti presidiis sicurrere valeamus. datum Rome 
apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatori die xx Aprilis 1475. 
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Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo  




Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictione. nuperrime ad nos venit orator 
magni et potentis principis assanbech qui plura de illis apparatu optimoque a omnio 
invadedendi comunes inimocs nostros Turchos nobis retulit utpote qui dies ac 
omissis de salute Christiane reipublice solliciti sumus oratorem quidem ipsum 
libenter vidimus et benigne audivimus qui cum ad nos accedere statuerit noluimus 
eum absque litteris nostris venire hortantes vos velitis hominem hunc pro 
consuetudine vestra grato omnio recipere et audire commendatumque habere ac 
principem ipsum per has nostras adhortam et excitare ut in tam utili opere in dies 
magis perseveret. datum Rome apostolicam sede Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die 
xxvi Aprilis 1475 Pontificato nostro anno iii. 
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Die xxvi Aprilis 1475 
 
Verum sit aliquid ordinandum benivolentie factis qui ex exemplo Mediolanensis 
ducis Venetis novis sociis cum appareat maxima laboraturos esse Turcho hoste 
insidies magis premente 
 
Johannotius de Pittis eques: pertineri ad veros amicos amicorum re et communes 
existimari eporteri hanc societatem novam confirmandam esse omnibus modis neque 
id commodius posse fieri omissis indifatigatis in periculis ferre auxilium atque id 
quidem et libenter et celeriter faciendum ut acciepietis beneficium sit et pulchrius in 
qua enim expectandum esse donec Veneti auxilium petavit cum sit impromptum qui 
tum auxili indigeant presertim pecuniam 
 
Iohannes Canisianus eques: sensit cum prima summa duabis additus cautionibus in 
caute agatur ne in periculum adducant mercatori Florentini qui in greciam 
negotiantur tum ut pecunie inde parentur inde minus incommodi ad rempublicam 
perveniat 
 
Antonius Ridolfis eques: nihil dissentivis a superioribus sententiis admnuit id tantum 
ut de quantitate prudentie deliberatur in su per quidem secundum vires non dispare 
ad amicitie officio atque eam consultationem omissis apariores 
 
Bongiannos Gianfiliatius: idem et suasvi celeritatem 
 
Petrus Minerbeitis, Johannes Florenus: idem 
 
Charolus Nicoli de Medicis: cum hiis qui in suo ordinis sedeant primas sententias 
probare 
 
Leonardus Bartholinis: idem 









Ab Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. novissime litteris dilecti filii 
nobili viri Petri Mocenico ducis Venetiarum accepimus immanissimum illum 
Turchum Christiani nostris hostem acerrimum classem validam que instructissimam 
retinere quam sicut signis que aliquorum relatione habetur per mare maius versus 
partes moldavie pro iniuriis ulciscendis omissis cladis ibridem suscepte connertere 
intendit. ex ademptatio nos merito et omissis ad commiserationem calamitatis 
Christiane quod ad hec ipso pericula consideranda primum igitur quod ad nostrum 
pastorale officium attinet  supplices Deum oravimus quod per alias personas Deo 
acceptas preces effundi fecimus ut ipse qui preponeris est pro sui novis omissis 
decertantibus assistat ad omnios catholicos regume et principum ac fidelium populos 
uniate ut hic truculentissimus hosti Christianorum unibus repellatur devotioni non 
omissis significe malum duximus et copiam litteram memorati ducis presentibus 
introduci scimus ut plare intelligati quando indiscriminite non solum moldavie partes 
verum et omnium Christianos verseritur velitis itaque prout ad catholicos viros 
spectat de aliquo subsidio cogitare quos illis partibus bello olaborantibus prout 
expedire videretis operare se sucurrere. nos non desiderantes quod ad tamtam belli 
mole susciemendam nostre et ecclesie facultatis nullo modo sufficirent 
concurrentibus auxiliis Christianos presidia exhibere. iuxta vires nostros pollicemur 
neque aliquo pacto una cum aliis huic Dei et fidei cause deerimus. cogitare et ante 
oculos nostros ponere velitis quidem si dilectus filiis nobilis vir stephani voivoda qui 
nuper victoria potitus stragem et iacturam maxima Turchis intulit ab eidem bello 
lacessitus Christianos auxiliis se de sciturum semserit et locho cesserit quod deus 
avertat quantus periculi ungari et germanos populi devotissimi et reliquam 
Christianitas sub incesserit. quare eandem devotionem vestram pervisera hunc Dei 
nostri et omissis ipsius Dei et Christiani nomine sententia hortamus in domino ac 
deprecamur ut visa vires vestras aliquam solventionem facere velitis prout vester 
conscientie visum fuerit in quo Deo iam primis gratissimum obsequirum prestavitis 
et ad gloriam ac laudam rei publice vestre cedit. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum 
sub anulo piscatoris die prima Iulii mccclxxv Pontificatus nostri anno quarto.  
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Ab Sixto iiii Pontefice Maximo  
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Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. pridum urgente necessitate 
reipublice Christiane decimam super clero per universas Italiam imposuimus sicut 
omissis applicus de super et factis et istuc missis iam plene videre potuistis. sed 
quoniam ii quibus hec quia demandata est nobis scripserunt id a nobis non fuisse 
permissum donec aliud deliberantis et propterea nihil aliud de mente vestra deinde 
referipsistis sumus profecto admirati quippe qui persuase simus nobis vos ad id ante 
alios futuros promptiores. desideramus itaque omnium quam aperte intelligit ut 
sciamus an decima ipsa in domnio vestro exergenda vel non exorge exortamur et 
pictamus que literras vestras. sumus enim ut testari omnes possunt de Christiana fide 
vehementer solliciti parati pro viribus nihil pretermotere. datum Rome apud Sanctum 
Petrum sub anulo pischatoris die viii Julii mcccclxxv nostri Pontificato quarto. 
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Domino Aloysio Guicciardino (in Venice) 
 
Estato da noi Rinieri da Ricasoli narra che havendo lui insummo gruppo di Stefano 
di Maiolica da Branditio balle tre di panno di firenze et botte tre dolio mandava alla 
valona a Francescho del Nero. una galea di cotesta illustrisima Signoria cioe la galea 
dellisola della Braza chiamata lagalera Bracciona prese decto grippo al suasino et 
levò detti panni et olio et posele a Corfú. per la quale cosa vogliamo siate a costesta 
illustrissima Signoria et supplichiate in nome nostro che scrivino al balio di Corfú et 
al padrone di decta galea che decti panni e olio sieno restituiti al nostro cittadino et 
mercatante altre ad che faranno cosa degna della loro giustitia et nostra coniunctione 
ne faranno a noi etiamdio piacere singulare. vale die X Augusti 1475. 
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Ab Sixto iiii Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. audita tamdem caphensis civitatis 
direptione que immanissimo hosti preda facta est pro ex copiis litteras dilecti filii 
nobilis viri Petri Mocenico ducis Venetiarum et (…)prepositi hic in chios videre 
poteriti qui ampleis dicimus aut suadeamus non satis habemus nisi ut ignaviam nom 
accusemus qua sit ut cotidie magis Christianam religionem periclitari ante oculos 
conamus et periculum in dies magis admoneri cum hec omnia futura multo ante 
prospexerimus et legatis et nuntiis et classe iam biennio emissa et facultatibus nostris 
in omne proficisci genus expositis hortati omnes fuerimus ad ponendas similitates ad 
concordiam pro republica Christiana suscipiendam ad resistendum hinc crudelissime 
pesti ad conservandam religionem pateritis vocibus non semel sed plures 
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mutaverimus exemplo provocaverimus et nihil conferimus neque et omictamus quod 
saluti rei publice Christiana conducere possit et tamen in tanto periculo in tam 
manifesta calamitate nemo insus est ad salutem sese erigere qua se dimino quodam 
omissis omnibus mentis lumen ereptumsit ut non violeant iminentem omissis 
cernicibus tempestatem. sed quodam puis et misericordies et iniquitate nostras non 
respicet neque deferet sperante in se non cessabimus verum pro officio nostro 
pastorali ea omnia temptare que salutis sum ut omnes intelligant per nos non defuisse 
quin omnia adhiberimus remedia que presenti temporum conditioni pro facultate 
nostra adhibueri potuerunt. et quoniam iam eo progressu est immanissimi hostis 
rabies ut amplius cunctandum non sit statuimus ut omnes Christiani porincipes 
oratores suos ad nos mittans ad ea tractandum et consulendum que huic tam 
necessarie provionis et communi cause expedere cognoverint quod si fiet ut 
speramus non dubitamus quin breva omnia bene successura sint et catholicam 
ragionem tanta ignominia liberemus. si vero quod absit ex audite non erunt patris 
voces in tanto periculo. Deum testamur et homines quem omissis cannus quem ex 
nunc imploramus non stetisse pernos quin Christiano sanguini opitularemur et eris 
rerum in suppremo malicio illum futurum esse qui  in causa erit recordande hoc 
sanctissime expeditionis. cum non cognoverimus devotionem vestram 
reliogisissimam semper extitisse et omnia prompto anno fecisse que spectant adeo 
altationem Christianis religionis. hortamus nos omissis modum et per passionem 
salvatoris vestrem rogamus et omissis vestra auctoritate mandamus ut oratores 
vestrum cum pleno mandato bene instructum de his homnibus que petinens ad hoc 
opus sanctum Dei et ad consolendum et oportunas provisiones faciendum mittere 
velitis qui hic sit ad kalendis novembris proxime futuras  simul cum aliis ad quoes et 
scribimus ut quid agendum sit consultare possumus quoniam et eas ipsa morum non 
patiatur et vos urgentissime necessitate non defitur vos pro catholico vestro vero non 
dubitatumsu omissis cum agatur de stati defortunis et vita unuscuiusque quod si tales 
essent ecclesie facultates ut soli hoc onus sub omissis possumus faceremus 
libertissime nec quemquam alium ad hoc expectaremus. verum cum soli tanto 
provincie sufficere non pussumus nuper cum iam supsa vires fecerimus necesse est 
ut ceteros quo concurrant presidios. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo 
piscatoris die 11 Septembris mcccclxxv Pontificato nostro anno quinto. 
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Carolo Baroncelli consuli  
 
Intendiamo essere morto costa Francesco di Giovanni Ugolini nostro cittadino diche 
viene al presente costi Antonio suo fratello per recuperatione dogni cosa setruova del 
suo mandato da Jacopo Villani et Benedecto Salviati creditori di decto Francesco 
vogliamo insieme col decto Antonio conogni diligentia procuri che ogni cosa del suo 
sinnivengha et faccile de porre apresso a Bartholomeo Pecori o appresso di Philippo 
Pasquini le quali cose uno dedecti tengha a petitione desopra decti suoi creditori et in 
ogni cosa ne exeguisca la volontà di Jacopo Ugolini et Benedecto Salviati farai ogni 
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Venit cum his ad vos literis baldus altovita nobilis civis noster quem mittit Joannes 
Benitius creditor Marini mercatoris Ragusei quemadmodum ex baldo ipso coram 
intelligetis. in totissima est iustitia vestra et nostra amicitia pregamus valete apud vos 
utrumque neque opus est modo quod scribi plenumque solet in litteris 
commendatutis ut aliquid demore conceditis benito nostro iustitia facis est. valete die 








Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. et si nuperrime ad vos 
scripserimus ut ad kalendas Novembris oratorum vestrum hic habitetis  cum pleno 
mandato ad consultandum ea quot opus essent ad expedictionem adversus hostem 
Christiani nominis. in quia alia et intelliximus imminentia pericula que eam mora 
non patiuntur hortamus vos plurimum et applicat iterum auctoritate mandamus ut que 
ceptis presentibus oratorem ipsum vestrum aut plenum mandatum omissis vestro hic 
mittere velitis quoniam et aliis hoc idem scribimus neque id tempus velitis expectare 
nam eo res iam deducta est ut misi celeriter provvideatur dubitamus non cum 
velimus postea provvidere possumus. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo 
piscatoris die xvii Septembris mcccclxxv Pontificato nostro anno quinto. 
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Venit ad vos cum his litteris nostris Constantius Landuccius procurator et gestor 
negociorum Cipriani insigni  nobilis civis nostri et benemeriti de republica et statu 
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nostro ut pecunias quasdam  Hieronymi insignii filii sui recuperet quas Antonio 
Martori mercatori vestro in Bursia crediderat atque ex quibus id serici quod isthuc ad 
vertum esse intelleximus coemit. rogamus ergo nos in huius civis nostri iustitiae 
faveatis videtur enim imprimis satisfactum esse debere ei  ut pecunias contribuis ad 
seriam coemendum. sed vos melius res intelligetis qui nos scriberemus et 
Constantius ipse coram omnia explicabit clarius. feceritis nobis rem ad modum 
gratam si eum nostra causa experitis benigne dedertisque operam ut que celerrime 








Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo  
 
The king of Hungary wrote to the pope that omissis sit accelerandum in 
provisionibus adversus impiissimum hostem faciendis omissis. Florence must send 
ambassadors to Rome  









Ab Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem . quid ad oratorem  nostrum super 
rebus reipublice Christiane necessariis mandatum miseritis plurimum nos laudavimus 
in domino fecitis quod catholicos viros decet et quod omnes de nostra pietate 
sperabant. superest ut in religionis ad rei expeditionem  necessaris nonnulla 
intermittatus sed ad tale iam provisione deveniater. qualiter tempora exigunt et 
omissis vestra pietas pollicetur. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo 
piscatoris die iii Februarii mcccclxxvi Pontificato nostro anno quinto. 
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Altra volta scrivemo a messer Luigi operassi apresso acotesta illustrissima Signoria 
la restitutione di certe balle di panni et botti dolio mandava Rinieri da Ricasoli alla 
valona a Francesco del Nero che furono tolte da una galea dicotesta illustrissima 
Signoria come piú appieno sarai informato da ipso Rinieri delle quali robe nesono 
restituite parte et parte ne resta a restituire. voliamo sia acotesta illustrissima Signoria 
et operi Rinieri de Ricasoli cictadino et mercatante nostro sia interamente restituito 
come si conviene alla nostra amicitia e confederatione nostra. vale die xxiiii 
Februarii 1476. 
 








Joannetto de Villamarina  
 
Viene in coteste parti el nobile cittadino nostro Pierfrancesco Tosinghi padrone di 
una delle nostre galee. potrebbe per qualche cosa havere bisogno della opera vostra o 
del vostro favore apresso la maestà del re. preghiamo strenissimamente di quelle 
cose che vi richiedeva lo favoregiate per nostro amore che ve ne resteremo 
obligatissimi. se mai accadera dimostreremo cofacti havere ricevuto dalla v.m il 
favore. vale die xxviii Martii 1476. 
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Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. promptitudinem cum nostri in 
oblatione secundi subsicii vehementer apud omnes commendavimus fecistis eam id 
quod de catholicis et religiosis viris expectabamus. verum eum hec ipsa expeditio cui 
incumbimus magnis videatur indigere subsidis aliquid oblationibus factis addendum 
putavimus et a nobis omissis que scribus nostris s.d.r. pater et cardinalibus 
incipientes taxam omnibus auximus nobis et ipsis cardinalibus de triginta millibus ad 
quadraginto, carissimo in Christo filio nostro Ferdinando Sicilie regi illustri de 
triginta ad triginta quinquem, vobis de quindecim ad decem et octo, dilecto filio 
nobili viro duci Venetiarum de quinquaginta ad quinquagintaquinque ne parva pro re 
alicui opportunitati deesse cogamur. speramus omnes quidem additamentum hoc 
libentissime et promptissime sucepturos nec defuturos imparvo. qui in magno tam 
alacros se ostendunt. dilectum quoque filium nobilem virum galeatium mariam 
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ducem Mediolani ad triginta milita taxavimus et credimus eum in hoc acquieturum. 
ad quod et vos eum velitis hortari iure confederationis. certos que qui adhuc no 
obtulerint taxavimus et ut cum aliis concurrant paterna vigilanti qua insistemus 
aducemusque in sententiam Deo duce et eorum nobis pieta pollicetur. quia quare vos 
filii dilectissimi hortamur et rogamus in domino ut taxam adductione huismodi 
libenter suscipere velitis. vestrosque oratori quod et aliis scribimus facultatem dare 
illam ratificandi acceptandique absolute et absque sola conditione nequid abstet 
quominus celeritur tam sancto pioque operi detur mitum. preterea filii dilectissimi 
videntos nobis pp. tam magnam additione pro aliorum exemplo et pubblica utilitate 
susceptam necesse fore ut impersis multus presertum gentum armorum paremis et 
quibusdam alis destituamur presidiis. equissimum videtur ut et nos et reliqui ad quod 
scribimus., velitis permittere et nobis fidem dare quod eritis nobis auxilio et 
protectioni siquis quod in no credimus non lacessitus a nobis nostra et dicte ecclesie 
loca bello invadere aut quovis modo perturbare caperet aut seducere auderet ne 
viribus nostris pro salute publica spoliati incommodum et detrimentum subeamus. 
quod vos supra sapientia singulari et ceteri recte sentientus optime possint 
considerite. datum apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die viii Mai 
mcccclxxvi Pontificato nostro anno quinto. 
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Ab Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo 
 
Dilecti filii apostolicam benedictionem. pro defensione rei publice Christiane que ut 
nulli observum est in maximo versatur pericule assidue cogitantes totis his mensibus 
cum nostris et aliorum Italie potentatum oratoribus egimus ut ei certum ei decerneret 
subsidum in que et per totum triennium proxime futurum iuxta taxam quas iusta 
impositionem, nostram quilibet acceptaverat et iam nos ulto pro parte nostra polliciti 
oramus liberaliter sumus. carissimo in Christo filius nostri Ferdinandus Sicilie rex 
illustris dilectisque filii nobiles viri Venetiarum et ferrarie duces plenam absque 
exceptione mandatum ad oratores suos miserunt. rem tam piam ac tam necessariam 
aplactentes expectabatur mandatum rei publice nostre a qua non minus que a quo 
piam alio P.P. innatam  pretatem animum que ad publica commoda semper 
promptum speratur ab omnibus. misistis illud quidem nuper sed non eiusmodi quod 
rei de qua agitur satus faciat. nam omissis ceteras difficultatis solum pro una vice 
dumtaxat loquit et cum ea conditione si mario pars Italie populorum contribuat non 
potevimus ob id non mirari atque dolere. mirari qui preter omnium expectatione et 
precipue dumtaxam deputate vestra opinionem acciditi dolere quia merentur ne id 
coram pertubit eam et cum pene conactam subuertat. non cernitur in hoc mandato ea 
liberalitas et promptituto quam hortemis polliceti estis et que nos decet. immo ut 
libere loquamur subterfugium queddam hoc videri posset. quia ut contribuat maior 
pars populorum Italie hoc nec querendam omissis nec exigi debet cum impossibile fit 
quare dilectissimi filii facint. mittat a mandatum liberum non de imo anno sed de 
triennio non ut maior pars populorum Italie concurrat quod impossibile esset sed sit 
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absque illa(ulla) conditione presertim cum ita tractatum fit. ut contractum cum his et 
non cum maior parte populos ut optime nostri fieri debeat. satis omissis pretati vestro 
et nostre omniumque expectationi. consulite honori nostro et comuni utilitati velitis 
taxaque quindecim millium ducatorum in quacumque summa libere exhibere que alii 
additiones acceptarunt et nos in prima taxa remansitis hoc pro pastorali monemus 
offero hoc saltor noster qui vos et alius pretioso sanguine scernit suo postulat hoc 
necessitasque exigit quare paterna nos hortamur et rogamus in domino caritate ut 
mandatum ipsam in ea forma quam dicimus et in qua alii prenominati miserunt quam 
primum mittere velitis ut in cepta pro seque et feliciter domino auctorem terminare 
possimus. quo eius feceritis speramus et dilectum filium nobilem virum galeatium 
mariano ducem Mediolani pro tuis religione et putatum in rem publicam Christianam 
ex omissis vestro piam hanc et necessariam omissis non deferturum datur fulgime. 
sub anulo piscatori die xxvii Augusti mccclxxvi Pontificato nostro anno sexto. 
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Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo 
 
Dilecti filii salutem, et apostolicam benedictionem audito dilecto filio Antonio de 
Tornabuonis sindico vestro contributionem subsidii anni presentis offerente 
rationesque cur pro reliquis duobus annis nunc oligationem non facitis afferente 
contenti sumus obbligationem pro uno anno accipere et ita accepimus sperantes seu 
potuis confidentes quod tamquam optimi Christiani et studiosissimi utilitatis publice 
quotiens necessitas postulabit in comuni causa non deeritis. datum fulginei sub anulo 
piscatori die xxiii Septembris mccclxxvi pont. nostri anno sexto. 
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Joahanni Villemarine  
 
Lamore che vi portiamo cifa pigliare confidenza in richiedervi: havete nelle mani 
Giovanbattista di Pasquale Genovese al presente ma antiquamente Fiorentino et e 
parenti suoi qui sono dibuona conditione in modo che havendo richiesti di questa 
littera volentieri glielabiamo compiaciuti per chiarivi che per nostro amore gli 
doniate la libertà farettecene piacere asssai et accedendo vi ricorderemo del piacere 
che farete. vale die xv Novembris 1476 
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Missive I Cancelleria 47 
 





Fratri Antonio Ursino Magno Magistro Rodi 
 
Mortuis sunt superiore tempore in navi cui operat Manfredus Papponius Pisanus 
civis Mariceris Vermillus et Dominicus Tovallias cives nostri. in res mercimonia. 
Florence asks to the Grand Master of Rhodes the wares of these Florentine 
merchants.  
die primo (s.d.) mcccclxxvi 
 
221 




Ab Ioanne de Villamarina  
 
Excelsi et potentes domini post commendatione. quamvis diebus hiis non longe 
decursis vestris responsium dederim litteris. Tum cum magnifici Pisanorum consuli 
hominem potestate munitum ideos per me mitti debere potuerunt. replicandos iterum 
respondebo et primo breve siffate littere imo summo opere oblectarunt. Tum quia an 
meum avventum in eo quod petebam vestre intevertebant dominationes et ad affatos 
consules maris scripserant ut casum benigne in portu vestro susceperim. sed que 
cumque opus esset ut amico subministrarentur. tum etiam quo vestre dominationes 
me ob id super amasse noviquid immaximam pollicione constituit. itaque viris 
dominationibus iteris innumerabiles refero gratias dominos Joannes consul ut vestre 
dominationes noverunt cum omissis hic contulisse illico ad me venit umquam 
nomine potum et quecumque opus esse mihi optulit petitque hommes et res vestras 
nec non et Genoenses per me a securari debere cui responsium dedi infinitas gratias 
retuli res que vestras ut meas pro ut diu expetiti mihi menti. curare et custodire ac ab 
aliis iuxe posse curari et custodiri me obtuli Genoenses non cum serenissimo per egi 
inmicantus asservari negavi. nihil aliud inter me et ipsum allocuntam neque omissis 
expetita demum ut potuerunt me vestro magnificum orlandum davola potestaque 
sussultum ad eos misi ut quid petebant audiret quo reverso quicquid petunt audiri et 
nihil aliud dixerunt netque potuerunt nisi id quod in omissis me et ad affatum 
consuleut supra alloqutum fuit petendo de verbis illis scripturas et fiere debent 
cumque benignes homines et res vestras aservare que tutissime sunt in honestum et 
obsurdi mihi videri quam ob antiquam amicitiam benivolentiam que et comodo per 
eadem dominus mihi noviter illatas has vestras res ut supervis dixi medium 
commendatas sed in maximam habebo veneratione. ego enim sic maturatus sum 
quod cum amicorum damna sentio dolore conciter vestris siquis particularis persona 
in domni ve aliquo neretur que vereri non licet et omissis securum velit omissis quod 
non poset illi vel illis libenter concedam. Genoenses non assecurare tum que dicto 
meo serenissimo domino regi inimicant tum itaque eius omissis et subditi in hoc potu 
et in viaque opprimuntur pariter et omissis neque iustum neque honestium facere 
iudet maxime illos tutos facere in locis illis in quibus me et alios regias subditos 
sicasus acciderit vestre dominationes difendasse neque tutos reddere non poterant. 
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cum me ad alios affatos defensare non possent nisi in tu per alzatam aut prope turra 
et in flumine. si in vestris locis vestris dominationibus placebit dummodo que 
Genoenses ipse ibidem dictos regios subditos stemos faciant eos libenti anno 
observabo aliter sine mei honoris omissis id facere non possum quod vestre 
dominatione non velleit non vereror Petrum Luchensens quem vestre petunt 
dominationes liberari quibus me comendo ex portu Pisano vestro prope turras xvi 









Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo 
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. quod ad oratorem vestrums super 
rebus rei publice Christiane necessariis mandatum miseritis pluriumum vos laudamus 
in domino fecistis quod catholicos viros decet et quod omines de vestra pietate 
sperabant. superest ut in reliquis ad rei expeditionem necessariis mora nulla 
intermittantur. sed iam ad talem provisionem deverniatur qualem tempora exigunt et 
spectata unam pietas pollicet. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo 
piscatoris die iii Februarii mcccclxxvii Pontificatus nostri anno quinto.  
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Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. considerantes quanto in periculo 
sit res Christiana et quotidie magis in partibus profectum ungarie Turchorum sevitia 
exerescat. designavimus nuper ad partes illas apostolice sedis legatum dilectum 
filium nostro omissis sancte procedis per omissis cardinalem novariensis ut et illos 
paci principum quod huic communi cause conducit studeat et consulat qui prope die 
iter accipiet. sed ut melius res geri et fidei preforte subveniri possit ordinamus ut 
meditatem subsidii presentis anni quod singulos Italie potentatum tangit secum 
deserat. aliter enim insanis et irrita quod ammo esset illius profertio devotionem 
igitur vestram quod semper pro vestra putare et religione ad hoc pactum opus 
promptissimos cognovimus. per presenter hortamur pro studio ut medietatem dicti 
subsidii vos tangentis quod est quindecimillium ducatorum ad nos que primum mitter 
velitis. scribimus ocidem et ceteris potentatibus et nos iam nostrum paravimus. ita 
enim filii dilectissimi cum Dei onnipotentis cuius quoque causa agitur auxilia labanti 
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omissis constitute fidei succuratur cum vestra et ceteros catholicos principum et 
potentatuum laude et commendatione. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo 
piscatoris die xviii Februarii. mcccclxxvii Pontificatus nostri anno sexto. 
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Die viii Julii mcccclxxvii 
 
Florentine calendar: die viii Julii mcccclxxvi 
 




Antonius Ridolfus equites 
Bongiovannes Gianfiliatum 
Bernardus Bonhieronymus Iurisconsultus et  
Laurentius Medices 
 
Richiedeva che non obstante la richiesta altra volta facta alla Santità del Papa et 
datone alui notitia per non parere di concorrere al presente alla contributione contro 
al Turcho per essere mutate le conditioni di Italia et che per pericolo che nuovamente 
si veghono per la invasioni del Turcho in diversi luoghi si dovessi conscendere alla 
domanda della Sanctità del Papa et a quella parte della contributione che si domanda 
fu consigliato si rispondesse in questa forma. 
Magnifico imbasciadore molto ci dispiace quello che intendiamo da voi de pericoli 
ogni di magiori per gli apparati et successi del Turcho et perché ogni fortuna della 
illustrissima Signoria di Vinegia reputiamo come per la nostra amicitia et 
confederatione et perché è connessa a questa causa vostra colla causa commune della 
relligione Christiana pella quale noi sappiamo questo si conviene a noi et a ogni 
fedele Christiano ma considerando le presenti seditioni d’ Italia et nostre ci pare da 
pensare alle cose piú presso et stare proveduto aogni caso che arrecasse la fortuna 
maximamente perché inventa la città nostra come voi sapete pelle seditioni de tempi 
non è in quello essere che sanza sconcio grande si potessi fare et nondimeno come 
altra volta dicemo quando el resto di Italia concorresse sappiamo il luogho nostro et 
faremo il nostro debito et insieme cogli altri concorreremo secondo le forze nostre et 











Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10  lettere di 




5 Marcii 1478 
 
Addi 27 scrissi alla vostra Signoria di poi ieri lo oratore Viniziano ebbe lettere da 
Vinegia dalla sua illustrissima Signoria che lavisa come lavevono fatto la pace col 
Turcho et che subito tale cosa notificasse al papa et poi a cardinali et conferito con 
noi tali aviso et parendogli che tutti insieme andassimo al Papa examinato prima che 
parole savesse avisare in sua compagnia ci presentammo a piedi del Pontefice. 
Loratore Viniziano espose quanto aveva incomissione et mostrò che la cagione che a 
questo aveva indotto la sua illustrissima Signoria era per salute delle cose loro et di 
loro colligati et constretti da omissis et non per propria volunta. Il Pontefice rispose 
noi non possiamo laudare tali cosa ne la possiamo credere perché non possono fidarsi 
della fede dello inimico di Christo pure sia quello che si vuole noi siamo certi che 
quello illustrissimo domino et non murirá mai la sua vera devotioni verso la religione 
Christiana et che sua intenzione era posare questa novità d Italia accioché per tutti e 
Christiani si possi fare e provedimenti convenienti et che fra pochi giorni lo vidremo 
questa notitia do pro mio debito alle vostra Signoria alle quali mi raccomando.  
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di 




Da dieci  
 
 
Magnifico orator iersera avemo lettere da Vinegia de di xxi per le quali siamo avisati 
la pace infra il Turcho et quella Signoria essere conclusa per mezzo di quello 
secretario che mandarono al Turcho adì xxv del passato in Constantinopoli con 
grande consenso così del Turcho con degli altri che gli sono datorno parci una grande 
novella e di qualità che fu molto migliore tanto le conditioni nostre habbiate voluto 
dare questo aviso per bene dallo imbasciadore Viniziano ne doverai essere informato 
prima. xxiiii Februarii. 
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lett. di 
filippo pandolfi a Roma 10  lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma  
 
7rv  




Per diverse vie si scrive che il re Ferrando fa preparatione alla guerra, raduna denari 
per ogni via vende castella a qualu nche persona che intende a danari solda gente et 
fa alcuna cosa necessaria alla guerra  informa che dimostra essere volto piutosto alla 
guerra che alla pace. Intendendo alchuno particolare ne daro notitia alla vostra 
Signoria omissis Rome die 5 Martii 1478 
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di 




Al continuo si sente di piú luoghi il re Ferrando fare molti provedimenti a fatto fare 
molte artiglierie et carta con spingarde per mandare a Talamone et di Viterbo a 
mandato 300 muli che portino vettovaglia in quello di Siena. A Genova a mandato 
per soldati navi et fa fare ogni demonstratione dessere volto alla guerra come le 
signorie vestre peraltro mi debbono meglio intendere.  
 
die Martii 1478 
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di 
Filippo Pandolfi a Roma  
 




Per lettere del passato da Vinegia (XXVI) abbiamo inteso con grandissimo piacere 
che quella illustrissima Signoria aveva deliberato in poregari et così significano al 
nostro imbasciadore di marci per capo delle gente che quella Signoria manda in 




Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di 




Ieri ebbe lettere il Papa della maestà del re Ferrando scritte a mano che lamostri per 
tutta la corte promette fare mirabilia et a sui spese et per mare et per terra et usa ogni 
atto in tenere fermo il papa a questa inpresa et costoro che dipendono eda lui in ogni 
cosa sono vili e gagliardi secondo lettere et offerte che ne fa il re.  
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11 Martii 1478 
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10  lettere di 




Di nuovo non cie cosa alchuna salvo ieri passorono per qui circha 70 muli charichi di 
panni et drappi et alchuni danari vanno in quello di Siena per dare la prestanza alle 
genti darme della maestá del re dimostrano volersi a buonora preparsi alla guerra. la 
venuta del conte carlo et deifebo in Toscana benché dia che pensieri a costor non la 
possono credere o vero così fingono ma ogni volta che solo le persone loro saranno 








Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo 
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. novissime venerunt littere a 
carissimo in Christo filio nostro Mathia Hungarie rege illustri ad oratores apud nos 
suos quibus ille significat cogi se necessario ad ineundis cum Turchorum principe 
tregua pluresque in eamdem rem rationes adducit interqua illa precipua est que tot 
laboribus fatigatus tot expensis exhaustus amplius tantam molem solus sustineri non 
potest. id quidem non sine dolore audivimus ne si fieret cogitare unusquisque potest 
que tum damni atque detrimenti Christianas rebus evenint. turcus enim ipse cum 
potentiam Hungarorum admodum pertimeseat quasi insecuritatem ob huiusmodi 
treguas adductus redderetur profecto ardentior atque animosior incommune 
Christianorum perniciem et ruinam. accedit quoque Christiane nationes Hungaris 
ipsis adiacentes et vicine videntes tantum fidei nostre pugile sibi deesse 
consternarentus animo et afflicius malis quem Turchi ipsi continue inferuit tanquam 
derelicti succumberet quo fit ut non ab re verendum sit ne et ipsi tandem conditione 
cum Turchis obligetur et vel treguas vel pacem ineant. sicque perfidissimus ille 
hostis indices magis animos affamens ad penetrandum tamquam tuctus intima 
Christianorum inquam eorum exitum debaccandum eo liberiorem aditum littere quo 
minores sibi vires obstare plures autem inamicitias vinculos animadverteret. nos ex 
pastorali officio regem ipsum litteris nostris paterne atque ex cordis affecti fumus 
exhortati ne ad huiusmodi treguas vel pacem descendat. nihilominus quia comunis 
res agitur in vigilandum nobis est repenteque succurendum presertum cum videamus 
inimicum a propinquare quotidie et fortiorem freri qui omissis ut omnes iam aperte 
nocuit nihil aliud quam Christianos sanguinem omissis nihil que aliud machinatur 
quam in extremam eorum desolationem. quam obrem non est diutius immorandum 
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periculum prope est et ante oculos positum ita ut evitare misi celeri et efficaci 
remedio non possit. quis enim dilecti filii Rempublicam Christianam in tanta 
necessitate  sicut omnes vident constitutam minare et tutare non debeat patiemur ne 
ut per ignavia nostram(vestram?) prevaleat adversus nos inimicus. velitis meminisse 
vos esse Christianos revolvite animo quid et que tum omnipotenti Deo sancteque 
religione debeatis. ferenda quidem sunt ab omnibus subsidia ut mines  potentissimi 
hostis contundantur si nobis consuluisse si Deo satisfecisse si Orthodoxam fidem 
servasse volumus prout velle debemus quare devotionem vestra quanto studio 
possumus hortamur et pervisera misericordie Ihesus Christi obtestamur ut animu 
disponatis adferendum subsdium illudque cum affectum pretextis. pridem prestemus 
scribemus et ceteris. nos autem qui et notes et dies ea semper cogitamus quibus 
nefandissima hoc lues tolli possit opem nostram advinatibus ceteris addemus 
prompteque prestabimus soliut scitis omnia non possumus et conatus dum taxat 
nostri in tanto negotio sine alio auxilio exigeri sunt. quemadomodum unusquisque 
pro sapientia sua potest considerare. datum a Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo 








Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive lettere di 





Da Napoli ci fu iersera lettera di Benedetto Salutati et contano come li era aviso da 
Otranto che avevano per una nave venuta da Costantinopoli come il Turcho et per 
mare et per terra metteva a ordine venire allo assedio di Raugia. la quale cosa alla 
maestà del re dava sospetto come è ragionevole perché omissis a vise ragione di 
poterlo credere. 
 
xiii Maii 1479 
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10  lettere di 
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Et però questa sententia si dará secondo il parere della maestà del re ferrando da che 
in ogni cosa dipendono. il qualebenche per quanto si dica dimostri per lettere essere 
gagliardo nientedimeno intendo che in segreto desidera la pace ne è volto alla guerra 
perché conosce lui avuta a fare in maggiore parte la spesa et senza speranza dalchuno 
acquisto. et ha anchora qualche sospetto della armata di viniziani la quale si avesse 
fatto dimostratione di offenderlo si iudica per tutti et per cosa certa si tiene che arresi 
la omissis et ad votum.  
 
Rome die XXVI Maii 1479 
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10  lettere di 




Iersera ci fu lettera dal governatore di Fano et conta come nel porto di Fano e d 
Ancona è arrivato 2 fuste di Turchi et anno fatto altissimi danni in modo che quegli 
luoghi sono tutti inpauriti et quegli da nuovo scrivono a nostro signore che farà 
qualche provedimento aliter che saranno constretti proveddervi loro per quello modo 
che meglio potranno questa nuova a data a tutta questa corte spavento et iudicassi 
che alla conclusione della pace tali cosa abbi grandemente a giovare.  
 
xxvii Maii 1479 
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di 





La Santità omissis facendo lungo sermone et cominciando a riferire omissis avevano 
piú volte pregato e supplicato a sua omissis per mezzodi sua imbasciadori omissis 
che volesse mettere Italia in pace solo afine che meglio et piú facilmente si potesse 
fare qualche buona provisione contro al Turcho. il quale già si poteva dire che era in 
Italia et ultimo loro ricordo come noi nella prima expositione avevamo anchora a 
questo fine chiesto la pace et conoscendo essere suo debito obbigare per tutte le a lui 
possibile al nemico della fede di Christo: era contento a questo fine defendere alla 
pace sanza havere molta consideratione et rispetti che in altro tempo meritamente 
avrebbe avuti.  
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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di 
Filippo Pandolfi a Roma  
 






29 Maii 1479 
 
 
Alargandosi molto in quello che segui ad 29 diche per lultima detti notizia et come il 
Viniziano aveva ricusato non volere concorrere a provedimenti che contro al Turcho 
facessimo a fare et che il Milanese et io benché con parole non chiare piú 
concludemo et diremo confirmarci col Viniziano. Et tandem concludi che poi che il 
fine per lo quale principalmente la sua Santità si muoveva a fare la pace non può 
conseguire se omissis agli uomini che per lui non resta omissis. 
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Magnifici domini mei post commendationem. lultima mia fu adì questo et di poi non 
ho altro da voi ne di qua è accaduto cosa da darne notitia se non che ieri questa 
illustrissima Signoria mi fece notificare come uno frate certosino stato priore alla 
certosa di Napoli era venuto qui priore in questo loro monasterio et di omissis priore 
era stato dinanzi alla loro illjustrissima Signoria et presentatogli omissis lettere della 
credenza della maestà del re per la quali pregava instantanee questa illustrissima 
Signoria che se degnassi presto plenis sua fede a questo in suo nome per el predecto 
priore gli fussi exposto le quali lettere lecte comincio el pore ad exponere a questa 
illustrissima quanto la maestà del re era desiderosa omissis dimostrandolo  con 
efficace et verisimili ragioni con dimostrazioni et ricordare la buona amicizia et 
observanza la lega fu fra quella illustrissima Signoria et la maestà del re Alfonso 
sogiungendo molti benefici factogli con placentia di questa illustrissima per la 
maestà del re Alfonso et sua nelle loro onorentie et bisogni maxime contro al Turcho 
et in tempi che niuna altra potentia se voluta scuprir a far contro di lui. scuso et i casi 
de Cypri iustificandoli et dimostrande edifecti non essa proceduti da sua maestà. 
similmodo scuso la andata del figliuolo al Soldano dicendo quella et cioè che lui 
omissis esser stato contro al suo volere et tutte le predicte cose et pose il priore 
predeto in parole et ragioni efferisce et verisimili ragioni perché questa illustrissima 
prestasse piena fede a questo per lui sera detto questa illustrissima Signoria gli 
rispose volere bene consulere et differi secondo la usanza sua. la riposta in altro 
tempo si sa sel predecto priore vorra dire altro et questa illustrissima Signoria ha 
detto dará notitia di questo in questa vi succederá. sono circa vii giorni che ne di 
Lombardia ne dicosti omissis nova veruna diche per questa Signoria et per noi se ne 
piglia grande amiratione omissis 
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Die vii Septembris mcccclxxix 
 
Responsio facta fratri Sebastiano priori Sancti Martini nuntio spectabilissimi domini 
regis Ferdinandi per illustrissimum dominum Venetorum. 
 
Che noi havemo lecto la lettera della maestà del re et audito quanto la paternità sua 
ne ha referito per nome de questa Signoria pp. che in verità tutto ne è stato gratissimo 
non perché la cagione voglia che della mente di sua celsissima così nelle cose di 
Cypri come in tutte le altre se crede altrimenti ma perché piú per molti casi 
intervenuti non mancha chi verisimilmente ne possi havere facto diverso iudicio et 
presertim per i presenti movimenti et turbationi delle cose di Italia la concio delle 
quali havemo desiderato et desidereremo come è ben noto alla prefacta maestà oltre a 
tutti gli altri respecti et cause a fine omnibus de reintegratione et firmamento di 
buona sincera et perpetua amicitia fra noi la quale oltre che la sua honesta per se et 
laudabile cosa è stata in hora favorevole et utile alle cose deluno et delelatre. in 
queste poche omissis semocerti che sua omissis habbi inteso il nostro iudicio et 
existimatione della mente della prefacta maestà fundacta in ragione et in che intendi 
del desiderio nostro che tolto via ogni rancore et ogni dispiacere delle cose di Italia 
noi che i compagni nostri viviamo colla omissis in che quello amore in quella carita 
et sincerita che longamente havemo viso et è degna cosa che fra iservitori nostri et 
sua posterita se conservi. et però non saremo piú longhi essendo sua omissis 
prudentissima et intendendo per la forma di queste parole in che convenendo li animi 
di tutte le parti in cotale buona dispositione come in verità semo dal canto nostro et 
lui ne aferma et noi vedemo sia la maiestà regia dal canto suo facile e pronto sera el 









Magnifici domini mei omissis ho scripto alle s.v. per non dare spesa dimandare 
sintende et adì xxvii del passato a hore una di nocte ricevette con delle s.v dedixxiii 
per la quale midanno notitia quello era seguito insino allora disarzana et come per 
detta ragione le s.v haveano mandato a Siena s. Allexandro Braccini allo illustrissimo 
s. ducha di calavria et la risposta havea ricevuto et etiamdio fui advisato come insino 
a quel tempo di lorenzo le sv. non haveano altro: la mattina seghuente che hebbi 
ricevuta la vostra lettera fui costi allillustrissima Signoria prima la ringratiai per parte 
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delle s.v degli piaceri et comodità haveano dato a Antonio de Medici nella sua andata 
in Ghostantinopoli et etiamdio nel suo ritorno mostrando quanto tutto era stato grato 
alle s.v che mi  rispuesero che quello haveano fatto per Antonio de Medici lo 
haveano fatto volentieri et di buona voglia et che così sarebbono sempre disposti in 
qualunche cose potessino fare che credessero fosse grata alla vostra m. s.   









Ab Sixto Papa IIII  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et pace in domino sempiterna. ex litteris Rhodianorum 
cognovimus civitatem et insulam Rhodi a Turcis obsideri remque in periculo esse 
itaque ad subveniendum illis licet hactenus non desuerimus oportunam nunc classem 
cum auxilio Christianorum principum et potentatuum parandam statuimus ex quo 
spes datur ne dum Rhodianos liberatum sed Turcos ipsos profligatam eri et cum 
causa heac communis fit debet ab omnibus consoveri. igitur ad presentem 
expeditionem taxatio unius civiusque facta est secundum quam contribuere debeat 
pro ut in cedula his acclusa continetur et nos primum taxam nostram iam 
persoluimus. taxa autem vestra octo milium ducatorum est. quare hortamur devotione 
vestram velitis ad hoc pro zelo fidei vos propios exhibere pecuniamque huiusmodi 
quanto cuis hic mittere ut quo celerius eri subsidium tanto oportunius huic rei 
consulatur. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die nona Julii 
mcccclxxx Pontificatus anno nono. 
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Ab Sixto Papa IIII  
 
Dilecti fiii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem cum oratorem vestrum una cum 
aliis in concistorio evocavissemus hortaremque uniusqueque ad securandum omni 
diligentia et celeritate eam contributione qua eorum potentatibus omissis per res 
Christiana in maiori periculo constituta esse non posset. adeo ut ne minima que de 
mora pati posse videretur et nos iam in presidium Rhodianum pro prius necessitate 
libenter contulissemus responsum est nobis ab oratoribus ipsis suspitione apud nos in 
illos esse ne bellum in Italia oriretur propterea cupere se de hoc fieri per nos certiores 
ut qua pro communi salute facienda essent liberioribus animus facere possent. nos 
quidem ut ipsis diximus non omissis sumus qui Italicam pacem perturbare in animo 
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habeamus qua toto Pontificatus nostri tempore omnis studio omni cura et vigilantia 
conservare semper sum conati presertum in his temporibus quibus ea ingruit periculi 
magnitudo ut nihil aliud magis cogemus quam quomodo unitis interse potentatuum 
Italorum animis immanissime Turcorum potentia resistatur. itaque non est quod a 
nobis aut ab eis spetiali quadam devotione ad defendendum nos et apostolicam 
sanctam sede nuper se obligarunt et promiserunt et nos e converso Italie quid timeri 
debeat  firmiter tenenter que vos quoque una cum confederatus vestri erga Italice 
pacis securitatem et conservationem id facietis pro ut facere tenemini. quare 
hortamur vos perviscera misericordia Dei nostri ut comunis periculi admoniti ea 
considerare velitis quae ad pubblicam salutem pertineant. habemus hostem ante 
oculos iam provinciam apulie numerosa classe infestatur videtur si Ragusio aut 
Rhodio potiatur quod deus pro pietate sua averta nihil reliqui fit nobis ad salutem. in 
hoc omne cura collocande sunt omissis quibuscumque aliis simultatibus in hanc 
solam expeditionem amitendum est. audiatis paterna veces comune periculum 
consideretis quanta opus fit celeritate metiamini. quod ad devotionem vestram attinet 
ole contributione ne differatis idem aliis scribimus. nam si intempore necessaria non 
praestans auxilia quicquid postmodum fiet prout facere omnino necesse erit servum 
eri et irritum. nos primi que potuimus fecimus parati et facere que facultas nostra 
prestare poterit. soli non possumus erimus apud omnes excusati si vitam manifesta 
calamitate paterna noces audite non erunt. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub 
anulo piscatoris die xxvii Julii mccclxxxx Pontificatus anno nono. 
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A Sixto Pontefice quarto  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. ex litteris carissimi filii nostri 
Ferdinandi Sicilie regis illustris et eorum qui maritima littera apulia accolunt facti 
simus certiores perfidissimos Turcos venisse nuper cum numerosa classe ad ea loca 
iocomque civitatem obsidere et omnia ibi flama ferroque devastare ita ut nisi celeri 
occuratur remedio dubitandum sit ne incetera loca Italiae penetrent. nam ea civitate 
expugnata difficcillimum esses resistere quin ulterios pro arbitrio labi possent. 
quamobrem considerata vicina et imminenticalamitate non est aliqua ex parte 
cunctandum sed celerrime ne ulterius serpat subveniendum .vos ergo dilecti filii per 
misericordiam Dei nostri obtestamur ut taxam illam qua superioribus diebus taxati 
fuistis hic sine mora mittatis. nos taxam nostrarum in promptur limenes videtis 
periculum ante oculos communem rei est consulendum. urget manifesta necessitas. 
nulla eum acceleratio ante ipsos esse potest quin imo verendum est ne subsidium sit 
tardum. datum Rome apud Sancti petri sub anulo piscatoris die quinta Augusti 
mcccclxxx pont. nostri anno nono. 
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A Ferdinando rege Sicilie  
 
Rex Sicilie et magnifici et ecellentissimi domini amici nostri carissimi. facile 
credimus civitate stat vehementissime commota fuisse audio nuntio de adventu 
Turcorum in Apulia ob que Hydruntine urbis obsidione quemadmodum nuper ad nos 
scripsistis. iam per littere enim cognitus et perspectus est nobis non levibus 
argumentis vester in nos animus praeterea ea esse amicitia et confederatio qua 
iungimur ut quecumque accidavit sive prospera sue adversa utrique nostrum 
communia esse debeant et presertum ea que impendet a comuni omnium 
Christianorum hoste pervicacissimo atque potentissimo. qui obrem primus agimus 
vobis gratias ingente per communi commodo perturbari fueritis. deinde per tam 
necessario tempore auxilium octomilium ducatorum auri nobis sed ministraveritis 
quod orator vester nobis exsoluit. non sumus nescii rem nobis esse cum hoste 
potentissimo ex a quanto valde tumendum sit verum aderit nobis omnipotens deus 
que ut scribitis non est verosimile deserturum popolum suum. aderit etiam autoritate 
et praesidiis suis summi pontifex qui audito eo insperato nuntio nihil pratermisit 
quod ad pastoralis offici curam pertinuerit. nec deevunt confederatorum nostrorum 
subsidia qui existimat agi de eorum domino et salutem. ita Deo populum suum bene 
omissis et nobis reliqua bene providentibus et curantibus speramus brevi futurum ut 
que animum nostrum et totius Italie nunc sollicitum tenent non infelicem exitum sunt 
habitura. vellem ea in nobis essent que litteris ipsis vestris scribitis et qua adducti 
amore quo nos complectimi vera esse existimare verum si quid usus et discipline 
militaris in superioribus belli consecut sumus dum regnum nostrum tuebamur 
adversus fidei nostre cultores nobi tanto in merito in regno patrio adversantes contra 
immanissimam gente fidei nostrae inimicissimam et quae nobilissimam regni nostri 
parte igne ferro directionibus que vastavit libenti et forti animo exercebimus et ut per 
alios exerceatur et communis hostis a cervicibus nostris depellat omni cura studio et 
vigilantia etiam cum nostro et filiorum nostrorum periculo procurabimus. cetera ex 








A Sixto Pontenfice IIII 
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem evocavimus omnes Christianorum 
principum oratores ut ad kalendas novembres proxime futuras apud nos sint cum 
plenis et sufficientibus mandatis ad consulendunm et contribuendum in tam 
manifesta rei publicae Christiane calamitate ea qua pro communi salute oportuna 
videbuntur. quare hortamur quoque devotione vestram ut pro vestro in defensione 
catholicae religionis studio considerata periculi magnitudine quod moram non patitur 
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velitis statuto tempore oratores vestros una cum aliis hic littere vel sufficientia 
mandata ad eos qui nomine vestro huic sit transmittere a vero tandem communibus 
periculi impendentibus aliquid dignum Christiano nominis fieri possit. et ut ad hoc 
sanctissimum opus carissimi in Christo filii nostri lodovici francorum regi animum et 
optimam dispositionem intellegatis mittimus ad vos his inclusum litteram tam eius 
qui legati nostri que ad constituenda in gallis pacem transmisimus exemplum ut 
voluntas vestra ad publicam salutem bene constituta ex hoc etiam ad re ipsam 
conplectendam alacrius insurgat et accendatur. datum Rome adpud Sanctum Petrum 
sub anulo piscatoris die xxii Septembris mccclxxx Pontificatus nostri anno decimo. 
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A Sixto Pontenfice IIII 
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. conqueruntur apud nos per litteras 
suas Januenses se a vobis armi laccessuri viamque iustitia offerunt pp commune 
Italie periculum siquid habeatis secu disceptationis. e contra orator apud nos vester 
asserit causa defensionis vos arma sumpsisse cum subditi vestri a januensibus 
hostiliter perturbarent. nos autem considerantes hanc armorem inter nos 
dimicationem non esse huis temporis necque presentis periculi hortamur nos paterna 
charitate et sub penis et censuris in bulla securitatis Italicae quam ad instantiam 
vestra et sociorum vestrorum edidimus contentis apostolica auctoritate vobis 
mandamus ut ab offensione statum discedatis viamque iustitia amplectamini quae 
nobis non denegabitur precipue cum januense ut diximus ea offerant . alioquin 
scitote nos ita postulante comuni Italie necessitate adversus eam partem que causam 
dederit pertubationis et parere mandatis nostris noluerit ad executionem penarum et 
omissis predictarum statum esse processuros et omne alioque potentatus iuxta bulle 
ipsius tenore adversus ea invocaturos. hoc idem et alteri parti scribimus. datum Roma 
apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die xxvii Septembris mcccclxxx 
Pontificatus nostri anno decimo. 
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A Bona et Johanne Galeazmaria Sfortia vicecomitibus ducibus Mediolani  
 
Excellenter et potente domini tanquam fratres nostri. inter magnum dolorem vestrum 
summamque expectationem quorum alterum recordatio amissorum oppidorum 
alteram vos spes recipiendorum auget consilium amicum sante et minime 
intempesturi inire videmus si quod flagitat rex Ferdinandus et summus pontifex 
persuadere nititur anobis aeque anime audieritis. que in loco res Italica sit constituta 
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cernitis ut quae intestines discordiis et vexationibus magnis ubique iacturis laboravit 
nunc ingenti omnium periculo et barbaris tentatur qui classicum in Calabria 
cecinerunt. et quoque privatus dolor vos erit adeo ut non nisi receptis oppidis quieturi 
videamini quoniam tanta res ad meliorem quantam unquam antea spem rediit 
brevique per regis voluntate quae proximo bello amisistis omnia in vestra potestatem 
sunt reditura nolite questumus nimis magno periculo festinare. sed quod sponte in 
omissis vestram relapsurum est temporis commodum expectate. misistis nuper 
aliquot turmas equitum cum haud magna peditum omissis in lunensem agrum ut que 
in vestros provinciales quotidie a fregosis qui sergianam urbem vestram praeter 
induciares fidem occupaverant inferebant iniurie eas proulsaretus. mittendarum 
copiarum iusta fuit causa sed quia urgentes suspitiones suscepta sunt quasi studia 
vestra ad arma spectent nmova omnibus curas fecistis nam si hoc tempore bellum in 
liguria suscipere velletis eodem malo tota mox laborare Italia atque quos omni studio 
depellere a nostris cervicibus oportet. Turcos sine cunctatione victores facerem. 
impedirent regi Ferdinando socialia et amica auxilia eius regnum barbaris obiectaret 
cuius si poturetur nulla ceteris spes salutis relinquis. nolite famam vestra aliqua 
inhumanitatis specie onerare. necque pati velitis ut inimici vestri si qui sunt iactarfe 
possint ex Florentinis scintillam ingentis incendii defluxisse. idem amicus et sociis 
res oppisa qua occupata sunt in etruria restituere festinat necque diutius expectatio 
vestra ut putamus distinebitur. sergianam per proditionem ad fregosios pervenit regia 
fide eam recepturi estis. sed quod ratio temporum non patitur omne belli preludium 
evitare nitamini. iam si ea urbs armis recipienda esset longa maiora moliri oportere 
que per hyemem atque per hoc toti Italie suspectissimum tempus parari et confici 
possunt. in omni vestra fortuna nullos magis qui nos fideles socii estis habituri. nihil 
que eque movet ut hortemur vos ad pacata consilia que sponte semper secuti estis qui 
ne commisceri confundique Italiam sustineamus si intestini tumultus concitaretur 
cum a fronte collato cum turci pede pugnare oporteat. scitis quanto studio que 
investram rem fieri possunt complectam. hoc unum a vobis petimus ut quando longe 
maius periculum qui spem continet siquod consilium suscepistis quod tama vobis 
susceptum in que persuadere nobis possemus in recipienda per oppugnationem aut 
obsidione sergiana id totum pro comuni utilitate hoc tempore deponatis. non enim 
dubitamus fore ut quam violatis induciis urbem amisistis eam tota adiuvanbte Italia 
sine magno negocio brevi ex regis sententia recuperetis.  
Mediolani vi Octobris 1480. 
 
247 




Rex Siciliae a viro Petro Lutocci domino oratori Florentino amico nostro carissimo 
 
Magnifici vir amici nostre carissime hogi simo venuti in fogia havendo prima patuto 
non poco incommodo per lo malo cammino che havemo havuto. et domani perché 
refera lo illustrissimo duca di Calabria nostro primogenito conferiremo con lui del 
modo per la expugnatione de Otranto e di omne cosa adico pertinenti. e di quello che 
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in futuro deliberavemovi donerimo particulare notitia. dichosi come è conveniente lo 









ab Ianuensibus  
 
Magnifici et excelsi domini fratres et amici carissimi. si omne tempore decuit Italiam 
esse quietam ac concordem et considerare quantum mali ei sepe attulit discordia qua 
illam coegit aliquin externis ac barbaris nationibus servire cum ipsa toti orbi olim 
imperasset hoc tempore non minus oportet eam interse mutua benivolentia mutuis 
que officis convenire ubi imminent novus hostis potentissimus infidelis nequaque 
negligendus. quod consilium sicuti per quanto in nobis est libenter amplectimur 
maiore possum animo id et amicis ut hoc idem faciant persuadere ubi nec difficile 
consilium arbitramur si ad commune utilitatem qua ad privatos affectus auspicere 
volumus magis. audimus in civitate vestra Pisarum manere magnifico dominum 
prosperum adurnubum qui moliri contra nos et statum nostrum non desinit existimas 
oportunitatem et vicinitatem loci ide melius facere posse qui si longius habitaret. 
preterea jeronimum de monte nigro duas triremium et unius biremis ductorem qui 
iam non modo armis sed subditis nostris haud modica damna intulit pro quo 
iudicatus a nobis et pubblicatus hostis et rebellis nunc querere ut apud excelsa 
rempublicam vestram et in portibus ac locis vestris recipiatur. quod et si non 
credamus magnifici vestri sibi concessuras quae probe intelligunt que omissis ab 
omni amicitia ac pacis officie foret praeoccupare vestrum diximus animum que 
forstam eum te hostem nostrum ne scrivisse dicere potuisset et rogare amicitiam 
vestra ut neque ipsum magnifici d. prosperum qui pubblicus et ipse hostis noster est 
manere apud se patiantur nec ipsum jeronimum apud se nullo pacto recipiere. quod et 
si omissis servandeque amicitia et paci nostre convenire plurimum si sic fecerint 
possit consulent etiam suorum securitati. cum jeronimus ipse non eos more induat 
quibus litteri habere apud que piam fidem possit et qui prie sua adversatur ceteris 
parere posse credatur quod habebimus singulam complacentia qui et huis me et maio 
pro republica vestra officia prestare quando cumque oporteat non negabimus qua ob 
causam hunc omissis nostrum mittimus cum his litteris nostri ut quid mag. v. in his 
statuerint intelligamus parati in omnes rem magnificis vestris gratam. data Janue die 
vi Martii mcccclxxxprimo. 
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A Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem audiverunt omnes ferme oratores 
principum et potentatuum Italie et in primis orator etiam vester apud nos agentes 
quam religiosissime Christianissimus rex francorum per dilectos filios oratores suos 
ad nos novissime destinatos se suaque obtulerit in favore fidei et nominis Christiani 
contra comune hoste et ligam et cum quibuscumque per maiestate suam oblata. 
dignis est ipse rex magna profeo commendatione qui publicum et scimus hoc opus 
tam ardenter amplectant et quia orator hic vester non est sufficienti mandato omissis 
ad ipsam ligam ineundam et alia que in re hac tractanda erunt hortamur devotione 
vestram ut illud qui primum in plenissima et efficacissima forma destinare velitis quo 
hoc oratores prefati regis ostendet etiam mandatum suum et aperient conditiones in 
eo contentas. erit igitur offici vestri pp pericula imminentia sine aliqua cuncatione 
dictum mandatum transmittere quo possumus omni studio et contatu nostro 
incumbere ad ea quae sunt tutelae nominis Christiani queadmodum super omnia 
cupimus et vehementer desideramus. datum Romae apud s. Petrum sub anulo 
piscatoris die xxiii Martii mcccclxxxi Pontificatus nostri anno decimo. 
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Ab Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo 
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. a omnia advertentes 
Christianorum principum discordias truculento hosti ad commune presentiam in dies 
magis aperire. nolentes que pro pastorali officio nostro his tot incomodis et periculis 
obviare ne in deterius serpant postque eo iam deducte sunt res nostre ut minime 
cunctandum fit cum perfidissimus et vigilantissimus hostis apparatum maxima 
adversus Italiam germania et Rhodum indefesso studio ut ex pluribus locis 
compertum omissis inter omnes Christianos principes et potentatus inducias 
indiximus. ad defensione catholicae fidei paterna caritate omnes hortati sumus. 
venientes aut mittentes at tam piam et necessariam expeditionem sub nostra et per 
littera sedis protectione suscepimus eis bella ut impedimenta quomodolibet 
inferentes sub spiritualis et temporali gladii pena ut abstineant comovimus prout in 
litteris nostris de super confectis quas et in vestris et in reliquorum omnium 
principum et potentatum Christianorum regnis provinciis et dominis pubblicare 
mandavimus latius continet. volentes igitur litteras ipsas plenum sortire effectum et 
debite omnino executione demandari devotionem vestra in domino hortamur et per 
religionem qua profitemini per passionem salvatoris nostri quam ut nos ab eterna 
morte redimeret subire dignatus est per tot fideles populus qui in teterrimamam ducti 
servitutem presidimum vestrum implorant per miseram stragem que tot preclaris 
civitatibus tot nationibus immines nisi quam primum surcuratur per gloriam et 
splendore Christiani nominis quod a spurcissimis hostibus in totum conculcatur nisi 
nos omissis ipsos excitaverimus vos obtestamur et apostolica auctoritate vobis 
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mandamus ut litteras ipsas tenorem et contientiam in omnibus et per omnia servetis 
cum effectu ad impleatis sicuti pro catholico animo vestro facturos nos confidimus 
ne in extremo indicio apud tribunal Dei rei sitis effusi Christiani sanguinis qui e 
manibus vestri requiret. alio quin contra inobedientes et contumaces ita urgente 
comuni periculo et necessitate ad executionem contentorum in litteris ipsis 
procedemus. datum Rome apostolicum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die x Aprilis 
mcccclxxxprimo Pontificatus nostri anno decimo. 
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Maii die II 1481 
 
Da Roma da messer Guidantonio di 28 Maii 
omissis. 
 
Laviso de Turchi 12 morti 40 presi a Otranto. 
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Ego Bartholomeo Scala Cancelliere. 
 
Petro de Nasis die 13 Maii 1481  
 
omissis habbiamo preso piacere della preparatione dello assedio di Otranto del quale 
hai mandato particular notitia in che siamo sicuri come in ogni altra sua operatione la 
excellentissima prudentia della maiestà del re et siamo in grandissima speranza che 
presto la sua maiestà habbi col favore di Idio a liberare Italia da pericoli nequali era 
venuta et così preghiamo la clementia divina che habbi a seguitare questo così 








A Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem.  optamus et vehementi quidem 
desiderio ut omnes in Italia tollantur controversiae et novitatum suspitiones ne 
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communi hosti ad publicam pernitie via magis aperiat et inextinguibili incendio tota 
conflagret Italia et perconsequens omnis Christiana religio. quare hortamur vos 
paterno affectum ut differentias omnes sique cum Januensibus et Senensibus vobis 
sunt velitis quo ad vos attinet de medio tollere et agere potuis via iuris quod et 
laudabilius et salutarius eri. nam et hoc idem ipsis scribimus ut autem partium quieti 
facilius consulat hortamur vos ut cautiones tale prestetis ad invicem ut de offensione 
et perturbatione unusquisque esse possit. quidem et vobis et toti Italie salutare 




Responsive Copiari II 
 
A Venetis 164r 
 
Joannes Mocenigo Dei gratia dux Venetiarum etc. magnificus et excelsus dominis 
prioribus libertatis et vexillifero iustitie populi Florentini fratribus et amicis nostris 
carissimi salutem et sincere dilectionis affectum. hac hora ex Constantinopoli facti 
sumus certiores magnum turcum naturali morbo interisse et quam tantae rei nuntium 
dignum existimavimus cognitione potetantum Christianorum et eorum presertum 
quos veteri prosequimur benivolentia sicut est vestra res pubblica. tabellarium istum 
ad nos expediendum curavimus et istas scribendas breves litteras. sed tam huismodi 
re magnum vobis allatura certo scimus gaudium et laetitiam pro vestra religione et 
pietate desiderioque et studio pubblice salutis cui potentissimis ille quodam hostis 








A Sixto Pape IIII Pontefice Maximo  
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. postea que immanissimi 
Turcorum tyranni nuntiatus est interitus sicut ex incluso litterarum ex cognoscere 
poteritis videtur nobis deus ad salutem viam aperuisse qui non meritis nostris sed 
ineffabile eius clementia atrocissimum hostem populo suo crudeliter omissis ulterius 
in Christianum sanguine debacchari passus non est ex alto nobis lumen omnes ad 
liberandum nos perpetuo eo discrimine quod superioribus annis rempubblicam 
Christianam tantis cladibus affecit. si nobis ipsis deese noluerimus in tanta rei 
benegerendem occasione divinitus ob lata. quod obrem cum preteritis malis edocti id 
omni conatu procurare debeamus ut huiusmodi periculis liberati in summa viamus 
tranquillitatem et non solum catholicae religionis libertatem eum dignitate reineamus 
sed etiam amissa recuperemus hortamur vos toto mentis affectu et per viscera 
misericordie Dei nostri obtestamur et rogamus ut si unquam ad hanc sanctam 
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expeditionem bene constituti fuistis nunc maioribus animis velitis insurgere vires 
vestras in medium conferre non deserere tantam oportunitatem qua si neglecta fuerit 
quod absit longe infeliciorem eventum rei Christiane parere posset quo antea peperit 
si expectemus donec confirmato regno et rebus compositis filii patris immanitate 
resumant. et quod ille atrociiter incaeperat crudelius hi prosequantur. nos classem 
nostram in promptu habemus apud Ianuam triremes triginta et naves quattuor egregie 
instructe brevi in tyberinis hostis erunt. apud anchona et alias armamus quae omnes 
invice cum regia classe congiunget. exemplum hoc secuti afferte et vos prompto 
animo subsidium vestrum aquo longe maior nunc quo antea fructus sperari potest 
quinquidem minorem habituri sumus resistentiam si gloriosa provinciam in tempore 
prsecuti fuerimus et oblata caelitus fortuna uti voluerimus. non solum eum perpetua 
nobis et universe reipublica Christiane salute et quiete comparabimus et sine timore 
de manu inimicorum nostrorum liberati Deo servire paterimus in sanctitate et iustitia 
coram ipso omnibus diebus nostrus sed et infelices illas fidelium populorum animas 
qua tetra oppresse servitute presidium nostrum assidue implorant et provincias et 
reliqua Christiani nominis amissa imperia cum dignitate et gloria Deo ipso 
concedente recuperabimus. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris 
die iiii Juniii mcccclxxxi Pontificatus nostri anno decimo. 
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A Ferdinando rege Sicilie  
 
Rex Sicilie etc. magnifici et excellentissimi domini amici nostri carissimi cum nobis 
invisceribus hereat ardentissimum desiderium recipienae urbis Hydrantine quam 
Turci firmissimo presidio occupant oportet nos perquirere omnes pecuniarum vias 
quibus tam salutare tamque pium et nobis et republicae Christiane tam necessarium 
opus perficiatur. itaque preter alia multa quae cum subditis nostris transegumiis 
coacti nuper fuimus pecuniam mutuo accipere a non nullis ex concivibus vestris qui 
in regno nostro necoiant. interquos magnifici iulianus et antonius exodi preclare 
eorum erga nos voluntatis testimonium exhibere volentes mutuarunt nobis grandem 
pecuniarum summam cuis restituende cum nulla nobis commodior facultas offeratur 
illaque eis gratios esse possit quam si ea pecunia que est ducatorum dece (ceto) milia 
largorum in ista vestra civitate eis persolvatur. freti mutua nostra benivolentia 
rogamus vos et observamus ut quanto hoctamen necessario tempore nobis opitulari 
decrevistis velitis pro nobis sponsione facere eidem Iuliano et Antonio qua cauti 
efficiantur ex primis pecuniis que illustrissimo duci Calabriae primogenito nostro 
debentur omissis sui stipendii eisdem spondis abseque aliqua retentione dedicta 
summa satisfiet. sicque realiter et cum effectum ubi tempus advenerit eandem 
pecuniae summam per solvi curabitus ad quod accedit ipsi illustrissimi ducis 
primogeniti nostri consensus et voluntas sicuti ex ipsis litteris cognoscetis. hoc a 
vobis tanto studio petimus ut maiore non possemus pro quo habebimus vobis gratias 
urgentes easdem si casus tulerit cumulutissime relaturi queadmodum omnia diffusius 
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intelligetis ex verbis Marini oratoris nostri cuius verbis eque ac nobis ut fidem 
adhibeatis vos rogamus. datum Baroli vii Iunii mcccclxxxprimo. 
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A duce Calabriae  
 
Illustrissimi et excelsi domini amici nostri carissimi. la maiestà del signore re nostro 
patre ha scripto del bisogno grandissimo. in lo quale de presente si truova per le 
spese delle guerre passate et per quelle che continuamente fa per la recuperatione de 
Otranto ha facto et de continuo necessariamente fa el possibile suo per havere denari 
per presto ultimare questa inpresa necessaria non solamente ad essa et alli soi subditi 
ma a tutta Italia et alla Christianita. et non havendo la maiestà sua in tanto bisogno 
lasciato derecercare alcuno delli amici soi ha ancora ricercato li magnifici juliano et 
Antonio Gondi de questa città antiqui amici et devoi soi li quali liberalissimamemnte 
la hanno servita de xviii milia largi et sono remasti contenti acceptarli sopra li primi 
denari che a nui seramo devuti da quessa excelsa republica per causa della nostra 
provisione come piú amplamente è contenuto in littere che de questo haveramo le 
V.S. da essa maiestà alla quale nui ne rimettemo. el perché nulla cosa desideramo piú 
che de gratificare in omnibus allo signore re secundo simo tenuti et tanto piú in 
questa cosa quanto che lana et importantia sua et lo commune periculo lo ricerca nui 
anchora ne havemo voluto preghare le S.V. et così quanto piú possimo le preghamo 
che conformandose colle lettere della maiestà sua vogliano fare promessa a decti 
gondi sopra la provisione nostra delli decti deceocto milia ducati largi. et quando sará 
lo tempo pagarceli con effecto et senza alcuna retentione secondo scrive lo signore re 
perché nui non solamente ne remaneremo contenti et satisfacti ma ne haverimo 
obligatione grandemente alle S.V. et stimarimo haverli havuti duplicati da quelle et 
così da mo per allora promettimo havere rato et firmo in dicto pagamento non 
altramenti che si dicta somma se pagasse in mano nostra. tanto extimamo che lo 
signore re in questa sua extrema necessita che è nostra anchora sia aiutato dalle S.V. 
alli piaceri delle quali continuamente ne offerumo. data in regiis foelicibus castris 
que hidruntini viii Junii mcccclxxxprimo. 
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1481 Giugno  
 
Una de 25 Maii colle copie da Ragugia della morte del Turcho contiene laviso della 
morte del Turcho et che il disposto di omissis et omissis andavano a recuperare lo 
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stato. Et il nostro dare favore et ricordo illustrissimo per questa morte daversi omissis 
alle cose nostre per rispecto de Vinitiani etc. 
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da milano Tommaso Ridolfi del primo  
 
la morte del Turco  et che la sará facta festa omissis. 
 







Notitia della morte del Turco e della festa ha facto il papa et doni. 
Notitia della speranza della victoria d Otranto. 
 
261 





Notitia da Barletta da primo di Luglio de ii adì 10 colle copie et contiene 
 
El dispoto de Arta et el figiliul de Scandarbeh che per ora mostrano delle imprese del 
recuperare il loro per la expugnatione d Otranto. 
omissis 
Rinferiscante della morte del Turcho da Raugia recando la copia. 
Nuove d Otranto et Ungheri vengono in favore del re. 
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Die xiii Junii 1481 
domino Thomaso di milano  
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1481 Juniis die 4 
 




One of the postscriptum states 
 
el rispecto a vinuto per questa morte del Turcho. saspecti da parte del re 
 
entro la sera da Filippo di Piero leggere una lettera di Marcii tratta alla 
excellentissima de omissis el ricordava stare parati per loccasione che Vinitiani 
hanno per la morte del Turcho e ricordava il pensare al bisogno comune et proveano 
fare dal canto della nostra lega el duca di Urbino et ricordano la richiesta et 
illustrissima Girolamo.  
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Notitia da Thomaso Ridolfi de 13 a 16 contiene 
quei signore conferma quello che ha decto alla parte de subsidii del re et conforta a 
expedire questi impresa de Otranto. 
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Petro de Nasis die xiii Junii 1481  
 
Habiamo due tue da Barletta de II et de III e circa li advisi non accade sono 
commendiamo la tua diligentia. allaparte dei subsidii che con tanta instanta richiede 
la maiestà del re e fa richiedere anchora pel meco messer Marino ci è molesto non 
potere come et ottimamente il nostro desiderio di fare venire così promptamenti 
come et il bisogno della sua maiestà concordante colla volontà et studio nostro et 
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sempre farà cosa grata alla sua maiestà in ogni cosa in questa molto piú che 
conosciamo laventa del bisogno che la sua maiestà dimostra. ma questa deliberatione 
qui col popolo facendi molto difficile per li insopportabili spese habiamo avanti et 
habiamo per lordinare a extraordinario per le cose di Lunigiana dove non ancora 
seguito la sicurtà regia contro Genovesi et noi secondo le obbligationi si fecero alla 
restitutione delle terre delle quali noi non ci è facto avere la ratificatione se non per la 
quale che para omissis la speranza anchora et universale in ciascuno che cotesta 
inpresa di Otranto si omissis questo a ultimate atteso la morte del Turcho et la 
turbatione di quello stato (la morte del bascia a valona) la mala conditione de Turchi 
in Otranto et successi omissis per la sapientia regia et virtú della excellenza del duca 








Thomaso de Ridolfis 
Breve risposta accade alle tue de 20 et 23. sarai grati li advisi messer Marino di 
nuovo ha richiesto de subsidi come costi ha facto el omissis siano confermati nella 
risposta da cotesto excellentissimo principe et ci è stato in quelli effecti che altra 
volta il che non labisogna altrimenti replichare. Sopra questo parata habbiamo 
risposto amore al re da Filippo. In quanto al domandare significandone il parere della 
excellentissima sua della nostra opinione. havete ancora facto intendere la risposta 
facta a quel che la maestà del re riceveva del parere della excellentissima sua che sa 
da fare dopo Otranti expugnatione. et habbiamo approbata tal risposta perché cotanto 
è il vero che la sua maiestà et per la sua prudentia et per essere in sifacto et per ogni 
cagione ne può meglio consigliare. noi da tal cosa excepto che da decto messer 
Filippo non habbiamo havuto insino a qui alcuna notitia. 
havevamo scripto questa et lavemo la tua de xxvii per lora non accade altra risposta.  
 
Sine die et mense 1481 
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Die 4 Julii 
 
Recitatis litteris et relationis qui venibant in consilio nomine in quid omissis legato 
regio petenti subsidia pecuniorum pro Hydruntino expugnando 
 
XII diei verba sunt  
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Dominicus de Bartholis: danda debito subsidia si tamem prius rex restitutione facit 
locorum in bello amissorum scribendum eius obligationis et omissis dare per 
subsidiis et pro stipendio ducis Calabrie et cum consensu princeps Mediolanensis 
 
equites et magistratus verba facis Loysius Guiciardinus eques: confirmaverint 
superatam sententiam et meminit sumptum moderatione 
 
qui student post magistratus atque regibus verba facit Petrus Verarchis: idem addidit 
quid ad quo 
 
recitatis de m. mandatis Antonii de Medicis ad regis et responsio litterarum Thomasii 
de Ridolfi omissis 
 
subsidia secundum primas s.mas 47 (in favour) 1 
omissis 
mandata et littere 77 (in favour) 1. 
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Commissione de nostri magnifici et excellentissimi signori a voi Antonio di 
Bernardo de Medici deliberata adì v di Luglio mccclxxxi 
andrai a Napoli e di poi a Barletta dove sará la maiestà del re e chiesta et impetrata la 
audientia e facte le consuete observantie et cerimonie delle quali ti informerai apunto 
presenterai la lettera della credenza che harai con questa et quella lecta dalla sua 
maiestà cominerai il tuo parlare salutando nel principio pro parte nostra e di tucto il 
nostro popolo observantissimo della serenissima maiestà la sua serenitá et 
raccomandando a quella con breve parole come a padre et benefactore singulare la 
città tucta e tutto il nostro popolo. dirai di poi essere mandato da noi per essere 
apresso alla maiestà del re essendo suto di bisogno dare licentia a Piero di Lutozzo 
per alcune sue necessarie occupationi di qua perché noi giudichiamo  molto 
necessario per conservatione della comune dignitá della nostra confederatione essere 
sempre apresso alla maiestà omissis che per noi intenda e suoi sapientissimi discorsi 
et gravissimi consigli per potersi unire con quelli e con quelli governarsi ad comune 
salute et comune bene. Pregando la maiestà sua si vogli degnare secondo le 
occorentie conferire atecho come li parrá. aciocche tu ci possi dare adviso delle cose 
che li occorreranno et noi secondo quelle meglio deliberare. non permettendo il 
nostro instituto con rispondente a quello che habiamo inteso et la intentione et 
desiderio della maiestà del re signore il quale è anchora conveniente alla natura della 
vera amicitia et della vera confederatione donde non debba essere cosa alcuna 
similata o coperta. ma debba ciascuno porre in mezzo liberamente et amorevolmente 
quello che occorre donde piú facilmente si possi trarre quella migliore deliberatione 
che è nella materia della quale si tracti. noi anchora accadendo faremo così et non 
dimeno sempre ci accorderemo alla sententia regia et delli altri nostri confederati i 
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quali per ciò tucti come da capo et patre habiamo ad havere dependentia et seguitare 
il consiglio auctorità et sapientia della maiestà. 
Congratulerai colla maiestà della morte del Turcho e della turbatione de suoi et 
communi inimicis del nome Christiano, confortando maiestà perchè Idio certamente 
in suo favore in defensione della commune causa. il quale sanza dubio prestamente li 
concederá una gloriosissima victoria et doneralli una palma duna immortale et 
perpetua laude con grandissimo contentamento nostro et universale obligatione di 
tucti e principi et popoli Christiani per lo comune interesse della nostra relligione et 
del proprio pericolo di ciascuno che instava se la maiestà collo aiuto divino et colla 
sua multa virtú non havessi resistito alli suoi potentissimi impeti. et interropto e suoi 
audacissimi et confidentissimi propositi et incepti. ringratierai della opera sua 
prestante indefatigatamente per restitutione di quelle terre che per suo iudicio uno 
suo beneficio ne sono insino aqui restituite. diche tucta la città et tutto il popolo 
nostro non solamente resta lieto et satisffacto ma obligato di obligationi infinita et 
perpetua et conformamente et prudentemente ricorderai quando fusse il tempo ad che 
sua maiestà si degni di pensare questa città e questo popolo tutto aspecta non con 
minore desiderio la perfectione di questo beneficio. la restitutione del tucto il che 
sarebbe intermanente il posare li animi di ciaschno ne havere a pensare mai ad altro 
che adire et referire gratie alla maiestà di tanto excellente et incomparabile beneficio. 
Agiugnendo in questa parte che havendo inteso quello non è occorso alla serena 
maiestà perché è Vinitiani non habbino a prendere animo di operare in preiudicio 
della nostra lega questa opportunitá della morte del Turcho la quale come sua 
maiestà disse pare che habbino piú tempo desiderata lodiamo fermamente il suo 
parere et la sua sapientia perché veramente et così nella unione delli animi nostri et 
nello amore nostro cifa noi confederati non solamente in fatto ma in demonstratione 
consiste interamente et il rimedio di questo pericolo et dogni altro che a communi 
stati et alla quiete di essi potessi mai in alcuno modo soprastare et che per questa 
cagione a noi occorreva ricordare alla maiestà sua come di sopra hai detto el iudicio 
della restitutione del resto delle terre nostre. perché nissuna cosa può piú 
efficiamente dimostrare lunità nostra. questo è il principale fondamento che farai 
credere quello che desidera chi è malcontento della unione et fermezza della nostra 
coniunctione et lega et al presente è tolta via ladissoluta che altra volta ritardo il 
iudicio della maiestà sua perché intendiamo per vera via che quelli che a Siena 
governano intesa già quale sia la intentione della serena maiestà non solo sarebbono 
contenti che il iudicio del resto della restitutione seguissi ma lo desiderano come 
anchora colla omissis di messer Marino habiamo il tucto liberamente et 
amorevolmente conferito diche a sua maiestà doverrà anchora inanzi alla tua giunta 
haver dato adviso. da questa intera restitutione nascerebbono oltre asopradetti infiniti 
comodi. fra quali sarebbe in primis che noi ci leveremo da sospetti et da spesa la 
quale necessariamente et in Lunigiana et altrove si fa et potremo con mancho 
difficultà fare il debito et il desiderio nostro circa i subdsidi chiesti per lo presente 
bisogno della maiestà sua secondo il desiderio anchora et volontà nostra et in ogni 
cosa non solamente in questa conforme et corrispondente al desiderio et volontà della 
maiestà sua et il popolo nostro che al presente tutto è sospeso co hanimi in questa 
totale restitutione et per insino alleffecto si rende ogni deliberatione molto difficile 
come altrevolte habbiamo detto. restandone hora satisffacto et vedutosi tornato per 
beneficio et gratia di sua maiestà nella possessione delle sue cose verrebbe meno 
difficile in ogni deliberatione et noi potremo rispondere colli fatti a quello che 
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desideriamo et porgere convenienti subsidii alla sua mta in quei suoi bisogni et quelli 
in effetto sono bisogni anchora nostri suoi figliouli et confederati li quali siamo per 
havere sempre cola maiestà sua comune ogni fortuna come la ragione vuole et natura 
della nostra afectione et observantia verso di sua maiestà et come vogliono 
leconditioni de tempi et delle cose presenti et molto piú et lo nostro firmissimo et 
constantissimo proposito et deliberatione dessere sempre iuniti et legati cola maiestà 








A Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo 
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. ex litteris carissimi in Christo filii 
nostri Ferdinandi Sicilie regis illustris et legati classis nostre quare ex a his inclusa 
mittimus intelligetis recepetum esse a nostris Hydruntum et Italiam duro barbarorum 
bello quod omnes hactenus anxios tenuit Dei beneficio tandem liberatam quod qua 
scelux et salutare sit omnibus Christianis unusquisque potest facile iudicare ad hec 
cum apud vallonam et in epyro omnia nostris prospere succedere nucietur ita ut 
feliciora te non possint quas dubitat Deum nobis ex alto lumen ondere que tandem 
Christianam religionem in pristinam dignitate restituamus amissa recuperemus bello 
hostes ita persequamur ut perpetuo hac cura hac molestia liberi esse possimus. quare 
si hanc ad hoc Sanctissimi omissis bene constituti fuistis nunc omni conatu insurgite. 
nam ad reliquos omnes idem scribimus. ecce tempus salutis tempus glorie tempus 
victoriae quod si negligetur nullum tale unquam recuperare poterimus. parvis 
negocio bellum nunc confisi potest quid non sine maximo dispendio maximis 
calamitatibus nostris quod deus avertat postea conficiet si cunctabundi expectare 
voluerimus donec efferus hostis se colligat vires recuperet et adversus nos muniatur. 
nos et libenter hactenus fecimus supra quam vires nostre ferre potuerunt et facturi et 
sumus que poterimus. nam et nunc viginti caravellas et navium una oneraria ex 
decimis nostris in Portugallia instructas ad reliquam classe nostram missimus. sed 
soli non possumus non dubitamus si vestra et aliorum praesidia in commune salutem 
una nobiscum conservatur quin perpetuae saluti et tranquillitati Christiane religionis 
cum immortali omnium gloria Deo auctore consultatur. data Braciani sub anulo 
piscatori die xviii Septembris mccclxxxprimo Pontificatus nostri anno undecimo. 
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A Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo  
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Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. pro parte Senensium fuit nobis 
expositum que vos attentatis non nulla praesertum in ipsis confinibus que merito 
suspitionem prebere possunt. quare desiderantes inter vos et Senenses ipsos bonam 
vicinitatem servari et omnem turbationem scandalisque materiam tolli maxime ad 
universale totius Italie quietem pro qua tam laboravimus devotionem vestras 
hortamur in domino ut in hoc talem modium ad omissis velitis que ne dum turbatio 
aliqua oriatur sed omnis prorsus suspitio adumatur ne et contravenire videamini 
bullae nostre super gente Italica ut scitis edite. quod et nostra et caeterorum 
commendatio ne dignum erit. datum Viterbii sub anulo piscatori die xiii Octobris 
mcccclxxxi Pontificatus nostri anno undecimo. 
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A Ianuensibus  
 
Magnifici ac potentes domini amici carissimi, nuntiati nobis esse quasdam biremes et 
alia navigiola armata a vobis exisse ad depredationem nostrorum iamque aliquid 
egiss in hunc efficium que res nobis fuit plurimum admirationi et eo magis quo fama 
esse magnifici vestri hoc facere quia Paulus Baptista de Campofregoso cum suis 
triremibus aliquid damni vestris dicitur intulisse. nam etsi armamento illarum 
triremium numquam consenserumus nec eo tempore neque et apud nos armate 
fuerint quo rebus nostris in manifesto periculo laborantibus providere iis et aliis que 
tunc fiebant malis possemus nec in presentiarum facere aliud in nostra esset 
potestate. iudicavimus et publicavimus eum hoste et rebellem nostrum prohibuimus 
que ne in provincia nostra receptum habeat aut aliquid precipiat alimenti quid apud 
omnes sufficere potest ut pro omissis credant displicuisse nobis et displicere que ipse 
agit nec omittumus alia excogitare remedia quantumque a nobis fieri poterit pro quo 
omissis nullam causa vel limam habeat ad heac in nostro agendi sic que rogamus et 
hortamus vestri dominatum ut revocare suos velit ab hac nobitate et providere siquid 
rapuerunt integre restituat. fatemur enim nos pro nova et consilio libenter in pace 
cum omnibus vivere et siquid aliquin controversie accidit legibus et amicabile 
iudicio controversias dirimi prius quam armis disceptare si tantum compellimur 
tuemur res nostram quo melius possmus nec refugimus quod devitare non possumus 
ubi Dei gratia neque arma nobis desunt neque alia ad propulsandam vim necessaria 
excogitare et omissis decet quid honestum sit et quam periculosa solent esse 
discriminum initia que postea extingui facile nequeunt. Rogamus magnifice vestri ut 
quae omissis sua sit ad haec nobis respondeat per hunc tabellarium nostrum que ob 
hanc causam mittimus ad vos parati in omnem rem magnifici vestri gratas. data Ianue 
die xviii Octobris mcccclxxxprimo 
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A Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo 
 
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. exigit rei magnitudo de qua agit 
ut unumquemque catholicum principem et rempublica hortari monere et requirere ad 
commune gloria et salute eo ferventis debeamus quo maiore in dies ab immortalis 
Deo offerri videmus occasione non solum amissa recuperandi sed etiam Christiani 
nomen ulterius propagandi si nobis ipsis in tanta oportunitate deesse noluerumus. 
scripsimus ad vos et a hos Christianos principes et potentatus sepe numero ut ad hanc 
gloriosa adversus impios Turcos expeditionem comunibus presidiis insurgeretur nihil 
omitteretur quod tante prestitae occasioni de esse maxima subscuto Turcorum tyranni 
interitum discordiaque filiorum magnis utrumque favoribus de imperio invicem 
contendentum. recuperata etiam post modum a nostri Hydrunto que oportunitas eo 
maiore nunc et oblata est qui ex Oriente quotidie perfertur plures civitates et 
provincias ad Christianum nomen desicere multas ad deficiendum paratas esse 
nihiloque aliud expectare qui subsidia catholicorum quibus mediantibus pristina 
libertate possint audentius recuperare. preterea dissensione et concertationes illas 
suorum ipsorum ita nutriri hinc inde magnis contentionum fornitibus et alternis 
viribus augeri ut haud facile sedari posse videantur. quibus rebus fit ut aperte 
admoneamur non negligere tantam occasionem ne secordia et ignavia nostra eo res 
Christiana deducatur ut cum velimus providere postea non possumus et amittamus 
quietem et gloriam quam nobis et universe catholice regioni ex hoc fuimus 
comparature. vos igitur iterni hortamur iterum obtestamur et rogamus ut iam omnia 
ad hoc praeclarissimum opus alacribus animis insurgatis presidia ad prosequendam 
hanc pulcherrimam expeditionem adquam deus ex alto nos incitat statum conferatuis 
exhibeatis Christiane caritati quidem est vestrorum partium ne imputari vobis possit 
fuisse vos interea communi causa his ipsis temporibus in quibus omnia prospere 
successura sperantur. nos et pro parte nostra defuturi non sumus ut felix heac 
expeditio effectum consequantur que casus fecerimus proximis annis notissimum 
vobis et omnibus esse debeat. sed quia tante provinciae solis officem non possumus 
necesse est ut vestra et reliquorum subsidia nobiscum concurrant. super hec autem a 
vobis responsum quam primam expectamus. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub 
anulo piscatoris die ultima Octobris mcccclxxxprimo Pontificati nostri anno decimo. 
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Ab Ianuensibus  
 
Magnifici et potentes domini amici nostri carissimi. disputati vinculam appelatis 
litteras nostras et ridiculum dicitis esse rationesque adduximus ut donatio vestra 
credere posset molestum nobis fuisse siquid in vestros egerit Paulus Baptista de 
Campofregoso cuius contrarium si simulatis non recte non amice facitis omittemus a 
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modo verba quibus non multis fidem adhiberet et stabit ipsa verita in sua sede ut vos 
dicitis nam ea est veritas quam boni et sapientes viri putari esse veritate. si non ad 
partes nostrarum litterarum respondisse vostra magnifica non indignum fuisset ut 
quicumque de virtutibusque partis honestate apertius posset iudicari. facere qui Pauli 
Baptista restituat siquidem a vestris abstulit non est in nostra potestate. in vestra est 
ut que vestris rapuerunt nostris restituat quia id consensum ac iussu vestro factum 
nemo est non aperte intelligat. si crescente discrimina non erit culpa nostra qui initia 
extingui summo curavimus studio. sed erit in nobis se per annis ad res honestas et 
tranquillas sed hoc ide vestra dominos hoc facere voluerit. iuste agere et modeste 
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NAMES DATE SOURCE CONTENTS AND 
EVENTUAL PLACE 
Angelo Acciaiuoli 15 November 1437 
Müller, pp. 169-172 
n. 119 
Sale deed of alum of 
folie nove.  
Constantinople. 
 
Angelo Acciaiuoli 10 December, 1437 Badoer, p. 330 
Angelo Acciaiuoli 
stipulates an insurance 





16 September, 1437 Badoer, pp. 445, 488 
Francesco has to give a 
sum of 243 hyp. e 27 
car. for half of the 




10 September, 1438 Badoer, pp. 475, 488 
Francesco has to give 





30 March, 1439 Badoer, pp. 485, 488 
Francesco has to give 
150 hyp. to Bartolomeo 
Spagnolo for a promise 




13 September, 1438 Badoer, pp. 488, 489 
Francesco has to 
receive from Badoer 
527 hyp. equal to the 
half of the wares bought 
and loaded into the ship 
of Zorzi from Scarpanto 
on behalf of Badoer for 




  Francesco has to 
receive from Badoer 50 
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 13 September, 1438 
 
Badoer, pp. 488, 491 
 
hyp. and 27 car. for the 
wool loaded into the 





18 may, 1439 Badoer, pp. 489, 658 
Francesco has sold the 
wares in Rhodes and 
Beirut for overall 
revenue of 1149 hyp. 
and 3 car. 
Constantinople. 
Francesco di Piero 
Alderotti 
5 September 1477 
Müller, p. 222-223 
n. 184 
Mentioned as prisoner 
in Caffa for the time of 
the letter. 
Andrea di Niccolò 
Aleis 
1478 Mallett, p. 176 
Owner of two great 
galleys prepared for 
Levant. 
Antonio Altoviti Several dates (1466) 
Mallett, p. 169 
Miscellanea, 11/18 
owner of two great 
galleys returning from 
the Levant 
Antonio Altoviti 27 December 1468 Mallett, p. 171 
Conductor and owner of 
two great galleys sailed 
for the Levant 
Niccolo Ardinghelli  7 February 1465 Gregory, p. 133-134 
Niccolo Ardinghelli is 
mentioned as aspettava 
Niccolo’ di Levante che 
si diceva aveva sue 
mercatanzie. Vedrassi 
che ora ch’egli è; 
tornato quello farà. 
Niccolo Ardinghelli 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Chatelan Amidei 
8 February, 1436 Badoer, pp. 7, 94 
Bartoli wrote on behalf 
of Chatelan Amidei for 
a sum that Chatelan has 
to give to Drapieri’s 
bank. Constantinople. 
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Chatelan Amidei 
19 September, 1436 Badoer, pp. 6, 19 
Bettino Bartoli (see in 
appendix) does 
commercial brokering 
on behalf of   Chatelan 
Amidei for a sum of 9 
perp. e 311. car.  
Constantinople. 
Manente Amidei 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Piero Attavanti March 1474 Mallett, p. 174 
owner of one great 
galley sailed for 
Constantinople 
Carlo Baroncelli September 1461 MAP, f. 88 n. 126 
Letter sent to Piero and 
Giovanni di Cosimo de 
Medici regarding wool 
lot. 
Carlo Baroncelli 3 September 1472 Müller, pp. 216-217 
The Florentine 
Commune appoints 
Baroncelli new consul 
in Constantinople. 
Carlo Baroncelli 17 July 1476 MAP, f. 33 n. 542 
Mentioned as passing 
through Adrianople in 
the letter sent from 
Braccio de Medici to 
Lorenzo de’ Medici 
(see s.v. Braccio de 
Medici in this 
appendix). 
Gentile Bardi 4 March 1474 
Müller, p. 218 n. 
176 
The Commune 
interceded in favour of 
Giovanni Peruzzi and 
Gentile Bardi for some 
credit owned by them. 
Rhodes. 
Gentile Bardi 
7 March 1474 
 
20 August 1474 
Müller, p. 220 n. 
179 
Recommendation to the 
Grandmaster of Rhodes. 
Rhodes. 
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Gentile Bardi 25 March 1478 
Müller, p. 224 n. 
187 
Florence asks the 
Grandmaster of Rhodes 
to satisfy the credit own 
by Bardi from the 
deceased Manfredo 
Papponi. 
Calcedonio di Bindo 
Bardi 
15 November 1437 
Müller pp. 169-172; 
n. 119 





31 October 1300 
Polonio, pp. 85-86 
n. 73 
Pisanus Vicecomes 
instructs Ianucius to 
recover a credit from an 
accomandita. Ianucius 




31 October 1300 
Polonio, pp. 86-87 
n. 75 




31 October 1300 
Polonio, pp. 87-88 
n. 76 
Ianucius complained 
against the consul of 
Venice, Nicola Zugno, 
for the forced unloading 
operated by the local 
government of 17386 
wheat measure. 
Famagusta. 
Zichinus Bartholi 17 March 1299 
Balard, III pp. 135-
136 n. 111 
Zichinus gives receipts 
to Negro de Sturla for 
wares given to him by 
Rizardellus de 
Clarencia. He works for 
the Peruzzi company 
and has a house in 
Famagusta. Famagusta. 
Bettino Bartoli 1421/1422 
Müller, 149-150; n. 
101 
Bettino is sent to 
Constantinople as 
ambassador on behalf 
of the Florentine 
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municipality. Florence 
Bettino Bartoli 8 February, 1436 Badoer, pp. 7 94 
Bartoli wrote on behalf 
of Chatelan Amidei for 
a sum that he has to 
give to Drapieri’s bank. 
Constantinople. 
Bettino Bartoli 19 September, 1436 Badoer, pp. 6, 19 
Mediation for Chatelan 
Amidei of a sum of 9 
perp. e 311. car.  
Constantinople. 
Bettino Bartoli 20 September, 1436 Badoer, pp. 19, 102 
Med. Constantinople. 
 
Bettino Bartoli 26 September, 1436 Badoer, p. 17 
Med. Constantinople. 
 
Bettino Bartoli 9 November, 1436 Badoer, pp. 19, 102 
Med. Constantinople. 
 
Bettino Bartoli 21 November, 1436 
Badoer, pp.  19, 135, 
251 
Med. Constantinople. 
Bettino Bartoli 3 December, 1436 Badoer, pp. 76, 78 
Med. Constantinople. 
 
Bettino Bartoli 5 December, 1436 Badoer, p. 17 
Med. Constantinople. 
 
Bettino Bartoli 2 March, 1437 Badoer, pp. 19, 102 
Med. Constantinople. 
 
Bettino Bartoli 11 March, 1437 Badoer, pp. 34, 95 
Remuneration for his 
mediating activities 18 
car. through Drapieri’s 
bank. Constantinople. 
Bettino Bartoli 11 October, 1437 Badoer, pp. 505, 520 
Med. Constantinople. 
 
   
 
  514 
 
Branca Bartolini 1469 Pagnini, p. 303  Mentioned in Dei's list. 
Zaneto di Bettino 
Bartoli 
1437 Badoer, p. 582 
Account and 
compensation for his 
intermediation. 
Constantinople. 
Zaneto di Bettino 
Bartoli 
21 March, 1439 Badoer,  p. 629 
Account and 
compensation for his 
intermediation. 
Constantinople. 
Leonardo Bartolini 23 August 1465 
ASF, Prot. Sig. 
Miss.  45 n.  25 
 
The documents mention 
a letter sent to 
Mainardo Ubaldini 




Marco di Lionardo 
Bartolini 
9 May 1467 
Müller, p. 205 n. 
158 
The Florentine Signoria 
recommends Marco 
Bartolini to the 
Grandmaster of Rhodes. 
Rhodes. 
Girolamo Bellacci 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Pandolfo Bellacci 1469 Pagnini p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Francesco Benci July 1471 Mallett p. 173 
Owner of the 
Ferrandina which 
sailed to the Levant. 
Joannes Benitius 16 September 1475 
ASF, Sign. Missive 
47 47 
He emerges in a letter 
sent by the Signoria to 
Ragusa/Dubrovnik. 
Joannes is creditor from 
some Ragusans. At the 
moment of the letter he 
is going to Ragusa. 
Francesco Berrardi 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
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Piero receives 400 
florins to trade for 4 
years from Benedetto di 
Bernardo Uguccione. 
Piero Berti 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




20 June 1461 Melis,  p. 262 
Copy of an account of 
10 panni received by 
Biliotti from the 
Florentine galleys 





20 August 1461 
Mercanzie, 10831 
49r 
Baldassarre di Gualtieri 
Biliotti receives from 
Lorenzo di Ilarione di 
Lippaccio Bardi 3000 
florins to trade in the 
Levant, Romania and 
Turkey for 3 years. 
Giannozzo Biliotti s.d. (1458) 
ASF, Sign. Missive 
42 218-219 
The Florentine Signoria 
recommends Biliotto to 
Ragusa. 
Tommaso Biliotti 18/19 April 1466/7  
Mercanzie, 10831 
11v 
He receives 580 florins 
from Giovanni di 
Taddeo (Corvetti) to 
commerce in the 
Levant. 
Lipus Bonacurssis 31 October 1300 
Polonio, pp. 87-88 
n. 76 
Lipus complains to the 
consul of Venice, 
Nicola Zugno, for the 
forced unloading 
operated by the local 
government of 17386 
wheat measure. He 
works for the Bardi. 
Famagusta. 
Agnolo 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 mentioned in Dei's list 
   
 





17 July 1476 MAP, f. 33 n. 542 
In the letter of Braccio 
de’ Medici (see s.v. 
Braccio de’ Medici) is 
mentioned as being 
elected consul in 
Adrianople. However, 
Braccio also advised 
Lorenzo of Agnolo’s 
death due to the plague 
(16 of June 1476). 
Jacopo 
Buondelmonti 
1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Urbano Caetani October 1463 Mallett, p. 167 
Owner of three great 
galleys about to sail for 
the Levant.  
Carlo Cambi 14 February 1460 
Sign. Missive, 43 6-
7 
Mentioned for a 
business quarrel in 
Ragusa. 
Francesco Cambi 14 February 1460 
Sign. Missive, 43 6-
7 
Mentioned for a 




9 May 1464 Müller p. 201 n. 151 
His boat full of 
Florentine wares and 
departed from Ancona 
was robbed by 
Suordinave.  
Angiolino Capponi 1469 Pagnini, 303 
Mentioned in Dei's list. 
Levant 
Francesco Capponi 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Zanobi Carnesecchi 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




30 June 1460 
Sign. Missive, 43 
106-107 
In one letter from the 
Florentine Signoria 
emerges as a privateer 
who currently is 
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fighting the Turks and 
probably hired by the 
Pope. 
Pippo Cerchi 18 November 1461 
Sign. Missive 43 
350-351 
He is mentioned as 
living in Valona 
(Albania). 
Giovanni Cerretani 17 July, 1437 
Badoer, pp. 59, 96, 
163 
Cerretani receives 170 
hyp. as a loan from 
Nicola Sardino, of the 
Badoer’s bank. 
Constantinople. 
Giovanni Cerretani 15 November 1437 
Müller, pp. 169-172 
n. 119 
Sale deed of alum of 
folie nove. 
Constantinople. 
Giovanni Cerretani 5 July, 1438 
Badoer, pp. 162-
163, 181, 363, 36 
Cerretani sells 1200 
skins of goat/horse 
castrated to Badoer for 
312 hyp. 
Constantinople. 
Giovanni Cerretani 22 October 1438 Badoer, pp. 181, 462 
Cerretani brings back 7 
gold yarn pipe, unsold 
in Adrianople, given by 
Pipo di Giacomo 
(Filippo) 
Constantinople. 
Matteo C(i)erretani 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Raffaello Charfidoni 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Lione Chastellani 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Salveltro Cieffini  1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Jacobus Contini 28 July 1463 MAP, f. 11 n. 539 Letter sent from Pera to 
Cosimo di Giovanni 
de’Medici. 
   
 




1458 Mallett, p. 163 






Feb/March 1460 Mallett, p. 164 
owner of two galleys 
sailed for 
Constantinople 
Piero di Francesco 
Corsellini 
July/August 1460 Mallett, pp. 164-165 owner of two great 
galleys about to sail for 
Constantinople 
Bernardo di Bartoli 
Corsi 
22 August 1465 
Leg. Comm., 16 35-
36 
Elected ambassador for 
the magnum Sultanum, 




21 November, 1438 Badoer pp. 59, 108 
Alessandro di Galeotto 
has to give a sum to 
Nicola Sardino of the 
bank for some purchase 




6 August 1458  
Mercanzie 10831 
40v 
Raffaello is mentioned 
as having business in 
Romania and Turkey. 
Pagolo di Ser 
Giovanni da Colle 
12 January 1481 
Müller, p. 232 n. 
194 
Mentioned as having 
certain unspecified 
“duties” given by the 
Signoria. 
Constantinople. 
Adamo di Ser Piero 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei's list. 
Levant. 
Ambrogio son of 
Rustico da Firenze 
10 July 1350 
LIAB, Laiou pp. 
109-110; n. 2 
Proxy for recovering 
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Ambrogio son of 
Rustico da Firenze 
3 September 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 125; 
n. 26 
Canotus Rosso, called 
Malipetro, gives a 






10 July 1350 
LIAB, Laiou pp. 






23 August 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 124; 
n. 24 
Samuele gifts a sum to 
his son Sansone. 
Constantinople. 
 
Dato da Firenze 5 April 1274 
Ferretto, 1 p.348, 
n.870 
Dato da Firenze 
receives a loan of 11 l. 
Genoa 
Dato da Firenze 11 April 1274 
Ferretto, 1 p.350, n. 
877 
Dato da Firenze and 
Oberto d'Alba receive 
some sums.  Genoa 
Dato da Firenze 17 March 1274 
Ferretto, 1 p. 342 n. 
853 
Dato together with 
Albertino son of 
Bonifazio Baldo d'Alba 
receive in comm. 19 l., 





2 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Andreolo Pachagnelo of 
S. Cassiano in Venice a 
young female tartar of 
15 years old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
4 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Nicola Moro Venetian 
cit. a female tartar of 28 
years old. La Tana. 
   
 




4 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells a young 
female tartar called 
Jamanzach. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
14 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Giovanni Trevisano a a 
slave. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
14 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Giovanni Trevisando, 
med. on behalf of 
Marzo Salvador, Cocha 




14 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells 3 
females: one circassian, 
one from Catai, and a 
Jew. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
17 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Nicola of Valaresso 
med. on behalf of 
Elisabeth, Maffeo 
Contarini’s widow, one 
female tartar of 11 
years old called 
Charachtes. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
17 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Nicola Contarini 3 
female tartars: Aycholu, 
20 years old, Charaches 




18 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to a 
Venetian med. on 
behalf of a Lucca's cit. 
one female tartar 
Cochutamis 11 years 
old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
18 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells 3 
females: a circassian, a 
Russian and one Tartar 
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of 20 years old. One is 




20 September, 1369 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Dandolo one female 




21 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Andreolo de Bernardo 
one female tartar Chara 




21 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Andreolo de Bernardo 
one female tartar called 
Cholut. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
22 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Giovanni Trevisan one 
baptised slave called 




4 may, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells two 
females: one circassian 




4 July, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Pietro Trevisan med. on 
behalf of Francesco 
Bragadin one female 
tartar of 16 years old 




13-14 July, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Rolando di Verona, 
Venetian cit., med. on 
behalf of Francesco 
Volpelli cit. of Lucca, 
one female tartar 
Ersapti 16 years old; 
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one boy 10 years old, 
one Mongol female 8 
years old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
4 August, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells several 
females one of 18 years 
old, one of 8, one of 12, 




8 August, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells two 
females: one circassian 




11 August, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells two 




7 September, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Nicola Superanzio, 
med., one female tartar 




8 September, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Antonio Venier, med. 
on behalf of Zaneto 
Lando one female 




25 September, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Nicola of Vallaresso 
med. on behalf of 
Andreolo Donato on 
female tartar of 9 years 
old called 
Chtothlucheb. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
25 September, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Nicola Contarini one 
female tartar of 18 
years old. La Tana. 
   
 




26 September, 1360. 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Sell to Andrea 
Gradenigo one female 




4 May, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells one 
female circassian and 
one female Mongol of 
13 years old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
14 July, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells one 
Mongol girl of 8 years 
old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
8 August, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells one 
Mongol boy of 8 years 
old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
14 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Bertuzio Zuirano, cit. of 
Venice, one girl from 
the catai. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
14 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Bertuzio Zuirano one 




4 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Nicola Delfino cit. of 
Venice, med. on behalf 
of Giovanni Bembo, 
one female circassian of 
8 years old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
14 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Nicola Delfino med. on 
behalf of Caterina 
Sanudo one girl of 13 




18 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to 
Pietro Anselmini cit. of 
Lucca, resident in 
Venice, one female 
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circassian of 14 years 
old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
8 August, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells to a 
Venetian merchant 
resident in La Tana, 
Zarchassa of 13 years 
old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
11 August, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells two 
circassian girls of 12 e 
14 years old. La Tana. 
Domenico da 
Firenze 
18 September, 1359 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Domenico sells one 
Russian girl called 
Rhosia. La Tana. 
Francesco Giovanni 
da Firenze 
6 August 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 121 
n. 19 
Receipt of a payment. 
Constantinople. 
Giovanni Dini da 
Firenze 
1340 
Sapori, I libri degli 
Alberti del Giudice 
p. 288 
Giovanni da Firenze has 
to give 5 p. and 2 gen.  
Ninozzo Francesco 
da Firenze 
9 November 1381 
Balbi-Raiteri, p. 
211-212 n. 11 
Formed a society with 




12 November 1381 
Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 
213-216.  n. 12 
Witness for his society 
partner will. Licostomo. 
Ninozzo Francesco 
da Firenze 
19 December 1383 
Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 
217-218 n. 14 
Ninozzo gives a certain 
sum to Alberto de 
Albara. The latter 
promise to put in Pera 
156 hyp. Or in 
Licostomo 16 silver 
asp. For every hyp. 
Paolo di Bindo da 
Firenze 
15 February 1344 
Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 
46-49 n. 19 
Will of Desseus son of 
Michele Dessi de Iayra. 
Caffa 
Paolo di Bindo da 
Firenze 
13 March 1344 
Balbi-Raiteri,  pp. 
63-66 n. 28 
Lucia, daughter of 
Paolo da Firenze, 
declares to have 
received the dowry 
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equal to 7.000 asp. of 
Caffa. Caffa. 
Paolo di Bindo da 
Firenze 
23 March 1344 
Balbi-Raiteri,  pp. 
71-75 n. 33 
Paolo declares to have 
received from 
Bartolomeo Xandri 
Pandulfi da Firenze a 
certain sum. Caffa 
Lorenzo Davanzati July 1472 Mallett, p. 173 
Two great galleys about 
to sail for 
Constantinople. 
Lorenzo Davanzati 5 November 1472 




Davanzati to Mehmet 
II. It is probably 
connected to the two 
great galleys coming to 
Constantinople (see 
Davanzati July 1472).  
Andrea de Banchis March 1465 
Prot. 
Leg. Comm.  15 c. 
152 
Is mentioned the 
inheritance of Andrea 
de Banchis. Not sure if 
referring only to wares 
or the eventual death of 
the merchant there. 
Bochinus de Bardis 2 May 1307 
Balard I, p. 233 n. 
163 
Receipt of a payment. 
Part of the Bardi 
company. Famagusta.  
Bochinus (de 
Bardis) 
11 September 1301 
Pavoni, pp. 123-124 
n. 94 
Mentioned as living 
together (or guesting) 
with Nartinus and 
Iacobinus de Milano 
witnesses in an act. 
Also part of the Bardi 
company. Famagusta. 
Bochinus de Claro 
de Florencia 
20 October 1296 
Balard III, pp. 13-14 
n. 10 
Received a receipt on 
behalf of Nardo 
Centummille of Bardi 
society in Florence for a 
sum of 1.000 Saracen 
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bysant owned to Pirsio 
de Amfussis. The act 
happened in his house 
in Famagusta. 
Famagusta.  




118 n. 102 
Witness, defined as 
habitator in Famagusta. 
Famagusta. 
Bochinus Lapo de 
Florencia 
13 March 1307 
Balard I, pp. 166-
167 n. 98 
Called as witness. 
Famagusta. Works for 
the Peruzzi company. 
Brunetto de 
Florencia 
21 February 1301 
Polonio, pp. 279-
280 n. 238 
Brunetto receives 415 
white bysant in 





26 April 1301 
Polonio, pp. 423-
425 n. 354, p. 427 n. 
356 




14 January 1307 
Balard I, pp. 89-90 
n. 15 
Called as witness. 




17 January 1307 Balard I, p. 90 n. 16 
Received a receipt on 
behalf of the Peruzzi 
company for a payment 
of 7.000 white bysant 





28 March 1307 
Balard I, pp. 176-
177 n. 107 
Called as a witness. 





28 March 1307 
Balard I, pp. 177-
178 n. 108 
Called as a witness. 




17 March 1299 
Balard III, pp. 135-
136 n. 111 
Called as a witness. 
Famagusta. 
Guirardo Lapo de 13 March 1307 Balard I, pp. 166-
Called as witness. 
Famagusta. Works for 
   
 
  527 
 
Florencia 167 n. 98 the Peruzzi company. 
Ianucius Bartholi de 
Florencia 
31 October 1300 




Ianucius to recover a 
credit from an 
accomandita. Ianucius 
works for the Peruzzi 
company. Famagusta. 
Ianucius Bartholi de 
Florencia 
31 October 1300 
Polonio, pp. 86-87 
n. 75 
Called as a witness. 
Famagusta. 
Ianucius Bartholi de 
Florencia 
31 October 1300 
Polonio, pp. 87-88 
n. 76 
Ianucius condemn to 
the consul of Venice, 
Nicola Zugno, the 
forced unloading 
operated by the local 





27 February 1381 
Basso, pp. 107-109 
n. 50 
The house of the 
deceased Iohannis is 
mentioned in the act. 
The current occupier is 
the uxor. Chios. 
Perso de Gualcelli 
de Florencia 
6 February 1307 
Balard I, pp. 116-
117 n. 44 
Called as a witness. 
Famagusta. 
Richus Manfredi de 
Florencia 
4 March 1301 
Polonio, pp. 311-
312 n. 262 
Richus receives a 
receipt. The Florentine 
works for the Peruzzi 
company. Famagusta. 
Ugezonus de Rubeo 
de Florencia 
14 March 1297 
Balard III, pp. 48-49 
n. 36 
Receives a sum in white 
bysant and will give 
back 59 golden ounces 
within 15 days of 
Benvenuto de 
Pestorio’s ship arrival. 
Famagusta. 
Ugezonus de Rubeo 14 March 1297 Balard III, pp. 48-49 
Receives a sum in white 
bysant and will give 
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de Florencia n. 36 back 59 golden ounces 
within 15 days of 
Benvenuto de 




25 September 1301 
Pavoni, pp. 190-191 
n. 153 
Called as witness. 
Famagusta. 
Jacobotius Gigni de 
Florentia 
27 July 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 118 
n. 12 
Selling of a slave. 
Constantinople. 
Jacobotius Gigni de 
Florentia 
7 August 1350 
LIAB, Laiou pp. 
121, n. 19 
Francesco son of 
Corsini pay to his 
daughter of 300 hyp. 
Constantinople. 
Jacobotius Gigni de 
Florentia 
20 August 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 123 
n. 23 
Canotus Melisino gifts 
his daughter Teodora of 
100 hyp. 
Constantinople. 
Jacobotius Gigni de 
Florentia 
7 October 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 136 
n. 44 
Selling of a slave. 
Constantinople. 
Jacobotius Gigni de 
Florentia 
s.d. 
LIAB, Laiou pp. 
111-112 n. 6 
Proxy for recovering 
credits from Romania 
through Franciscus de 
Vielmo. 
Constantinople. 
Lodisio Petri de 
Florentia 
19 March 1381 
Basso, pp. 123-125 
n. 61 





Balard II, p. 353-
354 n. 61 
Gives a certain sum to 
Giacomo de Valenza in 
exchange of 1100 
Genoese lira within 3 
months. Famagusta.  
Works for the Peruzzi. 
Nicolao de 
Lamberteschis 
19 February 1310 
Balard II, pp. 375-
376 n. 80 
Called as witness. 
Works for the Peruzzi. 
Famagusta. 
Pietro de 1310 Balard II, p. 353-
Gives a certain sum to 
Giacomo de Valenza in 
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Lamberteschis 354 n. 61 exchange of 1100 
Genoese lira within 3 




6 April 1274 
Ferretto 1, pp. 348-
349 n. 871 
Rodolfino gives in 
comm. to Manfredo 
Pallastrello from 
Piacenza 100 l.,.6 s and 
2 den. Genoa 
Jacopo de Ricci  1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Marcho de Ricci 
Elmiaghola 
1469 
Pagnini, p. 303. 
Orvieto, 1961 p. 261 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Simone di Brandaia 27 June, 1360 
Verlinden, pp. 926-
927 
Simone buys from 
Giovanni cit. of Venice 
one young male Alan of 
18 years old. La Tana 
Rustico di Firenze 10 July 1350 
LIAB, Laiou pp. 
109-110 n. 2 
See Ambrogio son of 
Rustico. 
Constantinople. 
Rustico di Firenze 3 September 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 125 
n. 26 
See Ambrogio son of 
Rustico. 
Constantinople. 
Zeni di Francesco 17 November, 1438 Badoer, p. 556 
Zeni changes a credit 
letter of 76 duc. and 18 
gros. to hyp. in favour 
of Badoer. 
Constantinople. 
Zeni di Francesco 19 November, 1438 Badoer, p. 569 
Zeni receives a 
commission for the 
change. Constantinople. 
Zeni di Francesco 29 December, 1438 Badoer, p. 568 
Zeni changes a credit 
letter worth 70 duc. in 
bysant. Constantinople. 
Zeni di Francesco “” Badoer, p. 561 
Zeni receives a 
commission for the 
change. One for cº. 
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Constantinople. 
Sandro di Pandolfo 27 February 1325 
LIAB, Otten-Froux 
pp. 177-180 
Sandro loans a cocca. 
Constantinople. 
Sandro di Pandolfo 23 March 1344 
Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 
71-75 n. 33  
Paolo di Bindo declares 
to have received from 
Bartolomeo Xandri 
Pandulfi of Florence a 
sum. Constantinople. 
Benedetto Dei 7 November 1467 
Orvieto, pp. 250-251 
n. 10 
In a letter sent to 
Lorenzo de’ Medici Dei 
informed the 
Magnificent that several 
Anconitan ships which 
carried Florentine wares 
had been stopped by the 
Venetians towards 
Modon. 
Gerardino Delben 17 September 1350 
LIAB, Laiou pp. 
129-130 n.34 
Gerardino has to 




Berto Delbubbola 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




28 March 1274 
Ferretto, 1 p. 347, n. 
868 
Balduccio gives gold 
a.v.  5 l. to Casalino de 
Domuculta in comm. 
Genoa. 
Agostino del Nero Feb/March 1460 Mallett, p. 164 
owner of two galleys 
sailed for 
Constantinople 
Francesco del Nero 10 August 1465 Sign. Missive, 47 41 
Living in Valona. Was 
supposed to receive the 
wares sent by Rinieri 
Ricasoli (see Ricasoli 
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s.v.) 




Mallett, p. 169 
Miscellanea, 11/18  
Captain of the state 
galleys to the Levant 
Bernardo di Simone 
del Nero 
27 December 1468 Mallett, p. 171 
Captain of two great 
galleys sailed for the 
Levant 
Bartolomeo di 
Bernardo di Simone 
del Nero 
26 October 1471 




Bernardo new consul in 
Constantinople.  
Filippo del Vigna 5/8 January 1481 
Müller, p. 232 n. 
193 
Recommendation made 
by the Florentine 
Signoria I favour of 
Filippo del Vigna. 
Constantinople. 
Giovenco di 
Lorenzo della Stufa 
September 1461 Mallett, p. 165 
owner of two great 
galleys sailed for 
Constantinople 
Lionardo Diguntino 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Martino Dossi s.d. (1461) 
Sign. Missive, 43 
350 
In the letter, Martino 
emerges as living in 
Modon.  
Donato (dei) Donati 29 July 1281 
Ferretto, 2 p. 407, n. 
822 
Donato gives wares a.v. 
of 15 hyp.  to Tutobono 
de Multedo. In Pera and 
Genoa. 
Donato (dei) Donati 19 August 1281 
Ferretto, 2 p. 412, n. 
834 
Donato gives to 
Dagnano 50 hyp. in 
comm. In Pera, in the 
Genoese loggia. 
Donato (dei) Donati 4 July 1281 
Ferretto, 2 pp. 391-
391 n. 797 
Donato. Gives to 
Simone from Monleone 
200 hyp. In Pera, in the 
Genoese loggia. 
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Donato (dei) Donati 11 July 1281 
Ferretto, 2 pp. 395-
396 n. 805 
Donato. gives to Leone 
son of Tommaso from 
Lucca Lombards panni 
a.v. 41hyp. 12c. In Pera, 
in the Genoese loggia. 
Donato (dei) Donati 16 July 1281 
Ferretto, 2  p. 403; 
n. 812 
Donato gives to Simone 
de Clavica Lombards 
panni a.v86. l. In Pera, 
in the Genoese loggia. 
Donato (dei) Donati 23/24 July 1281 
Ferretto, 2 403; n. 
812 
Donato. gives to Pietro 
Portaiola 200 hyp. In 
Pera, in the Genoese 
loggia. 
Donato (dei) Donati 26 August 1281 
Ferretto, 2 pp. 415-
416, n. 842 
Donato loans a galley 
together with other 
people from the consul 
G. Squarzafico. In Pera, 
in the Genoese loggia. 
Donato (dei) Donati 28 August 1281 
Ferretto, 2 p. 416 n. 
844 
Donato does a proxy of 
200 hyp. to Procaccio 
Portonario. In Pera, in 
the Genoese loggia. 
Donato (dei) Donati 2 October 1281 
Ferretto, 2 p. 428 n. 
870 
Donato elects as his 
attorneys Aldobrandino 
and his brother 
Bonsignorino. In Pera, 
in the Genoese loggia. 
Donato (dei) Donati 6 October 1281 
Ferretto, 2 p. 428 n. 
870 
Donato is elected 
attorney In Pera, in the 
Genoese loggia. 
Dono Doni 1469 Pagnini p. 303 





Mallett, p. 169 
Miscellanea, 11/18  
Owner of the two 
galleys returning from 
the Levant. 
Domenico Fagiuoli 27 December 1468 Mallett, p. 171 Conductor of two great 
galleys sailed for the 
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Levant 
Matteo Federighi  1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




3 December 1300 
Polonio, p. 158 n. 
142 
Andrea on behalf of the 
Mozzi company 
received 1.450 golden 




15 April 1301 
Polonio, p. 407 n. 
343 
Andrea grants a receipt 
to Perrocius Grassus for 
70.000 white bysants. 
Famagusta. 
Deo Frescobaldi 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Batista Frescobaldi 2 March 1478 MAP, f. 37 n. 106 
Batista, as Florentine 
consul in 
Constantinople, sent a 
letter to Lorenzo di 




Piero Ghaddi  1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Maso Giallo che non 
Volterra 
1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Giuliano Ginori August 1462 Roover, p. 274 
Ginori travels together 
with the shipment 
owned by Niccolo (see 
Niccolo Dietifeci 
August 1462). Giuliano 
is supposed to start an 
apprenticeship under 
Niccolo in Pera. 
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Niccolo Guasconi July 1472 Mallett, p. 173 
Two great galleys about 
to sail for 
Constantinople 
Niccolo Guasconi 1473 Mallett, p. 174 
Owner of two great 




1478 Mallett, p. 176 
Owner of two great 




26 August 1457 
Sign. Missive, 41 
113 
A galley used by 
Giacomo Guicciardini 
and transporting wheat 
from Rhodes to Cyprus. 
Jacopo di Piero 
Guiccardini 
1457 Mallett, p. 163 
Captain (or owner?) of 
one galley sailed to the 
Levant. 
Pietro Guidetti 25 March 1478 
Müller, p. 224 n. 
187 
Guidetti emerges as 
living at the moment in 
Rhodes. 
Francesco Ispini 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




25 September 1301 
Pavoni, pp. 190-191 
n. 153 
Called as witness. 
Famagusta. 
Benitus Latinus 17 March 1301 
Polonio, pp. 337-
338 n. 281 
Called as witness. 
Profession: speciarius. 
Famagusta 
Berthozius Latinus 17 March 1301 
Polonio, pp. 337-
338 n. 281 
Owner of the house in 
which the act was draw. 
Speciarii probably 
father of Benitus and 
Thomasinus (see a.v. in 
this appendix). 
Famagusta. 
Federicus Latinus 28 September 1300 
Polonio, pp. 17-18 
n. 15 
Giovanni David from 
Acres, Pisan, appointed 
Federicus counsellor to 
recover what he is due 
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from his ship the San 
Nicola. Famagusta. 
Thomasinus Latinus 17 March 1301 
Polonio, pp. 337-
338 n. 281 





13 October 1473 
Müller, p. 218 n. 
175 
The Florentine Signoria 
recommends someone 
sent by Machiavelli to 
recover his wares in 
Valona due to the death 
of his accomandatario. 
Valona. 
Paolo di Giovanni 
Machiavelli 
5 August 1471 Mallett, p. 173 
Two Medici galleys 
sailed for Levant 
Giuliano Manetti 
from Florence 
3 September 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 125 
n. 26 




16 September 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 129-




17 September 1350 





22 September 1350 
LIAB, Laiou p. 132, 
n. 38 
Francesco Corbo sell 
one tartar girl to 
Giuliano. 
Constantinople. 
Richus Manfredi de 
Florencia 
4 March 1301 
Polonio, pp. 311-
312 n. 262 
Richus receives a 
receipt. Richus works 
for the Peruzzi 
company. Famagusta. 
Richus Manfredi 7 August 1301 
Pavoni, pp. 45-47 n 
36 
Called as witness. 
Famagusta. 
Richus Manfredi 10 September 1301 
Pavoni, pp. 127-128 
n. 97 
Called as witness. 
Works for the Peruzzi 
company.  
Francesco Mannelli 6 August 1437 
Mallett, p. 156 
Badoer, pp. 203, 248 
Owner of a great galley 
sailed to 
Constantinople. 
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Ruperto Mannelli 23 March 1464 Gregory, p. 109 
In a postscriptum 
Alessandra Strozzi 
mentions the return of 
Ruperto Mannelli from 
the Levant.  
Unfortunately he did 
not bring any sugar for 




[February 1466]  
Müller, p. 204 n. 
155 
Giovanni is both citizen 
of Florence and 
Ancona. Florence asks 
to the Florentine consul 
in Constantinople that 
Giovanni should not 
pay double taxes on his 
wares. Constantinople.  
Antonio di Niccolo 
Martelli 
October 1463 Mallett, p. 167 
Conductor of three 
great galleys about to 
sail for the Levant 
Bartolomeo di 
Niccolo Martelli 
September 1461 Mallett, p. 165 
Conductor of two great 




October 1463 Mallett, p. 167 
Conductor of three 
great galleys about to 
sail for the Levant 
Bartolomeo (di 
Niccolo) Martelli 
September 1461 Mallett, p. 165 
owner of two great 
galleys sailed for 
Constantinople 
Carlo Martelli 3 May 1462 MAP f. 16 n. 87 
Letter sent from Pera to 
Cosimo de’ Medici. 
Contains both political 
and commercial 
information. 
Giovanni di Niccolo 
Martelli 
October 1463 Mallett, p. 167 
Owner of three great 
galleys about to sail for 
the Levant.  
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Manetto Martelli 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Manetto Martelli s.d. Orvieto, p. 239 
Owner of a ship to the 
Levant. 
Martello Martelli 19 October 1454 
Müller, pp. 180-181 
n.  129 
Mentioned as being a 
Knight of Rhodes.  
Martello Martelli 1456 
Roccatagliata, p.54 
n.20 
Francesco di Lucca 
appointed Martello 
Martelli, patron of also 
one galley, counsellor 
on behalf of the Church 
of St. George in 
Mytilene. Mytilene.  
Piero Mattei 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Mariotto Mazuoli 1469 Pagnini p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Braccio de’ Medici 17 July 1476 MAP, f. 33 n. 542 
Letter sent to Lorenzo 
di Piero de’ Medici. 
Adrianople. 
Cosimo di Leonardo 
Molletti 
April 1465 Roover, p. 275 
Banchi instructs 
Cosimo to recover as 
much as possible 
moneys and clothes 
from Dietifeci in Pera.  
Chosimo (di 
Lionardo) Molletti 
1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant.  
Albertazzi (de’) Neri 2 May 1457 
Sign. Missive, 41 
68-69 
Owner of a ship 
captured from Peter 
near Brindisi. He 
emerges from a letter 
sent to the prince of 
Taranto from Florence. 
Tommaso Neri 3 March 1466 
Müller, pp. 204-205 
n. 156. 
The Florentine Signoria 
recommends Tommaso 
to the Grandmaster of 
   
 





July/August 1460 Mallett pp. 164-165 Owner of two great 
galleys about to sail for 
Constantinople 
Angelo di Nerone 
Dietisalvi Neroni 
1458 Mallett, p. 163 
Owner of two galleys 
sailed for 
Constantinople 
Angelo di Nerone 
Dietisalvi Neroni 
July/August 1460 Mallett, pp. 164-165 Conductor of two great 
galleys about to sail for 
Constantinople 
Piero Ottavanti 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Bernardo Panteleono 22 October 1300 Polonio, p. 67 n. 58 
Bernardo gives 420 
white bysant to 
Giovanni de Paternanis 
in exchange of 8 and 
half of Venetian grossi. 
Famagusta. 
Bernabo Patteri Probably 1468 




Bernabo consul in 
Chios. 
Giacomo Pazzi (in 
the text Pacti) 
15 February 1460 
Sign. Missive, 43 1-
2 
Florence recommends 
Giacomo and Pietro 
Pazzi sent to Ragusa. 
Pietro Pazzi (in the 
text Pacti) 15 February 1460 
Sign. Missive, 43 1-
2 
Florence recommends 
Giacomo and Pietro 
Pazzi sent to Ragusa. 
Bernardo Peruzzi 
18 June-11 July 
1479 
Müller, pp. 225-228 
n. 189 
Bernardo contacted 
Florence to inform the 
Signoria that Bernardo 
Bandini Baroncelli was 
in Constantinople. 
Constantinople.  
Giovanni Peruzzi 4 March 1474 
Müller, p. 218 n. 
176 
The Florentine Signoria 
interceded in favour of 
Giovanni Peruzzi and 
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Gentile Bardi for some 
credit owned by them. 
Rhodes. 
Giovanni Peruzzi 
20 August 1474 
7 March 1474 
Müller, p. 220 n. 
179 
The Florentine Signoria 
recommends Giovanni 
to the Grandmaster of 
Rhodes. Rhodes. 
Giovanni Peruzzi  2 December 1476 
Müller, p. 222 n. 
183 
The Florentine Signoria 
recommends Giovanni 
for business made by 
the Peruzzi on behalf of 
Francesco Sassetti. 
Rhodes. 
Giovanni Peruzzi 25 March 1478 
Müller, p. 224 n. 
187 
Florence asks the 
Grandmaster of Rhodes 
to satisfy the credit own 
by Peruzzi from the 
deceased Manfredo 
Papponi. 
Lodisio Petri (de 
Florentia) 
19 March 1381 
Basso, pp. 123-125 
n. 61 
Called as a witness. 
Chios. 
Attaviano Petrucci 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




August 1459 Mallett, p. 163 
Conductor of two great 
galleys sailed for 
Constantinople and the 
Black Sea 
Luigi (Luca?) di 
Buonaccorso Pitti 
October 1463 Mallett, p. 167 
Captain of three great 
galleys about to sail for 
the Levant.  
Piero di Niccolo di 
Piero Popoleschi 
August 1459 Roover, p. 271 
Banchi entrusts 54 
woollen cloths to Piero. 
Piero has to sell the 
clothes in 
Constantinople and 
Turkey and to purchase 
silk from the Caspian 
Sea. He also receives 
   
 




Antonio di Giovanni 
Quaratesi 
25 August 1481 
Müller, p. 233 n. 
196 
The Florentine Signoria 
petitions the 
Grandmaster of Rhodes 
to allow Quaratesi the 
seizure of Pazzi’s 




10 September 1301 
Pavoni, pp. 127-128 
n. 97 
Called as witness. 
Works for the Peruzzi 
company. Famagusta  
Simone Raynerius s.d. 
Balard I, pp. 187-
188 n. 117 
Simone gives a sum to 
Giacomo and Manfredo 
Turcha. The latter will 
give back as a change 
1320 white bysant when 
their boat will return. 
Famagusta. 
Rinieri Ricasoli 10 August 1475 Sign. Missive, 47 41 
Owner of the ship that 
was sent to Valona and 




1334-1335 Sapori II, p. 733 
Bartolomeo purchases 
grain from Romania 
Andrea Rondinegli 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Jacopo di Niccolo 
Sacchetti 
July/August 1460 Mallett, pp. 164-165 Captain of two great 
galleys about to sail for 
Constantinople 
Antonio Salteregli  1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei's list. 
Levant 
Anastasio Salviati 19 October 1454 
Müller, pp. 180-181 
n. 129 
Mentioned as being a 
Knight of Rhodes 
Anastasio Salviati 14 January 1462 
Müller, p. 197 n. 
146 
Recommendation made 
by the Florentine 
Commune to the King 
   
 
  541 
 
of Cyprus. Cyprus.  
Bernardo Salviati May 1442 Wright, pp. 175-191 
Alum contract in 
Rhodes 
Bernardo Salviati 24 May 1452 
Mercanzie, 10831 
26v 
Salviati received from 
Giovanni di Cosimo e 
Giovanni di  Bicci 
5.000 florins to 
commerce in Rhodes 
for 4 years. 
Bernardo Salviati 27  May 1452 
Mercanzie, 10831 
27r 
Salviati received from 
Nicola di Piero Capponi 
1.000 florins in 
accomandita for 4 years 
to commerce in Rhodes. 
Bernardo Salviati 16 July 1456 
Sign. Missive, 40 
417 
Sign. Missive, 42 
302-303 
Robbed by the Prince of 
Taranto towards 
Cyprus. Mentions of 
Salviati’s business in 
Rhodes.  
Bernardo Salviati 4 March 1461 
Müller, pp. 190-191 
n. 141 
The Florentine Signoria 
complained to the 
Mahona of the 
treatments made in 
Chios to the Florentine 
merchants. It is also 
mentioned that 
Bernardo has a quarrel 
with Gabriele 
Giustiniani and a cargo 
of alum supposed to be 
sold in Tuscany. Chios. 
Bernardo Salviati 13 March 1466 
Sign. Missive, 45 
131 
Bernardo Salviati has a 
business quarrel in 
Chios. 
Bernardo Salviati 12 December 1466 
Müller, pp. 204-205 
n. 156. 
Recommendation made 
by the Florentine 
Commune to the 
Grandmaster of Rhodes. 
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Bernardo Salviati 23 May 1467 
Müller, p. 206 n. 
159 
Recommendation made 
by the Florentine 
Commune to the King 
of Cyprus.  
Bernardo Salviati 28 April 1475 
Müller, p. 221 n. 
181 
The Florentine 
Commune pushed the 
advisors of the Queen 
of Cyprus Carlotta to 
return the moneys they 
owe to Bernardo 
Giannozzo Salviati September 1456 
Leg. Comm., 14 52-
57 
Giannozzo Salviati was 
robbed by the Prince of 
Taranto. He had wares 
belonging to Marco and 
Bernardo Salviati 
Lionardo Salvucci 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Lionardo Salvucci 12 January 1481 




Salvucci as new consul 
of Constantinople. 
Constantinople.  
Bartolomeo Sapiti 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei's list. 
Levant 
Carlo Scala 1474 
Müller, p. 219 n. 
178 
The Florentine Signoria 
recommends Carlo 
Scala. Candia. 
Carlo Scala 7 February 1478  
Müller, p. 224 n. 
186 
Recommendation made 
by the Florentine The 
Florentine Signoria 
recommends Carlo 
Scala. Carlo has to 
recover some moneys. 
In the text is defined as 
mercator.  
Niccolo Serragli 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
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Piero Signorini 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Jacopo di Piero di 
Matteo Tedaldi (is 
the same Jacopo 
Tedaldi?) 
6 August 1458 
Mercanzie, 10831 
41v 
Jacopo di Piero di 
Matteo Tedaldi 
received from Carlo di 
Jacopo di Piero 
Baroncelli 1000 florins 
for Romania and 
Turkey for 3 years. 
Jacopo Tedaldi 20 September, 1437 Badoer, pp. 178, 205 
Jacopo changes 70. duc 
Venetian for 3 hyp. and 
5 car. Constantinople.   
Jacopo Tedaldi 25 December, 1439 
Badoer, pp. 714,730, 
731, 757 
Jacopo buys with 
Badoer, med. on behalf 
of Tommaso di Corone 
some ox leather. 
Constantinople. 
Filippo di Filippo 
Tornabuoni 
August 1459 Mallett, p. 163 
Captain of the two great 
galleys sailed for 
Constantinople and the 
Black Sea. 
Filippo di Francesco 
Tornabuoni 
September 1461 Mallett, p. 165 
Captain of two great 
galleys sailed for 
Constantinople 
Giovanni Tosinghi 1444 
Mallett, p. 160 
Müller, p. 284 
Owner of a galley 
sailed to Constantinople 




25 March, 1437 Badoer, pp. 42, 97 
Mainardo buys two 




20 March, 1438 Badoer, pp. 375, 396 
Travel of Mainardo 
together with Lorenzo 
Tiepolo to Rhodes and 
Caixa (near Gallipoli) 
to buy wool. 
Constantinople. 
   
 




9 July, 1438 
Badoer, pp. 379, 
396, 397 
Mainardo receives as a 
gift one picco and half 
of panno negro from 
the master tailor 




4 February, 1438 Badoer, p. 379 
Mainardo has attended 
1/3 of the travel to 
Rhodes, investing 175 




18 April, 1439 Badoer, pp. 600, 625 
Mainardo buys scarlet 
panni bastardi for 53 





20 April, 1439 Badoer, pp. 577, 660 
Mainardo buys 2 panni 
of Florence garbo, one 
green and one 
turquoise, amount 106 




18 April, 1439 
Badoer, pp.577, 600, 
625, 628, 674 
Travel of Mainardo to 
Rhodes to buy wool. 
Badoer cover 2/3, while 
the Florentine 1/3. The 
travel’s purpose is to 
deliver a deposit of 
6000 asp. (1333 from 
the Florentine) to the 
Greek Constantine 
Strati who lives there. 
The 30 April 1439, 
Mainardo returns to 
Rhodes to load the wool 




23 December, 1439 Badoer, p. 632 
Mainardo receives the 
compensation for his 
intermediation worth 20 
   
 





28 June 1463 Signori/Otto, 77 
Unpublished letter 
mentioning also the 
existence of the 
Ottoman privileges to 
Florence. 
Donatus Ugholini de 
Florencia 
4 March 1301 
Polonio, pp. 311-
312 n. 262 
Called as witness. He is 
a censarius. Famagusta.  
Donatus Ugholini 13 August 1301 
Pavoni, pp. 54-55 n. 
42 




11 September 1475 Sign. Missive, 47 47 
He died in 
Constantinople. 
Francesco Ugholini 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Francesco Ugholini 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 




6 August 1458  
Mercanzie, 10831 
40v 
Raffaello di Giovanni 
Corsidoni receives from 
Benedetto 2000 florins 




21 July 1455 
Sign. Missive, 40 
290-291 
The boat of Bernardo 
carrying wheat was 
attacked near Corefice. 
Dariotto di Bernardo 
Uguccione 
6 August 1458  
Mercanzie, 10831 
40v 
Raffaello di Giovanni 
Corsidoni (see s.v. 
Corsidoni)  receives 
from Dariotto 2000 
florins to trade in 
Romania and Turkey 
Mariceris Vermillus 1 s.m 1476  
Sign. Missive, 47 
103 





1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
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Piero di Giuliano 
Vespucci 
1467 Mallett, p. 170 
Owner of the 
Ferrandina sailed for 
Constantinople.  
Francesco di Paolo 
Vettori 
1458 Mallett, p. 163 
Captain of two galleys 
sailed for 
Constantinople 
Francesco di Paolo 
Vettori 
Feb/March 1460 Mallett, p. 164 
Captain of two galleys 
sailed for 
Constantinople 
Pagholetto Vettori 1469 Pagnini, p. 303 
Mentioned in Dei’s list. 
Levant. 
Giuliano Zati 15 November 1437 
Müller pp. 169-172 
n. 119 
Sale deed of alum of 
Folie Nove. 
Constantinople. 
Giuliano Zati 10 December, 1437 Badoer  p. 330 
Giuliano signs an 
insurance which covers 












   
 







ASMi, Archivio Ducale 
 
ASF, Consulte e Pratiche 
 
ASF, Manoscritti 117 
 
ASF, Mercanzie  
 
ASF, Provvisioni  
 
ASF, Signori, Dieci di balia, Otto di pratica Missive 
 
ASF, Signori Legazioni e Commissarie 
 
ASF, Signori Minutari 
 
ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 
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ASF, Signori Responsive Copiari I/II 
 
ASF, Signori Risposte verbali di oratori  
 
ASV, Registri Senato Secreti XIX  
 




Arias, G. 1901. I trattati commerciali della repubblica fiorentina 1, Florence 
Badoer, G., Dorini, U., Bertelè, T. (eds.) 1965. Il libro dei conti di Giacomo Badoer, Rome 
Balard, M. (ed.) 1984. Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti Rogati a Cipro. Lamberto di 
Sambuceto (31 Marzo 1304-19 Luglio 1305, 4 Gennaio-12 Luglio 1307), Genoa 
Balard, M. (ed.) 1984. Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti Rogati a Cipro. Giovanni de Rocha 
(3 Agosto 1308-14 Marzo 1310), Genoa 
Balard, M. (ed.) 1983. Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti Rogati a Cipro. Lamberto di 
Sambuceto (11 Ottobre 1296-23 Giugno 1299), Genoa 
Balard, M. Laiou, A.E. Otten-Froux, C. (eds.) 1987. Les Italiens à Byzance: Edition et 
présentation des documents, Paris 
   
 
  549 
 
Balbi, G. Raiteri, S. (eds.) 1973. Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Caffa e a 
Licostomo, sec. XIV, Genoa 
Basso, E. (ed.) 1993. Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Giuliano de 
Cannella (2 Novembre 1380-31 Marzo 1381), Athens 
Beldiceanu, N. (ed.) 1960-1964. Les actes des premiers sultans conservés dans les 
manuscrits turcs de la Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris, Paris 
Böhmer, J. (ed.) 1967.  Acta Imperii selecta. Urkunden deutscher Könige und Kaiser 928-
1398 mit einem Anhang von Reichssachen, Aalen 
Buchon, J.A.C. 1843.  Nouvelles recherches historiques sur la principauté française de 
Morée et ses hautes baronnies, Paris. 
Bruni, L., Hankins J. 2004. History of the Florentine People, Cambridge (Mass.) 
Bruni, L., Baldassarri, S.U. 2000. Laudatio Florentinae Urbis, Florence 
Bruni, L. Viti, P. 1996. Opere letterarie e politiche, Turin 
Camerani, G. (ed.) 1951. I documenti commerciali del Fondo diplomatico mediceo 
nell’Archivio di Stato di Firenze (1292-1492), Florence 
Cecconi, E.1869. Studi storici sul concilio di Firenze : con documenti inediti o nuovamente 
dati alla luce sui manoscritti di Firenze e di Roma, Florence 
Chalkokondyles, L., Migne, G.P. (ed.) 1857. Historiarum demonstrationes, in Patrologia 
Graeca 159, Paris 
Conti, E. (ed.)  1981. Le <consulte> e <pratiche> della Repubblica Fiorentina nel 
Quattrocento, Florence 
   
 
  550 
 
Corazzol, G. (ed.) 1994. Dispacci di Zaccaria Barbaro. 1 Novembre 1471-7 Settembre 1473, 
Rome 
Corvisieri, C. (ed.) 1890. Notabilia temporum di Angelo de Tummulillis da Sant' Elia, 
Leghorn 
De Angelis, L. Ninci, R. Pirillo, P. (eds.) 1996. Le consulte e pratiche della repubblica 
fiorentina (1405-1406), Rome 
Dei, B., Barducci, R. (ed.) 1985. La cronica dall’anno 1400 all’anno 1500, Florence 
De La Broquière, B., Schefer, C. (ed.). 1892. Le voyage d’Outremer, Paris 
Della Tuccia, N. Ciampi, I. (ed.) 1872. 'Cronache di Viterbo e di altre città, in Cronache e 
statuti della città di Viterbo, Florence 
Del Piazzo, M. (ed.) 1969.  Il protocollo del carteggio della Signoria di Firenze 1459-1469, 
Rome 
Del Piazzo, M. (ed.) 1956. Protocollo del carteggio di Lorenzo il Magnifico: per gli anni 
1473-74, 1477-92, Florence  
Diether, R. R. (ed.) 1983. Critobuli Imbriotae historiae, in Corpus Fontium Historiae 
Byzantinae 22, Berlin 
Dölger, F. 1976. Regesten der kaiserkunden des Ostromischen reiches von 565-1453 3, 
Hildesheim 
Facio, B., Pietragalla D. (ed.) 2004. Rerum gestarum Alfonsi regis libri X, Alessandria 
Ferretto, G. (ed.) 1903. Codice diplomatico delle relazioni fra la Liguria la Toscana e la 
Lunigiana ai tempi di Dante (1265-1274), Rome  
   
 
  551 
 
Guarino da Verona, Sabbadini, R. (ed.) 1916. Epistolario di Guarino Veronese, Venice 
Iorga, N. (ed.) 1899-1902. Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XVe 
siècle 1-3, Paris 
Gregory, H. (ed.) 1997. Selected Letters of Alessandra Strozzi, Berkeley 
Hofmann, S.I. (ed.) 1929-1931. Concilium Florentinum, Rome 
Hofmann, S.I. (ed.) 1946-1971. Concilium Florentinum. Documenta et scriptores, Rome 
Imperiale. C. (ed.) 1926. Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e dei  suoi continuatori, Rome 
Fubini, R., Rubinstein, N. (eds.) 1977-2011. Lettere di Lorenzo il Magnifico, Florence 
Laggetto, M., Muscari, L. (ed.) 1940. Historia della guerra di Otranto del 1480, Mariano 
Lampros, S. P. (ed.) 1972. Palaiologeia kai peloponnēsiaka, Athens 
Landucci, L., Lanza A. (ed.) 1985. Diario fiorentino dal 1450 al 1516 continuato da un 
anonimo fino al 1542, Florence 
Langkabel, H. 1981. Die Staatsbriefe  Coluccio Salutatis, Köln  
Ligenthal (Von), K. 1857. Jus Graeco-Romanum 3, Leipzig 
Ludwig, W. (ed.) 1893. 'Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum', in MGH, Wien 
Machiavelli, N. 1847. The History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy from the Earliest 
Times to the Death of Lorenzo the Magnificient together with the Prince, London 
Masi, G. (ed.) 1941. Statuti delle colonie fiorentine all'estero (secc. XV-XVI), Milan 
Melis F. (ed.) 1972. Documenti per la storia economica dei secoli XIII-XVI, Florence 
   
 
  552 
 
Miklosich, F., Müller, J. (eds.) 1860-1890. Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et 
profana. 1-6, Wien 
Müller, G. (ed.) 1879. Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll’Oriente cristiano e 
coi Turchi fino all’anno MDXXXI, Florence 
Notar Giacomo, Garzilli P. (ed.) 1845. Cronica di Napoli di notar Giacomo, Naples. 
Novati, F. (ed.) 1896. Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, Rome 
Palmieri, M., Scaramella G. (ed.) 1906-1915, Liber de temporibus, Città di Castello 
Palmieri, M., Scaramella G. (ed.) 1906-1915, Annales, Città di Castello 
Pagnini, F. (ed.) 1765-1766. Della decima e di varie altre gravezze imposte dal comune di 
Firenze: della moneta e della mercatura de' Fiorentini fino al secolo XVI 1-4, Lucca 
Pastor, L. (ed.) 1904. Acta inedita historiam pontificum Romanorum: praesertim saec. XV, 
XVI, XVII illustrantia. Volumen 1, A. 1376-1464, Freiburg 
Pavoni, R. (ed.) 1982. Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di 
Sambuceto (6 luglio- 27 ottobre 1301), Genoa 
Pegolotti, F., A. Evans (ed.) 1936. La pratica della mercatura, Cambridge  
Pertusi, A. (ed.) 1976. La caduta di Costantinopoli. L’eco nel mondo. 1-2, Milan 
Pertusi, A., Carile, A. (eds.) 1983. Testi inediti e poco noti sulla caduta di Costantinopoli, 
Bologna  
Piccolomini E.S., Totaro, L. (ed.). 1984. I Commentarii / Enea Silvio Piccolomini papa Pio 2, 
Milan 
Piccolomini E.S., Brown, R. (ed.). 2013. Europe (c. 1400-1458), Washington 
   
 
  553 
 
Pitti, B. 1720. Cronica di Buonaccorso Pitti con annotazioni, Florence 
Poliziano, A. AA.VV. (eds). 1769. Conjurationis Pactianae anni 1478. Commentarium. 
Documentis, figuris, notis nunc primum inlustratum cura, et studio Ioannis Adimari ex 
marchionibus Bumbae, Naples 
Polonio, V. (ed.) 1982. Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di 
Sambuceto (3 luglio 1300- 3 agosto 1301), Genoa 
Predelli, R. (ed.) 1955. I libri commemoriali della Repubblica di Venezia, Venice 
Puncuh, D. (ed.) 1996. I libri iurium della Repubblica di Genova 1-2, Genoa 
Rinuccini, F., Aiazzi, G. (ed.) 1840. Ricordi storici di Filippo di Cino Rinuccini dal 1282 al 
1460, Florence 
Roccatagliata, A. (ed.) 1982. Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene 1, 
Genova 
Rovere, A. 1979. Documenti della Maona di Chios (secc. 14-16), Genoa 
Sciambra, M. Valentini, G. (eds.) 1968. Il liber brevium di Callisto III: la crociata, l’Albania 
e Scanderbergh, Palermo  
Schirò, G. (ed.) 1975. Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia, Rome  
Senatore, F. (ed.) 1997. Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli (1444- 2 luglio 1458), Salerno  
Senatore, F. (ed.) 1997. Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli (4 luglio 1458- 30 dicembre 1459), 
Salerno  
Thiriet, F. (ed.) 1958-1961. Régestes des déliberations du Sénat de Venise concernant la 
Romanie 1-3, Paris-La Haye 
   
 
  554 
 
Thiriet, F. (ed.) 1966-1971. Déliberations des assemblées vénitiennes concernant la Romanie 
I-II, Paris-La Haye 
Thomas, G.M. (ed.) 1899. Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum sive Acta et Diplomata Res 
Venetas Graecas atque Levantis illustrantia. Pars II, a. 1351-1454, Venice 
Verpaux, J. (ed.) 1966. Pseudo-Kodinos, Traité des Offices, Paris 
Villani, G., Porta G. 1990. Nuova cronica, Milan 
Zambotti, B., Pardi, G. (ed.) 1937. 'Diario ferrarese dall’anno 1476 sino al 1504', in Rerum 
Italicarum Scriptores 34/8, Bologna 
Minio, B., Wright, D.G., Melville-Jones J. R. 2008 The Greek Correspondence of 
Bartolomeo Minio, Padua 





Abulafia, D. 1981. 'Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy', 1265-1370' in The Economic 
History Review New Series 3, 377-388 
Abulafia, D. 1986. 'The Anconitan Privileges in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Levant 
Trade of Ancona', in Airaldi, G., Kedar, B.Z. (eds.) I Comuni italiani nel regno crociato di 
Gerusalemme, 525-570 
   
 
  555 
 
Abulafia, D. 1987. Italy, Sicily, and the Mediterranean, 1110-1400, London 
Abulafia, D. 1993. Commerce and Conquest in the Mediterranean, 1100-1500, Aldershot 
Abulafia, D. 1997. The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms, 1200-1500: the Struggle for 
Dominion, London 
Abulafia, D. 1997(2). 'East and West: Comments on the Commerce of the City of Ancona in 
the Middle Ages', in Ghezzo, M.P. (ed.) Città e sistema adriatico alla fine del Medioevo. 
Bilancio degli studi e prospettive di ricerca, 49-66 
Abulafia, D. 2010. ‘The Mouse and the Elephant: Relations between the Kings of Naples and 
the Lordship of Piombino in the Fifteenth Century’, in Paton, B. (ed.) Communes and 
Despots in Medieval Renaissance Italy, 145-160 
Abulafia, D. 2011. ‘Piombino between the Great Powers in the Late Fifteenth Century’, in 
Studi in onore di Giorgio Chittolini, 3-14    
Adam, R. 1979. 'Francesco Filelfo at the Court of Milan (1439-1481). A Contribution to the 
Study of Humanism in North Italy', in Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom 
51, Tübingen 
Ammirato, S. 1826. Istorie Fiorentine, Florence 
Andriopoulou, S. 2011. Diplomatic Communication between Byzantium and the West under 
the Late Palaiologoi (1354-1453) (PhD thesis), Birmingham 
Angelov, D. 2007. Imperial Ideology and Political Thought in Byzantium, 1204-1330, 
Cambridge 
Angold, M. 1975. A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the 
Laskarids of Nicaea (1204-1261), London 
   
 
  556 
 
Angold, M. 2003. The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, Harlow 
Antoniadis-Bibicou, H. 1963. Recherches sur les douanes a Byzance: L'octava, le 
kommerkion et les commerciaires, Paris 
Antonini, F. 1930. 'La pace di Lodi e i segreti maneggi che la prepararono', in Archivio 
Storico Lombardo 57, 233-296 
Ashtor, E. 1976. 'Il Commercio levantino di Ancona nel basso medioevo', in Rivista Storica 
Italiana 88, 213-253 
Ashtor, E. 1983. Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Princeton  
Ashtor, E. 1986.  East-West Trade in the Medieval Mediterranean, London  
Babinger, F. 1951. 'Maometto II il Conquistatore e l’Italia',  Rivista Storica Italiana 63, 469-
505 
Babinger, F. 1951(2). 'Ja'kub-Pascha, ein Leibarzt Mehmed's II', in Rivista degli Studi 
Orientali 26, 82-113. 
Babinger, F. 1963. 'Lorenzo de’ Medici e la corte Ottomana', in  Archivio Storico Italiano 
121, 305-361 
Babinger, F. 1963(2), 'Relazioni visconteo-sforzesche con la corte Ottomana durante il sec. 
XV', in La Lombardia e l’Oriente Atti del convegno di studi su Milano, 8-30 
Babinger, F. 1968. 'Pio II e l’Oriente maomettano', in D. Maffei (ed.)  Enea Silvio 
Piccolomini Papa Pio II, Siena, 1-13 
Babinger F., Hickman, W. C. (ed.) 1978. Mehmed the Conqueror and His time, Princeton  
Balard, M. 1978. La Romanie génoise (XIIe – début di XVe siècle) I-II, Genoa 
   
 
  557 
 
Balard, M. 1989. L’organisation des colonies étrangères à Constantinople (XIIIe-XVe siècle), 
in Hommes et richesses  dans l’empire byzantin, Paris 
Balard, M. 2006. Les Latins en Orient (XIV-XV siècle), Paris 
Balletto, L., Pistarino, G. 1995. '1453: da Pera genovese a Galata turca', in Archivio Storico e 
Giuridico Sardo di Sassari 2, 307-320 
Balletto, L., Pistarino, G. 1995(2). 'Reflexiones acerca de las relaciones entre Génova y el 
sultan Djem', in Revista de Historia Universal 7, 35-56   
Balletto, L. 2005. 'I Genovesi a Focea ed a Chio tra XIII e XIV secolo', in Atti 
dell’Accademia Ligura di Scienze e Lettere Ser. 7, v. 8, 101-119. 
Balletto, L. 2005 (2).  'Commerci e rotte commerciali nel Meditteraneo orientale alla metà del 
Quattrocento: l’importanza dell’isola di Chio', in  Memorie della Accademia Lunigianese di 
Scienze, Lettere ed Arti Giovanni Capellini  75, 191-206 
Banchi, L. 1879. 'Il Piccinino nello Stato di Siena e la Lega Italica', in Archivio Storico 
Italiano 4, 44-58, 225-245 
Barker, J. 1969. Manuel II Paleologus (1391-1425): a Study in Late Byzantine 
Statesmanship, New Brunswick 
Barker, J. 2009. 'Emperors, Embassies, and Scholars: Diplomacy and the Transmission 
of Byzantine Humanism to Renaissance Italy', in Angelov, D. (ed.) Church and Society in 
Late Byzantium, Kalamazoo, 158-179 
Bayley, D. 1961. War and Society in Renaissance Florence, Toronto 
Baron, H. 1938. 'The Historical Background of the Florentine Renaissance', in History. The 
Journal of the Historical Association 22, 315-327 
   
 
  558 
 
Baron, H. 1957. 'Fifteenth-century Civilisation and the Renaissance', in Potter, G. R. (ed.) 
The New Cambridge Modern History 1: The Renaissance, Cambridge 50-75 
Baron, H. 1966. The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and 
Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny, Princeton 
Baron, H. 1967. 'Leonardo Bruni: "Professional Rhetorician" or "Civic Humanist', in Past & 
Present 36, 21-37 
Basso, E. 2007. 'La Maona di Chio, Genova e l'Impero Ottomano: relazioni commerciali e 
intrecci diplomatici fra Tardo Medioevo e prima età moderna', in Cavaciocchi, S. (ed.) 
Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico secc. 13-18: atti della trentottesima 
settimana di studi, 1-5 maggio 2006, 981-1004 
Basso, E. 2008. 'Genova e gli Ottomani nel XV secolo: gli "Itali Teucri" e il Gran Sultano', in 
L’Europa dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli: 29 maggio 1453. Atti del 44 Convegno storico 
internazionale, Spoleto 375-409 
Beck, H.G., Manoussacas, M., Pertusi, A. 1977. Venezia centro di mediazione tra Oriente e 
Occidente (Secoli XV-XVI) Aspetti e problemi, Florence. 
Berza, M. 1944. 'La Colonia Fiorentina di Costantinopoli nei secoli XV-XVI e suo 
ordinamento secondo gli statuti', in Revue Historique du Sud-est européen 21, 137-154 
Bignami, L. 1934. Condottieri Viscontei e Sforzeschi, Milan 
Bisaha, N. 2004. Creating East and West Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks, 
Philadelphia 
Black, J. 2009. Absolutism in Renaissance Milan: Plenitude of Power under the Visconti and 
the Sforza, 1329-1535, Oxford 
   
 
  559 
 
Black, R. 1985. Benedetto Accolti and the Florentine Renaissance, Cambridge  
Bliznjuk, S. 1997. 'Genovesi a Costantinopoli ed Adrianopoli alla metà del XV secolo in base 
a documenti dell’Archivio di Stato di Genova', in Byzantinische Zeitschrift 90, 13-23 
Bojovic, B. 1998. Raguse et l’Empire ottoman (1430-1520): les actes impériaux ottomans en 
vieux-serbe de Murad II a Selim I,  Paris 
Bombaci, A. 1954. 'Venezia e l’impresa turca di Otranto', in Rivista storica italiana 66, 159-
203 
Boyar, E., Fleet, K. 2010. A Social History of Ottoman Istanbul, Cambridge 
Borsari, S. 1958. 'L’espansione fiorentina in Oriente', in Rivista Storica Italiana 70, 477-507 
Braccini, T. 2008. 'L’imperatore Giovanni VIII Paleologo a Pistoia', in Byzantinische 
Zeitschrift 98/2, 383-397 
Bryer, A. 1980. The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos, London 
Brucker, G. 1977. The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence, Princeton 
Brucker, G. 1994. Renaissance Florence: Society, Culture and Religion, Goldbach Keip 
Verlag 
Bülent, A. 2004. Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Ottoman Diplomacy Conventional or 
Unconventional?, Basingstoke 
Burckhardt 1955, La civiltà del Rinascimento in Italia, Florence  
Buser, B. 1879. Die Beziehungen Der Mediceer Zu Frankreich Wahrend Der Jahre 1434-
1494: In Zusammenhang Mit Den Allgemeinen Verhaltnissen Italiens, Leipzig 
   
 
  560 
 
Camerani, S. 1939. Contributo alla storia dei trattati commerciali tra la Toscana e i Turchi, in 
Archivio Storico Italiano 97/2, 83-101 
Cameron, A. 1934. The Apostolic Camera and Scottish Benefices, 1418-1488, London 
Cammelli, G. 1941. I dotti bizantini e le origini dell’umanesimo: Manuele Crisolora, 
Vallecchi 
Canetta, C. 1885. 'La pace di Lodi (9 Aprile 1455) ', in Rivista Storica Italiana 2, 516-564 
Carducci, G., Kiesewetter, A., Vallone, G. 2005. Studi sul principato di Taranto in età 
orsiniana, Bari. 
Carile, A. 1974. La rendita feudale nella Morea Latina nel XIV secolo, Bologna  
Carile, A. 1978. Per una storia dell’impero latino di Costantinopoli (1204-1261), Bologna  
Caselli, C. 2010. Napoli aragonese e l’impero ottomano (PhD thesis), Pisa 
Chastel, 1959. Art et humanisme a Florence au temps de Laurent le Magnifique: Études sur 
la Renaissance et l'Humanisme platonicien, Paris 
Clark, P. 1991. The Soderini and the Medici: Power and Patronage in Fifteenth-century 
Florence, Oxford 
Crum, R.J. 1996. 'Roberto Martelli, The Council of Florence, and the Medici Palace Chapel', 
in Zeitschrift für Kunstgesichichte 59, 403-417  
Corongiu, A. 2008. 'Gli ultimi anni di Maometto II il Conquistatore nel carteggio sforzesco', 
in Itinerari della ricerca storica 20-21, 179-211 
D’Agostino, G.  1975. 'Il Mezzogiorno aragonese (Napoli dal 1458 al 1503), in Storia di 
Napoli 2, 593-672 
   
 
  561 
 
Davies, J. 1988. Florence and its University during the Early Renaissance, Boston 
De Angelis, L. 1992. 'Lorenzo a Napoli: progetti di pace e conflitti politici dopo la congiura 
dei Pazzi', in Archivio storico italiano 150, 385-422 
Della Berardenga, U. 1963. Avventurieri alla conquista di feudi e di corone (1356-1459), 
Florence 
De Roover, F. 1999. L’arte della seta a Firenze nei secoli 14 e 15, Florence 
De Roover, F. 1966.  'Andrea Banchi Florentine Silk Manufacturer and Merchant in the 
Fifteenth Century', in Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 3, 223-285 
De Roover, R. 1963. The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494, Cambridge 
Del Treppo, M. 1972. I mercanti catalani e l’espansione della corona aragonese nel secolo 
XV, Naples 
De Mesquita, B. 1941. Giangaleazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan (1351-1402). A Study in the 
Political Career of an Italian Despot, Cambridge 
Demacopoulos, G. 1999. 'The Popular Reception of the Council of Florence in 
Constantinople 1439-1453', in St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 43, 33-53 
Dennis, G. T. 1960. The reign of Manuel II Palaeologus in Thessalonica: 1382 – 1387, Rome 
Dees, R. 1987. 'Bruni, Aristotle and the Mixed Regime in “On Constitution of the Florentine', 
in Medievalia et Humanistica 15, 1-24 
Der Nersessian, S. 1969. 'The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia' in Setton, K., Wolff R. L., 
Hazard, H. W. (eds.) The later Crusades, 1189-1311, Madison 630-659 
Dölger, F., Karayannopoulos, I. 1968. Byzantinische Urkundenlehre, Munich 
   
 
  562 
 
Dover, P. M. 2005. 'Royal Diplomacy in Renaissance Italy: Ferrante d'Aragona (1458-1494) 
and His Ambassadors', in Mediterranean Studies 14, 57-94 
Djuric, I. 1995. Il crepuscolo di Bisanzio, Rome 
Ferjančić, B.  1967. 'Notes sur la diplomatique byzantine', in Zbornik Radova Vizantoloskog 
Instituta  10, 251-296 
Field, A. 1988. The Origins of the Platonic Academy of Florence, Princeton 
Fleet, K. 2011. 'Florence and the Ottoman empire in the Second Half of the Fifteenth 
Century' in  The 12th  International Congress of Ottoman  Social and Economic History 11-
15 July 2011, Istanbul 
Fleet, K. 1999. European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: the Merchants of 
Genoa and Turkey, Cambridge 
Franceschi, F. 1993. Oltre il “Tumulto”: I lavoratori fiorentini dell’arte della lana fra Tre e 
Quattrocento, Florence 
Fubini,  R. 1987. 'Classe dirigente ed esercizio della diplomazia nella Firenze 
quattrocentesca', in D. Riugadini (ed.) I ceti dirigente nella Toscana del Quattrocento, 
Impruneta 
Fumi, L. 1912. 'Il disinteresse di Francesco I Sforza alla crociata di Callisto III contro i 
Turchi', in Archivio Storico Lombardo 39, 101-113 
Galasso, G. 1992. Il regno di Napoli:il Mezzogiorno angioino e aragonese, Turin.  
Garagnini, G.C. (ed.). 1994.  Lorenzo il Magnifico e il suo mondo: convegno internazionale 
di studi (Firenze, 9-13 giugno 1992), Florence 
   
 
  563 
 
Gatteschi, A. 2008. 'Il concilio di Ferrara-Firenze e gli stati italiani', in L’Europa dopo la 
caduta di Costantinopoli: 29 maggio 1453. Atti del 44 Convegno storico internazionale, 
Spoleto 289-354 
Geanakoplos, D.J. 1975. 'Byzantium and the Crusades 1261-1354', in K.M. Setton (ed.) A 
History of the Crusades 3, Madison 69-103 
Geneakoplos, D. J. 1985. L’imperatore Michele Paleologo e l’Occidente, Palermo  
Ferente, S. 2005.  La sfortuna di Jacopo Piccinino: Storia dei bracceschi in Italia 1423-1465, 
Florence 
Gill, J. 1967. Il Concilio di Firenze, Florence. 
Gill, J. 1964. Personalities of the Council of Florence, Oxford 
Gill, J. 1979. Church Union: Rome and Byzantium (1204-1453), London 
Goldthwaite, R.A. 1982. The Building of Renaissance Florence: an Economic and Social 
History, Baltimore 
Goldthwaite, R. A. 1987. 'The Medici Bank and the World of Florentine Capitalism', in Past 
& Present 114 (Feb.), 3-31 
Goldthwaite, R.A. 2009. The Economy of Renaissance Florence, Baltimore 
Gottlob, A. 1889. Aus der Camera apostolica des 15. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur 
Geschichte des päpstlichen Finanzwesens und des endenden Mittelalters, Innsbruck 
Guillou, A. 1991. La civiltà bizantina oggetti e messaggio. Fonti diplomatiche e società delle 
province, Rome 
   
 
  564 
 
Griffith, G., Thompson, D., Hankins, J. 1987. The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: Selected 
Texts, Binghamton (NY) 
Griffiths, G. 1999. The Justification of Florentine Foreign Policy: Offered by Leonardo 
Bruni in His Public Letters (1428-1444): Based on Documents from the Florentine and 
Venetian Archives, Rome 
Grendler, P. 2002. The Universities of the Italian Renaissance, Baltimore 
Hankins, J. 2010. 'The Chronology of Leonardo Bruni’s Later Works (1437-1443), in Studi 
medievali e umanistici 6, 1-40 
Hankins, J. 2003.  Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance I, Rome  
Hankins, J. 2000. 'The Civic Panegyrics of Leonardo Bruni', in Hankins J, (ed.) Renaissance 
Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections 143-178, Cambridge. 
Hankins, J. 1995. 'Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of 
Mehmed II', in Dumbarton Oaks Papers 49, 111-207  
Hankins, J. 1992. 'Cosimo De’ Medici as a Patron of Humanistic Literature', in Ames-Lewis, 
F. (ed.) Cosimo "il Vecchio" de' Medici, 1389-1464, London 69-94 
Hankins, J. 1991. 'The Myth of the Platonic Academy of Florence', in Renaissance Quarterly 
44, 429-475 
Halecky, O.1972. Rome et Byzance au temps du grand Schisme d’Occident, in Id. (ed.). Un 
empereur de Byzance à Roma, London 477-532 
Heyd, W. 1967. Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen - âge, 1-2, Amsterdam 
   
 
  565 
 
Herrin, J., McManus, S. 2013. 'Renaissance Encounters: Byzantium Meets the West at the 
Council Ferrara-Florence 1438-1439, in Brownlee, M. (ed.) Renaissance Encounters: Greek 
East and Latin West, Leiden 35-56 
Hoshino, H. 2001. Industria tessile e commercio internazionale nella Firenze del tardo 
Medioevo, Florence 
Hoshino, H. 1980. L’arte della lana in Firenze nel basso medioevo. Il commercio della lana e 
il mercato dei panni fiorentini nei secoli XIII-XV, Florence 
Housley, N. 2012. Crusading and the Ottoman Threat. 1453-1505, Oxford 
Ilardi, V. 1959. 'The Italian League, Francesco Sforza, and Charles VII (1454-1461)', in 
Studies in the Renaissance 6, 129-166 
Ilardi, V. 1972. 'The Assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza and the Reaction of Italian 
Diplomacy', in Martines, L. (ed.), Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200-1500, 
London 1972, 72-103 
Imber, C. 2006. The Crusade of Varna, 1443-1445, Ashgate 
Imperiale, C. 1934. Codice diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova, Rome 
İnalcik, H. 1960. 'Mehmed the Conqueror (1432-1481) and His Time', in Speculum 35, 408-
427 
İnalcik, H. 1967. 'Notes on N. Beldiceanu’s Translation of the Kanunname, fonds Turc 
ancient 39, Bibliotheque Nationale', in Der Islam 43, 154-57 
İnalcik, H. 1973. The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age. 1300-1600, London 
   
 
  566 
 
İnalcik, H. 1977. 'An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations', in Venezia centro di 
mediazione tra oriente e occidente (secoli XV-XVI): aspetti e problemi 1, 83-90 
İnalcik, H. 1982. 'Ottoman Archival Materials on Millets', in B. Braude, Lewis B. (eds.) 
Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning of a Plural Society, New York, 
437-449 
İnalcik, H. 1989. 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusade (1451-1522), in Setton, K., The Impact 
of the Crusades on Europe, Madison 311-353 
İnalcik, H. 1997. An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1600 1, 
Cambridge 
İnalcik, H. 1998. Essays in Ottoman History, Eren 
Jacoby, D. 2007. 'Byzantium, the Italian Maritime Powers, and the Black Sea before 1204', in 
Byzantinische Zeitschrift 100/2, 677-689 
Jacoby, D. 1997. Trade, Commodities and Shipping in the Medieval Mediterranean, Ashgate 
Janin, R. 1964. Constantinople byzantine, Paris 
Jeffreys, E., Haldon, J., Cormack, R. (eds.) 2009. The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies, 
Oxford 
Jacobs, E. 1927. Die Mehemmed-Medaille des Bertoldo, Groke 
Jones, P. J. 1974. The Malatesta of Rimini and the Papal State, Cambridge 
Jones, T. L. 2011. The Renaissance Portrait Medal and the Court Context: on the Origins 
and Political Function of Pisanello’s Invention (PhD dissertation), University of Florida 
   
 
  567 
 
Karpov, S. P. 1986.  L’impero di Trebisonda, Venezia, Genova e Roma 1204-1461. Rapporti 
politici, diplomatici e commerciali, Rome 
Kent, D. 1978. The Rise of the Medici: Faction in Florence 1426-1434, Oxford 
Kyritses, D. 1999. 'The Common Chrysobulls of Cities and the Notion of Property in Late 
Byzantium', in Summeikta 13, Athens 229-245 
Komorowski, M. 2012. 'The Diplomatic Genre before the Italian League: Civic Panegyrics of 
Bruni, Poggio, and Decembrio', in Moudarres, A., Moudarres, C.P. (eds.) New worlds and the 
Italian Renaissance, 47-74 
Krekić, B. 1972. Dubrovnik in the 14th and 15th Centuries: a City between East and West, 
Norman 
Krekić, B. 1986. Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Âge, The Hague  
Laurent, V. 1963. 'Un argyrobulle inédit du despote de Morée Théodore Paléologue en faveur 
de Mastino de Cattanei, gentilhomme toscan', in Revue des études byzantines 21, 208-220 
Lazzari, A. 1945. Il primo duca di Ferrara, Borso d’Este, Ferrara 
Leonhard, F. 1992. Ancona nel Basso Medioevo, Bologna 
Léonard, É. G. 1956, La lettre autobiographique du grand-sénéchal Nicola Acciaiuoli (1364), 
in Reichenkron G. (ed.). Formen der Selbstdarstellung: Analekten zu einer Geschichte des 
literarischen Selbstportraits, Berlin 229-240 
Leonte, F. 2012. Rhetoric in Purple: The Renewal of Imperial Ideology in the Texts of 
Manuel II Palaiologos (PhD dissertation), Budapest 
   
 
  568 
 
Lewis, B. 1952. 'The Privilege Granted by Mehmet II to His Physician', in Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 14/3, 550-563 
Lilie, R.-J. 1984. Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den 
italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der 
Angeloi (1081–1204), Amsterdam  
Litta, P. 1902. 'Martelli', in Famiglie celebri italiane, Milan 
Loenertz, R.-J. 1979. Démétrius Cydonès. 'De 1373 à 1375', in Orientalia christiana 
periodica 37, 5-39  
Lognon, J., Topping, P. 1969. Documents sur le régime des terres dans la principauté de 
Morée au XIV siècle, Paris-The Hague  
Lopez, S. 1934. 'Il principio della guerra veneto-turca nel 1463', in Archivio Veneto 15, 45-
131. 
Luttrell, A. 1970. 'Aldobrando Baroncelli in Greece 1378-1382', in Orientalia Christiana 
Periodica 36,  273-300 
Luttrell, A. 1975. 'The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1306-1421', in K.M. Setton (ed.) A History of 
the Crusades 3, Madison 278-313 
Luttrell, A. 1999. 'Interessi fiorentini nell’economia e nella politica dei Cavalieri Ospedalieri 
di Rodi nel Trecento', in The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece, and the West 1291-
1440 8, 317-326 
Luzzatti, M. 1964-1966. 'Filippo dei Medici Arcivescovo di Pisa e la visita pastorale del 
1462-1463', in Bolletino storico Pisano 33-35, 361-408 
Luzzatto, G. 1995. Storia economica di Venezia dall’XI al XVI secolo, Venice 
   
 
  569 
 
Mallett, M. E. 1967. The Florentine Galleys in the 15th Century, Oxford 
Mallett, M.E., Hale, J.R. 1984. The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice C. 
1400 to 1617, Cambridge 
Mallett, M. E. 2001. 'Italian Renaissance Diplomacy', in Diplomacy & Statecraft 12, 61-70 
Margaroli, P. 1992. Diplomazia e stati rinascimentali. Le ambascerie sforzesche fino alla 
conclusione della Lega italica (1450-1455), Florence 
Mallett, M. E. 2003. 'Venezia, i Turchi e il Papato dopo la pace di Lodi' , in Il sogno di Pio II 
e il viaggio da Roma a Mantova. Atti del convegno nazionale, 13-15 Aprile 2000 Mantova, 
237-246 
 
Marinescu, C. 1936. 'Contribution à l'histoire des relations économiques entre l'Empire 
byzantin, la Sicile et le royaume de Naples de 1419 à 1453', in Atti del V congresso 
internazionale di studi bizantini, 209-219 
Marinescu, C. 1994. La politique orientale d'Alfonse V d'Aragon, roi de Naples (1416-1458), 
Barcelona 
Martellozzo Forin, E. 1999. 'Conti palatini e lauree conferite per privilegio. L’esempio 
padovano del sec. XV', in Annali di Storia delle Universita italiane 3, 79-119 
Martines, L. 1959. 'La famiglia Martelli e un documento sulla vigilia del ritorno dall’esilio di 
Cosimo de’Medici (1434)', in Archivio Storico Italiano 117, 29-43 
Martines, L. 2003.  April Blood: Florence and the Plot against the Medici, London 
Marzi, D. 1910. La cancelleria della Repubblica fiorentina 1-2, Rocca San Casciano 
   
 
  570 
 
Matschke, K. 2002. 'The Late Byzantine Urban Economy, Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries', in 
Laiou, A. (ed.) The Economic History of Byzantium: From the Seventh through the Fifteenth 
Century, Washington 
Mattingly, G. 1988. Renaissance Diplomacy, Boston 
Maxson, B.J. 2014. The Humanist World of Renaissance Florence, Cambridge (MA) 
Melis, F. 1990. I mercanti italiani nell'Europa medievale e rinascimentale, Grassina  
Mergiali-Sahas, S. 2006.  'An Ultimate Wealth for Inauspicious Times: Holy Relics in 
Rescue of Manuel II Palaeologus’ Reign', in Byzantion 76, 264-275 
Mc Manus, S. 2009. 'Byzantines in the Florentine Polis: Ideology, Statecraft and Ritual 
during the Council of Florence', in Journal of the Oxford University History Society 6, 1-23  
Miller, W. 1926. Trebizond: the Last Greek Empire, New York 
Miller, W. 1921. Essays on the Latin Orient, Cambridge 
Molho, A. 1971. Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance, 1400-1433, 
Cambridge 
Monti, M. 1939. 'La spedizione in Puglia di Giorgio Castriota Scanderbeg e i feudi pugliesi 
suoi della vedova e del figlio', in Iapigia 10/3, 275-318. 
Mueller, R. 1992. 'Mercanti e imprenditori fiorentini a Venezia nel tardo medioevo', in 
Società e Storia 55, 29-60 
Najemy, J. 2006. A History of Florence, 1200-1575, Oxford 
Nauert, C. G. 1995. Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe, Cambridge 
   
 
  571 
 
Navarro Sorní, M. 2003. Calixto III Borja y Alfonso el Magnánimo frente a la cruzada, 
Valencia 
Nebbia, G. 1939. 'La lega italica del 1455. Sue vicende e rinnovazione nel 1470', in Archivio 
Storico Lombardo 65, 115-135  
Necipoğlu, N. 2009. Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins, Cambridge (NY) 
Nevi, R. (date not provided). Glass Bridges: Cross-Cultural Exchange between Florence and 
the Ottoman Empire (Master Thesis), Edinburgh  
Nicol, D. 1957. The Despotate of Epirus, Oxford 
Nicol, D. 1988. Byzantium and Venice: a Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations, 
Cambridge 
Nicol, D. 1992. The Immortal Emperor, Cambridge 
Nicol, D. 1993. The Last Centuries of Byzantium, Cambridge  
Oikonomidès, N. 1985. 'La chancellerie impériale de Byzance du 13e au 15e siècle', in  Revue 
des études byzantines 43, 167-195 
Oikonomidès, N. 1979. Hommes d’affaires grecs et latins à Constantinople (XIIIe-XVe 
siècles), Montréal 
Origone, S. 1988. 'I Toscani nel Mediterraneo: l’area bizantina, il Mar Nero', in La Toscana 
nel sec. XV: caratteri di una civiltà regionale, San Miniato, 271-285 
Origone, S. 1992. Bisanzio e Genova, Genoa 
Orvieto, P. 1969. 'Un esperto orientalista del '400: Benedetto Dei', in La Rinascita 9, 205-75 
   
 
  572 
 
Panareo, S. 1931. 'Trattative coi Turchi durante la Guerra d’Otranto (1480-81)', in Japigia 2, 
168-181 
Pardi, G. 1906. 'Borso d’Este. Duca di Ferrara', in Studi Storici 15-16 
Pastor, L. 1891. The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages: Drawn from 
the Secret Archives of the Vatican and other Original Sources; from the German 2, London 
Pastor, L. 1894. The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages: Drawn from 
the Secret Archives of the Vatican and other Original Sources; from the German 3, London 
Pastor, L. 1899. The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages: Drawn from 
the Secret Archives of the Vatican and other Original Sources; from the German 4, London 
Pertusi, A. 'The Anconitan colony in Constantinople and the Report of Its Consul, Benvenuto, 
on the Fall of the City', in Laiou, A. (ed.) Charanis Studies, New Brunswick, 199-218 
Pertusi, A. 1990. Il pensiero politico bizantino, Bologna 
Pezzolo, L. 2013. 'The Venetian Economy', in Dursteler, E. (ed.) A Companion to Venetian 
History, 1400-1797, 255-290   
Picotti, G.B. 1996. La dieta di Mantova e la politica de’ Veneziani, Trento 
Philippides, M. 2011. The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, Westfield (NJ) 
Piranesi, G. 1917. Un fiorentino in Levante, Florence 
Pisani, M. 1923. Un avventuriero del Quattrocento: la vita e le opere di Benedetto Dei, 
Naples  
   
 
  573 
 
Pissavino, P.C. 2005. 'Sistemi di potere e dinamiche istituzionali nel primo e maturo 
Quattrocento : il De Republica di Uberto Decembrio, in Vegetti, M., Pissavino, P.C. (eds.) 
Decembrio e la tradizione della Repubblica di Platone tra Medioevo e Umanesimo 
Pontieri, E. 1969. Per la storia del regno di Ferrante I d’Aragona re di Napoli. Studi e 
ricerche, Naples 
Preto, P. 1975. Venezia e i Turchi, Florence 
Robinson, A. 1888. 'The Claim of the House of Orleans to Milan', in The English Historical 
Review 3, 34-64 
Raby, J. 1987. 'Pride and Prejudice. Mehmed the Conqueror and the Italian Portrait Medal', in 
J.G. Pollard (ed.) in Italian medals (Studies in the History of Art) 21, Washington, 171-174 
Raveggi, S. 2006. L’Italia dei guelfi e dei ghibelllini, Milan 
Renouard, Y. 1942. Recherches sur les compagnies commerciales et bancaires utilisées par 
les Papes d'Avignon avant le grand schisme, Paris 
Renouard, Y. 1949.  Les hommes d'affaires italiens du Moyen Âge, Paris 
Richards, G. R. B. 1932. Florentine Merchants in the Age of the Medici, Cambridge (Mass.) 
Robin, D. 1991. Filelfo in Milan, Princeton (NJ) 
Romanin, S. 1855. Storia documentata di Venezia 4,Venice 
Ryder, A. 1990. Alfonso the Magnanimous: King of Aragon, Naples and Sicily, 1396-1458, 
Oxford 
Rubinstein, N. 1996. The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434-1494), Oxford 
   
 
  574 
 
Ruddock, A. 1951. Italian Merchants and Shipping in Southampton: 1270-1600, 
Southampton 
Runciman, S. 1965. The Fall of Constantinople 1453, Cambridge 
Santi, B. 1983. Palazzo Medici Ricciardi and the Benozzo Gozzoli Chapel, Florence 
Santoro, C. 1968. Gli Sforza, Varese 
Sapori, A. 1952. I libri degli Alberti del Giudice, Milan  
Sapori, A. 1972. La mercatura medievale, Florence 
Setton, K. 1975. Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311-1388, London  
Setton, K. 1978. The Papacy and the Levant (1274-1571), 2: The Fifteenth Century. 
Philadelphia  
Schiappoli, I. 1972. Napoli aragonese: traffici e attività marinare, Naples 
Seigel, J.E. 1966. ' “Civic Humanism” or Ciceronian Rhetoric? The Culture of Petrarch and 
Bruni', in Past and Present 34, 3-48 
Shaw, C. 2000. The Politics of Exile in Renaissance Italy, Cambridge 
Simonetta, M. 2003. 'Federico da Montefeltro contro Firenze. Retroscena inediti della 
congiura dei Pazzi' in Archivio Storico Italiano 161, 261-284 
Syros, V. 2010. 'Between Chimera and Charybdis: Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Views on 
the Political Organisation of the Italian City-States', in Journal of Early Modern History 14, 
451-504 
   
 
  575 
 
Soldani, E. 2007. 'Alfonso il Magnanimo in Italia: pacificatore o crudel tiranno? Dinamiche 
politico-economiche e organizzazione del consenso nella prima fase della guerra con Firenze 
(1447-1448)', in Archivio Storico Italiano 165, 266-324 
Squitieri, A. 1939. 'Un barone napoletano del 400. G.A. del Balzo Orsini, principe di 
Taranto', in Rinascenza salentina 7, 138-185  
Stiernon, L. 1959.  'Les origines du despotat d'Épire. À propos d'un livre récent', in  Revue 
des études byzantines 17, 90-126  
Strathern, P. 2007. The Medici: Godfathers of the Renaissance, Florence 
Tanfani, L. 1863. Acciaiuoli, Niccolò, Florence  
Tanzini, L. 2010. 'Il Magnifico e il Turco. Elementi politici, economici e culturali nelle 
relazioni tra Firenze e Impero Ottomano al tempo di Lorenzo de’ Medici', in Rivista 
dell’Istituto di Storia dell’Europa Mediterranea, 271-289 
Thiriet, F. 1959. La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age. Le développement et l’exploitation 
du domaine colonial vénitien (XIIe-XVé siècles), Paris  
Thiriet, F. 1977. Etudes sur la Romanie greco-vènitienne (Xe-XVe siècles), London 
Thiriet, F. 1978. 'La crise des trafics vénitiens au Levant dans les premières années du XVe 
siècle', in  Studi in memoria di F.Melis 3, Naples,  59-72 
Thomson, I. 1966. 'Manuel Chrysoloras and the Early Italian Renaissance', in Greek, Roman 
and Byzantine studies 7, Durham, 63-72  
Tocco, P. 2001. Niccolò Acciaiuoli : vita e politica in Italia alla metà del 14. secolo, Rome  
   
 
  576 
 
Tognetti, S. 2002. Un’industria di lusso al servizio del grande commercio: il mercato dei 
drappi serici e della seta nella Firenze del Quattrocento, Florence 
Ullman, B.L. 1963. The Humanism of Coluccio Salutati, Padua 
Ullmann, W. 1975. 'A Greek Démarche on the Eve of the Council of Florence', in Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 337-352 
Valentini, R. 1929. 'Lo stato di Braccio e la guerra aquilana nella politica di Martino V 
[1421-1424]', in Archivio della R. Società Romana di Storia Patria 52, 223-279 
Varlik, N. 2008. Disease and Empire: a History of Plague Epidemics in the Early Modern 
Ottoman Empire (1453-1600), Chicago. 
Vatin, N. 2001. 'L’affaire Djem (1481-1495)', in Vatin, N. (ed.) Les Ottomans et l’Occident, 
93-104 
Vatin, N. 1997. Sultan Djem: Un prince ottoman dans l'Europe du XVe siècle d'après deux 
sources contemporaines: Vâki`ât-i Sultân Cem, Oeuvres de Guillaume Caoursin, Ankara 
Vedovato, G. 1939. 'Note sui privilegi capitolari fiorentini del secolo XV', in Archivio Storico 
Italiano 97/1, 170-190 
Villain-Gandossi, C. 1983. La Méditerranée aux XIIe-XIVe siècles. Relations maritimes, 
diplomatiques, et commerciales, London  
Verlinden, C. 1977. L’esclavage dans l’Europe Médiévale, Gent 
Verpeaux, J. 1965. 'Les οἰκεῖοι: notes d’histoire institutionnelle et sociale'  in Revue des 
études byzantines 23, 89-99 
Viti, P. 1996. Il Concilio di Firenze 1-2, Florence 
   
 
  577 
 
Walsh, R. 2005. Charles the Bold and Italy (1467-1477), Liverpool 
Weiss, R. 1977. 'Gli inizi dello studio del Greco a Firenze', in Medieval and Humanist Greek. 
Collected Essays, 227-254 
Weiss, R. 1966.  Pisanello's Medallion of the Emperor John VIII Palaeologus, London 
Wilson, N. 1992. From Byzantium to Italy, Baltimore 
Wright, C. 2010. 'Florentine Alum Mining in the Hospitaller Islands: the Appalto of 1442', in 
Journal of Medieval History 36/2, 175-191 
Wright, C. 2014. The Gattilusio Lordship and the Aegean World 1355-1462, Leiden 
Wright, D.G., MacKay, P.A. 2007. 'When the Serenissima and the Gran Turco Made Love: 
the Peace Treaty of 1478', in Studi veneziani 53, 261-277 
Zakythinos, D. 1975. Le despotat grec de Morée, London 
Zamponi, S. 1978. Un ignoto compendio sozomeniano degli «Erotemata» di Manuele 
Crisolora, in Rinascimento 18, 251-270 
Zanfini, P. 2006. 'La pace di Lodi (1454) ', in Falcioni, A. (ed.) La signoria di Sigismondo 
Pandolfo Malatesti. 2. La politica e le imprese militari, 103-116 
Zinkeisen, J.W.1854. Geschichte de Osmanischen Reisches in Europa 2, Gotha 
Zippel, G. 1899. Il Filelfo a Firenze, Rome 
Zippel, G. 1907. 'L’Allume di Tolfa e il suo commercio', in Archivio della Reale Società 
romana di storia patria 30, 5-51 
Zorzi, A., Connell J., W. 2004. Florentine Tuscany: Structures and Practices of Power, 
Cambridge 
   
 





AA.VV. 1960- . Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Rome 
AA.VV. 1991. Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1-3, Oxford 
AA.VV. 2008. Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies, Oxford 
AA.VV. 1929-1935. Enciclopedia Italiana, Rome 
 
Prosopography 
Eubel, C. 1898-. Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi 1-6.  
Trapp, E. AA.VV(eds.) 1976-1995. Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit, 
Wien 
 
